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Preface
,[:_'_: What Does Reliability Mean?
[ _:. Systems...
_._ The word "reliability" applies to systems made up of people, machines, and written
information.
._: A system is reliable--that is, has good reliability- ;f the people who need the system candependon it over a reasonableperiod of time. People can dependon a system if itreasonably
satisfies their needs. These statementsare purposely somewhat vague because quantifying
them for any particular situation is a big task in itself.i
People,.. !
Several kinds of people are involved in a system, and they have different views of it. '
i:._ Some people rely on the system, othershelp to keep the system reliable, and still othersdo
both. Forexample, consideran automatic grocery checkout system. The people involved are
• The owners, who bought the system
• The store manager, who is responsible for the system's operation
• The clerk, who actually operates it
• The repair person, who keeps it working
• The customer, who is being waited on
Machines ....
f A system can comprise several kinds of machines. A grocery checkout system has
%_ mechanical parts, electrical parts, and electronic parts. An automobile has chemical parts
(fuel), liquid parts (hydraulic fluid for brakes), mechanical parts (engine, transmission,
wheels), electrical parts (wiring, lights), electronic parts (ignition system, radio, engine
controls), structural parts (body, frame, wheels, seats), miscellaneous parts ,!windows,
_. windshield wiper blades), and many parts that can be classified in several ways (e.g.,i
the fuel).
Written Information...
f
;_ Several kinds of written information are important to the way people rely on a system;
for example,)
• The sales literature that led the owner to buy the system
• The specifications for the system
• The detailed manufacturing drawings
• The software, programs, and procedures
_.._ * The operating instructions to the people who actually operate the system
The repair instructions to the people who keep the system runningand fix its parts when
it fails
• The supply instructions so that people know what kind of repair partsshould be made
I; :: and stocked [ ,_[ .iii "
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_ • The instructions to the machine, especially computer programs, which are so vital to
so many machines
• The inventory control to restock goods
i' Reliability...
People rely on systems
• To do useful or am_:sing things for them
• To do no unintentional harm to users, bystanders, property, or the environment
• To be reasonably economical to own and to fix
• To be safe to store or dispose of
• To accomplish their purposes without failure
What Does Reliability Engineering Mean?
Reliability engineering means do!rig special tasks while a system is being planned,
designed and develo/._l, manufactured, used, and improved. These special tasks are over
and above the usual engineering and management tasks and are needed to ensure that the
• people involved inthese usual tasks pay attentionto all important details. These tasks ensure
that the people who rely on the system will not be let down--not only when it is new,
but also as the system gets older, worn, and repeatedly fixed.
• Why Do We Need Reliability Engineering?
We, as users of technology, have always needed reliability engineering, but the separate
discipline of reliabilityengineering has developed only since the 1940's. Before the industrial
revolution mostof the reliability detail;;were handled by the individual workers for relatively
simple machines, products, and tools. But shoddy goods were produced--wheels that broke
too soon, farming implements thatwere not dependable, wood that rotted before its time.
Technology is changing rapidly. Systems are now large and complex. Companies that
: produce these systems must likewise be large and complex. In such situations, many
important details--the kinds thataffect reliability--slip by unnoticed in the press of getting
things done on time and at an affordable cost. The telephone and electric power utilities
and the military were among the first to see the need for a separate reliability discipline.
,J
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i!; Chapter 1
Introduction to Reliability
_ This perspectiveonthepast, present, and futureof reliability published papers and the number of their pages as
was prepared by Mr. Kam L. Wong. It was adapted from a measurement indexes to describe the development of reliability
r _ keynote speech he gave at the 1982 European Conference on and maintainability disciplines. This chapter does not use the
Electrotechnics. same types of indexes as the 1979 paper. Instead the rough _'
Ever s;nce the need for improved reliability in modern magnitudes of published works in reliability areas will be used
; systems was recognized, it has been difficult :o establish an to estimate the relative emphasis. Furthermore, this chapter |
identity for reliability engineering. Attempts to separate out concentrates on reliability engineering and not on the broad f_ an indep6ndent set of tasks for reliability engineering in field of reliability disciplines. When the term "reliability t{the 1950's and 1960's resulted in the development of engineering" is used, it is understood to relate to systems ,
applied statistics for reliability and a large group of tasks for engineering. To forecast for the future, we need to determine
management. However, most of these tasks are in truth not the what's and why's. If we cannot do that. then, at least, we ;_
reliabilityengineering tasks. Although much of the engineering need to establish a trend. Therefore, let us begin with what P,.
work done in the name of reliability pertains to basic design, has been done in the name of reliability engineering in the last _]
field failures in a well-designed system come ti'om defects 40 years. "q1
(flaws) that remain in the system after delive:y and not from
the basic design. Defect (flaw) control is the key to reliability, i
The traditional reliability tasks for a project are still important Era of Mechanical Designs
and should still be performed by reliability engineers. A new I
direction for system reliability engineers should be to act as Before World War II, most equipment was mechanical. A !
dynamic synthesizing feedbacks--identifying and ranking failure could usually be isolated to a rather simple part. Of
flaws and stresses, determining flaw failure mechanisms, course, mechanical systems could be complex and contain l
and explaining flaw control techniques to those responsible many interacting parts, but the difficulty in assembling such _
for
design, manufacturing, and support planning. Reliability products to sell at a reasonable price precluded building I
engineers and basic engineers must work closely together to complex systems. Therefore. one generally needed to deal only J
i "4
createa synergistic effect for achieving ever higher reliability, with r0'her simple items.
For the purpose of this chapter reliability engineering is Safety, which is closely related to reliability, was a critical i
defined as a branch of engineering devoted to preserving the factor in a piece of equipment. The key to reliable products _'
required performance of a system operating under the then was safety margins in either stress-strength, wear, or
stipulated conditions for the time period of interest within a fatigue conditions. Most of the efforts toward achieving good
set of constraints such as cost and weight. This formidable- safety margins were simply considered good engineering
sounding definition means that reliability engineering is a practices. Therefore, calling a task a reliability effort was not
e branch of engineering for making things work as advertised, meaningful. At times redundancy was used to ensure safety
--, : Such a nebulous definition has made it difficult to establish such as in multiengine aircraftand large structures. Ineffect,
an identity for reliability engineering, reliability in this era was implied in a product and was
This chapter identifies traditionalreliabilitydisciplines, The automatically expected by its users. Buyersusuallyboughtonly ! ':i
one reliability discipline excluded from this discussion is from manufacturers that were. well known for producing ,,
management. Although management is important, especially reliable products. The only quantitative measure related to !
with the contemporary awareness ot Japanese productivityand reliability and considered in equipment procurementand u_ge
the continuing quality and reliability of Ja?anese products, it was the wearout life of the equipment. After something was
is outside of the scope of this discussion. We concentrate on designed and built, the only efforts expended tbr reliability
the engineering and technical aspects of reliability. In 1979 were inspection and testing, Reliability engineering as such .!
a paper (ref. 1-1) v,, 3 published that used the number of did not exist.
! !
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Era of Electron Tubes and minimize logistic supplies, the military is nlost sensitive '
to the reliability problem.
,/, The availability of electron tubes opened the way to rapidly During the 1940's the U.S. military promulgated the joint
; increasing complexity of equipment, both in functions and Army and Navy (JAN) standards for parts _.ndestablished the
._ parts counts. By the end of World War II the state of the art Vacuum Tube Development Committee. By 1946 the airlines
t was growing much more q.,ickly in electronics than in had set upa study for the development of betterelectron tubes.
t= reliability engineering. The gap between technology and Later, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., and Cornell University did
reliability in electronic equipment was beginning to be felt by extensive analyses on defective electron tubes. About 1950,the U.S. military. Why should electr ,nic equipment present Vitro Laboratories and Bell Telephone Laboratories also
:: a greater reliabilityproblem thanearlier mechanical systems? pursued studies on failed parts, and the U.S. Department of
; First, the heart of electronic equipment then was the electron Defense established an ad hot: committee on reliability that
i:. tube. An electron tube is a complex device in itself. It is an became the Advisory Group on the Reliability of Electronic
_:_ assemblage of many small parts. Materialpurity--glass, glass Equipment (AGREE) in 1952. This group published its
_: seal, and cathode--is critical. Thus, an electron tube is not monumental report in 1957. In the meantime efforts directed
,:i highly reliable to begin with. Although it was good enough toward reliabilitymushroomed. A few of the many noteworthy :i
ill for use in a five-tube radio, the chance of failure went up activities and publications during this explosive developmentalexponentiallywhen complexity increased. Therefore, complex period are listed in table 1-1. Each entry has some significance
digital or analog electronic equipment can have low reliability, in the development of reliability engineering. _
A complex function could be performed rather easily Not reflected in table l-I are military specifications,by a piece of electronic equipment constructed by repetiti/e standards, and handbooks. Military specifications, standards,
standard assembly methods from a large number of mass- and handbooks were generated in the United States during the
produced, reasonably priced electron tubes and passive parts. 1950's, primarily to improve the understanding of reliability.
Using purely mechanical devices to perform such complex Much of the work that resulted in the publications shown in ifunctions was not economically feasible. The economics of table 1-1 was J aded by the U.S. Government. The military
production that enabled economical manufacture of complex and the Government's pushing gave birth to reliability ]
electronic equipment was also the majordriving force for low engineering, Their specifications required that various tasks _ ..i
reliability. Assume that a part will sell for a fixed price in the be done (see fig. I-1) by an independent system engineering !
marketplace. If a company can spend 10percent more money group. Whether the product had been designed in a reliable
to gain 15 percent higher production yield, the additional manner was the important question. The greater emphasis at "
spending will give the company more profit, However, if 15 that time was on the need to make products more reliable by,
percent more money will produce a yield gain of only 10 for example, reliability prediction. Reliability can be predicted
percent, it may not be profitable to spend the money. Thus, by counting parts or by analyzing part stress. Most proposed
in mass production there is a point where the company should predictions are partscount predictions to provide a model for i!
not put more money into improvingproductionyield. Although tradeoff studies, i
a quantitative relationshipbetween reliability and yield has not Various reliability efforts have bcen grouped into a number
been established, low-yield partsprobablyhave low reliability, of categories: manufacturingcontrol, design control, reliability
If the number of visible defects (flaws), which cause rejects, m,'thods, failure cause detection, finished item reliability
is high, it is logical that invisible defects will also be high. control, and flow control. Figure I-1 depicts how these cate-
Althoughthese defects are invisibleat the time of manufacture, gories have been emphasized through the years. Admittedly,
they cause failures during equipment usage, the construction of figure 1- i is rathersubjective; its purpose
Total sales was another factorthatkept manufacturersfrom is to establi_ trends,not to classifyeffortsprecisely. Note which
improving reliability; if the parts were more reliable, fewer specific quality and reliability effort emphasis is changing. " !
replacement parts would be sold. There is no fiscal incentive Bear in mind that the amount of effort expended may not be :_
to improve reliability unless the customer complains or a proportionalto theemphasis, althoughquite oPen it is the case. _
competitor's productdemonstratesmuch higher reliability for For example, wear life is always important. The decrea_ in
the same cost. From an economic viewpoint we really should the design control emphasis does not mean that wear life is
not expect the reliability of electronic equipment to improve unimportant, it only reflects that the importance of wear life ,_
unless a basic improvement in manufacturingprocess is made has been well established and that wear life has become a
at no increase in manufacturingcost, Fortunately, this does standard design control task as part of the design prucess.
happen, so thatreliabilitygenerallydoes improve with calendar
time. However, the publicusually does not wish to pay much
more for additional reliability, A spare might still be the best Era of Semiconductors , .
methodfor achieving high reliability even in critical operations i
like broadcasting, where using redundanttransmitters solve:; The invention of the transistor in 1948 opened up a new
the l_roblem.Because of their needto maintain strikecapability frontier for electronics. The simplicity of semiconducting I
! ';i
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TABLE I-I.--RECOGNIZED ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS DURING
DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD OF RELIABILITY ENGINEERING
f Date Event Date EventJuly 1949 Formation of the ProfessionalGroup on Quality May 1955 Puhticatinn,_f "SequentialLife Te_ts in Ihe
Control. ExponentialCaw." by B. Epsteinand M. Sobel
in Annals Statislics. vol. 26. '_of Mathematical
September1951 Publicationof "'A StatisticalDistributionFunction pp. 82-93
of Wide Applicability" by W. Weibull in Journal
:'_ of Applied Mechanics. vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 293-297. July 1955 Formation of the Reliability and Quality Control
Group.
July 1952 Publication of "'An Analysis of Some Failure
Data" by D.J. Davis in Journal of American August 1955 Publication of "'Systems Approach to Electconic
Statistical As_v,:iation. vol. 47. no. 258. pp. 113-150. Reliability" by W.F. Luehbertof U.S. Signal Corps.
;. August 1952 Establishment of the Advisory Group o.q Reliability September 1955 Publication of "'Handb_x,k of Preferred Circuits.
: of Electronic F..quipnlent(AGREE) hy the U.S. Navy Aer,nautical Electronic Equipment," by
' Department of Defense. National Bureau of Standards for U.S Na_,y.
Naval Weapons Dept_rtment. in Inst. Radio Eng.i - Publication of "A Survey of Current Status of the
: Electronic Reliability Problem," Rand Research Proc., vol. 44. pp. 523.-528.
Memorandum 1131. by R.R. Carhart.
October 1955 Publication of Vitro Laiv..,ramrie,_Report No 8t_.
May 1953 Publication of "'Rudiments of Good Circuit "'Techniques lbr Reliability Measurements ,rod l
Design," by N.H. Taylor. Prediction. Based on Field Failure Data." f
1956 Publication of "'Reliability Factors Ii,r Grot_nd !September 1953 Publication of "'Life Testing" by B. Epstein and
Electronic Equipment." edited by K. Hcnncy.M Sobel in Journal of American Statistical
McGraw-Hill. New York.
Association. vol. 48. no. 263. pp. 486-502.
November 1956 Publication of TRI IO0. "Reliability Stress Analysis1954 Publication of monographs on "Electron Tube Life
for Electronic Equipment." by J.A. Connor el al.
and Reliability" by M.A. Acheson. of RCA in Trans. Reliability Quality Control.
vol. PGRQC-9,
March 1954 Publication of "NEL Reliability Design Handbook"
by U.S. Navy Electronics Laboratory. June 1957 Publication of AGREE report "Reliability of Military
Electronic Equtpment'" by the Advisory Group on
_ptember 1954 Publication of "Truncated Life Tests in the
Exponential Case," by B. Epstein in Annals of Reliability of Electronic Equipment. ,_
Mathematical Statistics. vol. 23, p. 639. October 1958 Publication of Technical Relent No. 3. U.S. Nay)'.
"'Statistical Techniques in Life Testing." byNovember 1954 First national symposium on quality control and
reliability in electronics in United States. B. Epstein.
March 1955 Publication of "'RCA Reliability Program and Long September 1978 Forn,ation of the IEEE Reliabilib &vciety.
RangeObjective" by C.M. Ryerson. f
May 1955 Publicali,,n of "Electronics Reliability: l)¢finilion of I
Terms of Interest in _udy of Reliability" by G.R. II
Herd el al. of Aeronautical 'Radio. ira:., in Tran_:. [
Reliability Quality Control. vol. PGRQC-5. !
l
_ i:
_ devices held promise for muchhigher reliability. Indeed. ment. in the early 1960's integratedcircuits (IC'sl were
semiconductingdevicesultimatelyimprovedequipmentreli- inventedand now dominatethe electroni,:partsindustry.
abilitybyoneto i_,oordersof magnitudeovertheelectrontube During the 1960's reliabilitymethods gained momentum.
equivalents.By the mid-1950'strartsistorshecameavailable Designreview then became a predominantelement of
! in sufficientproduct,onquantitiesforuseinelectronicequip- reliability methods. The total reliability effort has h,,,cn
3
i !_'%
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20
I 1o I=°=' i :i
quality¢on..¢_..._..
o I I f I i I :
lg40 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Calendaryear t i
i . Figure I_-I.--Distribution of reliabilily emphasiswi|h respect to calendar year. •
;I
: increasing thro:tgh the years, as shown in figure 1-2. Again, _ 4
: classifying tasks to be called reliability engineering is an
inexact science• Do not attempt to read more than a trend .]
• indicatorin figure 1-2. The launching of Sputnik in 1957gave .-_&3
the world space programa tremendous push. The failure of
Vangua-dTV3 in the ,_n)e year and many moreU.S. satellite
failures ,n 1958 forcedthe United Statesintohigh gearto strive ] 2 -- /
tbr better reliability. Redundancy then became a life-saving _ _[ "'t
tool. Without the application of redundancy in their design, '_ 1
many satellites, spacecraft, andto a certain extent boosters
would hav fa ed. The emphasis pla ed by the U.S. ! J J L J
I Government on reliability in the 1950's and early 1960's 0
greatly improved equipment reliability. 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000Calendaryear ..
While the equipment designers and manufacturers were _
I Figure I-2.--Relative buildup of reliability effort in United States. (Related _. ,.
making equipment more reliable, so were the partssupl-liers, effortsucha,'.environmentalesting, stn:cturalndthermalanalysis, pans :tThe improvements came from better material purity, better and materials engineering, and standard quality controls are not grouped
process controls, better designs, aad new technology. One underreliability effort.)
interesting phenomenon developed in semiconductingdevice
technology when more complex devices were produced, made to relate reductions in di,- bonds, wire bonds, seal lengthPeople began tonotice thatthe reliability of semiconducting on the packages, et,'. to relia3ility improvements. But the
i devices was not inversely proportional to the complexity of improvementswere muchgreater th.',ncould be accountedfor.
; i the device, as intuition might have led them to believe. For Although =,orquantitativelyproven, the mass productionyield
ir i example, a 100-transistorIC is n_orereliable than a circuit theory mentioned earlier can be used to explain this phenom-
:i_ constructed from 100 individual transistors. Attempts were cnon. In effect, for simple devi,'es the production yield has
' I
4
!" i
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i;i reached a point where additionalcost to improve yield would During the heyday of reliability activity a small group of _-
I not bring sufficient income to increase profit. For complex engineers recognized that really improving reliability meant
! devices tighter process control (tighter in-process inspection) eliminating the source of failure. Thir; led to the calling of
,i" . pays off in profit because of the much higher rate of yield the first physics of failure symposium in 1962 (ref. 1-3).
i improvement. As was indicated,reliability is positively related Since then. much work has be.=;-_done to investigate failure
to production yield. Therefore, when the yield of more mechanisms. Papershave been presentedevery year in follow-
complex d vices is raise to approach that of simpler devices, on symposia on the subject. Also, parts screening was be-
i_ their reliability also approaches that of simpler devices. As coming a must. The issuance of MIL-STD-883 (ref. 1-4) in
['. complex devices become more reliable, more of them will be May 1968set the tone for microcircuitscreening to the present.
" used nn equipment, causing the reliability of the equipment Some real reliability engineering was being done.
:o need improvement. Before proceeding further, consider "The Tale of Two
Many books on reliability statistics were written during this Failures." A semiconductor diode developed a short. Analysis
growth era of the 1950"s and 1960's. Most of them were showed that a surge voltage was occurring occasionally that
mathematical. In effect, they were books on how to apply exceeded the breakdown voltage of the diode and was burning ',
i : statistical and probability theories to reliability work. In it up. it was a problem of stress exceeding strength. Let us
- particular, small-sample statistics was the main field of call this a type I failure. A transistor suddenly stoppedapplication. Most of these books were w, itten for applied functioning. Analysis showed that aluminum metalization
I mathematicians and not engineers. Physics uses much math, opened at an oxide step on the chip. The opening was: but applied mathematics used for physics is not physics. The accelerated by the neckdown of the metalization at the step.
_- . same reasoning applies for reliabilityengineering. Throughout This failure was caused by a manufacturing flaw. in the •
: the 1960's most of the efforts in developing reliability classical terminology this is a random failure. Let us call this
i_ _ engineering foliowed the classical method of trying to separate a type II failure. These two failure types are shown in
I : out an independent set of disciplines for reliability. In a math- figure I-3. Until now. most of the design control efforts shownematical analogy, people tried to break down the engineering in figure 1- ! have been aimed at th type I failur (i.e., stress
¢ : function into orthogonal functions ,sothat each orthogon',d term exceeding strength). Such design controls are important. For
could be dealt with individually in the hope of successfully example, much equipment still has inadequate design, such
recombining all the terms later. Through the years the as undercooling leading to overheating, even though cooling
reliability engineer provided a check on the design and process methods are well known. Designers need only to design ":
control engineers to improve the product's reliability. Like according to standard methods to provide adequate designs.
an electrical or mechanical engineer, the reliability engineer However. most equipment failures in the field bear no relation
should perform an independent systems engineering function, to the results of reasonable stress analyses during design. These
By the 1970's the implementation of reliability programs
, had become routine in developing equipment for the U.S.
Government and the military. Basically, the reliability Eloetromigration Cathode Bearing
programs ensured that certain good engineering practices were depletion wear
carried out and provided a reliable product to the customer. (a)
However, equipment still continued to fail, although at a lower
rate. Design reviews were helpful, but more was needed. With
i ' the tight funding situation, the benefits derivable from various "T"'F
_ reliability program ek'ments were questioned. This encouraged __1 /_ _,_"_ t_etal :
tailoring the reliability program to the need; that is, doing only *_%vd' • * Oxide .
-_ what gives a high return and not everything in the specification, xNN,,_xx_x'_ Metal
A way to alleviate the customer's repair cost problem was to
let the manufacturershare the burden.This led to the push Electromigration Misaligned Oxidepinhole _:
_" ' for reliability improvement warranties (RIW's). There were aroundflaw g_arwear breakdown
" many_waysof implementingRIW's. Some were simply (b)
warranties such as those on car batteries and household (a)Type I failures(a design margin problemon stress/sl¢cngth. :':ttigue.
appliances (ref. i-2). These changes were mainly changes in and v_ear).
: management emphasis; there was really no engineering tb) Type II failurc_,(a flawproblem),
_r . ' involved. Figure l-3,--Two types of failure.
t
b
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failures ,_re type II (i.e.. those caused by built-in flaws). It economic environment. Therefore, what is done to control or
has become c, ident that flaws aye what must be dealt with. eliminate flaws must be flexible. There is no point in trying
Flaws have long been recognized as the cause of early life to eliminate something that is not there. Dynamic quality '
failures.The partsscreeningpractice was developed to remove controlwill receivemore emphasis, as shown at the lower right
such flaws. Equipmentscreening performed duringthe 1960's cornerof figure 1-1 anddiscussed in appendixB, in achieving
also attests to such recognition. In the early 1970's, Ryerson reliability, since it is a task for removing flaws. Although the
used defect or flaw as a parameter in his Cost ReductionEarly investigatioe of failure physics will continue, the key now lies
:. Decision InformationT_hniques (CREDIT). In 198!, O_art in the physics of flaw failures.For visibility andease of system
_ presentedsome dataanddeveloped anequation relatingf_dures analysis, some quantitativemeasure of reliability will still bc i
_' resulting from screening to flaws (ref. 1-5), and later Wong required. The flaw theory covers both nonconstant and
extended the flaw theory to cover failures occurring during constant failure rates (ref. 1-6). The mathematical tools
the normal operating period of the system (ref. 1-6). In develorJed with the assumption of constant failure fate will no
essence, the combination of flaws and stresses cause: most Iongewbe sufficient. An analysis published in 1988 (ref. i-9)
i failures. In recognition of this fact, a large amount of en_:-e.y indi,.:at..dthe' the failure rate of electronic systems generally i _
_ i was•exerted in developing a screening technique in the late _ecre_ses wtt[ :.ystef,1age, with failure humps along the way
1970's. Two national meetings on environmental stress resemJing tt,e track of a roller coaster. It is, therefore,
= , screeningof electronic hardwarewere heldin theUnitedStates, necessary nr:w to deal with a roller-coaster curve, rather i !
in 1979 and 1981, under the sponsorship of the Institute of . than a bothtab curve, for electronic system hazard rates, t -
Environmental Sciences. The screening guidelines documents Fortunately, the advent of high-speed computers enables i
i - distributed at the 1981 meeting indicated that a number of nonstationaryfailure rate models to be dealtwith by simulation ! i!! systems experienced 20- to 90-percentreductionin field failure or MonteCarlo method,_withoutrequiringcomplicatedclosed-
_ _ rate after the addition of environmental stress screening in form mathematical expressions. A new set of mathematical i
t ! manufacturing. Reliability engineers should concentrate on tools is expected to be developed for use with the la,est
r ! flaws and stresses and leave the basic design to the designers, reliability models (ref. !-10). i
Software reliability, not shown in figure I-I, requires *:
increasing empl'msis. However, software reliability is really
a misnomer. It has an entirely different meaning from that of
New Direction hardware reliability. Software reliability is a measure of
i so,rare design adequacy. Therefore, it is a separate topicand
; The new d_.rectionin reliability engineering will be toward is discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
more realistic recognition of the causes andeffects of failures It is proposed thatnew boundariesbe defined for reliability
from *hesystem down to thc microlevel. Insteadof attempting engineering that exclude management, applied mathematics,
to operate independently, reliability engineeringshouldwork and double-checking. Not that these functions are not
interactively with other engineering functions. At the system important. In fact, they may still be performed by reliability
level, critical environmental stresses must be identified and engineers even though they are not classified as reliability
quantified. Design and manufacturing flaws, internaland ex- engineering Then, let us redefine reliability engineering in
ternal stresses, and failure mechanisms need to be classified tighter boundaries as a synthesizing function devoted to flaw
and foldedinto the overall quantitativemodel of failurecharac- control. Figure I-4 diagrams how this function interact_ with
ter_stics. The increasing emphasis on reliability physics has others. Reliability engineering would act like a filter or
bc_n bringing reliability engineering back toward the under- synthesizer feedback loop, performing the following tasks:
standing and application of basic engineering principles.
Although some work has been done, the different reliability (1) Identifying flaws and stresses and ranking them for
echnical areas have not been working together to provide a priority actions
unified methodology. For example, although thermalcycling (2) Engaging the material technologists to determine the
" has been _ecognizedas a key factor in inducing failures, MIL- flaw failur_ mechanisms
HDBK-2_7E (ref. 1-7) does nc.t take into account thermal (3) Developing flaw control techniques and feeding such
[_ cycling effects on failurerates. An attemptwas startedto bridge information back to the engineers responsible for design,' thegap betweenfailurerate, therm lcycling, and fatiguefailur manuf cture, and support planning
fatigue will still be considered in this manual, but in reference neering are stress screening regimens, failure characteristics
. to their effects on flaws rather than on the basic design, of partsand systems, effects of environmental stresseson flaws
Futureemphasis should shift as indicated in figure 1- I. In and failures, relationship of failure mechanisms such as
several reliability efforts the words "dynamic" or "tailored" electromigrationto flu- 0failures, relationshipof manufacturing
were used, signifying that flaws do not stay constant. They yield to product reliability, flaw detection methods such as
are very much human related as well as affected by the automatedIC chip inspectionand vibrationsignature monitor-
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'A bibliographyof otherusefuldocumentsonreliabilityis givenat theend
of this manual,
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Reliability Training 2 _f
1. Who has provided a large impetus toward safe and predictable products? "--_
! " A. Industry B. Universities C. Government
2. What brought on the reliability problem?
A. Use of semiconductor devices
B. Increased complexily of equipment "!.1
C. Material shortages
3. How does production yield relate to reliability?
A. There is no relationship. _!
B. High yield correlates with low reliability. !C i l it high reliability.
4. What is the theme of this course? +
A. Nothing is learned from failures. '+
B. Failures only need to be fixed.
i _ C. Each failure should be studied tO see what can be. done about it,
p :+
!;,+'
-'Answers are given at the end of this manual.
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Chapter 2
'.... Reliability Mathematics and Failure Physics
i
; Mathematics Review
' i Readers should have a good working knowledge of algebra Rule 2:
_. _ and a slight knowledge of integral and differential calculus. 1
i"_ _ However, for those who feel rusty in these subjects the follow- e-_ e '_
i: - i ing review includes solved examples for every mathematical
' manipulation used in this manual. Rule 3:
__ !' e xNotation -- = e_-y
: e y
_. : The Greeksymbol E (sigma) means "take the sumof," and Rounding Data
: the notation
• Reliability calculations are made by using failure rate data.
n If the failure rate data base is accurate to three places,
: " _ xl calculations using these datacan be made to three places. Use
i-- t should be made of the commonly accepted rule (computer's :
rule) to round the computational results to the proper
means to take the sum of the xi's from i = i to i = n.
number of significant figures. The "Mathematics Dictionary" l_
The symbol ",/x-means "take the nthroot ofx." The square (ref. 2-I) defines rounding off as
root, _, is usually written as v_ withoutthe radicand(the 2).
The Greek symbol II (pi) means "take the product of," and When the first digit dropped is less than 5, the
the notation preceding digit is not changed: when the first digit
n dropped is greater than 5 or 5 and some succeeding
II .¢_ digit is not zero, the preceding digit is increased by
i---I 1; when the firstdigit dropped is 5 and all succeeding
means to take the product of the x_'s from i = I to i = n. digits are zero, the commonly accepted rule is to
The notationx! is referred to as a factorial; it is a shorthand m _kethe preceding digit even, i.e., add I to it if it
method of writing i x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 ,'<... x x; or, in is odd, and leave it alone if it is already even.
general: x! - x(x - l)(x - 2)... (1). Howev,:r, 0! is defined
to be unity. For example, if the reliability of a system is 0.8324, 0.8316,
: or 0.8315, it would take the form 0.832, if rounded off to
-_ _ Manipulation of Exponential Functions three places, i
_ An exponential function is the Napierian base of the natural Imegration Formulas [
logarithms, •---2.71828 .... raised to some power. For
_ example, e2 is an exponential function and has the value Only the following integration formulas are used in this
i. 7.3891, This value can be calculated on most calculators, manual:
.. ,, Rules that must be followed when manipulating these
._, functions are given here. ['_x" _ = x'+_ b = b,,+..I _ a,,+
J,a n+ I a n+ I (l)
i Rule i:
i e-_dx= = + =e - (2), _ _e-,r _e-b e-e, -a e-b
• ] e "r X e y = e x+y
i:
_p -e-,Lq q e-_r _ e-'q TABLE2-1.--BINOMIALCOEFFICIENTSe-_' dx = _] = (3)a jp a n Coefficient of each term of (a + bp
Examples 1: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 il
i x2+l .1.3 0 i":; X2 d.t = --=-- ! I I
2+1 3 2 I 2 !
3 I 3 3 I
:: _ ta xZl3 (3)2-(2) 2 9-4 5 41 4 6 4 I
,_. =--[ = ----'_=- 5 I 5 10 10 5 !:_ xdr 2 2 2 2 2 6! i 6 15 20 15 6 i
7 1 7 21 35 35 21 7 !
Example 2: 8 I 8 28 56 70 56 28 s I
9 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 I
14 10 I 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 I: e-" dx = -e -r 3 ....,;, = e -3 _e-4
Example 6: I _
:.> Example 3: (" x = 2 ft
__e-2Jf I: e-S e-6 v_ 2 ft X 3 ft)(4 ft _24 ft 3 _--- 3 ft"'" e-Zr= "2 ' 2 =4 i '
Ov
--=yz= 12ft 2
,...._ Differential Formulas Ox
". i Only the following differential formulas are used in this
i manual: ., Expansion of (a + bF
d(ax----D= a (4) It will be necessary to knowhow to transform the expression '
dx (a + b)" into what is called a binomial expansion. Thistype
of problem is easily solved by using table 2-1 and recallingthat ,i a
d(ax') = nax"-I (5)
dr (n- l)(n)a,,_2b 2(a + b)" = a" + na"-Ib 4 2_
Etamples 4:
d(x) + (n - 2)(n - l)(n) a,_3b3 + . ..
--=1 3!dr
, __d(4x)=4 +n(n- l)(n-2)...(n m+ 1)
i dx m!
Examples 5: × a"-"bm + " " " + b" (7)k
i = ---2x
d(,¢ 2)
2x2-1
"_ dx Example 7:
d(4x3)= (3)4x3-I = 12X2
*_ Expand (a + b) 4. From table 2-1 with n = 4,dr
(a + b) 4 = a'* + 4a3b + 6a2b2 + 4ab 3 + b'*
Partial Derivatives
This manual uses the following partialderivative formula: Failure Physics
When most engineers think of reliability, they thinkof parts.
, Ov = #(xyz...___)= yz (6) This is understandable, since parts are the bui!ding blocks of
' ! O.q Ox products. All agree that a reliable product must have reliable
l0
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i parts. Butwould everyone agree on what makes a partreliable? of these failures, you could build a missile that would never
When asked this question, nearly all engineers would say a fail. You could do this because you could
! reliable part is one purchased according to a certain source (1) Eliminate as many ways of failure as possible I: "_'
i: controldocumentand boughtfroman approvedvendor. Unfor- (2) Eliminate as many stresses as possible I_.
[ tunately, the_ two qualifications are not always guarantees (3) Eliminate the remaining potential failures by controlling I
; of reliability, even though we would like to think that they the level of the remaining stresses
are. To illustrate, consider the following case of the qualified
li' _ clock. Sound simple? Well, it would be simple, except for one thing.
i !i A clock purchased according to PD 4600008 was procured Despite the thousands of failures observed in industry each ., ._
from an approved vendor for use in the ground supportequip- day, we still knew very little about why things fail and even
ment of a missile system and was subjected to qualification less about how to control these failures. The situation is not
tests as partof the reliability program. These tests consisted hopeless, however. Through systematicdataaccumulationand !
of high- and low-temperature, mechanical shock, temperature study, we learn more each day. This manual is a small but
shock, vibration, and humidity tests. The clocks fromthe then important part of this systematic development.
i sole-source vendor failed two of the tests: low temperature As pointed out earlier, this manual introduces some basic
and humidity. A failure analysis revealed that lubrican.+sin concepts of failurephysics. These include failure modes (how _-
the clock's mechanism froze and that the seals were not failures are revealed); failure mechanisms (what produces the _
adequate to protect the mechanism from humidity. A second failure mode); and failure stresses (what activates the failure _
approved vendor was selected. His clocks failed the high- mechanisms). It also introduces the theory and the practical " _!
temperature test. In the process the dial hands and numerals tools available for controlling failures. :_!
turned black, making readings impossible from a distance of This chapter presents some basic probability theorems in : :!
Iii i 2 feet' A third approved vend°r's clocks Passed all °f the tests preparati°n f°r a discussi°n °f the vari°us classes °f failures
except mechanical shock, which cracked two of the cases, that contribute to product unreliability.
Ironically, the fourth approved vendor's clocks, though less '
expensive, passed all the tests.
The point of this illustration is that four clocks, each Probability Theory !
designed to the same specification and procured from a
_ Fundamentals
qualified vendor, all performed differently in the same
: environments. These various failures are shown in table 2-2. Because reliability values are probabilities, every student
Why did this happen?The answer is simple. The specification of reliability disciplines should know the fundamentals of
did not include the gear lubricant or the type of coating on probability theory. Probability theory is used in chapter 3 to
the hands and numerals or the type of case material, develop models that represent exactly how failures occur in
i Many similar examples could be Cited, ranging from product-'.
requirements for glue and paint to complete assemblies and Prohablr_.lydefined.--Prohability can be defined as follows:
systems, and the key to answering these problems can best If an event can occur in A different ways, all of which are
!, be stated as follows: To know how reliable a product is or considered equally likely, and if a certain number B of these
_ how to design a reliable product, you must know how many events are considered successful or favorable, the ratio BIA
ways its parts canfail and the types and magnitude of stresses is called the probability of the event. Probability by this
:>_ that cause such failures. Think about this for a while; if you definition is also called an a priori (beforehand) probability
knew every conceivable way a missile could fail, and if you because its value is determined without experimentation, it [
knew the type and level of stress required to produce each follows that reliability predictions of the success of missile
t
TABLE2-2.--RESULTSOFQUALIFICATIONTESTSON "!
SOURCECONTROLDOCUMENTCLOCK
Vendor High Low Mechanical Temperature Vibration Humidity
temperature temperature shock shock
.._ I Fail Fa!)
2 Fail
3 Fail
4
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flights which are made before the flights occur are a priori In the coin toss example, the predicted reliability was 0.50.
reliabilities. In other words, a priori reliabilities are estimates The observed reliabilityof 0.508 indicates that the initialassump-
of what may happen, not observed facts, tions about the physics of the coin were probably correct. If, ,
After an experiment has been conducted, an a posteriori as a result of l0 000 tosses, heads turned up 90 percent of
probability or an observed reliabilitycan be defined as follows: the time, this could indicate that the coin was incorrectly [
lff(n) is the number of favorable er successful events observed assumed to be homogeneous and that, in fact, it was "loaded."
in a total number ofn trials or attempts, the relative frequency Inconsistency in the actual act of tossing the coin, a variable (
f(n)/n is called the statistical probability, the a posteriori that was no: considered in the initial assumptions, could also I"
:_ probability, the empirical probability, or the observed be indicated. Here again, even with a simple coin problem, _ , "1:
_i reliability. Note that the number of favorable eventsf(n) is it is necessary to consider all the ways the coin may "fail" i
a function of the total number of trials or attempts n. Therefore, in order to predict confidently how it will perform.
as the number of trials or attempts changes, f(n) may also Reliability ofmissiles.--ln the aerospace industry a priori
change, and consequently the statistical probability (or probabilities (reliability pred:.-tions) are calculated for missiles
observed reliability) may change, in an effort to estimate the probability of flight success.
Reliability of a coin.--Trying out this theory, consider the Inherent in the estimate are many assumptions based on the
physics of a coin. Assume it has two sides, is thin, and is made physics of the missile, such as the number of its critical parts, :i
of homogeneous material. If the coin is tossed, one of two its response to environments, and its trajectory. As in the coin
possible events may occur: heads or tails. If landing heads up problem the ultimate test of the missile's reliability prediction |
is considered more favorable than landing taii:',up, a prediction is whether or not tine,,:redictionagrees with later observations.
of success can be made by using the a priori theory. From If during flight tests the observations do not approach the i
the a priori definition, the probability of success is calculated as predictions as the number of flights increases, the initial
assumptions must be evaluated and corrected. An alternative
1 favorable event approach is to modify the missile to match the initial assump-
- 1/2, or 50 percent tions. This approach is usually pursued when the reliability
2 possible events prediction represents a level of success stated by the customer
or when the predicted value is mandatory for the missile to
This is an estimate of what should be observed if the coin is be effective. This subject of reliability predictions is discussed
tossed, but not yet an observed fact. After the coin is tossed, again in chapter 4.
however, the probability of success could be much more In practice, reliability testing yields the knowledge needed
specific as shown in table 2-3. to verify and improve initial assumptions. As.experience is "
gained, the assumptions undergo refinements that make it
TABLE2-3.--OBSERVEDPROBABILITYOF SUCCESS possible to develop more accurate reliability predictions on
new missiles and systems not yet tested or operated. This
Number of tosses, n [ I I 10 I I00[ ,0001 10000 I information also provides design engineers and management
Numberof heads with data to guide design decisions toward maximum missile
observed, f(n) 0 7 55 464 5080 or system reliability. Some reliability problems require the
Relative frequency
of probabilityof use of Bayes or Markovian probability theorems. Additional
success,.f(,,)/, 0 0.70 0.55 0.464 0.508 information on other topics is available in references 2-2 to "|
- 2-5 and in IEEE Reliability Society publications and other
documents listed in the reference sections for chapters 3 to
The table shows two important phenomena: 9 and in the bibliography at the end of this manual.
(1) As the number of trials changes, the number of favorable .
- ! events observed also changes. An observed probability of Probability Theorems
', success (or observed reliability) may also change with each
I additional trial. The three probability theorems presented here are
-" (2) If the assumptions made in calculating the a priori fundamental and easy to understand. In these theorems and
probability (reliability prediction) are correct, the a posteriori examples the probability of success (reliability) is represented !
(observed) probability will approach the predicted probability with an R and the probability of failure (unreliability) with :i
as the number of trials increases. Mathematically, the relative a Q. The tbllowing section (Concept of Reliability) examines ii
• frequency f(n)/n approaches the a priori probability B/A as what contributes to the reliability and unreliability of products. _l
the number of trials n increases, or Theorem /.--If the probability of success is R, the 7
probability of failure Q is equal to I - R. in other words, the
probability that all possible events will occur is Q + R = 1. 1.
• i nlimc* f(n) _- B_ Example 1: if the probability of a missile flight success is' n
! - n A 0,81, the probability of flight failure is 1 -0.81 =0.19. "I
g
_'" _
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Therefore, the probability that the flight will succeed or fail Qj first countdown fails "_
is 0.19 + 0.81 = 1.0. RtQ2 first countdown succeeds and second fails
Theorem Z--If Ri is the probability that a first event will RtR 2 both countdowns succeed "t,ccur and R2 is the probability that a second independent
event will occur, the probability that both events will occur From theorem 3 the probability that one of the three events
is RIR 2. A similar statement can be made for more than two will occur is
independent events.
Example 2: lfthe probability of completing one countdown Q_ + R_Q,. + R_Rz
without a failure RI is 0.9. the probability of completing two
countdowns without failure is RIR2 = (0.9)(0.9) = 0.81. The But because these three events represent all possible events
probability that at least one of the two countdowns will fail that can occur, their sum equals 1 (from theorem 1). Therefore,
is l -RiR z = I -0.81 =G.19 (from theorem l). We say
that at least one will fail because the unreliability term Q QI + RIQz + RiRz = 1
includes all possible failure modes, which in this case is two:
one or both countdowns fail. The probability of completing both countdowns without one
Example 3" If the probability of failure Qi during one failure RIR2 is the solution to the proposed problem;
countdown is 0.1, the probability of failure during two therefore,
countdowns is QIQ2 = (0.1)(0.1) = 0.01. Therefore, the
probability that at least one countdown will succeed is RiRz = 1- (RtQ_ + QO
I - QiQz = 1 - 0.Ol = 0.99. we say that at least one will
succeed because the value 0.99 includes the probability of one If Rt = 0.9, QI = 0.1, R2 = 0.9, and Qz = 0.1 then
countdown succeeding and the probabilityof both countdowns
succeeding. RIR2:= 1 - [(0.9)(0.1) + 0. ll I
Example 4: If the probability of completing one countdown 4without failure RI is 0.9 and the probability of a second = 1-(0.09 + 0.1)= 1 -0.19 = 0.81 -countdown failing is Q2 -- 0.1, the probability that the first
will succeed and the second fail is RjQ z = (0.9)(0.1) = 0.09. which agrees with the answer found in example 2 by using :i
Theorem 3.--If the probability that one event will occur is theorem 2. The expression for RiRz can also be written i
RI and the probability that a second event will occur is Rz and
if not more than one of the events can occur (i.e.. the events RIR2 = ! - (RIQ, + Q0 = 1 - I(1 - Qt)Q2 + QII
are mutually exclusive), the probability that either the first or
second event, not both, will occur is Rt -;-R_. A similar = I - (Q, + Q, - Qi Q2) _
theorem can be stated for more than two events.
which is the usual form given for the probability of both events
i_ Example 5 (true event method): Consider now the proba- succeeding. Note, however, that in this expression, the event
i bility of completing two countdowns without a failure. Let the indicated by QtQ2 (both countdowns fail) is not a true pos-
: probabilities of success for the first and second countdowns
'. sible event, because we stipulated in the problem that only one
be R I and Rz and the probabilities of failure be Qt and Q,_. countdown could fail. The term QtQz is only a mathematical
In order to solve the problem using theorem 3, it is best to event with no relation to observable e,,ents. In other words.
diagram the possible events as shown in figure 2-1. The if the first countdown fails, we have lost our game with chance.
mutually exclusive events are E_ample 6 (mathematical event method): Now consider the _ ]
same problem as in example 5, ignoring for the time being
:J
Total the restriction on the number of failures allowed. In this case " .'t
possible the diagram of the possible events looks like that shown iv
events figure 2-2. In this case the mutually exclusive events are '!_
; I -Ic.oun___ R,R, R, Q2 first countdown succeeds and second failsQ_R_. first countdown fails and second succeeds ":!
Falls(O2) R102 QtQ'. both countdowns fail _== ",.;
Keep in mind that in this example both countdc_wnsmay fail. i
Falls(O1) From theorem 3 the probability that one of the four events '
= Ot i
will occur is
Figure 2-I.-Diagram of possible events--probability of comp;'_ting two
• . countdowns without a failure. RIR2 + RtQ2 + Q,Rz + QoQz
:i
• i
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{Total Reliability as Probability of Success _l
possible
events Theclassicaldefinitionof reliabilityisgenerallyexpressed
as follows: Reliability is the probability that a device will .,.I
I JF [I operate successfull_' for a specified period of time and under _
First ucceeds(R0 Second Succeeds(R_ R1R2 . ,
countdown = countdown specified conditions when used in the manner and for the
] i purpose intended. This definition has many implications. The
first is thatwhen we say ihat reliability is a probability, we i
I
Fails(01) Fails(02) = R1Q2 mean that reliability is a variable, not an absolutevalue. :
Therefore, if a device is 90 percent reliable, there is a 10 ', "11
SecondISucceeds R2 percent chance that it will fail. And because the failure is acountdownr *- 01R2 chance, it may or may not occur. As in the coin ex mple, as
more and more of the devices are tested or operated, the ratioFails(02) of total successto total attemptsshouldapproachthe stated
"_ 0102 reliability of 90 percent. The next implication concerns
Figure2-2.--Diagramofpossibleevents--numberoffailuresnotrestricted. the statement "... will operate successfully..." This
means that failures that keep the device from performing its
intended mission will not occur. From this comes a more
Again, because the four events represent all possible e,vents general definition of reliability: that it is the probability
that can occur, their sum equals unity (from theorem 1); that is, of success.
: It should be obvious then that a definition of what constitutes
RIR2 + RIQ2 + QjRz + QIQ2 = 1 the success of a device or a system is necessary before a
statement of its reliability is possible. One definition of success
Solving for the probability thatboth countdowns will succeed i; for a missile flight might be that the missile leaves the
launching pad. Another, that the missile hits the target. Either
RiR2 = 1 - (R=Q2 + QiR2 + QIQ2) way, a probabilityof success, or reliability, can be determined,
but it will not be the same for each definition of success. The
Substituting 1 - QI for RI and 1 - Qz for Rz on the righ,,side importance of defining success cannot be overemphasized. ..,
of the equation gives the answer given in example 5: Without it a contractor and a customer will never reach an
agreement on whether or not a device has met its reliability
RIRz = l - [(l - QI)Q2 + Ql( l - Qz) + QIQ2J requirements (i.e., the mission).
The latter part of the classical definition indicates that a
= I - (Q2 - QoQ2+ QI - QJQ2 + QIQ;) definition of success must specify the operating time, the
= 1 - (Q, + Qz - QiQz) operating conditions, and the intended use. Operating time is
defined as the time period in which the device is expected to
This countdown problem has been solved in two ways to meet its reliability requirements. The time period may be
acquaint you with both the true event method and the mathe- expressed in seconds, minutes, hours, years, or an)' other unit
matical event method of determining probabilitydiagrams. The of time. Operating conditions are defined as the environment
exercises at the end of this chapter may be solved by using in which the device is expected to operate; they specify the "t
whichever method you prefer. Because these exercises will electrical, mechanical, and environmental levels of operation
be helpful to you in gaining a working knowledge of the three and their durations. Intended use is defined as the purpose of
theorems presented, we suggest that you work the problems the device and the manner in which it will be used. For
before continuing to the next section, example, a missile designed to hit targets 1000 miles away
. _ should notbe considered unreliable if it fails to hit targets 1100
: miles away. Similarly, a set of ground checkout equipment
' Concept of Reliability designed to be 90 percent reliable for a l-hour tactical
•-.; countdown should not be consideredunreliable if it failsduring
Now that you have an understanding of the concepts of 10consecutive countdowns or training exercises. The proba-
probabilitya_,dfailure physics, you are ready to consider the bility of success in this case is (0.9)l0 = 0.35 (from probability
concept of reliability. First, the most common definition of theorem 2).
reliability--in terms of successful operation of a device--is In addition to these specified requirelr,ents, we must also
discussed. That definition, to fit the general theme of this consider other factors. As explained in the inherent product
: manual, is then modified to consider reliability in terms of reliability section of this chapter, these areas have a marked
i th= absence of failure modes, effect on the reliability of any device.
.
i
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Reliability as Absence of Failure Inherent product reliability.--The next step is to consider
the inherent reliability of a product. Try to think of the
Although the classical definition of reliability is adequate expression P,PtP,, as representing the potential reliability of
for most purposes, we are going to mcdi_ it somewhat and a product as described by the product's documentation. Or
examine reliability from a slightly different viewpoint, to put it another way, let it represent the reliability inherent
Consider this definition: Reliabifity is the probability that the in the design drawings insteadof the reliabilityof the manufac-
critical failure modes of a device will not occur during a tured hardware. This inherent reliability is predicated upon :_
specified period of time and under specified conditions when the decisions and actions of many people. If they should
used in the manner and for the purpose intended. Essentially, change, the inherent reliability could change.
this modification replaces the words "a device will operate If the inherent reliabilityof the design is denoted by Ri, then
successfully" with the words "critical failure modes.., will
not occur." This means that if all the possible failure modes Ri = P,P,P,.
of a device (ways the device can fail) and their probabilities
of occurrence are known, the probability of success (or the Why do we consider inherentreliability?Because the facts of
reliability of a device) can be stated. It can be statedin terms failure are these: When a design comes off the drawing board,
, of the probability that those failure modes critical to the per- the partsand materialshave bee1 selected; the tolerance, error,
formance of the device will not occur. Just as we needed a stress, and other performan,:e analyses have been performed;
clear definition of success when using the classical definition, the type of packagingis firm; the manufacturing processes and
we must also have a clear definition of failure when using the fabrication techniques have been decided; and usually the test
modified definition, methods and the quality acceptance criteria have been selected.
As an example, assu::e that a resisto_ ba._only two failure At this point the designdocumentation representssome potential
_* modes: it can open or it can short. If the probability that the reliability that can never be increasedexcept by a design change
resistor will not short is 0.99 and the probability that it will or good maintenance. However, the possibility exists that the
not open is 0.9, the reliability of the resistor (or the probability actual reliability observed when the documentation is trans-
that the resistor will not short or open) is given by formed into hardware will be much less than the potential
" reiiabilky of the design. To understand why this is true,
Rresistor = Probability of no opens x Probability of no shorts consider the hardware as a black box with a hole in both the
-- 0.9 x 0.99 = 0.89 top and the bottom, Inside the box are potential failures that
limit the inherent reliability of the design. When the hardwareNote that we have multiplied the probabilities. Probability
theorem 2 therefore requires that the open-failure-mode is operated, these potential failures fall out the bottom (i.e.,
probabilityand the short-failure-modeprobability be independ- operating failures are observed). The rate atwhich the failures
fall out depends on how the box or hardware is operated.ent of each oth¢;. This condition is satisfied because an open
failure mode cannot occur simultaneously with a short mode. Unfortunately, we never have just the inherent failures to
worry about because other types of failures are being added
- Product .Application to t_:_"box through the hole in the top. These other failures
are generated by the manufacturing, quality, and logistics
This section relates reliability (or the probabilityof success) functions, by the user or customer, and even by the reliability
to product failures, organization itself. We discuss these added failures and their
Product failure modes.--In general, critical equipment contributors in the following paragraphs but it is important
failures may be classified as catastrophic part failures, to understandthat, because oftheadded failures, the observed i
tolerance failures, and wearout failures. The expression for failures will be greater than the inherent failures of the design. 1
reliability then becomes
R = P_P,P,. K Factors . _.
where The othercontributorsto productfailurepreviouslymentioned
are called K factors: they have a value between 0 and 1, and
i Pc probability that catastrophicpart failures will not occur modify the inherent reliability as follows:
P, probability that tolerance failures will not occur
Pw probability that wearout failures will not occur Rpn_duct= Ri(KcKmK, K_K,)
As in the resistor example these probabilities are multiplied
together. This means they are col,siderealto be iadependent where
of each other, but this may not always be true because an out- Kq probability that quality test methods and acceptance
of-tolerance failure, for example, may evolve into or result criteria will not degrade the inherent reliability. An
from a catastrophic part failure. Nevertheless. in this manual exampleof K¢ is the situationin which the quality control
they are considered independent and exceptions are pointed engineer accepts a defective part that later shows up as
out as required, a field failure and is counted against product reliability.
15
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K,, probability that manufacturing processes and fabrication a product_,ndthe achievement of reliabilitygrowth during the
and assembly techniques will not degrade the inherent build, use, and test phases are of major concern to many
reliability. Examples of K,,, would be cold-soldered reliability engineers.
joints, poor lamination of multilaycr printed circuit [_J
boards, and loose fittings in plumbing installations that
can show up as field failures. Concluding Remarks
Kr probability that activities performed by the reliability
engineer will not degrade the inherent reliability. An Chapter 2 has explained two principal concepts:
example of K, would be an inaccurate test analysis that (1) To design a reliable product or to improve a product, "t
forces a design change which degrades rather than you must understand first how the product can fail and then l:
improves the hardware performance. how to control the occurrence of those failures.
g. probability that logistics activities will not degrade the (2) There is an upper limit on how reliable a product can "i!
:nherent reliability. An example of Kf would be an be when a certain traditional way of design and fabrication .
inaccurate procedurein a repairmanual that, if followed, is used. That limit is the inherent reliability. Therefore, the
would create more failures than it fixes. ,_ost effective reliability engineer is the designer because all
t?.¢designer's decisions directlyaffect the product's reliability,
K,, probability that the user or customer will not degrade the The three probability theorems were also illustrated in this
inherent reliability. Examples of K, are operator errors chapter.
that cause a field failure b_cause correct operating
procedures are not followed. This factor has been
observed to be quite largefor many systems. In one missile
system, 11 out of every 100 countdowns were aborted References
because of operator errors (i.e,, K_ = 0.89). 2-1..lames. G.: MathematicsDictionary.FourthEdition.VanNostrand
There are many other K factors, butthese are the main ones. Reinhold,1976.
Even if each K factor could be made equal to unity (which, 2-2. Bazousky,l.: ReliabilityTheoryandPractice.PrenticeHall.t961.
of course, is the goal), we would still be left with R;, the 2-3. Earles.D.R.;andEddins,U.F.: ReliabilityPhysics.The Physicsof
Failure.AVCOCorp..Wilmington.MA.1962. • .!
inherent reliability of the design. It is also clear that any one 2-4. Calahro.S.: Reliability Principles andPractices.McGraw-Hill.1962.
of the factors can cause the product reliability to go to zero. 2-s. ElectronicReliability Design Handbook.MIL-HDBK-33g.Vols. I
The achievement of inherent reliability during production of and2. Oct. 1988.
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Reliability Training I',
la. What notation means to take the sum of the xi's from i = 1 to i = n?
f, °A. _ x's B. xk c. _x_
i= i i= 1
//
i lb. Ifx= 100, xl = 90, x2 -- 70, and x3 -----50, what is _ (x- Xi)2? ;
: i=I
,/
A. 350 B. 35xi02 C. 35 000
2a. What notation means to take the n th root of x?
, A. x" B. e" C. "4x"
_ . :
. 2b. Ifx = 100, x I = 90, x2 = 70, and x3 = 50, what is (x - xi)2?
,. i A. 3.6 B. 59.2 C. 640
3a. What notation means to ,_&e the product of the x i's from i = 1 to n?
fl
" A. IIx's B. IIxk C. I'I xl
i=0 i=1
• 3
3b. If x, = 0.9, x2 = 0.99, and x3 = 0.999, what is 1"I x, ?
r. •
i=1
-_ A. 0.890 B. 0.800 C, 0.991
4a. The notation x! refers to what shorthand method of writing?
A. Poles B. Factorial C. Poiynomials
4b. What does 10!/8! equal?
A. 800 B. 900 C. 90 ]
4
5a. Describe the three rules for manipulation of exponeatial functions.
i. Products
A. Substract exponents B. Add exponents C. Multiply exponents
ii. Negative exponent
A. Cancel exponents B. Balance exponents C. I/Expoqent
:- iii. Division
A. Add exponents B. Subtract exponents C. Multiply exponents
i 5b. Simplify, ese31e4.
, ,,._, A. Ez B. e4 C. e5
6. What is the integral of the following functions?
" I J2 jf_l._ a. dx
" _ JJfl
A. x414 B. x4141x2 C. [(x2)'t - (x,)'t]/4o
, JAnswersareSlvt'n at the end of this manual,
.i I
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" i•.X_
i ['.... -"1 - "
_ A. -e-'_'la B. e - _ la C. -e "'la Io
il
_ 7. What is the derivative of the following functions?
:._ a. IOx 4
_ A, 4.0x 2 B. 40x 3 C. 10x 3 i it
:i b. e_ '
i! A. (z, B. (z_12 C. 2(2J
_. 8a.Writethefirsttwo termsofthebinomialexpansion(a+ b),.
A. an+ (n- l)a"-Ub+ ... B. an- na"-ib+... c. an+ nan-tb+. •. '
8b.Expand(a+ b)3by usingtable2-_.. i1A. a 3 + 2a2b + b 3 B. a 3 - 3a2b - 3ab 2+b 3 C. a 3+3a2b ,4 T 2+ b 3
• : 9. What needs to be done to design a reliable product?
• A. Test and fix it )
B. Know how its parts fail
C. Know the type and magnitude of stresses that cause such failures
D. Both B and C
10. What are a priori reliabilities estimates of?.
A. What may happen B. What will happen C. What has happened
11. What are a posteriori reliabilities observing?
A. What m._y happen B. What has happened C. What will happen
12. If the probability of success is R, what is the probability of failure Q?
A. I+R B. I-R 2 C. I-R
13. If Rn, R2, and R3are the probabilities that three independent events will occur, what is the i: oo,-_ility
that all three will occur?
3
A. Ri + R2 + R3 B. RI(R2 + R3) C. H Ri
14. If R u, R2, and R3 are the probabilities that three independent events will occur and not more than one
of the events can occur, what is the probability that one of these events will occur?
3
A, RIR2R3 B. R3(RI +R 2) C, _ RI
/=l
:°-* ]
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15. What do we need to know if a device is to perform with classical reliability? : ,_
A. Operating time and conditions
B. How it will be used \
C. The intended purpose
_':: D. All of the above
_:i 16. What do we need to know if a device is to perform with reliability defined as the absence of failure? _ -
_'i A. Critical failure modes
"__ B. Operating time and coJlditions
t i C. How it will be used
D. The intended purpose
E. All of the above '
17. What is the inherent reliability Ri of the product you are working on?
ti A. Pr (the probability that catastrophic part failures will not occur)
_ _ B. Pr (the probability that tolerance failures will not occur)
i: i C. Pw (the probability that wearout failures will not occur) :_
i i D. The product of all of the above
18. What is the reliability of your product?
_._ A. Kq (the probability that quality test methods will not degrade Ri)
. B. K,, (the probability that manufacturing processes will not degrade R_)
_ C. K_ (the probability that reliability activities will not degrade R_)
D. Kr (the probability that logistic activities will not degrade Ri)
E. K_ (the probabiliW that the user will not degrade R_) "
F. The product of all of the above and R_
1
i'
t
l
Chapter 3
- Exponential Distribution and Reliability Models
An expression for the inherent reliability of a product was X .(failure rate) = I0 failures/hour
given in chapter 2 as (ref. 3-1) t (opeaning time) = 0.0! hour
. Ri = PcPtP,. x (observed failures) = 0, I, and 2
The probability of observing no failures P(0, 0.01) is then
where
Pc probabilitythat catastrophic part failures will not occur P(O, 0.01) = (10 x 0.01) ° e -_l°x°'°t_
Pt probability that tolerance failures will not occur 0!
P,. probability that wearout fait.,:reswill not occur I × e -c'l
' - -- = e -°'! = 0.905
In chapter 3, we discuss the term P_ and develop and explain ! _iits mathematical representation in detail. We then use the
probability theorems to establish memods of writing and The pzobability of observing one failure P(I. 0.01) is
solving equations for product reliability in terms of series ar:J J
redundantelements.
P(i, 0.01)= (10 X 0.01) I e -It°x°'°h L
ExponentialDistribution
_ (0.1) I e -o-I
=0.I ×0.905 = 0.091
To understand what is meant by exponential distribution, I
first examine a statistical function called the Poisson
distribution. This distribution is expressed as (ref. 3-2) The probability of observing two failures P(2.0.01) is
P(x,t) - (Xt)'Ve-----_ (10 x O,Ol)2 e -(;OxO'OI}
x! P(2, 0.01) = 2! _
where _ (0.1) 2 e -°'t = 0.01 x 0.905
,i
average failure rate 2 x I 2 .
t operating time 0,00905
= _ = 0.0045 _!_
x observed nuNber of failures 2
Thisdistributionstates that if an observed average failure rate
,_ is known for a device, it is possible to calculate the Remember that the definition of Pc is the proL,ability that
I probabilityP(x,t)ofobservingx = 0,1,2,3 ..... numberof no catastrophic failures will occur. So for the computer
failures when the device is operated for any period of time t. P,. -- P(0, 0.01) =0.905. in other words, there is a 90.5-
To illustrate, con_ider a computer that has been observed percentchance thatno arithmetic errors will occur during the
to make [0 arithmeticerrors(or catastrophicfailures) for every 0.01-hour program. This is the reliability of thecomputer for
hour of operativa. Suppose we want to know the probability that particularprogram.
of observing 0, I, and 2 failuresduringa 0.01-hour program. Again the Poisson distribution for x = 0 (i.e,, no observed
From the data given, then failures) is = :
._ ........ -' • ....... _-•'_ _ _ "-........ : ....... _;__.... '.... 7_F_"""__- .'_:? '" . •. . • ..... 1
r:
_r
P(O. t) (Xt)° e - _ part. Forexample,s_pposea contractoruses I million integrated= = e -_ circuits in a computer. Over a periodoffing she may observe0_
an average of one circuit failure every 100 operating hours.
The term e -xt is called the exponential distributionand is the Even though she knows the failure rate, she cannot say which .,,
form of P,.. Consequently. for a device that has an one of the million circuits will fail. All she knows is that, on ]simplest
average failure rate g the probabilityofob_rving no failures the average, one will fail every 100 hours. In fact, ifa failed
|
for a period of time t is (ref. 3-3) circuit is replaced with a new one, the new one. theoretically, ,has the same probability of failure as any other circuit in the :
P,. = ex_ computer, in addition, if the contractor performs a failure
:t analysis on each oftbe failed circuits, she may find that every i
The exp_ssion for inherent reliability now takes the form failure is caused by the same mechanism, such as poorlywelded joints. Unless she takes some appropriate corrective ._
_)
_! Ri = e-X'P,P,,, action, she will continue to observe the same random fai!ures _
_ even though she knows the failure cause.
_i A catastrophic failure is an electrical open "_rshort, a
i _ or in the more general expression for total product reliability mechanicalinitialor structuraitolerancedefect,or an extreme deviatiOnresistorfrOm :_
_ R = e-X'PtPw(KqK,,K,K_K_) an setting or (a 5-percent-tolerancethatdeviated_yond its end-of-life tolerance, say to 20 percent,
would be considered to have failed catastrophically).At this point it is probably a good idea to digress for a The latter portionof the failure rate definition refers to the
moment to explain why these expressions for reliability may circumstance under which a failure is revealed. If a potential _
ii differ from those used elsewhere. During the conceptual and operating failure is corrected by a maintenancefunction, such
_; early research and development phases of a program, it is as scheduled preventive maintenance, where an out-of-
common practice(and sometimes necessary because of a lack
of information) to assume that Pt = ! (the design is perfect), tolerance part could be replaced, that replacement cannot be
,_ represented by X because it did not cause an operating or
[_ that P, = ! (no wearout failures will occur), and that the K unscheduled failure. Here we see one of the many variablesi_ factors all equal 1 (there will be no degradation of inherent ,_
reliability). These assumptions reduce the inherent reliability that affect the operating failure rate of a product: the main-
:: tenance philosophy. ,
i and product reliability expressionsto
Ri = R = e- x, Failure Rate INmensions M
Failure rate has the dimeI_,sionof failure per unit of time,
Frequently.these assumptionsare not realisticand the resultant where the time is usually expressed in 10_ hours or cycles. "
reliability predictions areusually high. They may bear little Some Government documents express _, in percent failures
resemblanceto the reliabilityfinallyobserved when the product per l0 3 hours. Table 3-I shows the most common usage.
is tested. Later in this manual we will let Generally. the form that allows calculations using whole
numbers, rather than decimal fractions, is chosen.
pc=R=e -xl
"Bathtub Curve" ;'
to keep the notation simple. In t:]e Poisson distribution, ), was referredto as an average
On the other hand. "'iN8JsocorrllTiOf_to use e -kt tOrepresent failure rate, indicating that _, may be a function of time _,(t).
the observed product reliability. In this case the observed
average failure rate _ represents the combination of all types TABLE3-1.--COMMONFAILURERATE
_ of failures including catastrophic, tolerance, a_d wearout. If DIMENSIONS
_ the total product failure rate is _', then
Failures/hour, Failures/ Failures/
R = e-x', = e-_p,p,.(KqK,,,g, KeK,,) percent 10¢'hours 109hours
P* 10.0 100.0 I00 000.0
• Failure Rate Definition I.O 10.0 _00oo.0
. I 1.0 I 000.0
,- The failure rate X as used in the exponential distribution .0t .I 10o.0
e-_ represents random catastrophic part failures that occur .OOl .01 io.0
in so short a time that they cannot be prevented by scheduled .00Ol .001 1.0
• maintenance(ref. 3-4). Random means thatthe failuresoccur .00001 .t_Ol .I ,
" randondyin time (not necessarily from randomcauses as many ,0000oI .0000l .01
,0000001 ,000001 ,001
• i people interpret random failure) ,rod randomly from part to
iI
_ -"_ "_I
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eliminated. The interval from tj to t, represents the useful "
A operating life of the equipment and is generally consideredto have a constant failure rate. it is during this time that the "_
i expression P, = e -_ is used. Therefore, when using e -_,
we assume that the ._ystem has been properly debugged. In
practice )his assumption may not be trite, but we may still
obtain an adequate pictureof the expected operatingreliability
by accepting the assumption. The interval from t2 to t3
B represents the wearout period, during which age and de-
terioration cause the failure rate to increase and render the
system inoperative or extremely inefficient and costly to
Figure 3-l.--Failure rate turves, maintain.
The following analogy should help summarize the concepts
Figure 3-1 shows three general curves representing X(t) of failure and failure rate: A company picnic is planned to
possibilities. Curve A shows thatas operating time increases, be held on the edge of a high cliff. Because families _,.';iIbe
_ failure rate also increases. This type of failure rate is found invited, there will be various types of people involve,!: large,
:i where wearoutor age is a dominant failure mode stress (e.g., small, young, and old, each type with its own personality and
slippedclutchesor tires). Curve B shows thatas operatingtime problems. Picnic officials are worried aboutthe possibility of
: : increases, the failure ratedecreases. This type of failure rate someone falling over the cliff. The question is, What can be
-, has been observed in some electronic parts, especially semi- done about it? Four possible solutions are presented:
' conductors. Curve C shows that as operating time increases, (i) Move the picnic fartherback from the cliff. The farther
the failure rateremainsconstant. This type of failure rate has back the picnic, the less the chance that someone will walk
, been observed in many complex systems and subsystems. In as far as the cliff and fall over.
a complex system (i.e., a system with a large numberof parts) (2) Keep the picnic short. The shorter the picnic, the less I7.
partshaving decreasing failure rates reduce the effect of those time anyone has to walk to the cliff.
having increasing failure rates. The net result is an observed (3) Look over the cliff to see if anyone has fallen. This is
near-constantfailureratefor the system. Therefore, part failure a good idea because they would know when to call the :,
" ratesare usually given as a constant, although in reality they ambulance--but it hardly helps to keep others from falling.
may not be. This manual deals only with constant part failure It is possible, however, that if they go to the bottom of the
rates because they are related to system operation. Even if the cliff to _ WhOhas fallen over. they might observe thatevery
failure rates might be changing over a period of time, the 15 minutes one person over the age of 99 falls over the cliff.
constant-failure-rate approximation is used. Knowing this, all persons over 99 could be sent home and the
If the failure ratefor a typical system or complex subsystem picnic could be saved from further tragedy.
is plotted against operating life, a curve such as that shown (4) Finally, they could build a high fence to separate the
in figure 3-2 results. The curve is commonly referred to as cliff from the picr,ic. Obviously, this i_ the best solution,
a "bathtub" curve. The lime to represents the time at which because it is doubtful that anyone would climb the fencejust
the system is first put together. The interval from to to tt to get to the cliff.
! represents a period during which assembly errors, defective Now, let us look at the analogy of this picnic-to-failure rate.
i parts, and compatibility problems are found and corrected. Say thatwe are building a system (picnic) made of many parts
As shown, the system failure rate decreases during this (people) and thatthere are many typesof parts: some are large, i
debugging, or burn-in, interval as these gross errors are some small, and some new and untried, such as integrated
rt " circuits. Some of these parts, the composition resistors for .
' IDetmggin01 Intrinsic)htilure I WearoutI instance, are old and mature. Each parthas itsown per_nality :
i } (the way it was fabricated). Ourproblem is how to keep these
_ _. parts from failing (falling over the cliff). And a_ain we have
' _ li'_ Y I four possible solutions: i ii
i_ | I I (!) Reduce the stresses on the parts (move the picnic back ,
, from the cliff): the lower the stresses, the fewer the failures.
I I I I (2) Keep the operating time (the picnic) short: the shorter ,I I I I the operating time, the less chance a part has to fail. i
: I I I I (3) Establish part failure rates (look over the cliff to see
: to t1 t;_ ta if anyone has fallen), butthisonly helps if we know whatparts )
Time (people) are failing. Once we know this, we can eliminatetho_
i Figure 3-2,--Failure rate versus operating 6,.¢. parts from our system, i
t
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(4) Eliminate the failure mechanisms of the part (build a Note that when the failures were observed is not indicated. _'1
fence to separate the cliff from the picnic). This is the best The assumption of a constant failure rate leads to a constant
answer, of course, because if we eliminate the cause of part time between failures, or MTBF.
failures, we cannot have any system failures. "
Calculations of Pc for Single Devices !,Mean Time Between Failures
If a failure rate for a device is known, the probability of I
For theexponential distributionthe reciprocal of failure rate observing no failures tbr any operating period t can be ':
...-
is called the mean time between failures (MTBF) and is the calculated.
integral of the exponential distribution: Ecample 1: A control computer in a missile has a failure :
rate of I per 10 2 hours. Find P,. for a flight time of O.l hour.
I i_ e- _dt I xt = Solution/: ii=- = -- (e- )oMTBF h -o
h -_ (0 !) h Therefore, there is one chance in a thousand that the control l
computer will fail. (Note: if _, or t/MTBF is less than 0.01. ,
Therefore, ifa device has a failure rate of one failure per 100 P,. -= i - Xt, or 1 - t/MTBF.) For example. "
hours its MTBF is 100 hours. !
_, If the timedimension is given in cycles, the MTBF becomes P, = e-°'°°n _ I - 0.001 -- 0.999 ]mean cycles between lhilures (MCBF), a termalso in com on
use. For a nonrepaii_ble device, mean time to failure (MTTF)
is used instead of MTBF. For a repairable device MTBF is If _. or t/MTBF, is greater than 0.01, use exponential tables
usually equal to MTTF. to find P,., as shown here.
i - If a device has an MTBF of, for example, 200 hours, this
does not mean that the device will not fail until 200 operating P_ = e-°'°8 __.0.923
hours have accumulated, nor does it mean that the device will ;
fail automaticallyat 200 hours. MTBF is exactly what is says: Example 2: The same type of problem can be solved if the
a mean or average value. This can be seen from MTBF is known. The MTBF of a tape reader used in ground
support equipment is I00 hours. Find P,. for a 2-hour
e-X' = e-_yMTBF operation.
Solution 2:
When the operating time t equals the MTBF, the probability
of no failure is P,. = e-'/mtnF = e-2,n00 = e-°'°2 = 0.980
e- MTn_,'MtBF= e-n = 0.368
If a specific P, is required for a specified operating time, the
(using exponential tables or a slide rule), which means that required failure rate, or MTBF, can be calculated.
there is a 1 - 0.368 = 0.632 chance that the device will fail Example 3: A relay is required to have a 0.999 probability _g
before its MTBF is reached, in other words, if a device has of not failing for 10 000 cycles. Find the required failure rate
and MCBF.
an MTBF of 1000 hours, replacing the device after 999 hours tSolution 3:
of operation will not improvereliability. To show the concept
of a mean value in another way, consider the following -i
empirical definition of MTBF: R = e -x' ,)
0.999 = e -°'°°_ = e -xcut_ ¢_"'¢" ;_Total test hours tMTBF _-
Total observed failures
Equating exponents gives _,]
For example, if I00 transistors are tested for I000 hours each _
and five failures are observed, the observed MTBF is h(lO 4 cycles) = 0.001
I00 × I000 !00 000 0.001 I failure 'i
MTBF .... 20 000 hours h = _ _-
5 5 104 107 cycles
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The required MCBF is therefore Example 4: A system has 100 parts, each one required for
system success. Find the system reliability R, if each parthas
1 l07 cycles R = 0.99.MCBF - h Solution 4: "_
n 10o
Reliability Models R_= II R_=II R_= R,R2R,... R,0o •
In the following sections we replace P,.=e -_, the j=l j=l
reliabilityof a part, with a plain R to keep the notation simple.
= (0.99)(0.99)(0.99)... (0.99) = (0.99)too
Calculation of Reliability for Series-Connected Devices
In reliability, devices are considered to be in series if each = (e-°'°1)10o = e-i = 0.368
device is requiredto operate without failure to obtain system
success (ref. 3-5). A system composed of two parts is Therelore, the probability that the system will succeed is about
' represented in a reliability diagram, or model, as shown in 37 percent.
figure 3-3. if the reliability R for each part is known, from Example 5: For a typical missile that has 7000 active parts
probability theorem 2, chapter 2, the probability that the and a reliability requirement of 0.90, each part would have
: system will not fail is to have a reliability Rp of 0.999985. This is calculated from
Rs = RIR2
(Rt,) 7000= 0.90 = e -0"105
(We assume that the part reliabilities are independent; i.e.,
the success or failure of one part will not affect the success Solution 5: Therefore,
or failure of another part.) If there are n parts in the system,
each one required for system success, the total system reli- iability is given by Rp = (e-°'l°5) vT°°°= e-s 5×1o-_= e-O.oooof5 _t
n = I - 0.000015 = 0.999985
Rs = RIR2R3 . . . R, = 1"I Ri
i=l
The product rule can also be expressed as
where
Rs probability that system will not fail
Rj reliability ofj th part R_ = ]'] Rj = RtR2R3 . . . R,j=l
n total number of parts
_- e-hill e -h2l" e -h313 . . . e -h,/,,
The expression
= e-lhltl +h2tZ+h313 + " '" h,/.I 4
j=l =exp -_ h/j
l j=l
is often called the product rule. where
It
, hj failure rate ofj th part _
_._.,.._.-_-• "j
t/ operating time ofj th part ,
: ,, I Therefore, if for each series-connected part in a system tlie i :i
_ Part 1 and if Part2 then failure rateand operatingtime are known, the system reliability
--_ kd_lanot _ does not _ 8u_ess '* if_l can be calculated by finding :_ h/J and raising e to the i
-,' Figure3-3.--Seriesmodel, j= I h/J power.
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.................. : "'_-::"_'_......V ..... "-":-_ ....."'___ .'""'_*_m'! 1aim L
_'1" 10/103"_'_'_ _'2=201103l_Ik3" 100/103
' / ''''° / I I ,
_: .i. Figure3-4.--Seriesmodelusingfailurerate,,;andoperatingtimes..! "
I
i i Example 6: Find the system reliability from the model Calculation of Reliability for Devices Connected in Parallel L
!
Solution 6: Step 1 In reliability, devices are considered to be in parallel if one :,
" 3 or more of the devices can fail without causing system failure
_jtj = _ltl + _2t2 + _.313 butat least one of the devices must succeed for the system _ .to succeed. First we consider simple redundancy, tj= I
S/mp/e redundancy.--If n devices are in parallel so that only 1
; = 10/103(10) + 20/103(4) + 1001103(2) one of the devices must Succeed for the system to succeed,
the devices are said to be in simple redundancy. The diagram,
:- = 100/103 + 801103 + 2001103- 380/103 or model, of a two-part redundancysystem presented in figure
3-6 illustrates this concept. In other words, if part I fails, the
Step 2 system can still succeed if part2 does not fail, and vice versa.
However, if both parts fail, the system fails.
_- From probability theorem 3, chapter 2, we know that the
R, = exp -- e-3S°/l°3 = e -0.38 = 0.684 possible combinationsof success R and failure Q of two devices
= I is given by
"i If the tj's are equal (i.e., each part of the device operates for RIR2 + RIQ2 + QIR2 + QIQ2
_._ the same length of time), the product rule can further be
reduced to where
Q-_ 3,j) RtR 2 both parts succeed
R, = exp t_ RtQ2 part 1 succeeds and part 2 fails ,
I QIR2 part 1 fails and part 2 succeeds
)-. where tc is the common operating time. Qt_: both parts fail
Example 7: Find the reliability of the system shown in We also know that _,hesam of these events equals unity, since ,
• figure 3-5. they are mutuallyexclusive (i.e., if one event occurs theothers
Solution 7: Step 1 cannot occur). Therefore,
3 RiR2 + RIQ2 + QtR2 + QtQ2 = !
•_ _j = _i + >_2+ ;_3= 7/103 + 5/103 + 6/103 = 18/103
: j=l Becauseat leastone of thepartsor devicesmustsucceed insimplei
redundancy, the probability of this happening is given by
_, Step 2 -_
! RIR2 + RIQ 2 + QIR2 = l - QIQ2
_, R., = exp t,. = e - ts/i°_(t°)= e -ts°/l_ In simple terms, if the only way the redundantsystem can fail ::
I is by all redundantpartsfailing, theprobabilityof success must "! :i= e -°'is = 0.835 be equal to ! minus the probability that all redundant parts
i." 2-I I
Figure3-5.--Seriesmodelwithoperatingtimesequal.
26
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r .
._i Part1does _ Automaticcontrol -_'
-1 l- "
___ notfail doesnotfail
If (R 1" 0.9)
or or "_
not fail doesnotfa!l Success
(R2 = 0.8)
or l"
Figure3-6.--Simple redundancymodel.
:. _ Manualcontrol J_.__.
_ doesnotfail
will fail (i.e., R = 1-Q), from probability theorem l, (Ra=0.7)
chapter 2. This reasoning can be extended to n redundant pans
if at least one of the n parts must succeed for the system to Figure3-7.--Space capsuleguidancemodel.
succeed.
Example 8: Suppose thereare threeways thata space
capsulecan be guided:(I) automaticallywith Ri = 0.9,
", (2) semiautomatically with R 2 = 0.8, (3) manually with Example 9: Find the reliability of the redundant system
.... R_ = 0.7. The model or diagram of successful guiding, shown in figure 3-8.
assuming that the three ways are independent of each other, Solution 9: Step I--Solve for the reliability of parts I and 2.
is shown in figure 3-7. From probability theorem 3, chapter 2,
the possible events are given by Ri = e -x_q = e -1(12°/l°6)xl°'_l = e -°'it° = 0.887
RjR2R: + RoRzQ 3 + RIQ2R 3 + QIR2R 3 + RIQ2Q 3 R; = e-x,.,2 = e-I(_O/t0%x 10-_1= e-O._O = 0.712
+ QIQ2R3 + QjRzQ3 + QIQ_Q3 step 2-Solve for the unreliability of each part. Ji
Because the sum of these probabilities is equal to unity and Qt = 1 - Rt = O.113 1
at least one of the control systems must (,perate successfully, : _
the probability that guidance will be successful Rsuid_nceis Qz = 1 -Rz = 0.288
eguidanc¢"= RtRzR3 + RtR2Q3 + RtQzR3 + QtR2R._ Solve for the reliability of the redundant system.
+ RtQzQ3 + QtQ2R._ + QjRzQ3 Rsimpleredund.',n,= 1 -- QIQ2 = 1 - (0.113)(0.288)
= i - QtQzQ3 = 1 - [(1 - Rt)(i - R2)(I - R_)] = 1 - 0.033 = 0.967
= 1 - [(1 - 0.9)(1 - 0.8)(1 - 0.7)] There is a 96.7 percent chance, therefore, that both parts will
not fail during the 1000-hour operating time.
= 1 -[(0.1)(0.2)(0.3)] Compound redundancy.--Compound redundancy exists
when more than one of n redundant parts must succeed for
= 1 - (0.006) = 0.994 the system to succeed. This can be shown in a model of a three-
element redundant system in which at least two of the elements
In general, then, for simple redundancy must succeed, as shown in figure 3-9.
From probability theorem 3, chapter 2, the possible events
n are
, R,,°,,0=i-nQ,= Q,,I
./=I
\ /
/or ,,,
)'_ = 120/10e
where _ l tl " 1000
., n Jl l _2
II Oj total probability of failure '-'-1 _,z = _O/10sj=l
Qj total probability of failure ofj jh redundant part _ t_ = 1000
._:i ] n total number of redundant parts Figur¢3-8.-Simple redundancymodelusingfailureratesandoperatingtimes. _'
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i I Solution 10" The number of possible events is given by
_ Part1 _ _:g (R + Q)4 = R4 + 4R3Q + 6R2Q2 + 4RQ3 + Q4 . ._
_i" pare ! ,
If faild°n°t[ Part2 [ Ithen Success The sum °f the pr°babilities °f these events equals unity; i "_i therefore, the expression for two out of four succeeding is, i
' __._ Rs=R4+4R3Q+6R2Q2=I-(4RQ3+Q4) ii[_ Substituting R = 0.9 and Q = 1 - 0.9 gives ;
p
i!i Figure3-9.--Compoundredundancymodel. Rs = 1 - (4RQ 3 + Q4) __.1 - [4(0.9)(0.1) 3 + (0.1) 4] .4 ,
_, RtR2R3 + R,R2Q3 + RzQ2R3 + QIR2R3 + RIQ2Q3 = 1 - [(3.6)(0.001) + 0.0001] = 1 - (0.0036 + 0.0001) • •
+ Q|Q2R3 + QIR2Q3 + Q|Q2Q3 =-1 - 0.0037 -.-0.996 ,!_-il
To simplify the notation, let R, = R2 = R3and Qi -'- Q2 = Q3.
Calculation of Reliability for Complete System
_i This reduces the expression to To find the reliability for a complete system, begin by ). _developing a model for the system, write the equation for the i ' :i, !
_ R3+R2Q+R2Q+R2Q+RQ2+RQ 2 +RQ2+Q" probability of success from the w.odei, and then use thefailure i !:i
: rates and operating times of the system elements to calculate _
or the reliability of the system (refs. 3-6 to 3-8). ] : _l
Erample 11: Consider the system model with series and !
! R 3 + 3R2Q + 3RQ2 + Q3 redundant elements shown in figure 3-10. _ 7
Solution 11: The equation can be written directly as .. :, .!
Because the sum of these probabilitiesequals unity and at least
two of the three partsmust succeed, the probability for success R_ = RtR2R3(I - Q4QsQ6) i
i iis given by where RiR2R3 representsthe probabilityof success of the series
R_ = R 3 + 3R2Q = 1 - (3RQ 2 + Q3) partsand (1 - Q4QsQ6) represents the probability of success
of the three parts in simple redundancy. If we know that
where 3RQ 2 represents one part succeeding and two parts '
failing and Q3 represents all three parts failing. Ri = 0.99 = e"°'m R4 = 0.85
Example !0: Assume that there are four identical power
supplies in a fire control center and that at least two of them R2 = 0.999 = e-°'°°l R5 = 0.89
must continue operating for the system to be successful. Let R3 = 0.95 = e-°'°5 Re = 0.78
each supply have the same reliability, R = 0.9 (which c,_uld
i represent e-Xa or Ri or R), Find the probability of system where R may represent e -_, inherent reliability Ri, or '
i Success R, impl¢redundant, observed product reliabilitydepending on the stage of product :_i i:
i notfail
I! does PtmZdoes Part$does PartISdoes ,_
notfall notf_ notfail notfall :.
!
notfall
Fisure3-10.--Modelof systemwithseriesandredundantelements.
' !
]
2s
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!, _e,
development, then the reliability of the system is where R,R 2 is the probability that the two parts in series will _'!
not fail, 1 - (R3Q4Q5+... + Q3Q4Qs) is the probability
R, -- e -°'°l e -°_0ole-°'°5[! - (I - 0.85)(1 - 0.89)(1 - 0.'/8)] that two out of three of the compound redundant parts will .,"
not fail, and (1 - Q6QT) is the probability that both of the
" = e-°°61[l- (0.15)(0.11)(0.22)] =e-°'°°'(l-0.00363) simple redundant parts will not fail. If data giving the
" reliabilities of each part are available, insert this information ,
ii_" . = e -o.o_l e -0.0o36__e-°°65 = 0.935 into the system success equation to find the system reliability. ,"!
! However, this does not mean that there will be no equipment Example 13: Write the equation for the system shown in .:figure 3-12. •
ii i failures. The system will still succeed even though one or two :' ..
g of the redundant paths have failed. Solution 13: The equation can be written directly as i
! Example 12: Write the equation for the system shown in ] .i
figure 3-11. R_ = RIR6RT[I - [Q2Q3(1 - R4R5)]] 1
!
Solution 12: The equation can be written directly as
i where RIR6R7 is the reliability of the series parts, (1 - R4Rs)
_,, " R s = RIR2[I -(R3Q4Q 5 -I-Q3R4Q5 + Q3Q4R5 is the probability that R4 or Rs will fail in the bottom
redundant path, and [1 - [Q2Q_(I - R4R5)]] is the reliability
._ + Q3Q4Qs)](I - Q6Q_) of the three paths in simple redundancy.
. ii
[ •
outotw° I _ _Part6does _
three [---[notfail
donot I'
i
U Part7 does
-]not fail
Figure 3-II .--System reliability model using series, simple redundancy, and compound redundancy elements.
t
i
• Paa_eo.
not fail "i
If Partl does Part3 dees Pare e and7
notfall notfall donot hill Suomu
o, i
/,
Part4does Pan$does
not tall not tall
! Figure 3-12.-Mndel with series elemenf_ in redundant paths.
I
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Concluding Remarks And finally, you should beable to combine the four methods i g
described abov_ to calculate *,hereliability of a total system. I
Chapter 3 has presented several inportan_concepts thatyou In 1985, alternative methodologies were introduced in the l "_
should i:ave clearly in mind: form of computer reliability analysis programs. One such i '
(1) The exponential distribution e - x_represents the prob- underlying model uses a Weibuli failure rate during theburn- 1
ability thatno catastrophicpart failures will occur in a product, in, or "'infantmortality," period and a constant failure rate i
(2) The failure rate _ as used in e-Xt is a constant and during the steady-state period for electronic devices, initial i
, representsthe rate at which randomcatastrophicfailuresoccur, results indicatethatgiven a 15- to 40-year systemlife the infant _i"
_: (3) Although the cause of failure is known, random failures mortalityperiod is assumedto last for the firstyear. Of course,
-_ may still occur, the higher the stress of theenvironment, the shorter the infant '
/,
(4) The mean time between failures (MTBF) is the recip- mortality period. The point is that there are many ",vaysof
rocal of the fail -e rate. performing reliability studies, and different methodologies
(5) In reliability, devices are in series if each one is required could be equally appropriateor inappropriate. Appendix C
to operate successfully for the system to be successful. Devices describes five distribution functions that can be used for
are parallel or redundant if one or more can fail without reliability analysis. Table C-I shows the time to failure fit
causing system failure but at least one of the devices must for varioussystems. The basic criteria relateto the distribution
succeed fcr the system to succeed, of failures with time. i
In addition, you should be able to calculate the following:
(1) The reliability of a device, given failure rate and
operating time.
(2) The reliability of devices connected in series from the References
i product rule:
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Reliability Training _
la. Of 45 launch vehicle flights, 9 were determined to be failures. What is the observed reliability?
A. 0.7 B. 0.8 C. 0.9
lb. What is the observed reliability if the next five flights are successful?
A. 0.72 B. 0.82 C. 0.87
it. After the five successes of part Ib, how many more successes (without additional failures) are required 1
for a reliability of R = 0.90?
A. 20 B. 30 C. 40 t
2. A three-stage launch vehicle has a reliability for each stage of Rj = 0.95, R2 = 0.94, R3 = 0.93,
a. What is the probability of one successful flight?
A. 0.83 B. 0.85 C. 0.87
b. What is the probability of flight failure for part a?
A. 0.00021 B. 0.15 C. 0.17
c. What is the probability of two successful flights?
A. 0.689 B. 0,723 C, 0.757
3. You are taking a trip in your car and have four good tires and a good spare. By expanding (R + Q)5
a. How many events (good tires or flats) are available? "
A. 16 B. 32 C. 64
b. How many combinations provide four or more good tires?
A. 6 B. 7 C. 16
c. If R = 0.99 for each tire, and a successful trip means you may have only one flat, what is the
probability that you will have a successful trip?
A. 0.980 B. 0.995 C. 0.9990
4. A launchvehiclesystemisdividedintofivemajorsubsystems,threeofwhichhavealreadybeenbuilt
and tested.The reliabilityofeachisasfollows:Rt= 0.95.R2= 0.95,R_ = 0.98.The reliabilityof'
theoverallsystemustbeequalto,orgreaterthan,0.85.Whatwillbetheminimumacceptabler liability
ofsubsystems4 and5 toensure85-percentreliability?
A. 0.92 B. 0.95 C. 0.98
5a. A launch vehicle test program consists of 20 test firings requiring 90-percent reliability. Five tests
have already been completed with one failure. How many additional successes must be recorded to
, successfully complete the test program?
A. 13 B. 14 C. 15
5b. Based on the probability (four successes in five flights) what is the probability of achieving successful
completion of the test program?
A. 0.04 B. 0.167 C. 0.576
tAnswers ate given at the end of this manual.i
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6. During individual testsof major laur.,:hvehicle subsystems, the reliability of each subsystem was found
to be
Subsystem 1 = 0.95 '"
Subsystem 2 = 0.99
Subsystem 3 = 0.89
Subsystem 4 = 0.75
!; Since all subsystems are required to function properly to ach;eve success, what increase in reliability
of subsystem 4 would be necessary to bring the overall systtm reliability to 0.80?
A. 15 percent B. 20 percent C. 25 percent I
7. Solve for the following unknown values:
a. _. ---750 × It, :_failures/hour; t = IO hours: R = ?
A. 0.9925 B. 0.9250 C. 0.9992
b. X = 8.5 percent failures/103 hours: t = 3000 hours; R = '_
A. 0.9748 B. 0.7986 C. 0.0781
c. MTBF = 250 failures/hour; t = 0.5 hour: R = ?
i ' A. 0.9802 B. 0.9980 C. 0.999.8
d. R = 0.999: t = 10 hours: k = ?
A. 1000 x 10-'_ failures/hour B. i0 x 10-6 failures/hour C. 10 percentfailures/103hours "_
e. MTBF -- '?
A. 10 4 failures/hour B. 10"_failures/hour C. 106 failures/hour
8. The a priori MTBF _,c_a_etinrlof a printed circuit hoard was 12.5 x I0_ hours. Find the number of
expected failures during a lOS-heur (accelerated) life test of 13 circuit board samples.
A. 12.5 B. 80 C. 125
9a. Write the reliability equation for the battery activation success diagram shown below:
If !And And ! And Then
i i
Battery Pasts :initiates IBnitcs Batter)' _UCCC_S
activatc umbilical EBW I initiator I activates 7
\
command path tpart 3) qpan 5) tpan 7)
(pan I) (pan 2) or or ;_,..-?
EBW 2 initiator 2
(pan 4) (pan fi)
A, R_= RiR2(l - R._R4)(I- R._R_R7 B, R_= RnR2(I - Q,_Q4)(I- Q._Q_)RI
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9b. If R -- 0.9 forall series andR -- 0.8 for all parallelparts, solve for R,.
A. 0.73 B. 0.26 C. 0.67 "_
10. A launchvehicle subsystemis required to be storedfor i0 years (use 9000 hours= I year). If the
subsystemreliabilitygoal is 0.975.
a. WhatXi,_,requiredwithno periodiccheckoutandrepair?
A. 2800 X 10-9 B. 28 × 10-9 C. 280 x 10 -9 _'_
b. WhatX is requiredwith checkoutandrepairevery 5 years? (Assume 100-percentcheckout.) [
A. 5600X 10 -9 B. 56× 10 -9 C. 560X 10 -9
-q
c. WhatX is ,'equiredwith checkoutand repairevery year? (Assume 100-percentcheckout.)
('_'_;i A. 2800 x 10-9 B. 28 x 10 -9 C. 280 x 10 -9
i
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Chapter 4 •
i Using Failure Rate Data ' .i
_! Now thatyou have a workingknowledge of the exlx,nential Random nature.--Notice that the failures in this constant-
i distribution e -x' and have the fundamentals of series and failure-rateregion are random (in occurrence). For example, _redundant models firmly in mind, the next task is to relate two diodes fail, then three transistors, then a silicon switch,
these concepts toyour everyday world. To do this, we explore then a diode, then a trimpot and a resistor, etc. __
i_ further the meaning of failure rates, examine variables that Repetitivefailures.--Figure 4-1 also shows thatduring the
!
affect part failure modes and mechanisms, and then use part first 1600 hours only two of these failures involved the same
' failurerate datato predict equipmentreliability. We introduce type of device. This is importantbecause in most systems the
a simple technique for allocating failure rates to elements of problems that get the most attention are the repetitive ones. ,:_
[i a system. The concepts discussed in this chapter are tools the It should be apparent in this case that the repetitive failures
designer can use for trading off reliability with other factors are not theones thatcontributethe most to unreliability(failure __i
such as weight, complexity, and cost. These concepts also rate). And taking corrective action on the repetitive type
provide guidelines for designing reliability into equipment of failure would only improve the observed failure rate by
during the concept stage of a program. 18 percent.
Failure modes.--Table 4-1 shows the observed failure
Variables Affecting Failure Rates modes (the way the failures were revealed) for the transistor,diode, and resistor failures given in figure 4-1. Note in _i
in chapter 3 failure rate Xwas defined as a constant in time table4-l(a) that the short failure mode for transistors had an
representing the rate of occurrence of random catastrophic occurrence rate five times that of any other mode. Note also , i
failures in theequipment. An actual observation of a constant thatthe eight transistor failures were distributedaboutevenly iin the threeenvironments but thatsome difle.rentfailure modes
failure rate is shown in figure 4-1. The results of two tests
are shown in this figure. One is an operating life test lasting were observed in each environment.
4500 hours; the other, a storage test lasting 7000 hours. Each Observe again in table 4-1(b) that the short failure mode
test is discussed separately, for diodes occurred most frequently. The failures were not
distributedevenly in each environment, but a different failure
Operating Life Test mode occurred in each environment.Resistors failed in two modes (table4-l(c)): one intermittent
The tests involved 7575 parts--3930 resistors, 1545 resistorat low temperatures and one tolerance failure at high
capacitors,915 diodes, 1080transistors,and 105 transformers, temperatures.
One-third of the parts were operated at -25 °F, one-third at Burn-/n.--As shown in figure 4-1 after 1600 hours the
77 °F, and one-third at 125 °F. The parts, tested :,ncircuits failure rate of the 7575 parts dropped by a factor of 7 for the
(printedcircuitboards), were deratedno more than40 percent, remaining 2900 test hours (3 failures per2900 hours, failures - _i
The ordinate of the curve shows cumulative failures as a 12, 13, and 14, as compared with 1! failuresper 1600 hours).
! function of operating time. For example, at about 240 hours This is an example of what are commonly called burn-in
the first failure was observed, at about 385 hours the second, failures. The first 11 failures represent parts that had some
etc. Several importantobservations can be made concerning defect not detectedby thenormalpart screening or acceptance
failure rates and failure modes, tests. Such defects do not reveal themselves until the parthas
Constant failure rate.--Figure 4-1 shows that the failure been subjected to operation for some time. As mentioned
. ! rate for the first 1600 hours is constant at one failure every earlier, eliminatingthe repetitive failure would only decrease
i 145 hours. This agrees with the constant-k theory. Bear in the failure rate in the first 1600 hours by about 18 percent,
_ mind that constant failure rate is an observation and not a but if screeningtestswere sensitive enough to detectall defects,
i physical law. Depending on the equipment, failure rates may the failure ratewould approach the intrinsic failure rateshown
i decrease or increase for a period of time. in figure 4-1 right from the start.
!
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I Inbinsicfailurerale, Capacitor,_ leak,wettanteJum
I 1fjhJre/2300hr-%
trdantmortify I GITransistor.short.2N389
• 15 _ failureride. J _ Transistor.Iolerance.2N33S
I 1MilureV145Iv dlort,77OF.2N396
I Tran_stor,open.125°F. Mo90
I Transistor.short,.-25OF.2N49e
Trans_ior.short.....25_F,Mo 90 !
I 10 Transistor,leakage.-25 °F.2N1057
"_ Resistor.tolerancechange,125°F.metalfilm Sample,_ze
,_, 3 inwrmitt_t..-_ oF Re.tom a_o i
Diode.open.125OF.1N483 Diodes 915 : "
Sele(_ milch,short,77"IF._60A Tranmlom lOIN) !
5 Transistor,iniennitlent,125OF,Mo90 Transformers t05 ; ,
_" Transistor._ 125q=,2N1016B To1_ i 7575 _I
: TranMMm.,sholl.77oI:,2N389 .]
: Diode.ShOal,77OF.1_ :j
! : Diode.short.77°F. 1N761 !
_ i 0 1 2 3 4 , , 6 7 8 9 10 11 , 12x103
I T,ne. t.hr I ! 1
!:i I I
• Figure4-1.--Observedpartfailuresversuslestandstoragelime.
In summary, some of the observed properties of operat:,ng researchon thisproblem because storage failure rates become
failure 1ales are as follows: a significant factor in the reliability of unmanned systems and
(1) For complex equipment the intrinsic failure rate of affectconsiderably the maintenancepolicy of manned systems.
electronic parts is usually constant in time.
(2) Failures are random, with repetitive failures repre- Summary of Variables Affecting Failure Rates
senting only a small portion of the problems. Part failure rates are thus affected by
(3) Failuremodesof partsandequipmentvat), depending (I) Acceptancecriteria
on the operatingenvironment. (2) All environments
(4) Mostpartshavea dominantfailuremode.For example, (3) Application
the dominant failure mode for semiconductors is shorting. (4) Age or storage
: (5)Rigidpartscreeningandacceptancecriteriac nsub- To findwaysofreducingtheoccurrenceofpart failures,we
i stantially reduce operating failure rates by eliminating early observe failuremodes, learnwhat causedthe failure (the failure
, failures, stress), determine why it failed (the failure mechanism), and
Storage Test then take action to eliminate the failure. For example, one of
the failure modes observed during the storage test was an 3
After the operating test the partswere put in storage for "open" in a wet tantalum capacitor. The failure mechanism _,
_ approximately 7000 hours (10 months) ,rod then rctested was deterioration of the end seals, which allowed the
to determine the effect of storage on parts. As shown in electrolyte to leak. One obvious way to avoid this failure mode ii
figure 4-1, three failures (14, '5, and 16) were observed at in a system that must be stored for long periods without ,'.i
_" the end of the storage period. Note that the average failure maintenance is not to use wet tantalum capacitors. If this is ,
rateobserved in storage (one failure per 2300 horns) is close impossible, the next best thing would be to redesign the end
to the same rate ob_crved in the previous 2900 hours of seals. This would no doubt require furthertesting to isolate
operation. Thus, it can be concluded thatstorage does produce the exact failure stress that produces the failure mechanism.
_ part failures and that the storage failure rate may be ashigh Once isolated, the failure mechanismcan often be eliminated
.... as the operating rate. Industry is conducting a great deal of through redesign or additional process controls.
TABLE 4-1.--FAILURE MODES TABLE 4-3.--STRESS RATIOS THAT MEET
q
(a) Trap2.iswrs ALLOCATION REQUIREMENT
• .... °%
Ob_rvcd Temperature, "F Total F Ob_rvod Pan Stressratm. W
failure -25 77 125 rate. *C O. I 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
mode failu_s/hr
Failure talc of derat_ _ per 100 hr. _XD
Open ...... I 2N-3-89 , MD-90 I 0.206/100
": Short MD-90 2NIOI6B 5 1.03/100 30 i 0.23 0.22 ;,
: 2N498 2N396 40 0.24 _
'" f 70 0.25
Totals 3 j 2 3 8 1.65/lip
. (b) Diodes
!Open .......... IN483 I
Sho. IN761..... 3 .73.o,
I NTImA
/ T_ls 0 3 I 4 i0.9?rio4
i 2 Ic) Resistors
i '; Intermittent Trimpot ............. I 0.06/100
., " Tolerance ........... Metal film I .06/100
L:_. Totals l 0 I 2 0.12/100
f '
I TABLE 4-2.--FAILURE RATE CALCULATION
(a) Tactical fire control station logic gate
i Component Stress ratio Number Failure rate Application Total failure
u_'o. of derated factor for rate.
N partat vehicle. _r = NkoKA,
40 "C ground failures/10_ hr
X/). mounK%l.
failures/100 hr K.4
Resistor, composition (2000 |l) 0.5 I 0.0035 10 0.035 -_
Resi_or, composition (180 00rJill .5 I .0035 | .035
Resistor, composition (22 000 fl) .6 I .0038 _ ,038Resistor, composition (6500 Q) .5 2 .0035 .070
Transistor. germanium (PNP typ=l < I W: 0.4 normalized ! 1.3 8 10.400
.junctiontemperature -.,
i Diode. i_,o IA .3 I 3.5 5 17.500
1
, ....... Tot_tl._, = _ Xr = 29.68 i_O
_-"_-'" (b) Proposed logic gate
Resistor, film (1300 fl) 0.8 _ 0.19 0.3 0.057 i
Resi,qor. film 13320 fl) .2 _ .14 .3 .042 _ q
l
.,t.4
" Resistor. film (46 600 f]) .2 .14 .3 .042 _ _1
" Transistor. silicon (NPN type) < I W; 0.15 normalized .165 8 1.320 ,i
junction temperature [. :i
': Diode, iN31A _ 2 3 0 5 75 00
Total, )_, = V. XT ,= 76.46.
,i
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Oneof the best knownmethods of representingpartfailures biiityof a chancefailure is toogreat, eitherdesign changesmust
is theuse of failure ratedata. Figure4-2 (from ref. 4- i ) shows be introducedor the operating environment made less severe, t
a typical time-versus-failure-rate curve for flight hardware. The SFR period is the basis for the application of most i
: . This is the well-known "bathtub curve," whichover the years reliability engineering design methods. Because it is constant, '_!_ has become widely accepted by the reliability community. It the exponential distributionof time to failure is applicable and
:+_ has proven to be particularlyappropriatefor electronic equip- is the basis for the design and prediction procedures spelled !
_:: sent and systems, it displays the sum of three failure rate out in documents such as MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2). i
i quantities: quality (QFR), stress (SFR), and wearout (WFR). The simplicity of the approach (utilizing the exponential i "
" Zone !, the infantmortality period, is characterized by an distribution, as previously indicated) makes it extremely _ , .
_- initially high failure rate (QFR). This is normally the result attractive. Fortunately, it is widely applicable for complex ! ,
. of poor design, use of substandardcomponents, or lack of equipment and systems. If complex equipment consists of
! !
'_ adequate controls in the manufacturingprocess. When these, many components, each having a different mean life and i + i
mistakesare notcaught by qualitycontrol operations, an early variance that are randomly distributed, then the system _Ifailure is likely to result. Early failures can be eliminated by malfunction rate becomes essentially constant as failed parts
a "burn-in" period during which time the equipment is are replaced. Thus, even though the failuresmight be wearout ! "
;: operated at stress levels closely approximatin_ the intended failures, the mixed populationcauses them to occur at random 1
: actual operating conditions. The equipment is then released intervals with a constant failure rate and exponential behavior, l•
i +_ for actual use only when it has successfully passed through This has been verified for much equipment from electronic I +i
the burn-in period. For most well-described complex systems to rocket motors. f
equipment, a lO0-hourfailure-free burn-inis usually adequate Zone I11,thewearoutperiod ischaracterizedby an increasing _ :,_
_++ to cull out a large pr6portion_t'the infant mo r_!ity failures failurerate(WFR) as a result of equipment deterioration due /i ' caused by stresses on the parts, to age or use. For example, mechanical components, such as
; . Zone I!, the useful life period, is characterized by an transmission bearings, will eventually wear out and fail
; essentially constant failure rate (SFR). This is the period regardless of how well they are nmde. Early failures can be
i-._ dominated by chance failures. Chance failures are those postponed and the useful life extended by ,'ood design and
_: _ failures that result from strictlyrandomor chance causes. They maintenance practices. The only w_,y to prevent failure due i
cannotbe eliminatedby either lengthy burn-inperiods or good to wearout is to replace or repair the deteriorating component
preventive maintenance practices, before it fails.
Equipment is designed to operate under certain conditions Because modern electronic equipment is almost completely
and to havecertain strengthlevels. When these strength levels composed of semiconductor devices that really have no short- .
are exceeded because of random unforeseen or unknown term wearoutmechanism, except for perhapselectromigration,
events, a chance failure will occur. Although reliability theory one might question whether predominantly electronic equip-
and practice are concerned with all three types of failure, the ment will even reach zone III of the bathtub curve.
primary concern is with chance failures, since they occur Different statistical distributions might be used to charac-
during the useful life of theequipment. Figure4-2 is somewhat terizeeach zone. Hazardrate hasbeendefined for five different
deceiving because zone I! is usually much longer than zone failure distribution functions, see figure C-! in the appendix.
I or I!!. The time when a chance failure will occur cannot be Depending on which distribution fits the hazardratedata best,
predicted, but the likelihood or probabilitythat one will occur a failure distribution function c+,n be selected. The infant
during a given period of time within the useful life can be mortality periodfor the typical hazard rate in figure4-2 might
• determinedby analyzing the equipmentdesign. If the probe- be represented by the Weibull distribution, the useful life
period by the exponential distribution, and the wearout period
i Equipmentlifeperiod+ by the log normal distribution.
i +, l I " I m -!
+_ / Infant Usefullife -
k mortality I I Wearoul:. PartFailureRateD,ta
l\ lov.,a..,,,, I
.[ 7m/ "++oo,,,mo,,+n,,,o of,o,,,,,,+,,,o,o ,o,+°n,+',
j_ _ integrity or reliability in terms of fnilure rate or mean timeI 81rex.relall_
I I betweenfailures (MTBF). ]n general,part failure ratesare
N_ falluru--,, presented as a function of temperature and electrical stress as
_,,_ ,, J---Ouallly I ,,/wo,,,,_ t shown in figure 4-3. The family of curves on the graph
-"',,6,,,,,,,,++failures .,...._.,.__ fa"llur-_" represents different applied electrical stresses in terms of al • I _ mlllml m ilbllm m imm _ ___
Time,I stress ratio or derating factor. For example, if a part is to
operateat temperatureA and is derated 20 percent (stressratio,
:. ' Figure4-2.--Hazardrate versus equipment )if_periods. 0.8), that part will have a failure rate of )_= 0.8 as shown. +
_.i .+8
+
R_r
Sires mlio time. This type of failure rate data is presented in the
1.0 MIL-HDBK-217 _ries.
8
" Improving System Reliability Through
Part Derating
i' _. 0.8 ---- The best way to explain how to derate a component is to
" _ give an example. Consider two 20-V wet slug tantalum_i capacitors, both to be operated at a component temperature
of 60 "C. One is to be operated at 20 V and the other at 12 V.
First. find the stress ratio or operating-to-rated ratio for
i _' both applications:
i o __sra.vo-----r l D Hence, one capacitor has a stress ratio of 1.0,A
Figure 4--3.--Failurerateversuselectricalstressratioandtemperature. Stress ratio = 20_._V= 1.020 V
) -.
If the part is derated 70 percent (stress ratio, 0.3), the part and the other, a stress ratio of 0.6,
will have a failure rateof _ = 0.3, etc. Failure rate is usually
given in failures per 106 hours, although as indicated in Stress ratio = 12 V = 0.6
' chapter 3 other dimensions are used depending on who 20-'V
publishes the data.
_ The current authoritative failure rate data published by the (A stress ratio of 0.6 means the same as "derating" the
Department of Defense are in MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2). component 40 percent.) To find the failure rate _ for each
_. The MIL-HDBK-217 series is a direct result of the 1952 capacitor, go to the MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4=2) table for
AGREEeffort mentioned in chapter I. The publications listed MIL-C-3965 glass-sealed wet slug capacitors. Move
• in table 1- | as well as references 4-3 to 4-5 are also offshoots horizontally across the 60 °C line to the vertical 0.6 and 1.0
i of this effort to meet the need for authoritative, statistically stress ratio columns and read directly:
based part failure rates. Because new data on both existing
i_ i and new state-of-the-art partsare constantly being generated _.6 = 0.12 failure per 106 hours
and analyzed, failure rate handbooks do change. Therefore,
be sure to use the latest version available. Even the latest Xjo = 0.57 failure per 10_ hours
version of the data used for compiling the handbook may not As mentioned earlier, failure rates are not absolute;
represent the parts you are using. The best procedure is to therefore, the failureratesjust calculated forthe two capacitors
use your own failure rate data. are not absolute, In other words, we cannot state,definitely
As emphasized in chapter 3 failure rates are statistical, and that one will fail at the rate of 0.12 per 106 hours and the
there is no such thing as an absolute failure rate. Consider other at 0.57 per 106 hours when used in the system. We can
. the simple definition of failure rate: say, at least, thatthe nonderatedcapacitor is expected to have
a failure rate4.75 times that of the derated one. If we derated.i
= Number of observed failures still further, say 90 percent, k0.1 = 0.0013/106, we could
•_-; Total operating time expect the capacitor to be 438 times more reliable than the
nonderatedcapacitor.This is, of course, the reasonforderating
i _ Obviously, if today we observe two failures in 100 hours and in the first place.
_Y
_ i tomorrow we accumulate no more failures, the new failure The same failure rate information is presented on the
- I rate is two failures in 124 hours. Then. ifa failure occurs in opposite page of MIL-HDBK-217E in figure 4-3 format.
_ i the next l-hour period, the failure rate is three failures in 125 Although the _ values must be approximatedfromthe curves,
! hours. Therefore, we can never kaow what the true failure this form of presentation shows graphically the effects of
; rate is, but we can determine representative failure rates or temperature and stress on failure rate and also the effect of
_.._.! best estimates from many hours of observed operating not derating.
i< i 3,
-_. J
_°
: .a
q.
Use of Application Factor proposed components are higher and the failure contribution
of the five diodes alone is double the total failure rate of the
Thus far only the stress ratio and the ambient temperature tactical circuit.
,. of the component have been considered in the derated failure
" ' rate Xn. However. other stresses, such as vibration, shock, These calculations are for anoperatingcircuit. Now consider
" _ and humidity, also affect failure rate. These environmental the effects of a nonoperating circuit on the mission model.
_ _ factors are taken into account by assigning a weighting From figure A-3 in appendix A, the operating application
: i application factorKA. Thus, the total failure rate Xr becomes factor for ground electronics equipment is given as 5 × 109.
_, The nonoperating application factor is 8×102. The scale
ii ! Xr = )'DKa isfaCt°rgivenf°rbyaono_r iing circuit using operating failure rates o
. .: The /i"A varies from component to component and by
i application. MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2) lists five gA_o 0.8Xtl0 3applications: ground, vehic!e4_nounted ground, shipboard, K_ = "'_" = _ = 0.16
ii airborne, and missile, Thus, if our two capacitors are used KA,, 5.0X 103 .;n a missile system, their failure ates become The expected failure'rate for a nonoperatingcircuit is given by i : :
ko.6 = 0.12/106 x 25 = 3.0/106 ),, = K__ )_,= 0.16 × 29.68/10 ° !
[ ,'
[:: _,Lo= 0.57/106 X 25 = 14.25/106 = 4.75 failures/lO ° hours i:
" _i! The K,4 factor includes the failure rate for the connection The operating and nonoperating times during a mission are i,- ,:
_. technique normally associated with that partclass, except for used in the model to calculate reliability, i
: wires and cables. The reliabilityof either circuit, operating or not, as discussed i
_" in chapter 3, would be given by
=" Predicting Reliability From Part Failure Rate Data R,. = e -x,', (
We have shown so far that the failure rate of a part is given
by kL_K_and, as shown in chapter 3, the reliability of a part where -
used in a circuit or system can be estimated from R = e-Xt. X,. circuit failure rate i.
Further, we can estimate the reliability of a system from
r,. operating time of circuit
(n /R, = exp -_ ),,t, ered[ctillg Reliability by Rapid Techniques "
i=1 iThe preceding logic gate illustrationis an example of a relia-
where bility predictionbasedon detailed knowledgeof parts population
_,_ failure rate of ith part and stress. In many situations, however, this type of detailed
prediction is not possible. Some situations that come to mind
t; operating time of ith part arc concept and tradeoff studies where detailed parts counts
This is also discussed in chapter 3. are not available, where operating stress levels have not been
! For example, table 4-2(a)shows a reliability estimate for determined, and where time or personpower is limited.
a tactical fire control station logic gate. The total failure rate Fortunately, a number of rapid reliabilityprediclion techniques - ,:_i
, _ of each part type in the circuit is shown as _,r = N'A_Ka.The are available. One good technique is presented in detail in
expected failure rate of the circuit k_ is then found from MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2). Usually, one or more of these
techniques can be used. Although the results lack the detail
" of the logic gate example, thesemethods aid in quicklyscreening
_,r = _ )_ = 29.68 failures/10 ° hours candidate designs and help managers make sound decisions.i=l
The reliability estimate for a logic gate proposed foranother Use of Failure Rates in Tradeoffs
system is shown in table 4-2(b). Note that the complexity
(number of parts) is higher for the proposed circuit than for The failure rate tables and derating curves are useful from
the tactical circuit by a ratio of 9:7 and the estimated failure the designer's point of view because they provide knowledge
rate is higher by a factor of 2.6. This is possible because, in for making reliability tradeoffs and permit a more practical
spite of greater derating, the failure rates of most of the method of establishing derating requirements. For example,
40
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suppose we have two design concepts for 7,erforming some operatingtemperature is therefore 60 °C, since the maximum
function. If concept A is found to have a tailure rate that is allowable failure rate ratio is )_= 2. In other words, at 60 "C
10 times higherthan thatof concept B, it can be expected that _.heequipment failure rate will be (Ill00) x 2 = !/50, which
concept B will fail one-tenth as often as concept A. If it is is the required failure rate. If blowers are used for cooling,
desirable to use concept A for other reasons, such as cost, the equipment mustoperate at temperatures as high as 75 °C:
size, performance, or weight, the derating failure rate curves if air-conditioning is used, the temperature need not exceed :
::. can be used to improve concept A's failure rate (e.g., select 50 *C. Therefore, it would appear that we must use air-
r components with a lower failure rate, d,;ratethe components conditioning if we are to meet the reliability requirement. I'
more, or both). An even better approach is to find ways to But other factors must be examined before we arrive at a !
reduce the complexity and thus the failure rate of concept A. finaldecision. Whatever type of cooling equipment is selected, l'
As another example of the use of failure rate data in total _ystem reliability now becomes
tradeoffs, consider figure4-4. This figure gives a failure-rate-
versus-temperaturecurve for theelectronicsof a complex (over Rr = R_R,.
35 000 parts)piece of groundsupport equipment. The curveF
_ was developed as follows: Therefore, the effect on the system of the cooling equipment's
_- : (1) A failure rate prediction was performed by using reliability must be calculated. An even more important con-
: component failure rates and their application factors Ks for sideration is the effect on system reliability should the cooling
[_- an operating temperature of 25 °C. The resulting failure rate equipment fail. Because temperature control appears to be
was chosen as a reference point, as indicated on the curve, critical, loss of temperaturecontrol may have serious system
"_:_::" (2) Predictions were then made by using the same method consequences. Therefore, it is too soon to rule out blowers
_- for temperatures of 50, 75, and 100 °C. The ratios of these entirely. A failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis [. :
k (FMECA) must be made on both cooling methods to examine
_ predictions to the reference point, 25 °C, were plotted versus
component operating temperature, with the resultingcurve for all possible failure modes and their effects on thesystem. Only i_" :
the equipment. This curve was then used to provide ;.radeoff then will we have sufficient information with which to reach
criteria for using air-conditioning versus blowers to cool the a sound decision.
equipment. To illustrate, suppose the maximum operating
temperatures expected are 50 "C with air-conditioning and
75 "Cwith blowers. Suppose further thatthe required failure Sonoperating Failures '.
rate for the equipment, if the equipment is to meet itsreliability
As pointed out in discussing figure 4-1, parts continue togoal, is one failure per 50 hours. A failure rate prediction at
25 °C might indicate a failure rate of one per 100 hours, fail when not in use. These nonoperating failuresare convened
Re°erringto figure 4-4, we see that the maximum allowable to nonoperating failure rates. In general, electronic parts fail
less frequently in the nonoperating mode than in the operating
mode. Certain hydraulic and mechanical pans, however, fail
more frequently in _henonoperatingmode. Formany military
weapon systems the nonoperating role is the norm. Missiles
may remain in storage depotsor in a dormant standbycondition
for months or years before being fired. Likewise, many
40 I- ' _Maximum _ subsystems in orbiting satellites are passive most of the time.
l" I IoperalJng / In these cases, system reliability becomes
._ L I : temperaturel
,_ .v [-- l iWilbblower_
E / ! /
I0 _ loperaling I J" R._ - RopcratingRnonol_raling- e-_:)',',e-_;_',,t,,
.m a 17- IlemperalumwithI _ :
_'. e _ lair'c°ndltl°ningI = e-_(;V. + ;_,,'.)
-i,L ', '/
F _n_ Becausenonoperatingtime t,_,can be manyorders of magnitude
u: 2 [,.. , point • _ ' greater than operating time t,,, nonoperating failures often '
l _ "'" - _ I represent a major portion of total system failures. There is,
1/_ i [ I i I I I hence, increased interest in how, why, and at what rate non-
" _0 30 40 $0 eO 70 O0 00 I00 operating parts fail. Somerecent studies gave indications that
Oom_m_ttaml_mm, "0 nonoperating failure rates may not be as high as some hand-
Figure 4-4.--Predicted failure rate ratios versus temperature for ground books might indicate. Turn-on and test strc._sfailures affect
i_-i. " supportequ_vm_n;(electronics). the count of true nonoperating failures.
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Applications of Reliability Predictions to This apportioning process is called allocation in reliability
Control of Equipment Reliability engineering.
Ir. a similar fashion the reliability organization usually -_
Even though we have indicated that reliability predictions allocates thesystem reliabilityor failurerate requirementsonly ,
, do not give absolute answers, several things can be done to to the assemblyor subassembly level. The designers, therefore,
make these predictionsmore meaningful. Considerthe concept must allocate goals to the part level for the component for
stage--the most important stage to reliability because the which they are responsible. All allocations at any level are . ,
f._
:. potential reliability of the system is fairly well defined by the performed in such .amanner that, when the failure rates or
' time the concept is selected. To predict the potentialreliability, reliabilities of the system elements are combined (by using
we usually must the prediction methods discussed in chapter 3), the goal or _'
(!) Predict the number and types of parts to be used in the requirementfor the system is obtained. The allocation process,
system together with part failure rate data, provides the designer with
(2) Choose a part derating factor a method for determining how good the pans must be if the
i (3) Choose a maximum operating environment design is to meet the specified reliability.
The first method of allocating failure rates is called the
Now, to make the prediction meaningful, we must assembly method. If the reliability requirement of a system, i
subsystem, or assembly, as well as the operating time interval,
(1) Place a complexity limit (thelimit predictedin (1) above) is known, the required failure rate may be calculated from
on the system
(2) Direct the minimum amount of derating allowed
(3) Approve partapplications to ensure that pans are used R = e-_'
i in the correct manner and will be operating within the
! The resulting failure rate can then be divided by the antic- _iassumed environmental limits
ipatednumberof partsto be used to allocate the average failure
rate requirement down to the part level.
Example I: Consider a missile that hasa reliability require-Standardization as a Means of Reducing merit of 0.99 for a flight period of 0.5 hour. The estimated
Failure Rates complexity of the missile is 10 000 active parts. Find the ,:
average failure allocation for each pan.
Another means of establishing control over the failure
rate (reliability) of a product is to employ standardization Step l--Write the reliability equation for the missile. _ ,
principles. As an extreme illustration, suppose we need 1000 !
transistors for a system and allow each transistor to be a Rm = e-X"/"
different type, bought from a different vendor. Ifeach vendor
part has five failure mechanisms peculiar to that vendor, the Step 2--Solve for the failure rate of the missile, i
system will have 5 x lO00 = 5000 failure mechanisms. If, -_
through testing, we find one failure mechanism and eliminate R,,, = 0.99 = e-°°l = e -x,,,(o.s) _
it, we have reduced the failure mechanisms of the system by
a factorof only 115000.If, on the other hand, we could require
that the 1000 transistors be of th,. same type and bought from Equating exponents gives
the same vendor and if this vendor's part has five failure
mechanisms, the system also has only five ways to fail. if we 0.01 ,i
then eliminate one of these failure mechanisms by testing, we _,,,(0.5) = 0.01 = 0.5 0.02 failure per hour :i
have reduced the failure mechanisms of the system by one-
fifth, or 20 percent. You can readily see, though, that an initial 'i
reliability prediction would be the same in both cases because Step 3--Solve for the average part failure rate kp
--r: each system uses 1000 transistors.Also the chanceof observing _
the failure mode will increase by five times. Quick failure
k,,, 0.02 = 2/10= 6
mode detectionand correction is importantin reliabilitywork. X_= Number of parts = 10 000 :_
,1, ,,,....,,n ,,.. allure Rates and Relnabnint
I The assumptions made in this example and the method of
Y
. allocating are as follows:
In most Government contracts rehability goals or require-
_... ments are specified at thesystem level only. The apportioning (I) All parts are required,for system success.
- : of these goals to elements of the system is leRto the contractor. (2) All pans fly the entire mission.
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Thus, if the system reliability requirement is to be met. high
7allurecontributors must be offset by low ones so that their Rrack= to_/_9_ = (e-O.OO,)'/to= e_O,00t= 0.9999
average !allure rate hr -< 2/10 -6.
Let us continue this example by further examining one The part failure rates Xt,of each rack can then be allocated
specific part class. For MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2) values as shown in example 1:
this flight failure rate Xpincludes the K4 value associated with
each part class (i.e., 1.5 to 100 for resistors). Thus, the kl, (1) All subelements operate for approximately the sa
for the fixed-film resistors (MIL-R-22684) in the system period.
becomes (2) There is no significant difference in the failure rate
; complexity of the subelements.
ht, = hoKa Many other methods of allocating reliability goals take into
account operating time, complexity, cost, maintainability, the
state of the art, and other factors. See references4-2 to 4-12.
:_ hO = _ = _=2/10-6 0.25/10 -6
• g ImportanceoflammingFrom EachFailure
_ When a product fails, a valuable piece of information about
Now that we have determined the ho requirement, we are this producthas been generated. We now have the opportunity
ready for the next step.
A quick scan of the XD values, extracted from MIL- to learn how to improve the product if we take the right actions.
L HDBK-217E (ref. 4-2) and shown in table 4-3, for this type Failures can be classified into categories:
_ of fixed-film resistor reveals the part temperature and stress (1) Catastrophic failures--for example, a shorted transistor
ratio combinations that provide ),1) -<0.25110-6. The anti- or an open wire-wound resistor
cipated operating temperature, say 40 °C maximum, would (2) Degradation failures--for example, change in the gain
further reduce the acceptable combinations, leading to the of a transistor or the value of a resistor
i - conclusion that this type of part must be derated 60 percent (3) Wearout failures--for example, the wear of brushes in
.. or more to meet the reliability apportionment, an electric motor
;i' The second method of allocating failure rates is called the These three principal failure categories can be broken down
equal-risk method and can also be applied when allocating re- further:
liability goals to several elements within a system (see fig. 4-5). (I) Independent failures--For example, a shorted capacitor
The reliabiliW assigned to each element is given by in a radiofrequency amplifier has nothing to do with a low-
err _ssion cathode in a picture tube. ]
R, = "qR-s (2) Cascade failures--For example, the shorted capacitor tin the radiofrequency amplifier causes excessive current to
flow in its transistor and burns the collector beam lead open. i
where n is the number of elements. The same reliability goal (3) Common mode failures--For example, uncured resin Jis assigned to each element, hence, the name "equal risk." is present in motors.Example 2: A fire control system computer is made up
of 10 logic racks and has a reliability requirement of 0.999. By using these categories and a good failure reporting, I
Allocate a reliability goal to each of the logic racks, analysis, corrective action, and concurrence system, much can r
be learned from each failure. Failure analysis is required to
determine what caused the part to fail. Corrective action
ensures that something was done about the cause. Concurrence
keeps management informed on what is being done to avoid i
another failure. These data enable all personnel involved to
• compare the part ratings with the use stresses and thus verify i
; [ i t
I Elementsofsysmm Failure Reporting, Analysis, Corrective :-
[ Action, andConcurrence 1A number of different methods can be used to record
reliability data for any given project. The Department of i
. Figure4-5.-Syltem elementsmodel. Defense has standardized a method on DD form 78% l. A t
t
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simple form that tells the whole story on one sheet of paper Launch and Hight Reliability
is NASA-C-8192 (fig. 4-6). The method that you use to The flight test program demonstrated the launch and flight .,
record reliability data will have to fit your needs. Keep your
form simple and easy to fill out, and get approval from reliability of the vehicle. Tile ultimate _i_i_ program success
ratioof 91 percent exceeded the overall _vaiiability-reliability
:i management, goal by a comfortable margin.
t
i
! Field Failure Problem
Case Study--Achieving Launch Vehicle
-, _ Reliability Twenty-six guidance sections failed the platformcaging test
: portion of the launch station periodic tests (LSPT's). These
failuresresultedin a majoralarm powerdown. An investigation
Design Challenge was conducted.
The launch vehicle studied requires the highest acceleration Description of launch station periodic tests.--The system
and velocity and the shortest reaction time of any developed, test requirements at the site include a requirement for station
As such, the design challenges were formidable; typical in- periodic tests upon completion of cell or vehicle installation
i: flightenvironments include randomvibrationof 61 g's rms up and every 28 days thereafter. LSPT's check the overall system
_ r tO3 kHz, mechanicalshock at 25 000 g's peak(between 5 and performance to evaluate the readiness of a ceil. During an
[ 10kHz), linear accelerationwell in excess of 100 g's, acoustics LSPT the software initiates a test of the vehicle and groundof 150 dB, andaerodynamic heating upto 6200 OF.The devel- equipment, data processing system, and radarinterfaces. Any
opment philosophy was tor a vehicle to be launched from a nonconformance during an LSPT is logged by the data •
_ tactical silo with the initial design. Although many changes processorand printedout, andthe time from initiationof LSPT
occurred during the 13-year development, the first flight test to failure is recorded During an LSPT the platformspin motor
vehicle was not greatly different from the 70 now deployed, is spun up and held at speed for approximately 10 sec. After
this the system is returned to normal. ]
_" An LSPT consists of two phases: tSubsystem Description
(!) Spinup--a powerup phase to spin the gyros, align the _:
The vehicle is launched from an undergroundsilo, which platform, verify platform null, and check airborne power
also _ervco as a "storage container" during the multiyear supply operation
design life. Adjacent to the silo and integral to it is a small (2) A detailed test of airborne electronics in the radio- "
compartment housing the ground support equipment. This frequency test phase
equipment is used to conduct periodic tests of the vehicle Initial failure occurrenee.--CeU 3 on remote farm 1(RIC3) ,
electronics, to prepare the vehicle for launch, and to launch
the vehicle. It also maintains the silo environment at experienced an LSPT failure (a major alarm powerdo_vn)
5.936 sec after "prep order," the command to get the vehicle i
80 ± 10 °F and 50 percent or less relative humidity, ready to launch. The failure did not repeat during four
The vehicle is predominantly in a power-offstorage mode subsequent LSPT's. RIC3 had previously passed three I
when deployed in its silo. A periodic test of flight electronics scheduled LSPT's before failure. A total of four cells on
is conducted automatically every 4 weeks. In a multiyear remote farms 1 and 2 had experienced similar failures. Two
design life the flight electronics accumulate about 11 rain of of the failures occurred at 5.360 sec (an inverter test to
operating time and 43 830 hours of storage time. The ratio determine if ac power is available). Two occurred at 5.936
of storage time to operating time is nearly 240 000: !.
sec (caging test to determine if the platform is _ulled to the
reference position; see fig. 4-7). , :!
Approach to Achieving Reliability Goals Replacement of failed guidance and control sections (G&C) :
28, 102, and 86 led to successful LSPT's. G&C 99, which _i
Reliabilitymathematical models were developed early in the failedonly once during in-cell testing, was left on line. O&C's
research and development program. From these models it was 28, 102, and 86 were returnedto Martin Marietta. Orlando, _!
apparent'hat the following parameterswere themost important for analysis of the presumed failed contrition.
in achieving the reliabi!ity goals: Failure verification and troublcshooting.-A test planwas _
:i(1) Electronic storage failure rate during a mu!tiyeardesign generated that permitted testing of the failed G&C's in a _;
life (i.e., storage failures) horizontal marriage test and a G&C test to maximize the :
(2) Percent testability of missile electronics (i.e., MIL- probability of duplicating the field failures. Test results
STD--471A, ref, 4-6) confirmed site failures for both thecaging nulland the inverter
(3) Periodic test interval for missile electronics null during a horizontal marriage test on G&C 102, a G&C
(4) Severity of in-flight environments(acceleration, shock, level test on G&C's 28 and 86. and an autopilot level test on
vibration, and aerodynamic heating) G&C 102. G&C 102 failed caging null four times and inverter
4_
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,, PROBLEM REPORT INgTRUCTION9
UINEBLACKINK,NOE_ CORRECTBYLININGOUT_ _ INCOIqRECTOATA.THENINITIAL• DATE....
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SECTION A - Person Rmorllno Problem (Inlflnt._|
CompletNd biodm(I.17)In84o11_A ofPmldemRq_t
null once at horizontal marriage. Evaluation of the inverter that the spin succes,,fully met its acceptance test procedure
null failurerevealed that a high caging amplifieroutputcaused requirements. A hesitation was noted during two of the seven
the launch sequencer level detector to become offset during spinup tests co:glucted. Platform 127 was heated to normal
inverter monitoring, resulting in the major alarm even though on the gyro :est set. Its resistances were checked and found
the autopilot inverter voltage was normal. Launch sequencer to meet specification requirements. No attempt was made to
offset may or may not occur with an uncaged platform start platform 127's spin motor at platform level. Both units
depending on the amplitude of the caging amplifier output were hand-carried to the subcontractor for failure analysis.
when the inverter voltage is monitored. Therefore, both the The subcontractor was familiar with the construction of the
inverter null and the caging null LSFT failures at site wece platform and had the facilities to disassemble the platform
due to failure of the platform to cage. without disturbing the apparently intermittent failure condition.
An autopilot acceptance test tool was modified to permit Verification test conclusions.--Verificafion tests isolated
monitoring of the platform spin motor voltage (800 Hz, 8 V, the site LSPT failures to a failure of the platform spin motor
3 ¢_)and the spin motor rotation detector _,SMRD). During to spin up, thereby causing major alarms at the inv,.rter null
a spinup test on autopilot 69 (G&C 102.),recordings indicated or caging nul! gate. During testing, three of the first four failed
sustained caging oscillation. The SMRD showed no evidence platforms caged upon repeated application of voltage. Once
of spin motor operation even d,,,ugh all autopilot ,,oltages were the platform caged, the platform, autopilot, and G&C met all
correct, including the spin motor excitation voltage at the system te_t requirements. On the basis of these results, it was
platform terminals. Further verification was obtained by decided to repeat LSPT's up to 10 times after a site failure
listening for characteristic motornoises with a stethoscope, before removing theG&C. If the LSPT's were successful, the
G&C 86 failed the G&C level test due to caging null and G&C wou?d be left on line.
inverternullalarms. Then, 3.5 sec into the third run the caging Measurements at platform level indicated the problem was
loop stopped oscillating, butthe platform did not cage in time internal to the platform and that all resistances and the plat-
to pass the test. The next run met all G&C test requirements, form temperature were correct. Subcontractor representatives
It appeared obvious that the spin motor started spinning in the reviewed the test results and concurred that the problem was t
middle of the run. internal to the platform.
G&C 28 failed one run of the G&C level test; however,
it met all requirements in the autopilot level test. This means Mechanical Tests '._
spin motor breakaway torque was measured with a IThe
Remoteform gram gage on platform 127 and was found to be normal >timereference
(RFTR)-/ (750 dyne cm). Dynamometer tests were performed on both [
Expanded I platforms. The dynamometer is an instrument that m_.asures
below-_ I rotationtorque by slowly rotating "herotor of the spin "notor
l while recording the stator rotationa_torque. The dynamometer
Prep I is use Iduring initialbuilds to establish the spinmotor _aring
occur preload (torque). The spin motorgeneratesapproximately4000
_1 dyne cm of starting torquewith normal excitation voltage; 800
I I I I dyne cm of this torque is used to overcome the inertia and
I I I I frictional torque of he m tor.
I X-3°°_° ms Inverter-/ Loage null/ Platform 140 was tested on the dynamometerand produced
I sysmm the torquepeaksof 3400 and3100 dynecm shown in figure4-8.
I ready The torque peaks were three revolutions apart. This is four
0 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 s times the normal running torque level for a new spin motor
Launchsequ_car clock,s and about four times the torque level for this spin motor for
the rest of its run. The torque increase lasted for about one-
•. Syst_n ready-x RFTR halfof a revolutionand repeatedwithin threerevolutions. The
"5,I spin motorbearings were cleaned and reassembled. Two largeInvomr Cagenull-_,,
" I1:'_ I I I t I I I I ! I I I ! t I I t I i I mj torque spikes of approximately 3000 dyne cm were observed: I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I l I I I I ! I I I I on the first revolution. A 2200-dyne cm torque hump, one
I [_ _73.9 ms _)24.5 ms J I I I revolution in duration, was centered at the beginning of the
L_ _7.7 ms 5050.7ms -- 1 1 1 second revoJution. From these results it was concluded that
IW_.i)ms - --J I something in the spin motor bearing was causing an abnormal _
i 6003.t ms - -- --=J frictional load in the bearing. This result isolated the problem
: Figure4-7.--Systemspinuptest,_.(Gatetimesarcwithin-_-_0msof that tO the spin motor bearing area and eliminated the motor
shownbecauseof dataprocessortolerance..) electrical characteristics as being a contributor.
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Figure 4-S.--Platform dynamometertorque t_'_. .
Runup and Rundown Tests to the spectrum of the coating on the failed bearings. The
_ conclusionof thisanalysisis that the soutceof the phenolic : * i
i" A series of tests were performedon spin motors96 and 140 is uncuredphenolic resins or resincompounds in the retainer. '
_. " to determinethe effect of motor running time on spin motor
start and running torq,e. Figure 4-9 shows the change in Retainerimocessing,--The retortermaterialis manufactured i i:!
_ .... rundown tir,le with change in motor run time. by a vendor to military specifications and screened to tighter i -:'L vehicle requirements for specific gravity. There is no specific
i. requirementconcerninguncuredresinsintheretainermaterial. _'
Summary of Case Study The ven_'_restimated an upper limit of i percent of uncured
F_Mprob/em cause.--Tbe 26 LSPT failuresat the site were resin in the retainer raw material. One percent would provide :
caused by the failureof tic G&C platform spin motors to spin 3 x 10-'s g of uncured resins, more than sufficient to cause
up within 6 sec after the command to get the vehicle ready the spin motor problem.
for launch. It wasdetermined that the spinmotors did not start The finished retainer material is cleaned by an extraction ;;
with normalapplicationof voltage. A polymerfilm bad formed process with benzeneor hexane. This process does not remove
on the bearing smfaces durin3 testing at 175 "F and caused a significant amountof uncured resins. Therefore, if ur.cured . "
the balls to stick t_, the outer racu. This film was identified resins survive the vendor processing, they will remain in the i
as fromthe alkylphenol and aikylbenzene families. Itssource uncured state in the installed retainers.
was determinedto be uncured resinsfrom the beating retainer. Mechanism offdmfonnation.-It is theorizedthattheuncured.
Polymer fdm.--A film approximately 900 A thick had resins are transferred fromthe retainerto the bearing surfaces iformed on the metal surfaces of the bearings of failed spin through the natural lubricatingprocess of the retainer.Running
motors. The amount of material generatedwas ~ 10-? g/ball, the spin motors generates centrifugal forces that sling the
To putthis number in proper perspective, 2 x 10-4 g of oil excess oil off the rotating surfaces, leaving a thin film of oil. J
is put on the b_aring raceduring initialbuild, and 2 x !0 -3 g The force of gravity during subsequent storage of the motor
of oil _s impregnated in the bearing retainer, causes the already thin film to become thinner on the top
Alkyl phunol/alkyl benzene is a generic identificagion of a surfaces and thickeron the lower surfaces. This redistribution
family of organic compounds. Further analysis identifies the process involves only the oil and leaves more viscous con-
majorcompounds in the family as phenol and methyl phenol taminantsin place. Subsequentrunningof the motorwill cause :_
(alkyl phenols) and toluene, xylene, and benzene (alkyl replacement ofoil on the oil-free surfaces. The source of the . ._
benzene,s).A phenolicpolymeric film would h_/e the gummy, replacement oil is the retainer capillaries. This replacement ,'_
-, adhesive, and insolubility properties detecte,c' in the analysis, process will cause the oil to bring any uncured phenolics to
: There is little doubt the gummy film detected was a phenol- the surfaceof the retainer.The metalsurfaces will then become
based material, lubricated with oil containing a small percentage of uncured
" Source ofphenol,--Phenols are used in three areas of the resins, Subsequent storage cycles and running will continue '*
spin motor. A phenolic adhesive bonds the stator laminations this redistribution process, steadily increasing the phenolic
togetherandbonds the hystertsis ringto the rotor.The bonding concentration. Exposure to a temperature of 175 °F and ex- , :_
processes adequately cure the phenol to the point where un- tendedoperationalmaintenance gradually cures these phenolics i "_
curedphenolswould notbe present. Also, the statorlaminations in two stages. Initially, _ highly viscous gummy residue is i
are coated with epoxy after bonding. The remaining source formed; finally, a hard insolublepolymer film is formed on the
is th¢ paper phenolic retainer, which serves as a spacer and metal surfaces. The film forms a bond between the balls and
a lubricationsource forthe spinmotorbearings. Mass spectral theraces.The coatingbuildsup to the pointwherethe spin motor
analysis of the retainers yielded spectra es_ntially identical torque cannotovercome the bond at initial power application.
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Extent ofproblem.--Analysis of failed and unfailed field (2) Most failures are random, with repetitive failures
unitsproved thatnot all platformsare susceptible to this failure, representing a small portion of unreliability.
Obviously, a high percentage are susceptible, since 26 failures (3) The rate at which failures occur depends upon
have been experienced. Itis likelythatmany unfailedplaffotm_ (a) The acceptance criteria, which determine how effec-
contain some small percentage of uncured resins, tively potential failures are detected
The significantly higher failure rate in the units with higher (b) All applied stresses, inciudingelectrical, mechanical.
serial numberspoints to a process (or common) failuremode. andenvironmental.(As these stresses increase,the failure :
All evidence points to lot-to-lot variations in the amount of rate usually increases.)
: uncuredresinsprese_.tin the re_iner raw material.Traceability (4) Publishedfailure ratedatarepresentthe potentialfailures
from retainer lot to individual platform spin motor was not expected of a part.The rate at which these failures areobserved
possible in this case, but such recordsshould beavailable. The depends on the appliedelectrical stresses (the stress _tio) and
26 units that have failed and the failure rate at the 14-day the mechanical stresses (the/CA factor).
intervalbound the total platform failure rate. The number of (5) In general, failure rate predictions are best applied on
spares available is adequateto meet system life and reliability a relative basis.
_ requirements. (6) Failure rate data can be used to provide reliability
S/re re//ab///ty.--The site system reliability goal allows criteria to be traded off with other performance parameters
i approximately two G&C failures per month for any cause, or physical configurations.
_, Analysisof testdata indicates thegoal can be achieved ateither (7) The reliab,_ty of a device can be increased only if the
a 7-daytest interval (0.8 failure/month)or a 14-daytest interval device's failure mechanisms and their activation causes are i
(!.5 failures/month). It cannot be achieved at a 21-day interval unc_erstood, i
i : (7.7 failures/month) or a 28-day interval (8.6 failures/month). In addi,ion, you should be able to use failure rate data to
Even though at least 74 percent of the site failures were predictthe failure rate expected of a design, andconsequently,
: restarted, a limited number of spare G&C's are available, to calculate the first term, Pc, of inherent reliability. Finally, |
Tests at the site revealed that most failed spin motors can you should be ableto allocate failure rate requirements to parts |
be restarted within 10 power applications and, once started, after having been given a reliability goal for a system or the |
will perform prope,-ly.The site procedure was revised to leave elements of a system. Iany failed G&C's d_._trestart within 10 attempts on line.
Platforms that did not start within I0 attempts were returned
to the contractor and were restarted by repetitive application References !
u
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la. Using the failure rate data in table 4-4 (on p. 51), calculate the flight failure rote for a launch vehicle "_
electronic subsystem consisting of the following parts (assume KA = 11_):
1
Component Number of
-. parts.
'! N
. Resistor, G657109/10 5
: Resistor, variable.I1176416 I
Capacitor. G657113 3 ;
Diode,G657092 3
i Tratmistor. I i 176056 4
_. Integrated circuit, analog, i 1177686 t
J
•_ A. 195 failures per 109 hours z
B. 195 000 failures per 109 hours ; !
C. 195 000 failures per 106 hours i
_,_ lb. Assume the flight failure rate for this circuit is 500 000 failures per 109 hours. Calculate the i :|
i; _ reliability of the circuit for a 0.01-hour flight, i
_. A. 0.9995 B. 0.99995 C. 0.999995 !
2. The a posteriori flight failure rate of a launch vehicle is 440 000 failures per 109 hours, f
i
a. If the storage failure rate is 0.3 of the operating rate, how long can the vehicle be stored with a , .!
90.4 percent probability of no failures?
A. 30 days B. 40 days C. 50 days '_,
b. After 1450 hours (2 months) in storage the vehicle is removed and checked out electronically, if
the vehicle passes its electronic checkout and the checkout equipment can detect only 80 percent
of the possible failures, what is the probability that the vehicle is good? (Ignore test time.) ;i
A. 0.962 B. 0.858 C. 0.946
3. A subassembly in a piece of ground supportequipment has a reliabilityrequirement of 0.995. Preliminary ,_
estimates suggest that the subassembly will contain 300 parts and operate for 200 hours. What is the
average part failure rate required to meet the reliability goal?
A. 25x!0 -6 B. 16667x!0 -_ C. 83x10 -9 :i
i 4. A piece of ground support equipment has a reliability goal of 0.9936. It contains four sub_'ssemblies
of approximately equal risk. ".
a. What is the allocated reliability goal of each of the four subassemblies? i_
I! ' A. 0.99984 B. 0.9984 C. 0.9884b. Allocating further into subassembly !. Assume the goal is 0.998. Solve for the average part failure
rate given the followsng:
Estimated parts count: 100
Estimated operating time: 10 hours
- A. 20 000xl0 -9 B. 2000XlO -_ C. 200x10 -9 _ .,
IAnswers are given at the end of this manual. },
rI
' !
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TABLE 4-.4.--SELECTED us'rING--APPROVED ELECTRONIC
FAILURE RATESFOR LAUNCH VEHICLE APPLICATIONo
Pat',,amber Pan Opentinll medes_Non--ins %
reader,
Failurerate,failures/l_ hr
;" lmegmed circuits :
I I177680/81/82/83/84/85 Digital 10 3
" I It77(_16 Analog 30 to
_" Trushtors
[ 6557155 Double switch 10 3
i 6557318/19 Med_ switch 20
6557046 PNP type of transistorI 1176911 Medium-powerswitch
_.- n!176056 High-speedswitch
i 1177685 Fkld-effect transimor
63100311 2N5201 10
655_/2 2N915(unmalched) 50 $
Diodes ,
6557061 Rcclifer andlogic (5 V) 20 3
6557O92 Re_ifm sad Iosk (30 v) 5
6557123 Recfifio"aedlogic(50 V) [ :l
fxS57t7.5 P.:ctifi_r andlogic (6013V)
I 1176912 Rectifier andlogic (400 V) _ " tt
Rc_iuors ]:" * 6557018 2.5-W wimwound 2 I
655"/015 I/8-W wirewound 3 2 . ,_
6557016/17 1-and2-W wirewound 2 .5 i
6557030 IllO-W fixed film I .5 ii
6557031 6-W wirewound $ .5 i
d
6557109/10 1/4-W fixed composition I .2 i
6557329 i/8-W fixed film I .3 l
I 1176416 I-W variable metal film 50 10.3
Capacitors i'
G657020/21/22 Fixed glast 0. I O.I
G657113/173 Fixedceramic I 5 I
G657114 Fixedceramic I0 I
G6571191120 Solidtanlalum 2 I
G657202 Precision,fixedceramic 50 3
Relays
I 11763261453 DPDT armature 100 20
Transformers(RF) i
i
11301034135/43149 10 5 ]
113010154 I $ | .'_
It: RF coil
"""--:_ G657140141 3 2
; G657178181 10 2 _
RF fill_r
i G657189 50 5 . t-....
i ....
i, ICurg;IM[llilUll¢It41e"l'lldWl_lvlillhl_[¢,_III_ _oUf_¢_I¢¢h 4-l lnd1-4), _ - " -
bAplMI¢_I_ III lll_ mlnllwfsof _ns d_wn, (Wtw,a c,¢_,"_b_w_,l
' ,i
1
• [ 5)
........... ........... : _ .... : .... _, _
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: Chapter5 i";
Applying Probability Density Functions I
! The inherent reliabilityof equipmentis defined in chapter3 as In a similar fashion we can find the probability of x being
.: within any other interval, say between c and d. from
i R_=e-_'/',t'.. __
! r d !
where
P(c<-x<-d)= _ p(x) dr
t .
R_ probability of no failures /:.:
e -x' probability of no catastrophic part failures
This is shown in figure 5-2. i_P, probability of no tolerance failures Example I: Suppose we were to perform an experiment in
i P.. probability of no wearout failures which we measuredthe height of oak trees in a l-acre woods. '
Before discussing the P, and P,,.termsin the next chapter, it The result, if our measuring accuracy is :t:5 feet, might look
:_. is necessary to develop an understanding of probability density like the histogram shown in figure 5-3.
functionsand cumulativeprobability functions. These concepts The value at the top of each histogram cell (or bar) indicates
form another part of probability theory not discussed in the number of trees observed to have a he!,#t within the ;,
chapter 2. First, in this chapter the theory of density and boundaries of that cell. For example, 19 trees had a height
cumulative functions is discussed in general; then the normal, between 0 and 10 feet, 17 trees had a height between 10 and
or Gaussian, distribution is discussed in detail. This normal 20 feet, etc. The figure shows that 100 trees were observed. "
distribution is used extensively later in the manual. Now let us calculate values for the ordinate of the histogram
so that the area under the histogram equals unity. Then, we
will establish a probability density function for the tree heights.
Probability Density Functions Since we observed 100 trees, it should be apparent that if the '
calculated ordinate of a cell times the width of the ,:eli (the
Ifa chance variable x can take on values only within some cell area) yields the percentage of 100 trees in that cell, the
interval, say between a and b, the probaJility densiW function sum of the percentage in all cells will have to equal 100
p(x) of that variable has the property that (ref. 5-1) percent. Of, if the percentages are expressed as decimal
fractions, their sum will equal I, which will be the total area
i, under the histogram. Therefore,p(x) dx = i
Percent of trees in cell , i]
:i =-._ In other words the area under the curvep(x) is equal to unity. Ordinate of cell Width of cell
i This is shown in figure 5-1.In the language of probability, the probability of x being
=_-T within the interval (a,b) is given by For the cell 0 to 10 feet, which has 19 percent of the trees in it,
; I t' 19i P(a < x < b) ffi dr Cell ordinate -- _ x " = 0.019 I
-'I ap(x) ffi I I00 I0
Ii Inother words the probability that x lies between a and b is As a check, we can see that
_t I. This should be clear, since a can take only values between
', a and b. Cell ordinate= 0.019 × Cell width (10) ---0.19, or 19percent
t
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TABLE 5-1.--.CALCULATION OF CELL i
Equation of curve p(x)--_ ORDINATES FOR TREE DATA _;
\ {
I-- Are8 gl'd_r Cell Ordinate Area. I '
,, f I/ '_ UfIRy 19 ,i_ cellonlinate0-10 _ = 0.019 0.19
.. : IO0 x 10
a x b "
17
10-20 -- = 0.017 .1_
Figure 5-1.--Probability dcn.,,ity funclkm curve. 103
15
Area under p(X) between x,, c and 20-30 -- = 0:015 .15
x = d is probability that x lies tO'
between c and d -_ 30-40 --=13 0.013 .13
r p(x)
/ II
40-50 -- = 0.011 .ll J
9 {
-- = 0.009 .09 { .
a c d b to._
": 7 ' •
Figure 5-2.--Applkmion ef probability dell_ity furRlion. (30-70 -- = 0.007 .0"7
" _ lO-_
5
19 70-80 -- = 0.005 .05
I0-_
i
f
17 3
80-90 -- = 0.003 .03 ;_
15 103
] • •
]_ 13 90-100 -- = O.OOl .01 '10._
J= 11 I
o To_aiarea t I.O0j ' ,9
"6 _ .o2o':'.',+::.:.:.:.:.
j_ :':+:':':
:!:i:_:!:_:7
E .018i:i:_!:!:i.....:;_,,!:_._::
!ii!iii!ili , !!iis r
:.:.::--!!_!_::.!_ .016 /'
__- .012
_.i o _o 20 so 40 so so 7o _o go _oo ._'.o,o .:i
,, Tree height, x, It 4I "
i Figure 5-3.--Height of trees c_-;erved in I-uc;'e wtxxls. { t{
t ,006
in a similar fashion the ordinates for the other cells can be .oo4 :_
calculatedand are shownin table 5-1 and figure 5-4. .oo2 i
The next step (fig. 5.-4) is to draw a llne throughthemidpoint
of the cells. The equation of this line is called the probability
density functionp(x) and has the form o lO 2o so 4o so so 70 eo 9o 1ooTree height,x, ft i
p(X) = -0.0002x + 0.02 Figure 5-4,--Pnff_ability density functitmfor treeheights, "i
!.... 54 ,*
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[V _ r_'_J_ ,t¢,',_, _*-, '-,_._- - -_ -_-,,._"_ _,_l_'-.'_ _,-",_- _t f_
I I ......
" ' ._ _ will exceed 90 ft-]
X2 IO0 ._ _ .
• = --- + O.02xl = ---(100)2+ 0.02(100) _ p(x)__0.0002x+O.02_/ , .'
o j :
,,:, _ 104+2=_i+2= I I I I I I l I
, i04 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Target miss distance, ft
:_ Thisagreeswithourrequirementthattheareaunderaprobability Figure5-5.--Probability densityfunctionformissiletargetmissdislance.. densityfunctionequalunity.
_-: a failure rate requirement for equipment (such as a missile)
' specified to operate in some temperaturerangewith a required
Application of Density Functions accuracy.
i Example 2: Suppose a missile has a maximum target miss
Now let us see how we can apply the density function to the distance requirement of 90 feet and that after several hundred
. tree data. I'o find the percentage of trees between 60 and 80 firings the probability density function for miss distance is
feet high, solve for
• p(x) = -O.O002x + 0.02 where 0 < x _< 100
P(60<x<_80)= p(x) dx = (-O.0002x + 0.02) dx which is the sameas thep(x) for the treeexample.This is shown
!.. 6o 6o in figure 5-5.
i:-. _ z" " _ I To predicttheprobabilitythathenextmissilefiredwillmiss
10 4 + 0.02X 60= -- -- (802 -- 602) + 0.02(80 -- 60) the target by more than 90 feet, solve for10 4
_ 1 1I°°104(2800) + 0.4 = --0.28 + 0.4 P(90 < x -< 100)= oo (-O'O002x + 0.02) dx ,
- + O.02x
--0.12, or 12 percent 10 4
Figure5-3 shows that this answer is correct, since 12/100trees _ 1 (1002_902) + 0.02(100-90)
were observed to have a height between 60 and 80 feet. 104
Another way to look at this example is that there is only a
12-percentchance that a tree picked at random from the l-acre _ 1900 + 0.02(10)
area would have a height between 60 and 80 feet. In a similar 10 4
fashionwe can calculate the probabilitythat a tree would have
any range of heights within the Ix_undaryof 0 to 100 feet. = - 0.19 + 0.2 = 0.01, or 1 percent
'. In the treeexample, we were able to measure the trees in ai
perficularpertof thewoods andto obtaina heightdensityfunction In other words there is a 99-percent chance that the missile
:, for those trees. But what do we do if we are interested in a will hit within 90 feet of the target and a l-percent chance _i
different area of woods and for some reason we are not able that it will not. This is shown as the shaded area under the
-_ to go out and measure the trees.'?We would probably assume density function in figure 5-5.
i that the acre we measuredwas representativeof all other acres
i in the same woods. If we accept this assumption,we could then
." i use our experience (the established density function) to predict Cumulative Probability Distribution
"", the distributionof treeheights in an unmeasuredacre. And this
i is exactly what is done in industry. Another practical tool in probability calculation is the !i
i As you can see, if we know what the density functions are cumulativeprobabilitydistributiou,denotedby F(x) (ref. 5-3). 1
_ for such things as failure rates, operating temperatures, and An F(x) curve for the tree example in the preceding section i
:..... i missileaccuracy,it iseasy to determinetheprobabilityofmeeting is Shown in figure 5-6. The curve represents the cumulative j
I
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[:,TABLE S-L--ORDINATES FOR CUMULATIVE
1•0 ! _ DISTRIBUTION OF TREE DATA !}
,9 Tree height, Area under Ordinate ofp(x_ curve _ "_
ft p(x) curve (cumulative a,'ea)
._ 20-30 . 15 .5 I
.6 30-40 .13 .6.1
i ,5 _____i0) _ _ 40-505 -6 .09ll .8475 ' .
0 0 9
.4 70-80 .05 .96 ;
8 -9 . 3 .99 i
.3 9o-wo .ol i.oo I
probability function F(x) is found from
.1
V I I I I I I I I I F(x) = _ p(x) dr t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 I
Treeheight,x, ft and b
_ I,, p(x) dx = F(b) - F(a)
Figure 5-6.--Cumulative probability function for tree heights.
_i : For the :ree example
: : areaunder the probability density function p (x). The ordinates
I ;of the curve were calculated as shown in table 5-2. F(x) = (-O.0002x + 0.02) dr = - -- + 0.02x
. The cumulative curve can be used to solve the same prob- 104
: iems as the density curve. .
Exmnple 3: Referring again to example 1, suppose we want Consequently, we can find the probability of a variable x being Jl
to know the probability that a particular tree selected at random within some interval by using the cumulative function F{x)
from the woods will have a height between 30 and 50 feet. even though the cumulative graph is not available•
_ Example 4: What is the probability that a tree selected atSolution 3A: Using the density function for tree height,
i random will have a height less than 20 feet?
_'r Solution 4:._)
Ii
P(30 _ x -_ 50) = _[_0 (-0.0002x + 0.02) dr
• P(0 < x _< 20) = p(x) dr = F(20) - F(0)
o
r 2 1_ x 2 _)• - + O.02x
[[i_ -- 104 + 0.02X 130 10 4
o
Ii20:00 ,0;1lift +0.40 = -i'_ + _ -0
= -0.04 + 0.4 = 0.36, or 36 percent ii
= -0.16 + 0.40 = 0.24, or 24 percent
" _ which agrees with a graphical solution. _
&dution 3B: Using the cumulativecurve shown in figure 5-5, Some general rules for the use of the cumulative function 'i
F(x) are
P(30 < x < 50) = F(50) - F(30) = 0.75 -0.51 '_
(1)P(x< a) = F(a) ,_
- = 0.24, or 24 percent (2) P(x > a) = 1 - F(a) _!
which agrees with solution 3A. (3) P(a < x < b) = F(b) - F(a) :
Note that in working out solution 3A the next-to-last step -
(0.75 - 0.51) is the same as the next-to-last step of solution Example 5: Suppose we would Eke t:- ;.,_owthe probability
3B. The reason for this is that the equation of the cumulative of eq,ipment seeing tropic zoneient _eratures above 120 "F
,i
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H..ii l
i_ • 4o t i i
_':,_ ' o_ 30 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 Height,5.2 5.4(t 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 J
• ':" 20i..IT I I I I I i
Figure5-8.--Histogramanddensityfunctionforheightsofchildren.
0 I I for theheightsof thechildren.Sucha curve(sometimescalled i
i
_ 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 a hell curve) isthe shapeoftbe normaldigtribu_ion. We say :iTropiczone temperature,OF that the children's heights are distributed normally.
Figure5-7.--Cumulativedistributionof tropiczonetemperatures. Normal Density Function
i' duringoperationbecause_tabove1200_-,,"......._",_toadda The equationforthedensityfunctionp(x) ofthenormal
costlyair-conditioningsystemtotheequipment.Ifwe could distributions
obtainthetemperaturedata,we mightfindthathecumulative
distributionfortropiczonetemperatureswouldbethatshown I -(.,.-.;5'-/2o-"
; in figure 5-7.
Solution 5: From the curve the probability of observing a
i: temperature at or above 120 "F is given by .
This curve is shown in figure 5-9. The function p (x) has two
parameters. The first is the mean 2 calculated fromP(temp > 120 OF)= ! - F( 120 °F) = 1 - 0.97
II
= 0.3, or 3 percent _ = _1 _ .r_
t_ i=1
With only a 3-percentchanceof temperaturesab_ 120OF,
we probablywoulddecideagainstair-conditioPig (all other
parameters,suchas failure rate, beingequal).
Normal Distribution p(x)..__ •-¢'-_)_/_°_7/
One of the most frequently used density functions in .4 - /
reliabilityengineering is the normal,or Gaussian, distribution. Pointof N_ /
" ' A moredescriptivename, however, is the norma curve of _ .3 -- infl_tlon-_
error because it represents the distributionof errorsobserved ifrom repeated measurements of an object or some physical .2 ,," curveequals
phenomenon (ref. 5-4). ctevla
, Example 6: Assume that we need to measure the heights .1 -
.- [ of eighth grade children. A histogram of the children's heights
would resemble the curve in figure 5-8, If, as in our tree 0
example, we calculate an ordinate for the histogram so that -4a -30 -20 -lo _' lo 20 _1o 40
the area under the histogram equals unity and then connect Staada_zed normalvariable
the midpoints of each cell, we obtain a smooth curve as showu
. ", in figure 5-8. This curve represents the density function Figure5-9.-Normal densityfunction.
t 57
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where TABLE5-3.--AREASBETWEEN-z ANDz
n total number of measurements or observations
z Areaundercurve Probability.
•ri value of ith measurement --: _<x < : ",,
The mean, therefore, is the arithmeuc average of the meas- _ 0.683 P(- Io < x _<Io)
' urements. From example 6 we would add up all the heights 2 .9545 P(-2o _<x _<20)
observed and then divide by the numberof children measured 3 .9973 P( -30 _ x <_30) :
to obtain a mean or average height. The mean of all the 4 .999937 P(-4o _<._-_<40) , .
children's heights from the data in figure 5-8 is 5.3 feet. 5 .999999426 P(-5o < x <-50)6 .99999999803 P(-60 _<x _<60)The second parameter ofp(x) is the standard deviation 0:. 7 .999999999992 P(-7o _<x <_70) :
calculated from
[_ -h,'2 standard deviations can be found from
(xi - _c)2Jo= Li=l n - 1 I I/2(=)2
p[-z --<x <_Z] = Area = I=_.:_ e- dz
where
! ./ mean of measurements The areas for various values ofz are shown in table 5-3. This
table says that the area under the normal curve between !o
xi value of i_hmeasurement
and - 1o is 0.683, or 68.3 percent; the area under the normal
n total number of measurements curve between 20 and -20 is 0.9545, or 95.45 percent, etc.
_ Note that n - 1 is used in the equation in order to give an Example 7"The term "30 limit" refersto the area under the i
unbiased sampling distribution. Inthe general definition of o, normal curve between 30 and -3o, which is 0.9973, or 99.73 i_
n instead of n - 1 would be used. percent, as shown in table 5-3. Therefore, if a power supply ]
The standard deviation is the square root of the variance, output isdefinedas 28.4-3 V and the ± 3 V representsa 30 limit,
which is denoted by 02. The magnitude of the variance, as 99.73 percent of all such power supplies will have an cutput
well as the standard deviation, indicates how far all the between 25 and 31 V. The percentage of supplies having an
measurements deviate from the mean. The standarddeviation output greater than 31 V and less than 25 V will be 1 - 0.9973 •
of the children's height data, for example, is approximately = 0.0027, or 0.27 percent. This is shown in figure 5-10.
0.3 foot. If the range of heights observed had been from 5 Up to nov, we have been working with areas under the
to 5.6 feet, the standard deviation would have been approx- normal density function between integers of o, that is, !, 2,
imately 0.1 foot. And with this standard deviation the 3, etc. In practice, however, we are usually interested in the
distribution would look squeezed together as shown by the area between decimal fractions of o, those being 1.1, 2.3, etc.
dashed curve in figure 5-8. However, the area under the We have also been using z to represent the number of standard
dashed curve would still equal the area under the solid curve, deviations that a particular limit value is from the mean. For
instance, in the power supply example 25 V was given as being
Properties of Normal Distribution three standarddeviations from the mean of 28 V. It is better
when working in decimal fractions of o to let z = (x - ./:)/o,
The normal density functionis a continuousdistribution from where x - ./is the distance from the mean ./to the limit value
-_ to _. It is symmetrical about the mean and has an area and o is the standard deviation. Going back to the supply
equal to unity as required for probability density functions, example, our lower limit was 25 V. This was 3 V from the " _
For ttJe normal distribution the standard deviation is the mean of 28 V, and the standard deviation was 1 V; therefore, :_
distance on the abscissa from the mean ./to the intercept on z--(25-28)/1 =-3.
the abscissa of a line drawn perpendicular to the abscissa ,i
- through the point of inflection on the curve. This is shown
in figure 5-9. It is also shown that equal increments of the Symmetrical Two-Limit Problems ,i
standarddeviation can be laid out to the left (-) and the right In this discussion the term "symmetrical two-limitproblems" _4
(+) of the mean .L refers to the area under the density function at equal values ,:i
As you will recall, in determining probabilities from a of z from both sides of the mean. The power supply example
density function, we need to calculate the area underthe curve was of this type, since we were concerned with the area
p (x). When using the normal density function, it is common between - 30 and 30 fi, :_the mean:v.1"oworkthese problems
i practice to relate areas to the standard deviation. In general, when z is a decimal fry.tion, we ,_setables of areas in the two
for the area under the curve between the values of z and -z. tails of the normal curve.
; 58
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TABLE 5-4.--AREAS IN TWO TAILS OF NORMAL CURVE AT SELECTED VALUES OF =
IFrom reference5-1 .l
z 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 O.01; 0.09
i
'+' 0 1.0000 0.9920 0.9840 10.9761 0.9681 0.9601 0.9522 0.9442 0.9362 0.9283
-_; . I .9203 .9124 .9045 .8966 .8887 .8808 .8729 .8650 .8572 .8493 i
;" .2 .8415 .8337 .8259 .818! .8103 .8026 .7949 .7872 ,7795 .7718 i
+. .3 .7642 .7566 .7490 .7414 .7339 .7263 .7188 .7114 .7039 .6965 |
.4 .6892 .6818 .6745 .6672 .6599 .6527 .6455 .6384 .6312 .6241 l_ .5 .6171 ,6101 .6031 .5961 .5892 .5823 .5755 .5687 .5619 .5552
_, _ .6 .5485 .5419 .5353 .5287 .5222 .5157 .5093 .5029 .4965 .4902
r-.,++_ .7 .4839 .4777 .4715 .4654 .4593 .4533 .4473 .4,13 .4354 .4295
.8 .4237 .4179 .4122 .4065 .4009 .3953 3898 .3843 .3789 .3735
.9 .3681 3625 .3576 .3524 .3472 .3421 .3371 .3320 .3271 3222
i.0 .3173 .3125 .3077 .3030 .2983 .2937 .2891 .2846 .2801 .2757
!. I .2713 :2670 ,2627 .2585 .2543 .2501 .2460 .2420 .2380 .2340 ,i
1.2 .2301 .2263 .2225 .2187 .2150 .2113 .2077 .2041 .2005 .1971
1.3 .1936 .1902 .1868 .1835 .1802 .1770 .1738 .1707 .1676 .1645
i ,.4 .1615 .1585 .1556 .1527 .1499 .1471 .1443 .1416 .1389 .1362
1.5 .1336 .1310 .1285 .1260 .1236 .1211 .1188 .1164 .!141 .1118 ]
1.6 .1096 .1074: .1052 .1031 .1010 .0989 .0969 .0949 10930 .0910 I!
1.7 .0891 .0873 .0854 .0836 .0819 .0801 .0784 .0767 .0751 .0735 ]
t',, 1.8 .0719 .0703 .0688 .0672 .0658 .0643 .062_ .0615 .0601 .05881.9 .0574 .0561 .0549 .0536 .0524 .0512 .0500 .0488 .0477 .0466
2.0 .0455 .0444 .0434 .0424 .0414 .0404 .0394 .0385 .0375 .0366 '-t
2. I .0357 .0349 .0340 .0332 .0324 .0316 .0308 .0300 .0293 .0285
2.2 .0278 .0271 .0264 .0257 .0251 .0244 .0233 .0232 .0226 .0220 ., !
2.3 .0214 .0209 .0203 .0198 .0193 .0188 .0183 .0178 .0173 .0168
2.4 .0164 .0160 .0155 .0151 .0147 .0143 .0139 .0135 .0131 .0128 i
i I
2.5 .0124 .0121 .0117 .0114 .0111 .0108 .0105 .0192 .00981 .009641
2.6 .00932 .00905 .00879 .00854 .00829 .00805 .00781 .00759 .0073_ .007Ii;
2.7 .00693 ,00673 .00653 ,00633 .00614 .00596 .00578 .00561 .0054t .0052' .i
2.8 .00511 .00495 .00480 .00465 .00451 .00437 .00424 .00410 .00398 .00385 t
2.9 .00373 .00361 .00350 1 .00339 .00328 .00318 .00308 .00298 .00288, .00279 +!
' z 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0,5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
: l _+4
3 0,00270 0.00194 0,00137 0,0:_67 0,3674 0,0.M65 0,0-+3I8 0,0-;216 0.0-+145 0,04962 j
: 4 '04633 '04413 "04267 '04171 '04108 '0"s680 '0"_422 '0"s26_ I '06159 '06958 _
5 .06573 .0e340 .06199 .0_116 .07666 .07380 .07214 .07120 I .{P663 ,0_364 4! 6 .0al97 .08106 .09565 ,09298 .0_155 .010803 .0t°411 "0t°208 I '01°105 "0H520
+i_ Table5-4 shows tabu!atedareasin two tailsof the normal Whatpercentageof the transistorswill have a _ within the i+i
i curve forselectedvaluesof z fromthemean_. Forexample, requiredlimits? '+_
+.+_.j whenz = 3.0, the tableshows that0.00270 of the totalarea Solution 8: Step I_ So_v_ for Z.
! lies in the two tails of the curvebelow-3o andabove30.
Becausethe curve is symmetrical,0.00135 of the areawill
: x-_= 105-30=180-105=75
lie to the leftof -3o and0.00135 t.othe rightof 3o. Note+_ tha thisagreeswithfigure5- I0 forthepowersupplyexampl .
+ F,zample 8 (_;ingtable3-4): Supposethata circuitdesign Since o is given as 32,
requiresthatthe gain_ of a transistorbe no less than30 and
! no greaterman 180. The mean._of the_ densityfunctionof =--=75 2.34 :
. L _. _ a p_trticulattransistoris LOSwitha standarddeviationof 32. z 32
! +.l
,+ +
++:+'':+ ..... ' + ,, ++.:_..+_,'.i.:":,i:';.::.,.:.,,, , ? _t_?_._;`' ,:, .... + '! , i• , , ... +++ j..++ +:_+,++............+ .+,+++.+.,..... :, j * J +
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_25 V<x <31 V)=99.73 percent7 the area under one tail of the density function as shown in
: Lower /1 /" Upper figure 5-12. Tabulated values of the area in one tail of the
limit--N.,i /" ii limit normal density function at selected values of z are given in "_
0.00135 ii "X ! willhave Example 9: Suppose an exploding bridgewire (EBW) powerwillhave
. '_ ! anoutput supply is required to produce an output voltage of at least :
lessenoutputbhanI I : :i :\ I greater 1500 V. At this outputvoltage or greater, all of the bridgewire
.... ... ! \ I than detonatorswill explode. If the mean outputof all such supplies I
25 V_ : : ! _ I :11V7 is known to be 1575 V and the standard deviation is 46 V, [ '
I ' . :::;: :l i:::. : what is the probability that an output of 1500 V or greater
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 will be observed?
Observedvoltage,V Solution 9: Step l--Calculate z.
I I I I l I ,..J
-30 -2o -lo _" lo 2o 3o Mean limit 1575 - 1500 75
z - - = -- = 1.63
Figure5-IO.--Probabilitydensityfunctionsforpowersupplyoutputs, or 46 46
Step2--Find the area in one tail of the normal curve at z from
Step 2--From table 5--4 the area in the two tails when z = 2.34 the mean. From table 5-5 the tail area at z = 1.63 from the
is 0.0193. Therefore, because of symmetry, 0.00965 of the mean is given as 0.0516. Therefore, there is a 0.0516 prob-
[- transistors will have a _ below 30 and 0.00965 will have a ability that an observed output will be below 1500 V.
_. _ above 180.
: Step 3--Find the probability that the output will be 1500 V
Step 3--Now find P(30 <_# _< 180). Since 0.0193 of the or greater. Since from step 2, P(x <_ 1500) = 0.0516,
transistors will have a j8 below 30 or above 180, then
! I - 0.0193 must give the percentage that will lie between 30 P(x > 1500) = i - P(x < 1500) = 1 - 0.0516
and 180. This is 1 - 0.0193 = 0.9807, or 98.07 percent, as
shown in figure 5-11. If we were to buy 100 000 of these = 0.9484, or 94.84 percent
transistors, we would expect 98 070 of them to have afl ' "'
between 30 and 180. The remaining 1930 would not meet our I
requirements. _----_ --- .a
One-Limit Problems X _/- P(xz lowerlimit) i:
in ma_y applications engineers are interested only in one- Lower _'/ I
sided limits, an upper or lower limit, rather than a two-sided limit -N. /_ _
upper and lower limit. In these cases they are interested in \x , x.
_30 _ _<180)- I - 0.0193- 0.98077 I : .....
/ \ _ x--_+
/
=---2.34a----_ 4----.y-2.34a-,, (It) L P(x< lowerlimit)
/
• Lo.er I r upper
limit "X :::l ,' j : _, /-- limit _x _ upperlimit)-_,\
• -- ; ; ,:::;,I ;:.:: ,i,i limit
I 3041 73 105 137 169 180
I Tr_lslstorgain,13
, a,, ,,
I l, I I I I I I _ x'-_+ i
I -.,Io _o -10 _ 1o 20 30 (b) _x> upperlimit)--/
L o,oo_ O.O0_S
Ilobelow lieId_ovll. (u)Lowerlimit.
I1" 30 p_ 180 .J (b) UPl_rlimit.
:. Figure5-I I.--Transislorguin, Figure5-12.--Exampleof one.limitproblems.
TABLE 5-5.--AREAS IN ONE 'FAIL OF NORMAL CURVE AT SELECTED VALUES OF = [ffl
IIFmm re_rence 5-1.]
.J
1
I 0.09: 0 o.ol 0.02 0.03 0.04 . 0.05 0.00 .0.07 0.08
0 0.5000 0.4960 0.4920 0.4880 0.4840 10.4801 0.4761 0.4721 0.4681 0.4641 =
i
•I .4602 .4562 ,4522 .4483 .4443 .4404 .4364 .4325 .4286 .4247
•2 .4207 .4168 .4129 .4090 .4052 .4013 .3974 .3936 .3897 .3859
•3 .3821 .3783 .3745 .3707 .3669 .3632 .3594 .3557 .3520 .3483 i|
.4 .3446 .M09 .3372 .3336 .3300 .3264 .3228 .3192 3156 .3121
•5 .3085 .3050 .3015 .2981 .2946 .2912 .2877 .2843 ,2810 .2776
•6 .2743 ,2709 .2676 ,2643 .2611 .2578 .2546 .2514 .2483 .2451
.7 .2420 .2389 .2358 .2327 .2296 .2266 .2236 .2206 .2177 ,2148
' 8 .2119 .2090 .2061 .2033 .2005 .1977 .1949 .1922 .1894 ,1867
.9 .1841 .1814 .1788 .1702 .1736 .1711 .1685 .1660 .1635 ,1611
1.0 .1587 .1562 .1539 .1515 .1492 .1469 .1446 .1423 .1401 ,1379
tI.I .1357 .1335 .1314 .1292 .1271 .1251 .1230 .1210 .1190 .1170!.2 .1151 .1131 .1112 .1093 .1075 .105o .1038 .1020 .1003 ,0985
1.3 .0968 .0951 .09M .0918 .0901 .0885 .0869 .0853 .0838 .0823
1,4 .0808 0793 ,0778 .0764 .0749 .0735 .0721 .0708 .0694 .0681 |
1.5 .0668 .0655 .0643 .0630 .0o:_ .0606 .0594 .0582 .0571 .0559
1.6 .0548 .0537 .0526 .0516 .0505 .0495 .0485 .0475 .0465 .0455
1.7 .0446 .0436 .0427 .0418 .0409 .0401 .0392 I .C384 .0375 .0367
1,8 .0359 .0351 .0344 .0336 .0329 .0322 .0314 ] ,0307 .0301 .02941.9 .0287 .0281 .0274 .0268 .0262 .0256 .0250 . .0244 .0239 ._233
2.0 ,0228 .0222 .0217 .0212 .0207 0202 .0197 .0192 .0188 .0183
2.1 ,0179 .0174 .0170 .0166 .0162 .0158 .0154 .0;50 .0146 .0143
2.2 .0139 .0136 .0132 .0129 ,0125 .0122 .Oil9 .0016 .0113 .OliO
2.3 .0107 .0104 .0102 ,00990 ,00964 .00939 00914 .00889 .00866 ,00842
2.4 .00820 .00798 0076 .00755 .00734 .00714 .00695 .00676 .00657 .006,39
2.5 .00621 .00604 .00587 .00570 .00554 .00539 .00523 .00508 .00494 .00480
2.6 00466 .00453 .00440 .00427 ,00415 .00402 .00391 .00379 .00368 .00357
2.7 .00347 .00336 .00326 .00317 .00307 ,00298 .00289 .00280 .007272 .00264
2.8 .00256 .00248 .00240 .00233 .00226 .00219 ,00212 .00205 .00199 .00193
2.9 .00187 .00181 .00175 .00169 .00164 .00159 .00154 .00149 .00144 .00139
z 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0,9
3 0.00135 0.05968 0.0-_687 0.0M83 0.03337 0.0._233 O.ffq 59 0.0-_108 0.04723 0.W481 t
4 ,0_317 .0_207 .0a133 .05854 ,0-_541 ,056340 .05211 .05 130 .0_793 .0_'479 _'!
5 .0_287 .t_170 .07996 .07579 .07333 .07190 .07107 .0_599 ,0s332 .0Xl82
6 .0_87 .0_530 .0_82 .0_149 ,0!'1777 .0i°402 .01_v206 .0 I°104 .0' '523 ,011260
i
., We can therefore expect to obtain a lS00-V output voltage So. for the normal distribution
level 94.84 percent of the time. Or to express it anotherway.
'=_'_ ' 94.84 percent of the supplies will produce an output above I ['
the minimum requirement of 1500 V. This result is shown in F(x) = _'_ 3 e" u21(.,-, ),ol" ,/_figure 5-13. As_aciated with the probabilitydensity function
_ . p(x) of the normal dist,ibution is a cumulative probability
distribution denoted by F(x). As shown in the integral or in z notation
formulas of chapter 2 the relationbetween thetwo is given by
I I -11/2)=2l:(x)= I p(x) F(z)= e dz
61
• .. . , , . ' _: i i_
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................. .._ ...........T ".=............... .9 "_/
............... . ........................
q
d(3) That the area between -1o and ._ is
t.._..- Meanvalue
,¢1-'[,_ O
q P( - la <_x _ .0 = F(£) - F( - la) %
,,--_o =aev = 0.5 - 0.16 = 0.34
/
:Nlkower s /- Distribution ,
-" _,/ ofoutput o- that there is a 0.34 probability that a variable x will i"limit -_ i: lie between the mean _ and -lo
x For more accurate work the c"mulative areas for selected ! /
i- valuesofzhavebeentabulatedandareshownintables5-6and _5-7. Table5-6 shows the cumulativeareasfor values ofz from i
; / 1500V 157SV _ - oe to 0, which is illustratedin figure 5-15, Table 5-6 ,:hows ' /
Lpmbabmtyeu,t _ProbabUllythat (!) That at z = 0 (i.e., when the distance from the limit to
F._° out_willlm_..._ out_twiUbeabove _ is 0) the cumulative area from - oo to _' is 0.5000,
_ 1800V=0.0516 1500V= 0.9484 or 50 percent J
Figure 5-13.--Exploding bridg:wire power supply output. (2)isThat0.1587,atz =-1.0or15.87thepercentCUmulativearea from-oo to-lo .!,i!
1.0 -- (3) Thatat z = -2.0 the cumulativeareafrom - ooto -20is 0.02275, or 2.275 percent
i 9 -- Table 5-7 shows the cumulative areas for values of z from
0 to oo. This is illustrated in figure 5-16.
I_ .a -- In both tablcs the value ofz is the same as F(x). It therefore
.7 -- F(x) . jx p(x)dx follows
• " (1) Thatthe probabilityof the variablex lying between - oo
_ and _ is
.6
'_ .S -- p( -oo _;x <._) =F(_)-F(-oo)
a"
.4 - = F(z = O)- F(z = - oo) "
.e'a_- i,:_:_:i =0.5- 0 =0.5,or50percent ,_
J
_l (2) Thattheprobabilityof the variablex lyingbetween-2. l o•1 -- ,,_._ and3.2ois
0 --Jr' _! P(-2.1o<x_3.2o)--F(3.2)--F(-2.1)
Figure5-,4.--CumulativenormalcuP.'e. =F(z=3.2)-F(z=-2. I) !]0.9993129 - 0.01786
A graph of Fix) is shown in figure 5-14. Recall that in = 0.9814529, or 98 percent - i
_ discussing cumulative functions earlier, F(x) was called '_
the cumulative aac." under the dens-;ty curve. Looking at Nonsymmetrkal Two-Lknit Problems i]
._.._, figure 5-14. then, you can _e The cumulative functionis useful for solving nonsymmetrical ]
(!) That F(._) = 0.5, or that 50 percent of the area under two-limit problems, whichare, in practice,the most frequently
the normal distribution is between -oe and the mean _: encountered. ._
• or that there is a 50-percent probability that a variable x Example !0: Suppose that a time-delay relay is requiredto
.... lies in the interval (-co, _) delay the transmission of a signal at least 90 sec but no more
(2) That i - F(X) - 0,5, or that 50 percent of the area than 98 sec. if the mean "time out" of the specific type of
under the normal distribution is between the mean _ and relay is 95 sec and the standarddeviation is 2.2 sec, what is ,
_o;or thatthere is a 50-percent probabilitythat a variable the probability that the signal will he delayed within the ,
x ties in the interval (_, eel specified times? i
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TABLE 5-7.--CUMULATIVE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FROM : = 0 to Do _1
IFrom reference5-2,1
: ,5i :
-- 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0,08 0.09 : ._4i
0 0.5000 0.5040 0.5080 0.5120 0.5160 0.5199 0.5239 0.5279 0.5319 0.5359 I .
•I .5398 .5438 .5478 .5517 .5557 .5596 .5836 .5675 .5714 .5753
•2 .5793 .5832 .5871 .5910 .5948 .5987 .6026 .6064 .6103 .6141 i
[" .3 .6179 .6217 .6255 .6293 .6331 .6368 .6406 .6443 .6480 .6517
_" _.8
•4 .6554 .6591 .6664 .6700 .6736 .6772 .6808 .6844 .6879
.5 .6915 .6950 .6985 .7019 .7054 .7088 .7123 .7157 .7190 .7224
•6 .7257 .7291 .7324 .7357 .7389 .7422 .7454 .7486 .7517 .7549
i .7 .7580 .7611 .7642 .7673 .7703 .7734 .7764 .7794 .7823 .7852_. 8 8 1 9 0 939 967 995 8023 8051 8078 8106 8133
•9 .8159 .8186 .8212 .8238 .8264 .8289 .8315 .8340 .8365 .8389
1.0 .8413 .8438 .8461 .8485 .8508 .8531 .8554 .8577 .8599 .8621
i.I .8643 .8665 .8686 .8708 .8729 .8749 .8770 .8790 .8810 .8830
1.2 .8849 .8869 .8888 .8907 .8925 .8944 .8962 .8980 .8997 .90147 : 11.3 .90320 .90490 .90658 .90824 .90988 .91149 .91309 .91466 .91621 .91774
_. :: 1.4 .91924 .92073 .92220 .92364 .92507 .92647 .92785 .92922 .93056 .93189 _
!I|'', 1.5 .93319 .93448 .93574 ,93699 .93_.2 .93943 .94062 .94179 .94295 .94408 t-!: :].1
1.6 .94520 .94630 .94738 .94845 .94950 .95053 .95154 .95254 .95352 .95449 I
1.7 .95543 .95637 .95728 .95818 .95907 .95994 .96080 .96164 .96246 .96327
1.8 .96407 .96485 .96562 .96638 .96712 .96784 .96856 .96926 .96995 .97062
1.9 .97128 .97193 .972.57 .97320 .97381 .97441 .97500 .97558 .9;515 .97670
2.0 .97725 .97778 .97831 .97882 .97932 .97982 .98030 .98077 .98124 .98169
2. ! .98214 .98257 .98300 .98341 .98382 .98422 .98461 .98500 .98537 .98574 • " "'l"_
2.2 .98610 .98645 .98679 .98713 .987451 .98778 .98809 .98840 .98870 .98899
2.3 .98928 .98956 .98983 .920097 .920358 .920613 .920863 .921106 .921344 .921567
2.4 .9Zl802 .922024 .92240 .9224.51 .9-'2656 .9228.57 .923053 .923244 .923431 .923613
2.5 .923790 .923963 .924132 .924297 .924457 [ .924614 .924766 .924915 .925060 .925201
2.6 .925339 .925473 .925604 .925731 .925855 .925975 .926093 .926207 .926319 .926427 ,.
I
2.7 .926533 .926636 .926736 .926833 .9269281 .927020 .927110 .927197 .927282 .927365
2.8 .92744.5 .927523 .927599 .927673 .9277441 .927814 .927882 .927948 .928012 .928074
2.9 .928134 .928193 928250 .928305 .928359 .928411 .928462 .928511 .928_59 .928605 __
3.0 .928650 .928694 .928736 .928777 .o28817 .928856 .928893 .928930 .928965 .928999,
3. I .920324 .920646 .930957 .931260 .931553 .931863 .932112 .932378 .932636 .932886 i
3.2 .9._3129 .9_3363 .933590 .9-_3810 .934024 .934220 .954429 .934623 .9._4810 .9_4991 -=_3.3 .935166 .935355 .935499 .935658 935811 .935959 .936103 .936242 .936376 .936505
3.4 .936631 .936752 .936869 .936982 .937091 ,937197 .937299 .937398 .937493 .937585
3.5 .937674 .937759 .937842 .937922 .937999 .938074 .938146 .938215 .938282 .938347
3.6 .938409 .938469 .938527 .938583 .938637 .938689 .938739 .938787 .9._8834 .938879
3.7 .938922 .938964 .940039 .940426 .940799 .941158 .941504 ,941838 .942159 .942468
3.8 .942765 .943052 .943327 .943593 .943848 .944094 .94433| .9445.58 .944777 .944988
'; 3.9 .945190 ._5385 .945573 .945753 .945926 .946092 .946253 .946406 ! 46554 .946696
4.0 .946833 .946964 .947090 .947211 .947327 .947439 .947546 .947649 ,947748 .947843 i
4.1 .947934 .948022 .948106 .948186 .948263 .948338 .948409 .948477 .948542 .948605 i_
4.2 .948665 .948723 .948778 .948832 .948882 .948931 .948978 .9_40226 .9"_55 .9-_1066
4.3 .951460 .9-_1837 .952199 .952545 .9_2876 .95,"-193 .953497 .953788 .9._4066 .954332 ,_
4.4 ,954587 .954831 ,955065 ,955288 ,9'_5502 ,955706 ,9-_5902 ,956089 ,9_6268 .956_39 ]
4.5 .956602 .9-_6759 .9_6908 .9._7051 .957187 .957318 .957442 .957561 .957675 .957784
4.6 .9._7888 .9s7987 .9.'_8081 .9s8|72 .9._8258 .9-_834 .9-s8419 .9_8494 .9-_8566 .9,_8634 "_
4.7 .9.58699 .958761 .958821 .9-_$877 .9s8931 .958983 .9q3320 .9q)789 ._1235 .9_1661 i4,8 ,9_2067 .9_'2463 ._2822 .9_3173 9_3508 .963827 .9_131 .9e'4420 .9e46% .9_4958 i
1,0 I.O 1,0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1,0 1.0 1.0
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CumuWaU_ /'T"_ Fromtable5--6
i areaIrom / I \
Step 3--Find/'(90 < x _ 981. From steps I and 2-- -z 0 ' , P(90 < x _<98) = F(98) - F(90) = 0.91309 - 0.01160
_: Figure 5-15.--Cumulative areas for values of z from -_ to O. percent
0.90149. or 90
There exists, therefore, a 90-percent probabilitythat the signal
__ _ will be delayed no less than 90 sec and no more than 98 sec. i
F Cumulaeve This is shown in figure 5-17. 1
/ areafrem 1/ **toz
/ Application of Normal Distribution to Test Analyses and
' _ Reliability Predictions
This section gives two examples of how the normal
--- 0 z . distribution techniques may be applied to the analysis of test
dataof certain devices and how the resultsof the analysis may
Figure 5-16.--Cumulalive areas for values of - from 0 to oe. be used to estimate or predict the outcome of actual tests (ref.
5-5). Many similar examples are given in the next chapter.
Area./=(90 < xs 98) - 0.901497 Example 11: For this two-limit problem, assume thata door
/ hingehas a pin pull-forcerequirementof 124-4.64 lb. Assume ',
/ further that we have received 116 door hinges and have !
.,----2.27o----,,..,1.36o4,' / I
i:: / ae:ually measured the pin pull-force required for 16 of them
a_. ,art of an acceptance test. The results of the test are as ;:
shinvn in table 5-8 and in histogram form in figure 5-18, We
:_iii!i!_!!zill...... /'- Upcer no_Jwanttoapplynormaldistributiontheoryandthenestimate "+
iii:ii_:iii_ii_e limit what percentage of the remaining 100 door hinges will meet +__ '
Lower===============================:.i::i::?,:::;::!_i_:_i::i!ii_L i -]
limit-_ _ --:'! ...............1_:_'_"::_:_ the pin pull-force requirement.
...... "\_i::iii_i!!iili::iiiiiiiii!iiii_::i iiiiiii!iiii:il_ Solution/I: Step I--Solve for the mean of the test data ,L
_! We have already seen that
9090.8 92.8 95 97.2 98 99.4
Signal delay lime, S _ Xi
I I I I, l ._= ;=.__j1
-20 -lo _" lo 2o n
Figure5-17.--Signal delay time. where
x_ value of i th measurement
Solution 10: Step l--Find F(98 sec). Since themean is given n total number of measurements
as 95 sec and the standard deviation as 2.2 sec.
Limit - Mean 98 - 95 3 TABLE5-8.--RESULTSOFDOORHINGE
" z = : -- = -- = 1.36 ACCEPTANCETEST2.2 2.2
1
Pull-force Number of ]
+-:A, From table 5-7 required, occurrences IIbF(98 sec)= F(z) = F(! .36) = 0.91309
s t
: Step 2--Find F(90 sec). Since the mean is 95 sec and the 1012 73 [
standard deviation is 2.2 sec, 14 4 i
', 16 I rt 90- 95 -5I r. = --. : -- = -2.27 Tolal 162.2 2,2
t+
65 I
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g
/=Areaunderdenslty n
;_o.=... so1_to,I:_ -_:.
7 : aOCelXZncelimit=, \-, /
-- i:ii:i:i_!!iiii_:! 98 per_nt i = I/
, = -,¢I
im#(--2320)l i |_1 _ limit(+2.32o) = =1 !
4 -- I ; [_{:i_i:]"
s _ ! iiiiiiiiii!ii!_
_il _ =(8-1_.)_+3(1o-12,:+7(n-12)_-- I peroent I iiiiiiiili!i::ilil_ :_::_i r I permmt
i 2 --deleclivo I y_I:!II_I::_::::;_:::_ ! defectivo +4(14 - 12)2+ (16- 12)2
willbe I ili!_i:i!_i_ : will be
z _ --_ /i!_i_!_iii:!!ii !i!!iili_, I hemI
-,,,_J! I I = (-4): + 3(-2) _+ 7(0)2+ 4(2)2 + (4);I II
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 =!6+i2+0+16+16=60
Pinp.ll-k_roe,Ib
I I , I I I I I I I 16
-4o-3o-2o-1o _" lo 20 3o 4o :_ (x,--12) 2 -ti=1
! FiBure5-1$.--D_x)rhins¢zestrcxulls. Then solve for :
n-I
Let x = pound forces so that _ _-('i- 12"_"/
.q = 8 x_ = 12 i= i 60 60
x,=10 x m=12 n- 1 16-1 15
x3 = 10 x_= = 12
.r4 = 10 x_ = 14 Finally solve for (7: ::
x_ = 12 xi._ = 14
.r_ = 12 xl4 = 14
i and let n = 16 (numberof occurrences).The mean i is therefore o = = _'4 = 2 ib
16
i=1 8 + 3(10) + "/(12) + 4(14) + 16 Step 3--With a mean of_ = 12 Ib and a standard deviation
n 16 of a = 2 lb. figure5-18 shows
(I) That the Io_,er pull-force limit of 7.36 Ib is z =
= 12 Ib (rounded to two places) (7.36 - 12)/2 = -2.32 standard deviations from the mean
(2) That the tLnner limit of 16.64 Ib is z = (!6.64 - 12)/2
Step2--Solve for the standarddeviationa, We havealsoseenthat = 2.32 standard deviations from the mean . :!
Consequently, the percentage of door hinges that should fall
_ ' .
i
} _ P(-2.32o < x _ 2,320)=- F(2.32) - F(-2.32)
--i o = n - I |
(from tables 5-6 and 5-7)
where
= 0.97966, or 98 percent
.r observed mean
.,: value of ith measurement This says that 98 percent of the door hinges should fall within
n total number of measurements the 12 ._- 4.64-1b tolerance and that 2 percent should be outside
.L
"IUU;/UZd,/I / ul/
of the required tolerance. However, none of the 16 samples Areaaeove SO°Cis probability
were outside the tolerance. So where are the 2 percent that thatoutputwillnotbe greaterthan
the analysissays aredefective? Theanswer is thatthe2 percent 31 Vat 50 "Candbelow:P= 0.9671:)"7 ',,
of defective door hinges are in the 100 not tested. I
Wecan makethis statementby assuming thatif we had tested Areabelow50 °Ois / •probal_lilythatouter /
all 100 door hinges, we would have expected to observe the wigbe greateretan _ I_ I
same mean, ._ = 12 lb, and standarddeviation, o = 2 ib, as 31 Vatso q3and /we did with the 16 samples. (This assumption is subject to below:P =0.03288-]_ confidence limits discussed in chapter 6.) If we accept this I: assumption, we would expect to find two of the 100 door I
;-" hingesdefective:onewouldhaveapull-forcelessthan7.36Ib .J __1.84 o--_ i .i,(thelowerlim t);and ne,apull-forcegreat rthan16 64 ..........:
(the upper limit). This is also shown in figure 5-18. 50 66 [
However, considering the 16 door hinges to be actually Temperature.°C
representativeof all such door hinges, we could predict that Figure 5-19.--FaiJuredislribulionof powersupplies.
only 98 percent of such door hinges produced would meet the
• acceptance criteria of a 12 4- 4.64-1b pin pull-force.
Eawnple 12: In this one-limit problem, 10 power supplies Then
are selected out of a lot of I!0 and tested at increasing
temperatures until all exceed a maximum permissible output :
i":_' of 3 ! V. The failure temperatures in degrees centrigrdde of tli__ (_i_ _):,1 I/_" (_4)
the i0 supplies are observed to be ]
i I 6 I/2. " "i
xl "=57 x6 = 60 o = =
x2 = 65 x7 = 75
x3= 53 xs = 82
.... x_----62 x9 = 71 --8.7dugC (roundedtotwoplaces)
.rs = 66 Xlo = 69
Find theprobabilitythat the remaining 100 supplies will have Step 3--Solve for z = (Limit - Mean)/o. With an observed , i
an omput greater than 31 V at 50 °C and below, mean of:_ -- 66 and a standarddeviation ofo = 8.7, the 50 °C
Solution 12: Step l--Solve for the mean ._. limit is z = (50 - 66)/8.7 = - 16/8.7 = - 1.84 observation
locations in standard deviations from the mean.
l0 Step 4--Look at table 5-6 and find the cumulative area from ,I
xi -oo to a = - 1.84. This is given as 0.03288. Therefore, there ._
i= I 57+65+53 +62+66+60+75+82+71 +69 is a 3.288-percent Fobability thatthe remaining 100 supplies
l0 10 will have an output greater than 31 V at 50 °C and below.
This is shown in figure 5-19. -_
660 ,_
=_=66 °C
10
Effects of Tolerance on a Product
Step 2--Solve forthe standard deviation o. First. =:i
(1) Whatcm_tolerancesdo to affectthereliabilityof a•product? • ,]
i l0 (2) How caa tolerances be analyzed? i:_
(x, - 66)2 = (57 - 66)2 + (65 + 66)2 + (53 - 66)2 (3) What methods are available?
=1 (4) What will affect the term P, in :he product reliability
/
+ (62 - 66)2 + (66 - 66)2 + (60 - 66)2 model'.)
These questions are important to ask because tolerances must "_i
+ (75 - 66)_-+ (82 - 66)2 + (71 - 66)2 + (69 - 66)" be expected in all manufacturing processes. _iElectricalcircuits are often affected by parttolerances (i.e.,
= 81 + I + 169 + }6 + 0 + 36 + 81 circuit gains can shift upor down, and transferfunctionpoles
or zeros can shift into the right-hand s-plane, causing
+ 256 + 25 + 9 oscillations). Mechanical components may not fit together or
| i may be so loose that excessive vibration causes trouble (refs.
i = 674 5-6 to 5-8),
i:.i
I_)_LULO/ I/ UlO
.°
Notes on Tolerance Accumulation: A How.To-Do.It Guide Per_bafion method.--The perturbationmethodis as follows: _1
GeneraL--The notation used in calculating tolerance is
± V = ['± 3o,. .,
T tolerance
o,. standarddeviation where
V dependent variable subject to tolerance
: accumulation , .
.r independent, measurable parameter a; = (_'_,, __,)2 + (_,_ _,)2+ . . . + (_,,,_ _,)2
: 4
, 1.2,3.n subscript notation for parameters and where
i generalized subscript (i.e., i = 1,2,3..... n for xi) _
Tolerance is usually 4-3o. When in doubt, find out. Note that V_q =f[ (i:= 4- ol), (x2 ± o2), (x3.4- 03)..... (2, 4- o,)]
when Tis expressed in percent, always convert to engineering
units before proceeding. The mean or average is V = f(xi, The .4-V limits are valid if C,. = (a,./_ x 100 < 10 percent.
•_2_3 .... ,'_st ). The coefficient of variation is C,. = (_/_') Partial derivative method.--The partial derivative methodis as follows:
× 100 = percent.
Worst-case method--The worst-case method is as follows:
_- _V= _'_ 30,.
,_ V =./](._= + TI), (-r2+ T2), (x._+ T3)..... (_,, + T,,)] where
T,,..... +
: Actually.
_.. i .4-V=J](£1 4- Ti ), (_ 4- T,)., (23 4- T_),.. .., (._,,4- T,,)] The .4-Vlimitsare valid if C,.= (al_') x 100_<10 percent, i
; Thus, four methods are available for estimating the effects _
¢-- ._
i where the plus or minus sign is selected for maximum V and of tolerance on a product. The worst-case method can be used ..i
_ : thenselected to give minimumV. If these 4- V worst-case limits on anyproblem. In thosecases where the -4-V worst-case limits
i' are acceptable, go no further. If not, try the root-sum-square are not acceptable, other methods can be tried. The root-sum-
_-- method, square method is usually valid if the functions are algebra- ,
[.. Root-sum-square method.--The root-sum-square method ically additive. The perturbationor partial derivative methods
is valid only if thef(x's) are algebraicallyadditive(i.e., when are valid only if the coefficient of variationis less thanor equal
F V is a linear functionof the x's): to 10 percent.
± V = _' 4- 3_7,. Estimating Effects of Tolerance
where The following examples illustrate how these tolerance
equations can be used. Consider a stacked tolerance problem
, _ , , _ where the dependentvariableis a linearfunction--three variables
o;:.=OT+a_+a_ + ... + a_
addedto give V.
and V = f(dJ,-_2,.r3)
o_= - if T_= .4-30
3 V=x_ + x2 + x._/.
, Stated another way T = 3o i]
-: where
! 271/2 .
±V= D_ "_*= I ±0.1 mil
:_, = 2 _ 0.l rail 7
If these ± V root-sum-square limits are acceptable, go no £3 = 3 ± 0.1 rail
farther. If they are notacceptableor thef(x's) involve products
or quotients, try the perturbationor partialderivative methods. Now, find _' and the expected range of V. "
' 1
r. !
1
._. ': ". :......... _,-"2"7;,7"7_:-"_: _' . - . : ':----7_ - ::........... :-':: _C,:i._.._. : ....:,.._...... :, ",_mr¢-.-'yl
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I) = I + 2 + 3 = 6 mils Using the worst-case method.
Using the worst-case method, with positive tolerance V_. = (10 4- 1) × (5 4- 0.5) x (2 4- 0,1) = 11 x 5.5 x 2.1 _
_'+ = (l +0.1)+(2+0.1)+(3+0.1)=6.3+ or9x4.5x 1.9-- 127or77
and with negative tolerance The root-sum-square method cannot he used because these
:_ variables are not algebraically additive.
_'_ = ( 1 - 0.1) + (2 - 0.1) + (3 - 0.1) = 5.7_ Using the perturbation method, i'
r,_ or V = V 4- 3o,. [
i _'± = 6 4- 0.3 mil where
,n,  wo  ,ca eme,  ,h ,o,e .nceon ,,o0,mil,[( i( i(.i is worse thanthe 3o,. tolerance. Tolerance can and ofien does o,. = _'aL - _' " + Paw - P 2 + Pan - _'
cause fit problems and circuit problems. Therefore, in some
Using the root-sum-square method, = )[ + #/_ - + I_'+ /,/4- _'
, _' = 6 mils
I/ 1:1and + /_ + /,I_- i: i
' 0.1 i
= 0.033 = e, = 03
__ °l= 3 " TL I
or.= --= - = O.33 ft
3 3 ..:(, , ,,,,:(o,.= ai+ o_+ a_) 30 Tw 5 ,!
Ow=_=-=O. 17ft I
3 3
r113(0.033)2iu,:0.0572 Tn 0.1 ;
on = .... 0.03 ft
3o,. = 0.172 3 3
that o,. = I[(10 + 0.33)(5)(2) - 10.q 2 + [(5 +so 0.17)(10)(2)
6 4- O.172 mils
- 100]2 + [ 2 + 0.03)(10)(5) - I00]21
l/2
In the root-sum-square method, the T value of 0.172 is the I 3
3t_ tolerance on V. = [(100.3 - 100)2 + (I03.4 - 100)2 + (101.5 - 100)2]
As a second example, consider a volume problem that has
L
J
: three variables in multiplication. Find _'and the expected range = (10.89 + I1.56 + 2.25)u2 = V2-5= 5
of V,
V=V4-3or=IO0± 15ft 3 :
. : _, = £1_,/7/= l0 ft × 5 ft x 2 ft = 100 ft._
¢ Checking the validity gives
--, First, convert percent tolerances to engineering units:
ov 5
/_ = 10 ft .*- 10 percent -- 10 ft 4- 10 ft x 0.1 = 10 ft • 1 ft C,..... x 10-_= 5 percentV 100
:. W=5ft±10percent=5ft±5ftx0.1=Sft±0.5ft
which is less than 10percent. This solution is a better estimate
of the effects of tolerance on volume. Note too that various
/:) -- 2 ft 4- 5 percent = 2 ft 4- 2 ft x 0.05 = 2 ft • 0. I ft
values can now be estimated for different types of problems
regarding this volume because it has been represented as a
T = ± 30 normal distribution function.
,r " ::_,:_'-,,_.,_2...'-:"'=L-_"C-_::=:_'r'i_,,_4_:::::_:__-.- _.: : .....- .. :_:=:':2 i_ : '-c_:_.:;_;_,-'_,,,
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.'q
q
where'he'ad--ivemeh a'"3 ', #[(
__ l .,,
o,. • , ..(a) Symmetrical two-limitproblem_,,which are concerned t
with the probability of a variable taking on values j
V = LWH, --=OVWH, --=c_VLH, --=OVLW within equal distances from both sides of the mean il_#L #W OH
OL= 0.33 ft, Ow= 0.17 ft, on = 0.03 ft
Ov = [(WH)[ o2/.+ (LH)_ 0 2 + (LW)_ o_] '/2 j
= [(5 x 2)2(0.33) -'+(10 x 2)2(0.17) '- iI
10 × 5)2(0.03)2]I/2 --Z _ Z "'ii+ (
J
= (10.9+ II.6+ 2.25)'/2= x/25= 5 (b)Nonsymmetricaltwo-limitproblems,whicharesimilarto(a)butwi h nunequaldistancefrombothsidesof
V= 100 :e 15 ft3 the mean of the density function :_
!
This method is more work and gives the same results as the /_ 1
perturbation method. Because the C,. = 5 percent, which is
less than I0 percent, the method would be suitable to use.
,¢
I .!_
Concluding Remarks 1,
Now that you have completed chapter 5 you should have
i a clear understanding of the following concepts:
i (I) A probability density function p (x) for a random vari-
able describes the probability that the variable will take on
a certain range of values. _' z i
(2) The area under the density function is equal to unity, • !!
which means that the probability is ! that the variable will be (c) One-limit problems, which are concerncd with the
within the interval described by the 0ensity function. For probability of a variable taking on values above or '!']
_i example, the normal distribution describes the interval from below some limit represented by some distance from i_
-o, to oo. the mean of the density function(3) Associated with each probability density function is a ,-
.. cumulative probability distribution F(x) that represents the
cumulative sum of the areas under the density function. (5) You should be able to take data measurements of a _!
(4) The normal distribution (also called the bell curve, the certain device and calculate the mean of the data given by _ I
Gaussian distribution, and the normal curve of error) is a 1
probability density function. Using the normal distribution. 1 '
you should be able to solve the following types of problems: X = - _ x_n iffil
70
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and the standard oeviation ul' the data given by (8) The perturbation or partial derivative methods are only
J,2 valid if the coefficient of variation is 10 percent or less.
°=[_1.= I n
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Reliability Training t
I. A unit is required to operate at 100 *F. If tests show the mean strength of the unit is 123 *F, and the
standard deviation is 9 deg F, what is the probability that the unit will operate successfully; that is,
P(x > 100 *F)?
A. 0.5234 B. 0.2523 C. 0.9946 D. 0.9995
: 2. A pressure vessel (including a factor of safety) has an upper operating limit of 8000 psi. Burst testsi,
show a mean strength of 9850 psi and a standard deviation of 440 psi. What is the probability of pressure
vessel failure; that is, P(x _ 8000 psi)?
_. A. 0.04267 B. 0.04133 C. 0.04317
: 3. A memory drum is required to reach sink speed and stabilize in 15.5 sec at 125 *F. Five drums are
_ tested with these stabilizing time results: 13.2 sec, 12.3 sec, 14.8 sec, 10.3 sec, and 12.9 sec. j!
• a. What is the mean stabilizing time?
A. 13.1 B. 10.7 C. 12.7
_, b. What is the standard deviation?
A. 1.63 B. 1.45 C. 1.32 i
c. What is the estimated percentage of drums out of specification; that is, P(x > 15.5 see)?
7
r" A. 6.7 B. 8.5 C. 4.3
i 4. A pyrotechnic gyro has an uncaging time requirement of 142 ± 20 msec. Six gyros were tested resulting , _
i in these uncaging times: 123, 153, 140, 129, 132, and 146 msec.
a. What is the mean uncaging time? - •
" !A. 133.2 msec 13. 135.2 msec C. 137.2 msec i
b. What is the standard deviation? 'i
• ,_
A. 10.2 B. !1.2 C. 11.9 _
c. That is the estimated percentage of gyros within specification; that is, P(122 <__x _ 162 msec)?
A. 89.8 B. 96.8 C. 82.6
5. A hydraulic pressure line was designed to the following stresses:
(a) Maximum operating pressure (actual), 1500 psi
(b) Design pressure (10 percent safety factor), 1650 psi
• Tests of the pressure line indicated a mean failure pressure of 1725 psi and a standard deviation of 45 psi. !t
a. What is the reliability of the line when the design pressure limits are considered? _'"_
A. 0.10 B. 0.90 C. 0.98
b. What is the reliability of the line when the maximum operating pres,'ure is considered'? "i
f
A. 0.99 B. 0.90 C. 0.80
IAnswers are given at the end of this manual.
.... •..................... _ __. __ _, .,_.o., _ _,,_ _ _, -,.,or_w,:_r_
A sample6. A communications network requires a 1300-msec watchdog delay after initiation, of I0 delays
wer e tested from a rack of I00 delays. The time delays of the circuits are as shown:
%,
Circuit Delay.
number msec
I 1250
2 1400 ,,
3 1700
4 1435
5 I100
6 1565
7 1485
8 1385
9 1350
I0 1400
a. Whatis the average(mean)delay time?
A. 1386 msec B. 1400msec C. 1407 msec
b. Whatis the standarddeviation?
A. 52.7 B. 87.1 C. 163.4
c. On the basis of this sample, what percentage of the 100 circuits will meet specifications (1300 msec
or greater delay)?
A. 75 B. 80 C. 90
7. A circuit contains four elements in series. Their equivalent resistance values are
Element Nominal Tolerance3
resistance. 7".
R. percent
ohm
A I00 ± 10
B 20 .4.I
C I0 _5
D I0 _5
UWhere± T = _3o.
a. What is the nominal or mean total resistance/_r?
A. 120 0 B. 140 f/ C. 160 f/
b. What are the worst-case R values?
A. + 131.6^ + 176.3 ^ + 151.2 ^
_!18.7_1 B. _146,2 u C. _128.8 U
"-"_: c. Using the root-sum-square method, what is the probability that Rr _ 135 9?
A. 0.905 B. 0.962 C. 0.933
d. Using the perturbationmethod, what is the probabilitythat ,_r _"135fl?
A. 0.905 B. 0.962 C. 0.933
(
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I_/_U/__O/_// u/o
8. Given power (watts) = I"R. where 1 = 0.5 A, Tt = ±5 percent. R = 100 ft, and Tt¢= ± !0 percent. !(Note: ±T= ±30.)
a. What is the nominal or mean power output P? it
A. 25 W B. 20W C. 30W I
b. What are the worst-case P values'? I
• A. +26.6. +35.2_ +30.3_18 2 w B. C. i
-22.6 w -20.3 W ] ,4'
1 i
c. Using the perturbation method, what is the probability that _'23.5_<P _<26.5)'?
A. 0.94 B. 0.80 C. 0.86
d. What is the C, (in percent) for the perturbation method used in question 8c?
A. 12% B. 8% C. 46%
e. Is the ro_,, _m-square method valid for solving the probability problem 8c?
A. Yes B. No
f. Using the partial derivative method, what is the probability that (23.5 _<P _<26.5)'?
A. 0.942 B. 0.803 C. 0.857
i 7,,
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Chapter 6
Testing for Reliabiiity
Inchapters 3 and4 we discussed the methods used to predict K_ probability that reliability engineering activities will not
the plobability that random catastrophic part failur_s we, ld degrade inhe_ ,t reliability
occur in given products and systems. These analytical tech- K_. probability that logistics activities will not degrade
niques are well established (ref. 6-1). Yet, we should keep inherent reliability
in mind that they are practical only when adequate exper- K,, probability that user or customer will not degradeimentaldata are available in the form of part failure rates. In
other words, their validity is predicated on large amounts of inherent reliability
empirical information. The termP,.PtP,,,denotes inherentreliabilityRi; (KvK,,,K,Ku,K,,)
Such is not the case when we undertake similar analyses are factors that affect the probability of the three rsodes of
to determine the influence of tolerance and wearout failures failure occurring during hardwaremanufactureand use rather
on the reliability of a product. An understanding of these than from unreliable hardware design.
failure modes depends on experimental data in the form of First, we _lh_:tratehow the empirical value of these terms
probability density functions such as those discussed in affects product reliability. Then, we discuss the particulartest
chapter 5. In general, such data are unavailable on items at methods used to develop these values. Assume that a device _,
the part or system level: this kind of information must be was designed with a reliability requirement of 0.996. This "'_
developed empirically through reliability test methods, means that only four out of 1000 such devices can fail. The _.
Chapter 6 reviews and expands on the terms used in the device contains 1000 parts, it has a function to perform within
reliability expression given in chapter 2 and then shows how a toleranceof X .,,-2 percent, and it must operate for a mission
the terms can be demonstrated or assessed throt gh the app!i- cycle of 1000 hours at 50 °t...
cation of attribute test. test-to-failure, and life test methods
(ref. 6-2). Pc Illustrated
If we know the number and types of parts in the device plus
Demonstrating Reliability the applied stresses and part failure ratesused in the exponen- "_
tial distriL ilion, e-'(_x), we can estimate the probability that -_.
Recall from chapter 2 thai one way to define product no catastrophic part failurewill occur during the mission cycle. .0_
reliability is as the probability that one or more failure modes Assuming, for example, that our estimate is P, = 0.999 (i.e.,
will not be manifested (ref. 6-3). This can be written as one device in 1000 will incur a catastrophic part failure during
the mission cycle), the productreliabilityof the device becomes i
i R = P,P,Pw(K_K,,,K,K,i(,,) i]
i.
!. where R = P,.P,P,,.(K factors) = e-"":x'P,P,.(K factors_ :i;
h,
: P,, probability that catastrophic part failures will not ocoer = 0.999P, P,,.(K factors) !
P, probability that out-of-tolerance failures will not _cur 'i
P,,. probability that wearout failures will not occur Pt Illustrated _,
K,I probability that quality test methods and acceptance Suppose we now test one of the devices at 50 °C. If the
criteria will not degrade inherent reliability functional output is greater than the spectfied tolerance of
K,, probability that manufacturing processes, fabrication, X _- 2 percent, the reliability of that particulardevice is zero.
and assembly techniques will not degrade inherent It is zero because P, is zero (i.e., R = (0.999)(0)P,,, (g f_tot_)
reliability = 0). We can say. however, that the device will continue to
19920232'12-08"1
operate in an out-of-tolerance condition with a probability of K Factors Illustrated '_
i.
no catastrophic failures equal to 0.999 just as we predicted, Since testing obviously mustbe conductedon realhardware,
To understandthis better, recall thatpartfailure ratesreflect the g factors as well as the P terms of reliaUility are present
only the electrical, mechanical, and environmental stresses
applied to the individual parts. For this reason a prediction in every test sample. Establishing values for the K factors
on the basis of such data u,ili neglect to indicate (1) that requires that all failures observed during a test be subjected
the partshave been connected to obtain a specified function, to physics-of-failure analyses by which specific failure mech-
_ (2) that a tolerance analysis of the function has been per- anisms are identified. Actually, the action taken to plevent
_ the recurrence of an observed failure mechanism determines
_, formed, or (3) that the parts are packaged correctly. In other the factor that caused the failure. A failure that can be
:, words, P,. represents only how well the individual parts will prevented by additional screening tests as part of the quality
operate, not how well the combined parts will perform.
acceptance criteria is charged to the Kq factor; one that
i If nine more of the devices are tested at 50 'C with all the requiresadditional control over some manufacturing process
i outputfimctions remainingwithin theX ± 2 percent tolerance, is charged to the Km factor, etc. Failures that requirechanges
i: Pt becomes 9/10 = 0.9 and the reliabiiity of the device in documentation, design, and tolerance would be charged to
_ R= (0.999)(0.9)P,,(K factors). Because the reliability
_ requirementof the device is 0.996, it should be clear that ,°1 the Pc, P, or P,_ terms as applicable.
must be greater than 0.996. Let us assume then that 1000 The least importantaspect of testing is the ability to charge !
devices are tested at 50 °C with only one tolerance failure, an organization or function with responsibility for a failure.
_: More important is the need to prevent observed failur_-sfrom
_. which produces an observed Pt ":999/1000 = 0.999. The
recurring. This requires that corrective action be ,,nade a
_ reliability of the device is now
_ i recognized part of each "eliability test program.
R = (0.999)(0.999)P_,(K factors) = 0.998 P,_(K factors) Getting back to the illustration, we assume that one failure
• _ out of I000 devices was caused by one of the K factors even
'_ though it could have been observed during a Pc, P, or Pw
• ; Note that, becauseoperatingtime is accumulatedduringoriginal faik:reevaluation. This reduces the reliabilityof the device to ifunctional testing, it is possible for random catastrophic part
.... i failures to occur. Remember, however, that this type of failure ]
_ R-P, PtP_(K factors)-- (0.999)(0.999)(0.999)(0.999) =0.996
is represented by P,. aM not Pt. .,:
[- Pw Illustrated _vhich indicates that the device met its requirement.
k.
! Now let us take another operating device and see whether
wearout failureswill occur within the 1000-hourmission cycle. Test Objectives and Methods
! If, as run time is accumulated, a faulty function outputi i
or catastrophic failure is caused by a wear mechanism, the The purpose of the preceding illustration was to provide a
i reliabilityof the device again becomes zero. It is zero because betterunderstandingof (1) how the P terms and the K factors ii
_i'" P,. is zero as shown in the equation relate to physical hardwareand (2) the techniques fordemon- !
[: strating the terms through testing. Table 6-1 shows the
R = (0.999)(0.999)(0)(K factors) = 0 suggested test methods. We say "suggested" because any of
the test methods can be used if certain conditions age met
Note the emphasis on thewords "wear mechanism." Because (re/. 6-4). These conditions are pointed out as each method
it is possible to experience random catastrophic part failures is discussed° Table 6-1 indicates the most efficient methods
and even out-of-t,,,!eranceconditions duringa test for wearout, by assigning priority numbers from ! to 3 (with i being the
it is absolutelynecessary to performphysics-of-failureanalyses, most efficient and 3 the least). _:
, This is essential in ascertaining whether the failures are
caused by truephysical wear before including them in the P,,. !_
p assessment. TABLE6- I.--TESTMETHODPRIORITIES <So far, the first two terms, Pc and P,, combine to yield a FORDEMONSTRATINGRELIABILITY _::
-': probability of (0.999)(0.999)= 0.998. As a result, the
remaining terms. P,,.(K factors), must be no less than 0.998 Reliability Sugestedtestmetlv_l ._
;.. if the 0,996 device requirement is to be satisfied. Therefore, term [ Attribute Teststo Life _.
i we assume that we have demonstrated a Pw of 0.999, which tests failure tests
reduces the device reliability to
P,. 2 3 1
R = P,P_P_.(Kfactors) .I (0._))(0.999)(0.999)(K factors) P, 3 z 2
P.. 3 2 I
:_ - 0.997(K factors) g factors 3 I 2
t i • ,
i_ 76 ,
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Test Oojectives declarationthatall similarsupplies, includingany not yet built, "_'¢
would also pass the test and be within the tolerance limit of jProm our discussions thus far it can be inferred that 1000 125 *F. B!tt no such statementwould be valid from the results
test samples are requiredto demonstratea reliability require- of so simple a test. The only reasonable conclusion we can I
• ment of 0.999. Because of cost and time considerations this reach from testing two samples to success is that these items t
" is obviously an impractical approach. Furthermore, the total alone are qualified.
pr_xhction of a productoften may not even approach 1000 Confidence levds.--Mr. Igor Bazovsky in his book entitled _t
items. Because we usually cannot test the total production of "Reliability Theory and Practice" (ref. 6-2) helps us to -
a product (called product population), we must demonstrate understam what the term "confidence" means in the business
reliability on a few samples. Thus, the main objective of a of testing:
reliability test !s to test an availabte device in such a way that
, the data will allow a statistical conclusion to be reached about Weknow thatstatisticalesti,_,,es aremorelikelyto be
the reliability of ¢imilar devices that will not or cannot be close to the.truevalue as the samplesize i._creases.Thus,
tested. In other words, the main objective of a reliability test there is a close correlation between the accuracyof an
is not only to evaluate the _cific items tested, but also to estimate and the s;ze of the sample from which it was
provide a sound basis for predicting the reliability of similar obtained.Only an infinitely large samplesize could give
items that will not b- tested and that often have not yet been us a 100 percentconfidenceor certainty that a me, _ared
manufactured, statisticalparameterc¢h,cideswith the truevalue. In this
In chapter 2 we explained that to know now reliable a context,confidence isa mathematicalprobabilityrelating
product is you must luaowhow many ways it can fail and the the mutualpositionsof the truevalue of a parameterand
" types and magnitudes of the stresses that producesuch failures, itsestimate.
: This premise leads to a secondary objective of a reliability test, When theestimateof a parameter is obtainedfroma
reasonablysizedsample,gc maylogicallyassume thatthe !
which is to producefailures in the productwhereby the types true value of that parameterwill be somewhere in the
and magnitudes of the stresses that r.ause such failures are neighborhoodof the estimate,to the right or to the :eR.
identified, h follows then that reliabiiJtytests that result in no Therefore,it wouldbe moremeaningfulto expressstarts-
failures provide some measure of eliability but little infor- tical estimates in terms of a rangeor interval with an - _
muttonabout th¢ populationfailuren echanisms of like devices, associatedprobabilityor confidencethat thetruevaluelies
(There are exceptions, of course, _s pointed out later.) withinsuch intervalthantoexpressthemas pointestimates. 'o_j
In the sub:;equent sections of :his chapter, we discuss This is exactly what we are doing when we assign con- !
attributetest, test-to-failure, and life test methods, explain how fidence :':nits to point estimatesobtainedf: rn statistical
well these methods meet the test objectives just described, measurements.
show how tt _.test results can be stat!stically analyzed, and To illustrate further the limitations efattribute test methods,
introduce the subject and use of confidence limits. A good ,_-"appb ":galestc the test results. Figure A-4(a) in appen-
discussion of reliat_ilitytesting for demonstration purposes is dix A shows on the ordinate the number of events (successes)
given in MIL-STD-785B (ref. 6-I).
necessary to d¢,nonstrate a reliabiliq, value (abscissa) for
Attribute Test Methods vdrious confidence levels (family of curves) when no failures
are observed. Figures A--4(b) to (f) provide the same infor-
Qualification, preflight certification, and design verification mutton when one to five failures are observed.
tests fall in the category of attribute tests (refs. 6-4 and 6-5). Fromthe resultsof two devices testedwith no failures, figure
They are usually of the go/no-go type used to demonstratethat A-4(a) shows that we can state with 50-percent confidence
a device is good ._rbad without showing how good or how bad that the population relia0ility of such devices is no less than
it may be. In atypical test two samples are sttbjecv-'_ to a 71 percent. Fifty-percent confidence means that there is a
: ,_clectedlevel of environmentet stress, usually the maximum 50-percent chance that we are wrong and that the reliability i_
' anticipatedoperational limit. If both samples pass, the device of similar untesteddevices will actuallybe less than71 percent.
i_considered qualified, preflight certified, or verified for use Similarly, we can also state from the same figure thatwe are i
in the particularenvironment involved (refs. 6-6 and 6-'?). 60 percent co_fi_ent that the reliability of all such devices is i
! Occasionally, such tests are called tests to success because the 63 percent. But either way the probability of success is less !
true objective is to have the device pass the test. than encouraging. !
This can be lib/s/ratedby the example of two power supplies, To gain a better understandingof figureA--4 and the theory
each with an outputrequirementof 12 ,- 0.24 V at a maximum behind it, let us stop for a moment and see how confidence
temperat,,re of 125 *F. If we test these items at 125 *F, we levels are calculated. Recall from chapter 2 that the corn-
• might observe an output of 12.230 V for one and 12.215 V bination of events that might result from a test of two devices
for the other. Since the output of each supply falls within the was give, by
t. i required toleraace, we woukl call both qualified, or Drefligm
i certified, as the case may be. This might seem to be a R 2 + 2RQ + Q' = I
p
¢
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where TABLE 6-2.--RELIABILITY AND CONFIDENCE
R "_ probability that both devices will pass LEVELFORTWO-SAMPLEATTRIBUTETEST WITH NO FAILURES "_,
2RQ prehability that one device will pass and one will fail
• ConfKlence Reliability. Risk.
Q-" probability that tx_h devices will fail level. R percent
In the power supply example we observed the fir;t event R _- percem
becau_ bothsuppliespassed the test. If we as,q,mea 50-percent m 0.95 9o
probability that both will pass, we can set R 2 = 0.50 and 50 .71
t ._
solve for the reliability of the device as follows: 60 •63 40
70 .55 3O
R 2 = 0.50 80 .45 20
90 .32 I0 ,/
R = _/0-_-0= 0.71 99 .10 I
. _!
We then can say with 50-percentconfidencethat the pc,pulation
( • . reliability of the device is no less than 0.71. By assuming a Application.--The discussion thus far has underscored the 1
50-percent chance, we are willing to accept a 50-percent risk shortcomings of attribute tests when sample sizes are small• i
t' of being wrong, hence the term "50 percent confident." If Tests involving only two or three samples may reveal gross I
_. - we want only to take a 40-percent risk of being wrong, we errors in hardware design or manufacturing processes, but i
F can again solve for R from when relied on for anything more, the conclusions become '
; risky {refs. 6-8 and 6-9). {
,_ R2 = 0.40 Attribute tests can be n_ful in testing for reliability when ! I
_: a sufficient samplesize is used. For example, I0 samplestested i
R = ,fO_40 = 0.63 without failurestatistically demonstratea population reliability i i
i of 0.79 at 90-percent confidence; I00 tests without failure I i
_ in )his case, we can be 60 percentconfident that the population demonstrate a population reliability of 0.976 at 90-percent i
[ reliabilP.y of the devices is no less than 0.63. confidence. To understand better the application of attribute _ -_|Selection of the confidence level is a customer's or
tests and the use of figure A-4, consider the following
i engineer's choice and depends on the amount of risk they are examples:
-j
willing to take on being wrong about the reliability of the Example !: During the flight testing of 50 missiles, five "
device. The customer usually specifies the risk he or she is failures are observed. What confidence do we have that the i !
willing to take in conjunction with the system reliability missile is 80 percent reliable.'?
requirement. As higher confidence levels (lower risk) are
chosen, the lower the reliabilityestimatewill be. Forexample, Soluti,,; i: From figure A--4(f) the answer is read directly i
if we want to make a 90-percent confidence (10-percent risk) to be a ; ,cent confidence level. The a posteriori reliability r_
statement based on the results of the test to success of two of these 5_ missiles, or that derived from the observed facts,
is still 45/50 = 90 percent. Thus, future flights will be at least
devices, we simply _olve 80 percent reliable with a 5-percent risk of being wrong. :
R 2 = ( i - Confidence level) = i - 0.90 = 0. I0 &mnple 2: An explosive switch has a reliabilityrequirement
of 0.98. How many switches must be fired withouta f=;lure
so that to demonstrate this reliability at 80-percent confidence? it
R = _/0_i0 = 0.316 Solution 2: From figure A--4(a) the answer is read directly _
as 80 switches. " '1
Table6-2 illustrateshow the reliability lower bound ch_,,iges Exmnple 3: _ test report states that the reliabilityof a device : .
with various confidence levels. The curves in figure A-4 are was estimated to be 0.992 at 95-percent confidence based on ' ,,_
! a test of 1000 samples. How many failures were observed?
_t developed in a similar manner. In figure A--4(b), which is used
, Solution 3: In figure A-4(d) the 95-percentconfidence curve -_
when one fa;,lureis observed, for 10 samples tested with one
-"_ observed failure :he statistically predicted or demonstrated crosses the 1000-event line at R = 0.992. Therefore, three :',
reliability at 90-percent confidence is 0.66. This answer is failures were obs_-ved, iifound by solving In these examples the population reliability estimates may i_
represent any of the P terms or the K factors in the expression -_
" R I° + IORgQ = I - 0.90 for product reliability, depending on the definition of failure ,i
used to judge the test results. For a device that is judged only
R = 0.663 on its capability to remBin within certain tolerances, the
reliability would be the Pt term. Had catasvophic failures
which agrees with the figure to two places, been included, we would have demonstrated the P,.P, terms. ,
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i In general, attributetests include all failure modes as part ,,f Solution 5a: Set 5.8 on themovable slide at the top window _
the failure definition and. consequently, the associated for the S_:value. Under N = 10 on the 90-percent window,
reliability is product reliability with both the P terms and the read So - 3.9. Without moving the slide, for successive .
K factors included, levels of confidence. 4.45 at 80 percent, 4.85 at 70 percent,
i AtWibutetest/xafetymarginsliderule.--Aspecial-purpose 5.21 at 60 percent, and 5.57 at 50 percent.
slide rule hasbeen developed to facilitatedeterminingattribute Example 5b: Six _amples are available for test. What SMis
i test/safety margin confidence levels. A slide rule should be required to demonstratea population _fety margin of 4.0 or :
!:. in the back of this manual. Take it out and use it as you go greater at 90-percent confidence level?
[_ over the following examples: Solution 5b: Using the 90-percent window, set So = 4.0
;.. Examples 4 (confidence level for attribute wst): Attribute opposite N = 6. At SArread 7. I. Therefore. test results of 7. !
testsare tests to success. Theobjective is for a selected number or greater will demonstrate SD_--4.0 at a 90-percent confi-
of samples, called tests on the slide rule, to operate successfully dence level. If 25 samples are available for test, set So = 4.0
at some predeterminedstress level. Some tests, however, may opposite N = 25 on the 90-percent window. An Su of only
fail. This slide rule handles combinations of up to 1000 tests 5.0 or greaterwould demonstrate4.0 or greater safety margin
and up to 500 failures. The answer is a direct population :it 90-percent confidence.
reliability reading of the untested population at a selected Sneak circuits.--During attributetesting the flight hardware
confidence level. Six confidence levels from 5Oto 90 percent may sometimes not work properly because of a sneak circuit.
are available. (The statistical basis for this rule is the X2 A sneak circuit is defined for both hardware and ¢ofiware as
approximation of binomial distribution.) follows (ref. 6-10):
Example 4a: Fifteen items are tested with one failure
observed. What is the population reliability at 70-percent (1) Hardware: A latent condition inherent to the system
confidence level? design and independentof component failure thatinhibits
Solution 4a: Set one failure on the movable slide above the a desired function or initiates an undesired function(path.
timing, indication, label) _70-percentconfidence level index. Read from TOTALNUMBER
" OF TESrSthe tests for a population reliability of 0.85 at (2) Software: An unplannedevent with no apparentcause-
70-percent confidence level. By settir,g one failure at and-effect relationship that is not dependent on hardware I,[
: successive I.:vels of confidence this example gives these failure and is not detected during a simulated system test , _i
population reliabilities: 0.710 at 95-percent confidence level, (path, timing, indication, label) _.,
0.758 at 90 percent, 0.815 at 80 percent, 0.873 at 60 percent, Each sneak circuit problem should be analyzed, a cause _
and 0.8c5 at 50 percent, determined, and corrective action implemented and verified.
Example 4b: A population reliability of 0.9 at 95-percent References 6-10 to 6-12 give a number of examples on how '_
confidence level is desired. How many tests are required to this can be done:
demonstrate this condition?
Solution 4b: Set zero failures at the 95-percent confidence (1) Reluctant Redstone--making complex circuitry simple
level index. From TOTALNUMBEROF TESTSread 29 tests (2) F-4 example
directlyabove0.90 populationreliability.Therefore,29 tests (3) Trim motor example
withoutfailurewill demonstratethiscombination.If, however, (4) Softwareexarlple
one failure occurs, set one failureat 95 percent. Then 46 others A few minutes spent with one of these references should solve
must pass the test successfully. Progressively more observed any sneak circuit problem.
failures such as 10 (set of 10 at 95 percent) require 170 Attribute test summary.--In summary, fourconcepts shouid
successes (160 + 10). be kept in mind:
Examples 5 (confidence h vei,for safer)' margins): Safety
margin SM indicates the number of standard deviations ou (1) An attribute test, when conducted with only a few _ ,
between some preselected reliability boundary Rb and the samples, is not a satisfactory method of testing for reliability.
't
mean of the measured sample fadure distribution. Thus, But it can identity gross design and manufacturingproblems. :'_iI,
SM = (XM - Rb) + Om, where ,_ and oM are the measured (2) An attribute test is an adequate method of testing for _i
--! mean and standard deviation of the samples under test. The reliability only when sufficient samples are tested to establish _ '
larger the sample size, the more nearly the measured SM an acceptable level of statistical confidence. _ ,_;
approaches the safety margin of the untested population 5'_. (3) Some situations dictate attribute tests or no tests at all
sizes N between 5 and 80. (Statistical basis for this rule: time for testing, test levels that exceed the limits of test
noncentral t distribution.) eouipment, andthe needto use the test samples after testing).
Erample So: Ten items are tested to failurewith an observed (4) Confidence, a statisticalterm thatdepends on supporting
• or measur d SM of 5.8. What is the lower expected safety statistical data, refl cts th amount of risk w are willing to
i margin o_ the untested population at 90-percent confidence'? take when stating the reliability of a product.
' i
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, i°I a Failuredistribution ",
SlmSS
Figure 6-1 .--Samples testedto successat reliability boundary. --.-
Stress
Figure 6-5.--Testing to develop failure distribution.
Rb 1.5Rb
I I
._ i I 1.5 times the reliability boundary. If both samples pass at this
_i !2 I _f Pass level, we will certainlyfeel more confidentthatsimilardevices
I will pass the Rb. Statistically, however, we are no better off
_ 1 I (_ tha-. before. This result is shown in figure 6-2.
I I __ We can also continue to increase the stress level until both
Stress samples f, il. If they fail at the same level, such as three timesFigure 6-2.--samples testedtosuccessat 1.5 times reliability boundary, tile Rh (as shown in fig. 6-3), we can call thedevice qualifi d
and infer that all similar devices will survive Atstress levels
:; Rb 3 Rb up to the Xh.But what if one sample faiis at 1.2 times the Rh and the
i I other at 3.5 times the Rb (as shown in fig. 6-4)? What then
._ I could we say about the point at which a third sample might
E I ._/-Fail
,. 2 _/ fail? Would it fail at the Rt,, at 2 times the Rh, or below the
"_ I _ Rb? Clearly, this type of test result casts some doubt upon thequalificationstatus of the device even thoughno failure occurs
t_ I _ at or below the RI,.
Stress Thus, it is desirable to test enough samples for the failure
Figure 6-3.--samples tested to failure at 3 times reliability boundary, distribution or density function to be established, as shown
in figure 6-5. Afterwards, we can determine the proportion
of the product that is expected to fail at or below the Rb. We
Rb do this by applying the density function and the cumulative
I distribution theory discussed in chapter 5.
I 3.5 Rb This method of testing to determine failure distributions is2 I I"1
= called test to failure. Its purpose is to fail the device under
c I 1.2Rb
"_ 1 I r2 test, instead of passing it as in the attribute test.
I Application.--As mentionedbefore, the purpo_ of the test-
ca I _, to-failure technique is to develop failure distribution for a
Stress product underone or more types of stress. The resultsare used i
Figure 6-4,--Samples failing at different stress levels above reliability tOcalculate the demonstrated reliability of the device for each _i
boundary, stress. In thiscase thedemonstratedpopulation reliability will
usually be the Pt or P,. product reliability term. Before going _
Test-To-Failure Methods further, however, three terms must be understood.
,-: Reliability boundary. --The reliability boundary, which is "
Let us returnmomentarily to the problem of interpreting the maximum anticipated operating stress level, may be
the result of two samples tested to success at a maximum represented in two ways: ":
anticipated stress, or qualification level. This is the reliability (1) As a single point, such as 30 g's, 125 °F, -23 *F, or "
boundary R_,above which a sample is not required to operate !0 W. When the Ri, is presented this way. we assume thatthe
or survive. This test result is shown in figure 6-1. equipment will be operated at the level indicated 100 percent
As indicated earlier, such attributetests tell only whether of the time. Because this is usually not done, this method "
gross defects exist in the devices tested; they tell nothing about represents a worst-case situation.
' similardevices thatwill not be tested. To obtain betterresults, t2) As a point in a stress-density function. For example,
we can test the two samples at a higher stress level, such as the g force reliability boundary for a missile autopilot during
8O
, .... _ ............ ._r _-_
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Reliabilityboundary the mean strr.ngtb is. This is stated mathematically as
strm;sdi$_bul_n 1
I 0.14 percent SM -Rb-i"992.86"perch.at _ I N , offlightswill as
O_mgllts W.m • -• / I "_ ex_r=e
exp_ce a I I \ gremr man2_ -,
g Jevelms / :: I .... \ ! Thus, SM is the same as the xla value calculated in chapter 5 .
from
_n29g_ / • I _ -\ n
:/ l /i:: x Limit - Mean
23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Gravitylevel,g
i when the limit is Rb. (The minus sign is ignored.)
I I I I I I ! As an illustration, assume a reliability boundary of -25 "F
-20 -lo _" lo 2o 30 for a hydraulicsystem. Throughtest-to-failureexposureat low
temperatures we are able to define a failure distribution tltat
_. Figtsrc 6-6.--Gravity level during missile flight, has a mean of ./, = -37 "F and a standard deviation of
;; as = 4 deg F. The safety margin of the system in reference
a flight could be expressed as a 30 limit of a normal to the -25 °F boundary is given by
distribution--say 29 g's--indicating that a stress of 29 g's or
more would be experienced only O.14 percentof the time. This
',. is shown in figure 6--6. Ss_ = Rb -- ./_ = -25 - (--37) = 12 = 3 _i
_. This method obviously represents a truer picture than a., 4 4 i
!-. method (!) of what stress levels to expect. But this type of
stress information is usually hard to obtain. Subsequent as shown in figure 6-8. :|L
sections demonstrate the difference this method makes in Having calculated a safety margin, we can solve for the (
design philosophy and the resultant reliability values, percentage of these systems that will lie above or below the '._
Failure for strength) distribution.--The failure density reliability boundary. For this we use the technique described (
function reflects the failure distribution of a device under a in chapter 5 under "One-Limit Problems." In our illustration _ ' ]
specific stress (re.'s. 6-8 and 6-9j. The data used to develop a safety margin of 3 indicates ffrom table 5-7 in chapter 5) .!
a failure distribution, also called a strength distribution, that 0.998650 of the systems will not fail until the reliability
representfailurepointsobtainedthroughtest-to-failuremethods, boundary of -25 "F is exceeded. If the failure distribution
Figure 6-7 shows such adistribution for a composition resistor representsan out-of-tolerance condition, the safety margin of
at high temperatures, which we interpretjust as discussed in 3 indicates a P, of 0.998650 at low temperatures.
chapter 5. For example, we can say that 50 percent of the Test procedure and sample size.--Devices that are not
resistors will fail at 160 "C and below, 84 percent at 170 °C automatically destroyed upon being operated are normally not
and below, etc. expended or destroyed during a functional test. Electronic
Safety margin.-- The safety margin SM of a device is equipment usually falls intothis category. For such equipment _._
defined as the number of standarddeviations of the strength a minimum sample size of five is necessary, with each sample
distribution a,. that lie between the reliability boundary and being subjected to increasing stress levels until failure occurs i
strength,
• distribution I i_
.--.
I '?
"t0 140 150 160 170 180 190 -49 -45 -41 -37 -33 -29 -25 i
Temperature,"(3 Tempermure,°C
I I I I I I I I I I I I I __1 ..,
-20 -lo _" 10 2o 30 --3o -20 -10 _ lo 20 30
' Figure 6-7.--Failure, (, strength, distribution of resistor in high temperature. Figure 6-8.-Safety margin of device in low lemperature. '
+ ,i
• j 81 "_
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or the limits of the testing facility are reached. In the tatter Safety margins for single failure modes.--For devices that
case no safety margin calculationis possible because no failures exhibit a single failure mode during a test-to-failureexposure, ,
are observed. Here, we must rely on intuition in deciding the the safety margin and the reliability are calculated by the
acceptability of the device, technique just discussed in the definition of safety margin. Me [
Test-to-failure procedure and sample size requirements for following examples further illustratethe method and show the
one-shot devices are different because a one-shot device is practical results.
i " normally expended or destroyed during a functional test, Example 6: A test was conducted on a vendor's 0.25- and
Ordinarce items such as squib switches fall into this category, 0.50-W film resistors to evaluate their ability to operate
_, For suL., devices at least 20 samples should be tested, but 30 reliably at their rated power levels. Thirty samples of each
_-; to 70 would be more desirable. At least 12 failures should be type were tested by increasing the power dissipation until the
observed In one-shot of which resistance exceeded 5 The results shownduring
a test. a typical test, ¢lJnge percent. are
i there are many variations, a sample is tested at the reliability in figure 6-10, from which the following points are
boundary and, if it passes, a new sample is tested at pre- noteworthy:
determined stress increments until a failure occurs. Then, the (I) The mean strength of the 0.25-W resistor was less than
next sample is tested at one stress increment below the last half the mean strength of the 0.50-W resistor: -/025= i. 19 W
tailure. If this sample passes, the stress is increased one compared with ./o..so= 2.6 W. This w_s to be expected, since
increment for the next sample. This process, depicted in the 0.50-W resistor was larger, had more volume, and could
figure 6-9, continues until at least 12 failures have been dissipate more energy.
observed. (2) The standard deviation of the 0.25-W resistor was almost
the same as that for the 0.50-W resistor: o0..,._= 0.272 W; \
oo..so =0,332 W. This was also expected because both
resistors were made by the same manufacturer and subjected
28 -- [] to the same process controls and quality acceptance criteria.
O (3) The 0.50-W resistor, because of its higher mean
26 -- O strength, had a safety margin of 6.32 in reference to its rated
[] power dissipation of 0.50 W. According to table 5-5, this
24-- 0
0
22- [] O Pa.,;s / -Pmbability°ffailumats;O'25W'3"28x10-4 "
O [] Fa;I -- / _,_----S_=3.45-_-_20 _O / /
[] R //" distribution18 -- [] 41-
16 -- [] 0 .25 .50 .75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.0G 2.25
.., [] _: Power,W
" i I I I. I .I I I
14 -- O _ -30 -2o -10 _ lo 20 3oIi o ==
m 12-- O _.
13 _ /-Probabilityoffailureat_;0.50W,1.49x10"10
/ .----su =s.s2---"110-- 0
[] 12 -- / /- Failure
8 -- [] 8 -- _ / distribution
_? o ,:°
-- s o (b) I I_.._ lill_'_3X,L I I
I 0 /-Failure 0 .5 1.0 1.5 2,0 2,5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
4 - I I"t_ / distribution Power,WiSl" 2 - --20 _ 20im
Sb'OSll (a) 0.25-W resistor..r_ = I. 19 W: e_ = 0.272 W. [
(b) O,50-W resistor, x, = 2,6 W; o, = 0,332 W, i
Figure 6-9,--Example of (me-shot test-to-failure procedure, Figure 6-;0.--Test-to-failure results fi_,"0,25- and 0.50-W resistors. I
t !.
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means that only 0.0"!49 resistors would exceed a 5-percent as an)' out-of-tolerance parameter. The results, shown in g
resistance change when applied at 0.50 W. The 0.25-W figure 6-12, indicate that vendor B's materials, design, and
resistor, because of its lower mean strength, had a safety process control were far superior to vendor A's as revealed
margin of only 3.45 in reference to its rated power of 0.25 W. by the large differences in mean strength and standard
According to table 5-5 again, this means that 0.03337 deviation. With an Se of 1.41, 7.9 percent of vendor A's
resistors would exceed a 5-pc,cent resistance change when transistors would fail at the 74 °C reliability boundary: with
applied at 0.25 W. Derating the 0.25 W to 0.125 W increased an SMof 8.27, vendor B's transistors would not be expected
the safety margin to 3.92 and decreased the expected number to fail at all. It is unlikely that an attribute test would have t
of failures to 0.04481, an improvement factor of 7.5. This, identified the better transistor.
of course, is the reason for deratirg components, as discussed Erwnple 9: Squib switch samples were tested to failure under
in chapter 4. Although we have indicated that a safety margin vibration in accordance with the procedure for testing one-
of 6.32 has statistical meaning, in practice a population safety shot items. The results are shown in figure 6-13, where the
margin of 5 or higher indicates that the applicable failure mode mean and standard deviations of the failure distribution have
will not occur unless, of course, the strength distribution been calculated from the failure points observed. As shown,
• deviates greatly from a normal distribution. ._ = 14 g's and a, = 1.04 g's to produce a safety margin of
Example 7: A fiberglass material to be used for a flame 3.84 in reference to the reliability boundary of l0 g's.
. shield was required to have a flexural strength of 1.5000 psi. The preceding examples have shown how the Pt product
The results of testing 59 samples to failure are presented in reliability term can be effectively demonstrated through test-
figure 6-11. The strength distribution of the material was to-failure methods. This has been the case because each
calculated to have a mean of 19 900 psi and a standard example exceptthe squib switch involved a tolerance problem.
deviation of 4200 psi. The safety margin was then calculated as The examples also show that the K..,,factor plays an important
role in product reliability and that control over K factors can
15 000 - 19 900 ensure a significant increase in reliability.
SM = 4200 = 1.17 Multiple failure modes.--Most products perform mgre than
one function and have more than one critical parameter for
each function. In addition, most products are made up of many
Because, front table 5-7, SM = ._.do._= I. 17 indicates that types of materials and parts and require many fabrication
87.9 percent of the samples will fail at reliability boundaries processes during manufacture. It follows then that a product
above 15 000 psi, we can see that 12.1 percent will fail at can exhibit a variety of failure modes during testing.
boundaries below 15 000 psi. This analysis is optimistic in that In the conduct of a test to failure each failure mode detected
I 1/59 = 18.7 percent actually did fail below 15 000 psi. The must be evaluated individually: that is, a failure distribution
test also shows that the reliability of the flame shield could
be improved by either selecting another type of material to
obtain a higher mean strength or changing the fabrication
processes to reduce the large strength deviation. Rb
Example 8: Samples of transistors from two vendors were liftM 1.411== Failure
tested to failure under high temperatures. Failure was defineu ..... r-
Rb 1 (a) l
I I I I J
-2t_ -lt_ _" lt_ 2a
SM= ',.17
._ Strength Rb
SM=8.27 _i / distribution
.- t_ I I I  "ll'r, JI _ 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
10 15 20 25 30x103 Temperature,*C
Strength,psi t t I t I
-2o -lo' _ lo 2o'
; I I I 1 ....I
-2¢r -lo _" lo 2o
, {a_VendorA. x, = 10.¢ "C; o, = 22degC.
i Figure6-11.-Strengthdistributioni fiberglassmaterial,x_= Iq9(X)psi; (hi VendorB..r, = 165°C;a, ._ II degC.
o, = 4200psi. Figure6-12.--Test-to-failureesultsfortwotransistors.
................... :_-r'. .... _' e" . "'" ......
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0 Pass
9 _ [] Fail
L 10 0 Rb
12--0 0 I-I 0 1
•_ 13 -- 0 0 [] 0 0 [] 0 0 [] 3
iJ '¢_ 14 0 0 _ 0 0 0 0 I-I[] 6
15-- [] O0 0 3 i
I o I I I "I/  -F lure I
16 10 20 30 "l / distribution t
.. Samplenumber i
Figure6-13.--Vibrationtest-to-failureresultsofone-shotdevice(squibswitch),x, = 14g's;o_= 1.04g's. I[
mustbe developedfor eachfailuremodeandsafetymargins increasingPt.2to 1 or by eliminating the mode altogether, _,
mustbe calculatedfor each individualfailure distribution, increasesPr.to_lfrom 0.9819 to 0,9998.
Moreover, as mentionedbefore, at least five samples or failure When stress distribution is known.--When safety margins - !
points are needed to describe each failure mode distribution, are calculatedin reference to a single point or a fixed reliability
To see this more clearly, consider the test results shown in boundary, the resulting reliability estimate is conservative ifigure 6-14. Here, each of the three failure modes observed because it is assumedthat the equipmentwill alwaysbe operated
is described in terms of its own failure distribution and at the reliability boundary. As an illustration, figure 6-15 i
resulting safety margin with reference to the same reliability shows the stress distribution for the operating temperatureof '.:
bou1__ry. If these failure modes are independent and each a device and the maximum anticipated operating limit
representsan out-of-tolerance Pt condition,theP, of thetest (145 OF),whichisgivenin thedevicespecificationsandwould : :
deviceis given by normally be consideredthe reliability boundary.
Figure 6-16 shows the strength distribution of the device
Pt.,ot_l= P,.j(SM = 3.5)Pt.2(SM = 2. 1)P, ._(SM= 7.6) for hig',.,temperatures and also that a safety margin for the
devic,_, when referenced to the 145 °F reliability boundary,
= (0.9998)(0.9821 )( 1.00) = 0.9819 is 1 54, or a reliability of 93.8 percent. We kr:ow, however, i
.thatthe 145 °F limit is the 3e limit of the stress distribution 1
This also shows that the independentevaluationof each failure and will occur only 0.135 percent of the time. The question
mode identifies the prioritiesnecessary to improve the product, is, How does this affect the estimated reliability of the device
For example, the elimination of failure mode 2, either by in the temperature environment?
If we select random values from the stress and strength
distribution and subtract the stress value fi'om the strength
R b value, a positive result indicates a success--the strength :i
.j
exceeds the stress. A negative result indicates a failure--the
S_ ,, 7.¢ i. /'i
/ [ I_. _F Failure StreSScli_ _ R.b _i
f(x) J-$M "3.6--_J | ......-"_-,_, distdbutions / _ I[_
I I,_._"" //I | i_
,}
"fl I :
I 25 45 65 85 105 126 145
120 140 160 180 200 220 Temperature,°F
Temperature,°F
Figure6.-15.--Stressdistributiontbroperatingtemperature.._-,= 85 °F; • i
Figure6..14.--Test-to-failureresultswhenmultiplefailuremodesareobserved, o, - 20deg F.
t 84 :!
l
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Rb =145° This 3.33 safety margingives a reliabilityof 0.9996 when the
stress distribution is considered. Comparing this result with
SM --1.54 the estimated reliabilityof 0.938 when the reliabilityboundary
_bu point estimate of 145 °F was used shows the significance of ""
_....._- Strength knowing the stress distribution whet estimating reliability
lion values.
Confidence levels.--As discussed before, the main objective ,
in developing a failure distribution f r a d vice by test-t -t [ _ failure methods is to predict how well a population of like
126 139 152 165 178 191 204 devices will perform. Of course, such failure distributions, "
Temperature,°F along with the resulting safety margins and reliability
estimates, are subject to error. Errors result fro,n
Figure 6-16.--Strength distribution for operating temperature,x.,.= 165 °F. samplesize
o.,= 13 deg F. limitations in much the same way that the dcmonstr:,,_.,d
reliability varies with sample size in attributetesting. Speci-
fically, the mean and the stapdard deviations of the strengthstress exceeds the strength. With this knowledge we can
' calculate a difference distribution and, through the application distribution must be adjusted to reflect the sample size used
• in their calculation. Tables A-3 to A-5 in appendix A have
of the safety margin technique, solve for the probability of been developed for this purpose by using the noncentral tthe strength being greater than the stress (i.e., success). This
difference distribution is also _:3tributednormally and has the distribution. Table 6-3 shows the applicable appendix A tables
following parameters: for selected confidence levels and sample sizes, and the i
_. examples that follow illustrate their use.
-- - Etwnple 10:Uponbeing tested to failure athigh temperatures,
Xdifference= Xs- &tress 10 devices were found to have a failure distribution of
Odifference (O.2 _2 x I/2 2s = 112.7 "C and o, = 16 deg C. The reliability boundary= m OSIrCSS]
was 50 °C. Find the safety margin and reliability demonstrated
From the strength and stress distributionparametersgiven in at 90-percent confidence, i
the preceding example (figs. 6-15 and o- 16), SolutionIO:.Step l--Solve first for theol:"_,',,edsafetymargi,., i
Xdirference = 165 - 85 = 80 °F SM= Rb_-- xs = 50 - 112.7 = 3.92 [
( ) ,Odiffereace= 202 + 132 J/2= 24 deg F os 16 !;
From table 5-7 the observed reliabilit_ is 0,99996.This distribution is shown in figure 6-17.
Because positive numbers represent success events, we are Step 2--Now refer to tableA-5(a) iu appendix A, which deals
interested in the area under the difference distribution that with 90-percent confidence limks for safety margins, and
includesonly p_sitive numbers. Thiscan be calculatedby using follow across to column N = 10, the number of samples. The
zero as the reliability boundary and solving for the safety values under the N headings in all of the tables listed in
margin from table 6-3 represent the observe,.i safety margins for sample
sizes as calculated from r_w test data. The SMcolumn lists
O- _ 0---80 corresponding popul_,iion safety margins for the observed
SM = ...... 3.33 safety margins shown under the N he'..'dings.Finally, corre-
o_ 2_
difference TABLE 6-3.--CONFIDENCE LEVEL TABLES 5,_
t dJstribtllJon, FOR VARIOUS SAMPLE SIZES i_
_:I 0.9396
Confidence Samplesize ' :
i_ percent 5-12 13-20 21-29 30-100I ] ] Confidence level tables
0 8 32 56 80 104 128 152
Temperature,"F 99 A-3(a)A-3(b)A-3(c)A-3(d._
95 A--4(a)A...4(b)A-4(c)A-4(C
• Figure6-17.--Strengthandstressdifferencedistribution.X,-80 "F', 90 A-5(u) A-._(b) A-5(c) A,5(d)
o_" 24degF. I
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,, sponding population reliability estimates are shown under the 20 _1
p_ headings, which may represent/'1 or P, as applicable ....
Step 3--Proceed down the N = 10 column to 3.923. the 18 '_
13
observed safety margin derived in step 1. 5 F = _ = 1.3 '
Step 4--Having located SM "=3.923 with l0 samples, follow
horizontally to the left to lind the demonstrated population 16
safety margin in the SM column. This is 2.6.
Step 5--With a populatior_SMof 2.6, follow the same line to 14
the right to find the population reliability estimate tmder the
P_ heading. This value is 0.9953. Recall that the observed x'
safety margin was 3.923 andthe observed reliability, 0.99996. 12 'i
Example I1: Twelve gyroscopes were tested to failure by SM--.13 :
time as a stress to develop a wearout distribution. The |using
wearout distribution was found to have a _ of 5000 hours and lO t Rb
a as of 840 hours. Find the P,. demonst,l'ated at 95-percent
confidence with a reliability boundat), of 1000 hours. 8 _- 9.68PerczntdefectiveSolution 11: Step l--The :;ample safety margin is =
..gZ (a)
lO00 5000 2. 6
SM = - = 4.76840 o
.i Step 2--The population safety margin at 95-percent confidence _,_II,F. _1130
" , = _ =1.3 t.I
with a 12-sample safety margin of 4.76 is read directly from 16
table A-4(a) to be 3.0. t
Step 3--For a population SM of 3.0, the corresponding P,. 14 -- .-_
under the p_ column is 0.9986. Thereby 99.86 percent of the _ igyroscopes will not wear out before 1000 hours have been I ' " _ [
accumulated. _2 _ i
• Safety factor.--This section is included in the discussion SM = 4.0 i
of test-to-failure methods because the term "safety factor" S-,_
is often confused with safety margin. It is used widely in 10 _ Rb .. ._
industry to describe the assurance agair_,stfailure that is built
into ,_:ructuraiproducts. There are many definitions for safety / _- 0,003Percentdefective
factor S_, with the mos, common being _he ratio of mean 8Fstrength to reliability bc ,ndary: (b)6 --'- _'i
SF = --2_ t_x}
Rh (a) StructureA,
(b)StructureB. :..."..
When dealingwith materials with clearly defined, repeatable, Figure 6-18.-Two structures with identical .safety factors (S_.= 13/10 "_ 1:3) :" _'_'_
and "tight" strength distributions, such as sheet and _aructural burdifferent_fet?tmargins. .. "i!
steel or aldminum, using SF presents little risk. However.
when dealing with plastics, fiberglass, and other metal sub- _
stitutes or processes with wide variations in strength or reliability terms without the need for the large samplesrequired _ -
repeatability, using SM provides a clearer picture of what is for attribute tests .... _- '_,
happening (fig. 6-18). In most cases, we must know thesafety (2) The results of a test-to-failure exposure of a device can . _,_
margin to understand how accurate the safety factor may be. be used in predicting the reliability of similar devices that "__
Test-to-failure summary.--In summary, you should under- cannot or will not be tested. " _:
stand the following concepts about test-to-failure applications: (3) Te'_ti_g to thilure provides a means of evaluating the -
distribution through test-to-failure failure modes and mechanisms of devices fbr improvement " _i(1) Developing a strength
:._ methods provides a good estimate of the Pt and P,,. product purposes. ' i!]
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(4) It allows confidence levels to be applied to the safety is accepted for delivery to demonstrate that its failure rate is ;
margins and to the resulting popuiution reliability estimates, below some predetermined value. Examples of such appli- 1
(5) To know how accurate a safety factor may be, we must cations are burn-in or debugging tests and group B life tests I,""
also know the associated safety margin, conducted on electronic parts. Some manufacturers of II"
communications satellites subject all electronic parts to a
Life Test Methods 1200-hour burn-in test and use only the ones that survive. .4
Chapters 3 and 4 introduced the "'bathtub" curve used to (2) To identify product improvement methods. Here, life
illustrate how the failure rate of a typical system or complex tests serve a dual purpose by providing hardware at essentially
no cost for physics-of-failure analyses. In turn, these analyses '1
subsystem varies during its operating life. In association with identify failure mechanisms and the action needed to reduce i ' ,i
this curve we identified three traditiona; failure rate regions:
the debugging or burn-in region, the intrinsic-failure-rate effectively a product's failure rate. In the past 10 years thishas resulted in significant part failure rate reductions. In fact,
region, and the wearout region. This curve is presented again the failure rates of some components have been reduced so I
in figure 6-19, but this time with data that indicate when the far that accelerated life tests (life tests at elevated stress levels)
failure rate regions occur.
: and test-to-failure techniques must be employed to attain
_ This illustration shows that the greatest reduction in failure
,_ rate during the debugging or burn-in region (as great as 10 reliability improvements in a reasonable timei'rame.(3) I"oestablish pre_,entive maintenance policies. Products
to I) occurs before 600 to 1200 hours of operation. The curve
-" with known or suspected wear mechanisms are life tested
_ also shows that electronic failure rates continue to decrease
_- to determine when the wearout process will begin to cause
_ through as much as 26 000 hours, or 3 years, of continuous undesirable failure rate trends. Once the wearout region is
- operation without signs of a wearout region, ltents of equip- established for a product, system failures can be reduced by
_" i ment with true inherent wear mechanisms usually enter the
[ wearout region at 3000 or more hours, implementing a suitable preventive maintenance plan or
I: It should be obvious that such data provide valuable overhaul program. This is effectively illustrated in figure6-20,
: guidelines for controlling product reliability. They figure which shows the failure rate trend in a c,mamercial jet aircraft
:. prominentl in the establishment of burn-in requirements, subsystem. Here, the upward trend after 4000 hours of
operation was revealed to laecaused by a servomechanism that
_..... predictions of spare part requirements, and an understanding required lubrication. By establishing a periodic lubrication
-" of the need or lack of need for a system everhaul program, schedule lbr the mechanism, further failures were eliminated.
Such data are obtained through laboratory life tests or from Note that this subsystem a!so exhibited burn-in and intrinsic-
the normal ope:ation of 2 fielded system. In either ca_ collecting failure-rate regions.
and assess!;Jg life data are vital in testing tbr reliability. (4) To assess reliability. Here. tests are performed or life
Appli,,,arion.--Although life test data are derived basical'y data collected from fielded systems to establish whether con-
for use in evaluating the failure characteristics of a product, tractual reliability requirements are actually being met. In cases
byproducts uf the evaluation may serve many _:her purposes, of noncompliance and when the field failures are analyzed,
Four of the most frequent are
-- one Of the prece._ling.methods is employed to improve lhe
!_..:, (1) To serve as acceptance criteria.for new hardware. For product, or else a design change is implemented, The effec-
: example, a product may be subjected to a life test before it
tiveness of the corrective action is then:evaluated from addi-
tional life data. Because-lifeqest-observed failure rates include
: catastrophic, tolerance, wearout, and K factor failures, life
I tests, usually demonstrate product reliabih;yDebugging Intrinsicfailure Wearout Test procedure and sample size.--Conducting a life test is
• lot_m-in rateregion region
-: _ Ir_tion i _ fairly straightforward. It inwflves only the accumulation ofI I , I equipment operating time, Precautions m.ust be taken, how-
_,. _ .,_ 17_ I Solid.state j ever. when the test is conducted in a laborar,ory. Operating
:_ _ I \ I eleetr°nlCS_l / II _, I , \1 i II conditions must !nclude. all: of the factors that affect failure -
,,._:_ _ Other •" "
_. . [ . I e_ipment__ .1_\ I
_ \i , ..
2 " " J
" "r _ _1 _ a0o0_u, 2e®o I:_ ", , _" I "(3year=,) . .
: Operatingtime,hr 0 1 2 3 4 Sx_C3
Operatingtime,hr
Filure6-,19.--Failurerate'_¢r_usoperatingtimefar typical._y,_tenl,,,and , ":
'i e(_'.plex su_';ystems. Fltqlre _20.- Failure ratet:han_ieri_,licsofconltllercial j¢l dectmnic ,,,ub_ystea_
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rateswhenthedeviceis operatedtactically.Majorfactorsare /L FJlumenvironment,power-onand power-offtimes, powercycling 50 rate,
rates, preventive maintenance, operator tasks, and field _.,
tolerancelimits.Ignoringanyof thesefactorsmay leadto an feiluret/hr
unrealisticfailurerateestimate. 11250"N
When accelerated life tests are conductedfor screening 40
purposes,stresslevels no greaterthan the inherentstrength
of theproductmustbe chosen.Theinherentstrengthlimitcan
beevaluatedthroughtest-to-failuremethodsbeforethe lifetests
are conducted. _Z30
Experiencewithnonacceleratedlife testsof militarystandard -_" "_
electronicparts for periods as IoPgas 5000 hours indicates _._ "_-1/86 i'
that an averageof one to two failuresper 1000parts can be "_
expected. For this reason life tests will not provide good -_ 2o
reliabilityestimatesat the partlevel exceptwhen quantities o
on theorderof 1000or morepartsareavailable.On the other
hand, life tests areefficientat the systemlevel with onlyone
sampleas longasthe systemis fairlycomplex(includesseveral 10
thousandparts).
Lifetests intendeoto reveal the wearoutcharacteristicsof
a device may involve as few as five samples,althoughfrom l
_ 20 tO30 are more desirableif a good estimateof thewearout J [
distribution is tO be obtained. 0 1 2 3 4x10s
i Analyzing life test data.--Recall from chapter3 that an Oporalingtime,hr
! empirical definition of mean time between failures (MTBF) Figure6-2 I.--Results of complex electronicsystem life test,
was given as
rate was
Total test hours
MTBF Total observedfailures _,= _35 = I failure/29hours
1000 ,d
Rememberalso that, becausethis ext_ression eglectsto show
when the failuresoccur, it assumesan inui,tsic failurerate or about 3 times .figherthanthe total averagefailurerateof
and thereforean intrinsic mean time between failures, or 1/86hours; in the1000-to4000-hourregionthe actualfailure
MTBF.The assumptionof an intrinsicfailurerate maynot rate was
be valid in somecases, butlife testresultshave traditionally
been reportedthis way. 12
To see this illustrated,considerthe resultsof a 4000-hour _,= _ = 1 failure/250hours "t3OO0
lifetestof acomplex(47 000parts)electronicsystemas .;hewn "_
in figure6-21. This graphplotscumulativelyin termsof tht.
times the47 failuresareobserved, so that the slopes of the or about 2.9 times lowerthan the average.
linesrepresenthe failurerate.The solidlineshows the system This illustrationestablishesthe ,4".sirabilityof knowingwhen
_ failureratethatresultedfromassuminganintrinsicfailurerate, failuresoccur, notjust the numberof failures.The resultsof "
[ _ which was analyzingdatabyregionscan beusedtoevaluateburn-inand
i sparepans requirements.The bum-in regionwas identified ;_
" ito be from0 to 1000hoursbecauseafterthis timethe failure
_ Total failures 47 ratedecreasedby a factorof 8.6.p -:..i _ .... 1 failure/86hours
! Total operationtime 4000 This resultalso has a significanteffect on logistics. For
i example, if we assume that the system will accumulate
_ 1000 hoursper year, we can expect duringthe firstyearto
Fromtheplottedtestdata, it isobviousthat this intrinsicfailure replace 35 parts
rate was not a good estimateof what reallyhappened. The
plotteddataindicatethat therewere two intrinsic-failure-rate /'1 failure '_portions:one from 0 to 1000hoursandthe other from 1000 ,_ x 1000 hours/• to4000 hour_.IntheO-to 1000-hourregiontheactualfailure \29 hours
Vd
whereas during the next and subsequent years we can expect exposure, exposure to high temperatures is an effective way
_omake only four replacements to screen defective parts from the system. Because the failure
rate continued to decrease after the tests were completed,
neither low temperature nor vibration caused permanent
-1failure × 1000 hours) damage to the _vstem.250 hours At the end of the 2000-hour period the failure rate was 3.3
failuresper 1000 hours. This reflected a tenfold decrease from
Using the average failure rate of 1 faihtre/86 hours, we the initial failure rate duringdebugging, typical of the results i _
• would have to plan, however, for 28 replacementsevery year. observed for many co:aplex systems. An example of a running
_ Obviously, the cost impact of detailed analysis can be average failure rate analysis that identifies a system wearout
substantial, region is shown in figure 6-23. The increasing failure rate
Running m,erages.--When s,,stemfailure ratesare irregular after 3000 hours was caused by relay failures(duringapprox-
or when there is need to evaluate the effect of different imately 10 000cycles of operation). This type of intbrmation
operating conditions on a system, running average analyses can be used to establish a relay replacement requirementas
are useful. This can best be illustrated through the example part of a system preventive maintenance plan.
presented in figure 6-22. A 300-hour running average in Confulence levels.--As discussed in chapter4, failure rates
50-hour exposures is shown for a complex system during an are statistical. Conseq_,_ntly, they are subject to confidence ]
engineeringevaluationtest. (Runningaverages ureconstructed levels just as attributeand test-to-failure resultsare influenced f
by finding the failure rate for the first 300 hours of operation, by such factors. Confidence levels for intrinsic failure rates i
then dropping the first 50 hours and picking up the 300- to are calculated by using table A-2 in appendix A.
p
350-hour interval and calculating the new 300-hour regional To use this table, first calcul_*e the total test hours i
failure rate, and then repeating the process by dropping the accumulated from
second 50 hours of data and adding the next 50 hours for the
total test period.) From the resultant curve you can readily n
see (1) the effects of the debugging test, (2) the increase in t -- _ Niti
failure rate during the high-temperature test and the decrease i= l
after that test, (3) another increase during low-temlY_rature
exposure and the subsequent decrease, (4) a slight increase where
caused by vibration, and (5) a continuously decreasing rate ith
as the test progressed. The curve indicates that the system is N; unit tested
the most sensitive to high temperature and that, because the t_ test time of N_
failure rate continued to decrease after high-temperature n total units tested
89
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Then find tinder the number of failures observed during the Step 2--Because the de:;ired 90-percent-confidence MTBF is
test the tolerance |actor for the desired confidence level. The given as 80 hours and the tolerance thctor is known, calculate
lower limit for the MTBF at tile selectetJ confidence level is the total test time required from
then fi)und from
t " (MTBF)(Tolerance filctor) = (80)(2.3) = 1_4 hnur_
MTBF = t to prove that 184 hours with no thilures demonstrates an .
Tolerance factor 80-hour MTBF at 90-percent confidence. :
A good discussion of fixed time and sequential tests is given
and the upper limit for failure rate from in MIL-STD-781D (ref. 6-3).
Life test summary.--ln summary, the following concepts
are reiterated:
Tolerance factor (!) Life tests are performed to evaluate product failure rate
t characteristics.
, (2) If "failures" include all causes of system failure, the
failure rate of the system is the only true factor available for
Erample 13: A system was life tested for 3000 hours, during
which six failures were observed. What is the demonstrated evaluating the system's pertbrmance.
80-percent-confidence MTBF? (3) Life tests at the part level require large sample sizes if
realistic failure rate characteristics are to be identified.
Solution 13: Step l--Solve for the total test hours. (4) Laboratory lili_tests must simulate the major factors that
influence failure rates in a device during field operations.
" (5) The use of running averages in the analysis of life data
t = _ Nitj = 1 x 3000 = 3000 will identify burn-in and wearout regions if such exi,,t.
i= l (6) Failure rates are statistics and thereh)re are subject to
confidence levels when used in making pretlictions.Step 2--From table A-2 find the tolerance factor for six
failures at 80-pc.'cent confidence to be ,3._,.
Step 3--Solve for the demonstrated MTBF.
t 3O00
MTBF = - = 333 hours
Tolerance factor 9
in contras: to the observed MTBF of 3000/6 = 500 hours.
Eramph, 14: Had lbur of the six failures in example 13been
observed in the first i000 hours, what would be the
demonstrated MTBF at 80-percent confidence in the region
from 1000 to 3000 hours?
Solution 14: Step I--The total test time is given as t = 2000
hours.
Step 2-From table A-2 find the tolerance factor for two
failures at 80-percent confidence to be 4,3.
Step 3--Find the demonstrated MTBF at 80-percent confidence
ql after 1000 to 3000 hours,
2000
MTBF - _ = 465 hours
4.3
F,t'ample IS: it is desired to demonstrate an 80-hour MTBF
on a computer at 90-percent confidence. How much test time _- 0 0
is required on one sample if no hfilures t_.'cur?
Solution 15: Step I--From table A-2 find the tolerance
factor fi)r no failures at 90-percent conlidence to be 2.3. Figure h 24,--Productfailure',):rfat.'c,
91)
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lReliability Training _ _ _
1. Sevenhydraulicpowersuppliesweretestedin a combinedhigh-temperatureandvibrationtest.-Outputs ;_
I:" i of six of the seven units testedwere withinlimits. ;_-: -,
.-! a. What is the observedreliabilityR of the seven unitstested? ,,_-_-'i),
i..I A. 0.825 B. 0.857 C. 0.913 _
,_ .._
} b. What is thepredictedpopulationreliabilityR at 89-percentconfidence? _-_"_i'_:_
"; A. 0.50 B. 0.75 C. 0.625
'ii c. confidence?H°wmanytern( ithono failurealreedyexpedenced)areneededto_R = 0.88 mSO-perc¢_ : [i:_
A. 24 B. 15 12. 311 ._
2. A vibrationtestwas conductedon 20 autopilot_ circuitswi_- these results:Meani, = 7.8 -g's; :_standarddevia ion_, = 1.2 g's; reliabilityboundaryP-b= 6_g's. ];']_
a. Whatis the observedsafetymarginSu? :.;,_'
A. 2.0 B. 1.0 C. 1.5 : _i_
_.,
_i b. Whatis the observed reliabilityR? .i._:.-_
i/-[ A. 0.900 B. 0.935 C. 0.962 /: __:_• c. What is the pr,-.dictedpopulationsafety marginSu at 80-percentconfidence? i
A. 1.19 S. 2.19 C. 3.19 } _;:;
d. Whatis the predictedpopulationreliabilityR at 80-percentconfidence? _ _::_
A. 0.75 B. 0.95 C. 0.88 t "''_'_''_
3. Twenty-fivelow-pressurehydraulicline sampleswere testedto destruction.Thes,:, ,_esareratedto ::/_
carry30 psia(Rb);is = 31.5 psia;o, = 0.75 psia. _
j - ....,
a. Whatis the observedSu of these test items?...... _ .,
A. 1.0 B. 2.0 C. 3.0 : ?_'r:_
b. What is the.predictedpopaistionsafety marginSAcat _-l_ent confidence? "_':_
A. 0.95 B. 1.25 C. 1.51 1 "._
[ c" Thedesignrequirementcalls f°r anSu > 4"0at90"percentconfidence'Afterdiscussingthe Problem i -,,_;:!_
withthedesigner,itwaslearnedthatthe30-psiaretin8includeda 2.5-psia"pad." Usingthecorrected _: i;,i.:ii;_Rbof 27.5 psia, now what are the Su andSo at 90-percentconfidence?
i i. Su (observed)= ?
A. 4.22 B. 5.33 C. 6.44 _,=:_!_
ii. So (predicted)= ? .- .l
A. 4.275 B. 23.75 C. 4.80 / "/)_
*Amwers,re lliVenattheeMofthlsnumual. :_::'_ .
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L Chapter 7
i L _ .=
Software Reliability •
_:! Softwarereliabilitymanagementis highlydependenton how programmer'sdevelopmentool", or (3) "'qualityis thesame
the relationshipbetweenqualitya_ reliabilityis,perceived, as reliabilityandis measuredby the numberof defectsin a
For thepurposesof hismanual,qualityis closelyrelatedto andnotby its reliability."All of thesephilosophies,
_:] the process,andreliabilityis closely relatedto the product, tendto eliminateprobabilisticmeasuresbecausethemanagers
_ Thus, both spanthe life cycle, consid&a programmeras a softwarefactorywhosequality
/i 4 Beforewe canstratifysoftware_liability, theprogressof outputis controllable,adjustable,or both.In actuality,hard-
Lj '_ hardwarereliabilityshouldbe brieflyreviewed.Overthepast waredesign can be controlledfor reliabilitycharacteristics [_ _}._
_i_! 25 yearstheindustryhas observed(!) theinitialassignment betterthan softwaredesigncan. Designphilosophyexperi- I !_
_i &"wizard status"to hardwarereliabilityfor theory,model- ments thatfailedto enhancehardwarereliabilityare again {_
_}k[_! ing,andanalysis,(2) thegrowthof thefield,and(3) thefinal beingformulatedfor softwaredesign. (Some of thematerial
' establishmentof hardwarereliabilityasa science. Oneof the in this chapteris reprintedwithpermissionfrom ref. 7-1.)
nwjorproblemswasaligningreliabilitypredictionsand ield Qualityand reliabilityare notthe same. Quality is charac-
!''_} [! wasPerf°rmance"Oncethatwasaccomplished,reliability,thewizardemphasisStatuseristicandreliabilityis probabilistic.Ourapproachdrawsthe i _
i -i removedfrom hardware The in linebetweenqualityandreliabilitybecausequalityisconcerned -
hardwarereliabilityfromnowto theyear2000, asdiscussed withthedevelopmentprocessandreliabilityis concernedwith
in chapter1, will be on systemfailuremodesandeffects, theoperatingproduct.Manymodelshavebeendevelopedand
Softwarereliabilityhas reachedclassificationas a science a numberof the measurementmodelsshow great promise.
formanyreasons.Thedifficultyinassessingsoftwarereliabil- Predictivemodelshavebeenfarless successfulpartlybecause
ity is analogousto the problemof assessingthe reliability a data base (such as MIL-HDBK-217E (ref. 7-2) for I
of a new hardwaredevice withunknownreliabilitychara¢- hardware)is notyetavailableforsoftware.Soltwarereliability t
teristics.Theexistenceof 30 to50 differentsoftwarereliability oftenhasto useothermethods;it mustbeconcernedwith the
models indicatestheorganizationin this area. As discussed processof softwareproductdevelopment.
in chapter1, hardwarereliabilitystartedata few companies
andlaterwas focusedon by the AGREEreports.The field
thenlogicallyprogressedthroughdifferentmodelsinsequence
over the years. Along the same lines numerouspeopleand Models
companieshavesimultaneouslyenteredthesoftwarereliability 1[ __field in their majorareas; namely, cost, complexity,and The developmentof techniquesfor measuringsoftware
reliability.The'differenceis thatat least IU0timesas many reliabilityhasbeenmotivatedmainlyby projectmanagers,who
peoplearenowstudyingsoftwarereliabilityas initiallystudied neednotonlywaysof estimatingthe personpowerneededto
hardwarereliability.The existenceof so manymodelsand developa softwaresystemwithagivenlevel of performance, i
their purportstends to maskthe fact thatseveralof these butalso techniquesfordeterminingwhenthislevelof perfor-
modelshaveshownexcellentcorrelationsbetweensoftware mancehas been reached.Most softwarereliabilitymodels
perfommncepredictionsandacttudsot_ue fieldperformance; presentedto datearestill farfromsatisfyingthesetwoneeds.
for instance,the Musamodelas appliedto communications Mostmodelsassumethatthe softwarefailureratewill be.
systemsandtheXeroxmodelasappliedtoofficecopien. There proportionalto the numberof implementationand design
are also reasonsfor not acceptingsoftwarereliabilityas a errorsinthesystem,withoutakingintoaccountthatdifferent
science, andthey arebriefly discussedhere. kindsof errorsmay contributedifferentlyto thetotalfailure
Oneimpedimento theestablishmentof softwarereliability rate.Eliminatingonesignificantdesignerrormaydoublethe
asa scienceisthetendencytowardprogrammingdevelopment meantime to failure,whereaseliminating10 minorimple-
philosophies such as (I) "do it fight the first time" (a mentationerrors(bulls)mayhaveno noticeableeffect. Even
reliability model is not needed), or t2) "quality is a assumingthatthe failurerateis proportionalto the number
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of bugs and design errors in the system, no model considers where X(/) --f(N - / + 1) and N is the number of errors I_
4 the fact that the failure rate will thenbe related to the system originally present. The model gives the maximum likelihood 1
i workload.Forexample,doublingtheworkloadwithoutchang- estimatesfor N andf I
, ing the distribution of input data to the system may double The Jelinsky-Moranda model has been extended by I •"
the failure rate. Wolverton and Schick (ref. 7-6). They assume that the error I _
!_' Sc_fiwarereliability models can be roughly grouped into four rate is proportionalnot only to the number of errors butalso __:_S.
./ cptegories: time domain, data domain, axiomatic, and other, to the time spent in debugging, m that the chance of discoverYincreasesas time goes o . Thayer, Lipow: an Nelson [_i_iI_'I-'_Time Domain Models (ref. 7-7) give another exter,sion in which more than one error ,.
_ _ Models formulated in the time domain attempt to relate can be detected in a time interval, with no correction being _madeafter theend of this interval. New maximum likelihood ]
' software reliability (characterized, for instance, by a mean- estimators of N andfare also given. , . ,_
i, time-to-failure (MTTF) figure under typical workload con- All the models presented so far attempt to predict the ¢' '/
ditions) to the numberof bugspresentin the software ata given reliability of a software system after a periodof testing and ill, •_
_- :':_ time during its development. Typical of thisapproach are the
•,. debugging. In agood example of an applicatio'._of this type
_.. models presented by Sbooman (ref. 7-3), Musa (ref. 7-4), of model, Miyamoto (ref. 7-8) describes the developmentOf
_- and Jelinsky and Moranda (ref. 7-5). Removing implemen-
%" tation errors should increase MTTF, and correlating bug an on-line, real-time system for which a requirement is that the
meantime between software errors (MTBSE) has to be longer
removal history with the time evolution of the MTTF value than 30 days. The system will operate on a day-by-day basis,
:.. may allow the prediction of wllen a given MTTF will be 13 hours a day. (It will be loadedevery morning and reset
reached. The main•disadvantages of time domain models are
everyevening.) The requirementis formulatedso thatthevalue
that bug correction can generate more bugs and thatsoftware
of the reliability function R(t) for t = 13 hours has to be
unreliability can be due not only to implementation errorsbut greaterthan e (- 13/MTBSE)_. 0.9672. Miyamoto also gives the
also to design (specification) errors, characterization, and variationsin time of the MTBSEusa functionof the debuggingsimulation during testing of the typical workload, time. The MTBSE remained low for most of the debugging
The Shooman model (ref. 7-3) attempts to estimate the period, jumping to an acceptable level only at the end. The
software reliability--that is, the probabilitythp.tno software correlationcoefficient between the remaining numberof errors
i in the program and the failure rate was 0.77, but the scatter .
failure will occur during an operating time interval (0,t)--
froman estimate of the n.mber of errors permao.hine-language plot showz_is disappointing and suggests that the correlation
r instruction present in a software system after T months of coefficient between the failure rate and any t:ther system
i debugging. The model assumes that at system integration there variable could have given the same value. In the same paper
are E_errors present in the system and that the system is
i" operated continuously by an exerciser that emulates its real Miyamoto describes in detail how the system was tested. _None of the models above takes into account that in the
l use. The hazardfunctionafter Tmonths of debuggingis assumed process of fixing a bug, new errors may be introduced in the _ ,"
to be proportional to the remaining errors in the system. The system. The final number given is usually the mean time _
reliability of the software system is then assumed to be between software errors, but only Miyamoto points out that
• this number is valid only for a specific set of workload ' _":
_'" R(t) = e-cr4r.n conditions,
i Other models for studying the improvement in reliability
where E(r, 13 is the remaining numberof errors in thesystem of a software item during its development phase exist, such
after T months of debugging and C is a proportionality as Littlewood (ref. 7-9), where the execution of a program
i constant. The model providesequations for estimating C and is simulated with continuous-time Marker switching among
E(r, 7")from the results of the exerciser and the number of smaller program_.. This model also demonstrates that under ,:,- er ors co rected, certainconditiens in t e softwar,: ystem structure, t e failure :
The Jelinsky-Moranda model (ref. 7-5) is a special case of process will be asymptotically Poisson. Trivedi and Shooman '=
the Shooman model. The additional assumption is made that (ref. 7-10) give another Marker model, where the most
A-_' each errordiscovered is immediately removed, decreasingthe probable number of errors that will have been corrected at
"- remainingnumberof errors by one. Assuming that the amount any time t is based on preliminary modeling of the error
of debugging time between error occurrences has an occurrence and repair rates. The model also predicts the
exponential distribution, the density function of the time of system's availability and reliability at time t. Schneidewind
_ discovery of the ith error, measured from the time of (ref. 7-1 i) describes a model which assumes that the failure
discovery of the (i - !) therror is process is described by a nonhomogeneous Poisson process.i' The rate of error detection in a time interval is assumed to
_.--.-',_":? p(ti) = 7_(i)e xu)'i be proportional to the number of errors present during that
i
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tinterval. This leads to a Poisson distributionwitha decreasing wherep is again the probability thata runof the programwill
hazard rate. result in an execution failure.
r A mathematical definition of the reliability of a computer
Data Domain Models program is given as the probability of no execution failures
, after n runs.
•"_ i Another approachto softwarereliabilitymodeling is studying
i the datadomain. The first model of this kind is described by R(n) = R" = (1 - p)" i_
_ Nelson (ref. 7-12). In principle, if sets of all input data upon |
"_-[_iJ_ which a computer program can operate are identified, the The model elaborates on bow to choose input data values at
L reliability of the program can be estimated by running the random for E according to the probability distribution Pi to
programfor a subsetof inputdata. Thayer, Lipow, and Nelson obtain an unbiased estimator of R(n). In addition, if the
(ref. 7-7) describe data domain techniques in more detail, execution time for each Ei is also known, thereliability
[ I_!I_ Schick and Woiverton (ref. 7'13)compare the time domain function can be expressed in terms of the more conventional
and data domain models. However, differentapplications will probability of no failure in a time interval (0, t).
tendto use different subsets of all possible inputdata, yielding Chapter 6 in Thayer, Lipow, and Nelson (ref. 7-7) extends
i different reliability values for the same software system. This the previous models to take into account how the testing of
fact is formally taken into account by Cheung (ref. 7-14), input data sets should be partitioned. Also discussed are the
__i where software reliability is estimated from a Markov model uncertainty in predicting reliability values, the effect of
i i wbose transitionprobabilitiesdependon a user profile. Cheung removing softwareerrors, and the effect ofpr0gram structure.
and Ramamoorthy (ref. 7-15) give techniques for evaluating
the transition probabilities for a given profile. Axiom tic Models
_ __ In the Nelson model (ref. 7-12) a computer program is The third category includes models in which software
defined as a computable function F defined on the set reliability (as well as software quality in general) is postulated
_ E = (Ei, i = 1.... N), where E includes all possible com-
, " to obey certain universal laws (Ferdinand and Sutherla, ref.
i binations of input data. Each E_ is a sample of data needed 7-16; Fitzsimmons and Love, ref. 7-17), Although such
to make a run of the program. Execution of a program
• produces, for a given value of Ei, the function value F(E_). models have generated great interest, their general validityhas
In the presence of bugs or design errorsa program actually never been proven and, at most, they only give an estimate
• implementsF'. Let E, be the set of inputdata such thatF" (E,) for the number of bugs present in a program.The best-known axiomatic model is the so-caUed software
produces an execution failure (execution terminates prema- science theory developed by Halstead(see ref. 7-17). Halstead
' tarely, or fails to terminate, or the results produced are not used an approachsimilar to thermodynamics to provide quan-
acceptable). If Areis the quantity of Ei leading to failure ,re, titative measures of programlevel, language level, algorithm
purity, programclarity, effect of mods-larization,programming
N, effort, and programming time. In particular, the estimated
p_--
N number of bugs in a program is given by the expression
iS th_ probability that a run of the program wiH result in an (E0)
execution failure. Nelson defines the reliability R as the B = K V
probability of no failures or
R -- 1 - p = ! - N, where
N K proportionality constant
Eo mean number of mental discriminations between
In addition, this model is further refined to account for the
errors made by programme r
fact that the inputsto a program are not selected from E with
V volume of algorithm implementation, N log2(n)
equal apriori probabilitybut are selected according to some
operational requirement. This requirement may be charac- where
terized by a probability distribution (Pi, i = 1..... N), P,
being the probabilitythat the selected input is Ea. If we define N program length
the auxiliary variables Yi to be 0 if a tun with Ei is successful, n size of vocabulary defined by language used
and I otherwise,
_ More specifically,
N
N= +
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: TABLE7-1.--CORRELATIONOFEXPERIENCETO (2) The softwarefailurerateis constantforagivennumber _i
SOFTWAREBUG PREDICTIONBY of system designerrors.
_, AXIOMATICMODELS (3) The systemstartsandcontinuesoperationuntila fault
- Reference Correlationcoefficient is detected; it then passes to a repair state. If the fault is dt_ ! ,',• betweenpredictedand toa hardwarera sient,the syst mis pu intoop r tionagain •._-:
_-L-_i realnumberof bugs aftera periodof timeforwhichtheprobabilitydensityfur_'tion __:r_
_:_ I is assumedtobe known.Ifthefaultisduetoa softwarefailure, _FunamiandHalsteed(ref.7-33) 0.98,0.S3,0.92 maintenancetakes place, duringwhich the errormay be ' :.f ,
_ removed,ntoreerrorsmay be introduced,orno modifications
-.!1_ maybe madeto the software. _ _
_' . t FitzsimmonsandLove(ref.7-17): The model computesthe availabilityof the system as a i _:_
;1 SystemA 0.St functionof timeby usingsemi-Markoviantheory.Thatis, the i -,_-" ._
Systemn .TS systemwill makestatetransitionsaccordingto the transition I;.-:I C 75
-, ' Overall .76 probabilitiesmatrix, and the time spent in each state is a -,_,:
C_j randomvariablewhoseprobabilitydensityfunctionis either : :::..assumed to be knownor is measurable,The mainresult _%
...... where presentedby Costis, Landrault,andLaprie(ref. 7-19) is how _,,'_
_-- N_ total numberof occurrencesof operatorsin a the availabilityof the systemimproves(whenall the design _-_;_°_,_
_'_ program errors have been removed)as the design errorsare being :, _;_
_-_ removedundersome restrictiveconditions.They show that ._!_
_..'_i N2 total number of occurrencesof operands in a
• -_ _ program theminimumavailabilitydependsonlyon the sottwarefailure _
-4 rateat systemintegration,andnot on theorderof occurrence _!_[
_ n_ numberof distinctoperators appearingin a program of thedifferentypesofdesignerrors.The presenceof different :_._
_-. I n2 numberof distinctoperandsappearing in a program types of design errors only extends the time necessaryto ! _.
i}__i andEohasbeenempiricallyestimatedas approximately3000. approachthe asymptoticavailability. _.The mathematicsof the model is complex, requiring _?:
'_ I Manypublicationshaveeithersupportedorcontradictedthe numericalcomputationof inverseLaplacetransformsfor the __!i
_ ] resultsproposedby the software sciencetheory, includinga special issue of the IEEE Transactionson Software transitionprobabilitiesmatrix, and it is not clear that the .
Engineering(ref.7-18). Thoughunconventional,themeasures parametersneededto simulatea real systemaccuratelycanbe easily measuredfrom a real system.proposedby thesoftwaresciencetheoryareeasy tocompute,
andin any case it is analternativeforestimatingthe number Finally, some attemptshave been made to model fault-tolerant software through module duplication (Hecht, I
of bugsin a softwaresystem. Table7-1 showsa correlation
coefficientbetweentherealnumberofbugsfoundinasotiware ref. 7-20) andwarningsabouthownotto measuresoftware
project and the numberpredictedby the software science reliability(Littlewood,ref. 7-21).Noneof theprecedingmodelscharacterizessystembehavior ' '
theory for severalexperiments.There are significantcorre- accuratelyenough to give the user a guaranteedlevel oflationswitherroroccurrencesin theprograms,althoughthe i_
data reportedby FitzsimmonsandLove(ref. 7-17) (obtained performanceundergeneralworkloadconditions.Theyestimate
from three GeneralElectricsoftwaredevelopmentprojects the numberof bugspresent in a programbutdo notprovide
totaling166280 statements)showweakercorrelationthanthe any accuratemethod of characterizingandmeasuringoper-
ationalsystemunreliabilitydueto software.There is a large !
. I originalvalues reported by Halstead. gap betweenthe variablesthatcan be easily measuredin a
i runningsystemandthe numberof bugsinitssottware.Instead, IOther Models a cost-effectiveanalysisshouldallow preciseevaluationof i +
, The model presentedby Costis, Landrault,and Laprie softwareunreliabilityfromvariableseasily measurablein an _
_':{ (ref. 7-19) is based on the fact that for well-debugged operationalsystem,withoutknowingthe detailsof how the i ;_i'i
I programsa softwareerrorresultsfromconditionson boththe software has been written. 1
, inputdata setand thelogicalpathsencountered.We canthen Trends and Conclusions
consider these events randomand independentof the past
behaviorof_hesystem(i.e., withconstantfailurerate). Also, With software reliabilitybeing questionedas a science,
becauseof theirrarity, design errorsor bugs may havethe programmingprocesscontrolappearstobe thepopularanswer
same effect u transienthardwarefaults, tobothsottwarereliabilityandsottwarequality.Measureme,ts
"< The model is builton the followingassumptions: of the programmingprocess are supposed to ensure the
(1) The systeminitiallypossessesN designerrors or bugs generationof an "errorfree" programmingproduct,if such
that can be totallycorrectedby N interventionsof the main- an achi_vemantis possible,Further,qualityandproductivity
tenanceteam. measurementscombinedwithselectleadingprocessindicators
i
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' are supposedto fulfillthecontrolrequirementsfordeveloping the $60billionrange.Internationalcompetitionwill eventually _-
qualitysoftware.Thisso-calledansweris similarto aphilos- yield error-freesoftware, i!
ophy thatfailed in attemptsto develop hardwarereliability In-houseandvendor-acquiredsoftwarecanbeputintofour I
:- _ control.Reliabilityshou/dbeusedtopredictfieldperformance, categoriesas follows:
x Especiallywith real-timecommunicationsand information (1) Productsoftware i:_
• managementsystems, the field performancerequirements (2) Embeddedsoftware :_
i: vastlyovershadowthe field defectlevel requirements.How (3) Applicationssoftware _
, canwechangethepresentpopulartrend(towardpwgmmming (4) Suppun software I_
processcontrol)to onethatincludesaprobabilisticreliability
Product so/tware.--This categorizationis from the view-
" approach?Theansweris notasimpleone;these mo_elsmust
_: be finelybalancedso thata clearseparationof reliab_lityand point of the software specialist. Communicationsdigital
::i.: quality can be achieved, switchingsystemssoftwareis includedas "productsoftware"
The trendsforreliabilitytasksinthe large-scalein'cgrated alongwith thesoftwarefordatapacketswitchingsystems,text
systems, etc.
(._ circuit (LSI)andvery large-scale integratedcircuit (VLSI)
-_.'"• Embeddedsoflwam.-- This categoryof softwarecomprises
_ . hardwareareasare in the failuremodesandeffectsanalysis
_" i
_:.. andthecontrolof failures.The sameemphasis.canbe placed programmingsystems embeddedin physical productsto
_'_ * "_ "r _ Onsoftware(programmingbugsor softwareerrors).Oncethis controltheiroperationalcharacteristics.Examplesof products
_._ _ is done,reliabilitymodelscanreflectsystemperformancedue are radarcontrollers, boiler controls,avionics, and voiceto hardwareandsottware"defects" becausetheirfrequency recognitionsystems.
_'_- " ! of occurrenceandtheeffectsof theirpresencein theoperation _'ms soJhmm.--Thiscategoryof softwareis usually
_;_- l will be known. This philosophyfocuses on the complete developedto service a company'sinternaloperations.The
:.. i accounting area of this category covers payroll systems,
_:._ _ eliminationof criticaldefectsandthespecifiedtolerancelevel
_/ i of minordefects. Normally,minordefectsareeasierto find personnelsystems,etc. The businessareaincludesreservations V
_ ' andmorenmnemusthanthemostcriticaldefectsandtherefore systems(car, motel), delivery routecontrol,manufacturing i_
i dominatea defect-removal-orientedmodel, systems, and on-line agentsystems, i_
- Weconcludethat the propermethodfordevelopingquality Support software.--This categoryconsistsof the software Ii programmingproductscombinesquality, reliability,and a tools needed to d velop, tes , and qualify therselectivemeasu ements gra .Ina dition,a red rec_onof productsor toaidinengineeringdesignanddevelopment.The
i theprogrammingdevelopmentprocesstobe basedinthe future categoryincludescompilers,assemblers,testexecutives,error
seeders, and developmentsupportsystems.on thecriticalityof defects,theirnumber,andtheirbudgeting
i at the variousprogramminglife-cyclephasesis the dominant Vendor-acquiredsoftware.--Thissoftwarecanbe absorbed
t requirement.A reliability growth model will monitorand by the previousfourcategoriesandis only presentedherefor
controlthe progressof defectremoval for the designphases clarification.It includes FORTRANcompilers, COBOL
j andprove a directcorrelatorto actual systemfield perfor- compilers, assemblers, the UNIX operating system, the
1 maned.With such an approacha system can be placed in ORACLEdatabasesystem, and applicationpackages.
i operationatacustomersiteatapreselectedperformancelevelas predictedby the growthmodel. Processing Environments
Softwarecanusuallybe developedin threeways;namely,
I Software (l) mterave,(2)batch,andO)rmmtejobenU,y.Inoper-
i ationalenvironmentthe ways expandto include real time. ,,.i
ii_ We have discussedsoftware models before describing Real-timedevelopmentcanbecharacteristicof bothproduct
. softwareforseveralreasons.The readershouldnotbe biased softwareandembeddedsoftware.However,becauseproduct
" I or led to a specific type of software.Few papers on soft- sottwareandembeddedsoftwarediffergreatlyin theirrequire-
ware reliabilitymakea distinctionbetweenproductsoftware, mentsandtL-irdevelopmentproductivityandqualitymethod-
--_._--M* i embeddedsoftware,applicationssoftware,andsupportsoft- ologies, they shouldnot be combined(e.g., avionics has
_:- _ ware. In addition,the modelsdo not distinguishbetween size, weight,and reliabilityrequirementsresultingin dense
vendor-acquiredsoftware and in-housesoftware and corn- softwareof a type that a communicationswitchingsystem
binaflonsof these, does not have).
• Categoriesof Software Severity of Software Defects
r A_ to ElectronicDesignMagazine,theUnitedSates We mustcategorizeandweightheeffec,s of failures, The
• supportsat least 50 000 software houses, each grossing followingfour-leveldefectseverityclassificationis presented
approximately$.,q)0000 peryear.ItIsprojectedthatsoftware in termsof typical software productareas:
" ' salesintheUnitedSlateswill surpasshardwaresalesandreach (1) System unusable(generic: frequentsystemCrashes)
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i (a) Management information system (MIS) software (d) Datacommunicationsdefects: occasional inabilityto !.i defects: inabilityto generateaccountspayable; inability keep up with data rate or requests: occasional minor • i
i to access data base; improper billing loss of data transmitted or received [_?(b) Computer-aided design (CAD), manufacturiag (e) Military system defects: loss of ,some operational ,
(CAM), and engineering (CAE) defects: inability to modes such as tracking history, monitor or slave
-_ ! use systems; CAD produces incorrect designs model of operation, multiple option selection
.: ._; (c) Telephoneswitchingdefects: frequentservice outages; (f) Space system defects: occasional loss of update
Ii ![_ i.-_ loss of emergency communications service information or frame; occasional loss of subframe
(d) Data communications defects: loss of one or more synchronization or dropouts of some noncritical
signaling channels: unrecoverable errors in transmis- measurementssion; erratic service (g) Process control defects: problems that require a
.._ (e) Military system defects: success of missionjeopar- workaround to be implemented; minor reductions in
: :I dized; inability to exercise fire control systems; loss rateor throughput;manual interventionat some points
_ of electronic countermeasure capabilities in the process
(f) Space system defects: success of space missionjeop- (4) No restrictions (generic: cosmetic; misleading documen-
ardized; risk of ground support team or flight tation;.inefficient machine/person interface)
i!_i crew life; loss of critical telemetry, intormation
-_ i (g) Process control defects: waste of labor hours,•raw
materials, or manufactured items;loss of control Software Bugs Compared With Software Uefects
I[< |t!_:ii:! resulting in contamination or severe air and water Software bugs are not necessarily software defects: the term
: pollution "'defect" implies that removal or repair is necessary, and the
(2) Major restrictions (generic: loss of some functions) term "bug" implies removal, some degree of correction, or
_t (a) MIS software defects: loss of some ticket reservation
a certain level of toleration. A recent example of bug toler-
centers or loss of Certainfeatures such as credit card ation from the telecommunications industry is contained in
reference 7-22; "It is not technically or economically feasibleverification
¢ to detect and fix all software problems in a system as large
i (b) CAD/CAM/CAE defects: loss of some features in as No. 4 Electronic Switching System (ESS). Consequently,
i: - ! computer-aided design such as the update function;significant operational restrictions in CAM or CAE a strong emphasis has been placed on making it sufficiently
tolerant of software errors to provide successful operation
areas: faults producedfor which there is no work-
around and fault recovery in an environment containing software
(c) Telephone switching defects: loss of full traffic ca- problems."
pability; loss of billing Various opinions exist in the industry about what consti-
(d) Data communications defects: occasional loss of tutes a software failure. Definitions range from a software '
,onsumer data; inability to operate in degraded failure being classed as any software-caused pcocessor re- >7.
mode with loss of equipment start or memory reload to a complete outage. One argument i • _.
(e) Military system defects: significant operational re- against assigning an MTBF to software-caused processor 1
restarts or memory reloads is that, if the system recovers in
strictions; loss of intermediate fast frequency the proper manner by itself, there has not been a softwarefunction in detection systems; loss of one or more
I antijamming features failure, only a software faultor the manifestation of a software
bug. From a systems reliability viewpoint, if the system
(_ Space system defects: occasional loss of telemetry recovers within a reasonabletime, the event is not to be classed
" data and communications; significant operational or
control restrictions as a software failure.
# ,
(g) Pwces_ controldefects: process cannot consistf;ntly ii.
• handl, exceptions: inability to complete all process Hardware and Software Failures
contro functions Microprocessor-based products have more refined defini-
(3) Minor r, strictions(generic: loss of features; inability to tions. Four types of failure may be considered: (!) hardware
effectively modify program) catastrophic,(2) hardware transient,(3) softwarecatastrophic,
(a) MIS software defects: mishandling of t_ecords; and(4) software transient. In general, thecatastrophic failures
system occasionally cannot handle exceptions require a physical or remote hardware replacement, a manual
_q (b) CAD/CAM/CAE defects:occasionalerrorsproduced or remote unit restart, or a software program patch. The
::/i in design system; faults produced for which there transient failure categories can result in either restarts or
: are workarounds reloads for the microprocessor-based systems, subsystems, or
_.":'_:i (c) Telephone switching defects: loss of some support individual units and may or may not requip.,furthercorrection.
t_[ feat,re, such as call forwarding or conferencing A r_cent reliability analysis of such a system assigned ratios
i 98 :',_tJ_" ,_' ¢i"_'_?_,_, _ _: ......,.'_7-_: . _ _, _'_ _ -"
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i: ! for these categories. Hardware transient faults were assumed (3) Hardware (integrated circuit) catastrophic failures
i to occur at 10 times the hardware catastrophic rat_:, and decrease with time after the "infant mortality" phase. ' '!_
i software transient faults were assumed to occur at 100 to 500 Th_ trendsaffect the operationalsoftwareof communications ;_I
i i times the software catastrophic rate. systems. If the transient failures increase, the error analysis .: r_
v" ; The time of day is of great concern in reliability m_xleling
_:" , and system security software are called intoaction more often.
" i and analysis. Although hardware catastrophic failure:_occur This increases the risk of misprocessing a given transaction _ .
i at any time of theday, they often manifest themselves during in the communications system. A decrease in the catastrophic i "
i busier system processing times. On the other hand, hardware failure rate of integrated circuits can be significant, as de- t '
[" I transient failures generally occur during the busy hours as do scribed in reference 7-!3, which predicts an order-ol-
af I software transient failures. The availability of restart times is magnitude decrease in the failure rate of 4K memory devices
i between the first year and the twentieth year. We also tend! alSOthesystemCriticaldowntimeandin theiseXamplepresentedpresentedasa functionir ferenCeofthe MTBF7-23'
_ to oversimplify the actual situations. Even with five vendors
of the software and the reboot time. When a system's predicted of these 4K devices, the manufacturing quality control person
i reliability is close to the specified reliability, such a sensitivity may have to set up different screens to eliminate the defective
-=! analysis must be performed, devices fromdifferent vendors. Thus, the system .softwarewill
!i _ [ Reference 7-24 presents a comprehensive summary of see many different transient memory problems and combi-
'_-i._ I developed models and methods that encompasssoftware life- nations of them in operation.
i_ill cycle costs, productivity, reliability and error analysis, and Central control technology has prevailed in communications
• complexity and the data parameters associated with these systems for 25 years. The industry has used many of its old
_:: t ntodels and methods. The various models and methods are modeling tools and applied them directly to distributedcontrol
i=i i compared in reference7-24 on a common basis, and the results structures. Most modeling research was performed on large
_ : _. are presented in matrix form. duplex processors. With an evolution through forms of
_&: i multiple duplex processors and load-sharing processors and
[_ • Manifestations of Software Bugs on to the present tbnns of distributedprocessing architectures,
_: I Many theories, models, and methods are available for the modeling tools need to be verified. With fully distributed
I quantifying software reliability. Nathan (ref. 7-25) has stated, control systems the software reliability model must be con-
i_ [ "It is contrary to the definition of reliability to apply reliability ceptually matched to the software design in order to achieve
analysis to a system that never really works. This means that valid predictions of reliability.
the software which still has bugs in it really has never worked The following trends can be formulated for software
in the true sense of reliability in the hardware sense." This transient failures:
statement agrees with reference 7-22, which says that large. (I) Software transient failures decrease as the system
complex software programs used in the communications architecture approaches a fully distributed control structure.
industryare usually operating with some software bugs. Thus, (2) Software transient failures increase as the processing
a reliability analysis of such software is different from a window decreases (i.e., le,_stime allowed per function, fast
reliabilityanalysis of established hardware. Softwarereliability timing mode entry, remc,val of error checking, _emoval of
is not alone in the need for establishing qualitative and quanti- system ready checks, e_c.)
tative models. Reference 7-26 discusses the "bathtub curve" A fully distributed control structure can be configured to
a_;d the effect of recent data on electronic equipment failure operate as its own error filter. In a hierarchy of processing
[ rate, and reference 7-27 discusses the effects of deferred levels each level acts as a barrier to the level below and
i maintenanceand nonconstantsoftware and hardwarefault rates, prevents errors or _'ransientfaults from propagating through
I In the early 1980's work was done on a combined hardware/ the system. Centralcontrol structures cannot usually prevent
I software reliabilitymodel. Reterence 7-28 states, "The use of this type of error propagation.
i;:, i steady-stateavailabilityas a reliability/maintainability measure If the interleaving of transaction processes in a software
i _ is shown to be misleading for systems exhibiting both hardware program is reduced, such as with a fully distributed controland software faults." The authors develop a th¢ory for com- architecture, the transaction processes are less likely to fail.
i_"_-'_l bining well-known hardwareand software mc,dels ina Markov This is especially true with nonconsistent user interaction asproeessand they consider the topic of software bugs and errors experienced in communications systems. Another opinion on
based on their experience in the telecommunications field. To software transient failures is that the faster a software program
synthesize the manifestations of software bugs, we must note runs, the more likely it is to cause errors (such as encountered
7 .1 some of the hardware trends for these systems: in central control architectures). Some general statementscan
(1) Hardware transient failures increase as integrated be formulated:
. [ circuits b¢come denser. (I) In large communications systems software transient
I (2) Hardware transient failures tend to remain constant or failures tend to remain constant, and software catastrophic
increase slightly with time after the "infant mortality" phase, failures tend to decrease with time,
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TABLE 7-2,--CRITICALITY INDEX ;
Bug Detect I Failure type Failure characteristic _'
manifestation removal _ ",
rate rate criti-
cality , ' -i L\
4 per day I per month 5 Transient Errors come and go
- 3 per day I per week 4 Transient Errors sre repeated f
2 per week i per month 3 Transient or Service is affected
,i catastrophic _.,
• i per month 2 per year 2 Transient or System is partially
_ . catastrophic down I
I per two I per year I Catastrophic System stops i
_..Years i_,•
(2) In small communications systems software transient Comparing references 7-30 and 7-29 yields an insight into
failures decrease with time. the different methods of achieving software reliability. The
(3) As thesize of the software programincreases, software methoddescribed in reference 7-30 concentrateson the design
transient failures decrease and hardware failures increase, process meeting a present level of reliability or performance
A "missing link" needs furtherdiscussion. Several methods at the various project design stages. When the system meets
its final software reliability acceptance criteria, the process
can be used to quantify the occurrence of software bugs.
However, manifestations in the system's operations are detri- is complete. Reference 7-29 describes a model that provides
:_ ! mental to the reliability analysis because each manifestation the design process with a continuous software reliability
could cause a failure event. The key is to categorize levels growth prediction. The Muss model can comparesimultaneous
of criticality for bug manifestations and estimate their probe- softwaredevelopments and can be used extensively in making
bility of occurrence and their respective distributions. The design process decisions. An excellent text on software
importance of this increases with the distribution of the reliability based on extensive data gathering was published in
hardwareand software. Software reliability is often controlled 1987 (ref. 7-31).
by establishinga software reliability design process. Reference We can choose a decreasing, constant, or increasing soft-
7-22 presents techniques for such a design process control, ware bug removal rate for systems software. Although each
The final measure is the system test, which includes the has its applicationtospecial situationsandsystems, a decreasing
evaluation of priority problems and the performance of the software bug removal rate will generally be encountered.
•system while under stress as defined by audits, interrupts, Systems software also has advantages in thatcertain software
reinitiaiization,andother measurable parameters. The missing defects can be temporarily patched and the permanent patch
link in quantifying software bug manifestations needs to be postponed to a more appropriatedate. Thus, this type of defect
found before we can obtain an accurate software reliability manifestation is treated in general as one that does not affect
model for measuring tradeoffs in the design process on a service, but it soould be includedin theoverall softwarequality
predictedperformancebasis. If a softwarereliability modeling assessment. The missing link concerns software bug mani-
tool could additionally combine the effects of hardware, festations. As described in reference 7-32, until the traditional
software, and operator faults, it would be a powerful tool for separation of hardware and software systems is overcome in
making design tradeoff decisions. Table 7-2 is an example the design of large systems, it will be impossible to achieve
of the missing link and presents a five-level criticality index a satisfactory performance benchmark. This indicates that
i for defects. Previously, we discussed a four-level defect software performance modeling has not yet focused on the
tl i severity classification with level four not causing errors. These specific causes of software unreliability.
examples indicate the flexibility of such an approach to
' criticality classification.
i Software reliability measurement and its applications are References
discussed in reference 7-29 for two of the leading software
r liability models, Musa's execution time model and 74. Slewior k,D.P.;andSwm1,a.S.:TheT_udPmakeofRdiM_
Litflewood's Bayesian model. Software reliability measure- SystemDmisn.DJsiudPress,Bedford,MA, 1982,pp.206-21I.
J ment has made substantialprogress end continues to prolp'ess 7-2. ReliabilityPredictionof ElectronicEquipment,MIL-HDBK-217E, |Jan.Igoo.
as additional projects collect data. The majorhurdle of 74. Shoomtn,M.L,:TImEquivslenceofRelhtbllityDiagmmsandqault.
establishing a software reliability measurement tool for use Fro, Analysis. II_JZ Tram. Rellab.. vo.'. R-19, no. 2. May 1970,
,Ji during the requirement stage is under way. pp,_4-7S.
'i
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7-$. Jelinsky.Z.; andMorandt.P.B.: Applicationsof aProbabilityBased 7-21. Littlewood,B.: HowTo MeasureSoftwareReliabilityandHowNot :.q
Methodto a CodeReadingExperiment.Record1973: IEEE To, IEEE Trans.SoftwareEng.. vol. SE-_, no. 2, June1979,
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7-7.Thayer,T.A.;Lipow,M.;andNelson,E.C.: SoftwareReliability..7-23.Aveyard.R L.;aM Man,F.T.:A SatdyontheReliebililyof heCircuit _ "
!i-! ii A Studyof a LargeProjectReality.NorthHolland, 1978. MaintenanceSystem-lB, Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 59, no. 8, Oct.
7-8. Miyamoto,I.: SoftwareReliabilityinOnlineRealTimeEnvironment. 19110,pp. 1317-1332.
: InternationalConferenceon ReliableSo.qware,IEEF,/Automation 7-24. SoftwareEI_ PasearehReview:(_e SoltwmeModels.
} Industries,Inc., SilverSpring,MD, 19_$, pp. $18-527. ReportNo. SPR-I. DateandAnniysisCenterforsoftware(DACS)_
:_ ) 7-9. Litliew(xxl,B.: A ReliabilityModelforMatkovStructuredSoftware. (kiff'm AFB, NY, 1979.
InternationalConferenceon Reliablesoftware, IEEE/Autonmtion 7-25. Nathan,1.:A DeterministicModelT_ Predict'Error-Free'Statusof
I Industries,Inc., SilverSpring,MD, 1975, pp. 204-207. ComplexSoftwareI)evelolxnom.WorkshoponQuantitativeSoftware
7-10. Trivndi,A.K.; and Shooman,M.L.: A Many-StateMarkovModel Models. IF..EE,New York, 1979.
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!. ln-hoase and vendor-acquired software can be classified into what four categories? t' :::
. A. Product, embedded, B. Useful, embedded, C. Product, embedded,
applications, and error- applications, and applications, and support ,.
'' free software harmful software software '
2. Name the four categories of software reliability models.
A. Time domain, data axiom. B. Time domain, &_ta C. Time axiom, data domain,
•.i corollary, and many domain, axiomatic, frequency domain, and !.
and other corollary )
.... 3. Can the bug manifestation rate be
A. Equal to the defect removal rate?
B. Greater than the defect removal rate?
C. Less than the defect removal rate?
D. All of the above? [
• 4. What are the various software processing environments?
• _ A. Interactive,batch, remote B. Hyperactive, batch, close job C. Interactive, batch, real job l
i job entry, and real time entry, and compressed time entry, and remote time[
5. Name the four levels of severity for software defect categoriz_tior.s.
A. Generic system, functional, B. System unusable, major C. System unusable, system
category restrictions, and restrictions, minor restric- crashes, loss of features.
working tions, and no restrictions and minor bugs
6. An on-line, real-time system has a mean time between software errors of 15 days. The system
operates 8 bours per day. What is the value of the reliability function? Use the Miyamoto model.
A. 0.962 B. 0.999 C. 0.978
7. Is it always necessary to remove every bug from certain software products?
A. Ye_ B. No C. Don't know
8. Name the four types of hardware and software t,ilure.
A. Hardware part. hardware B. Hardware plan, hardware C. Hardware catastrophic,hard-
board, software module, build, software cycle, soft- ware transient, software cat-
software plan ware type cycle, astrophic, software transient
"l
,i
iAnswersaresirenattheendof thismanual.
i
i I02
1992023212-108
i •
Chapter 8
" Soft,rare Quality Assurance
Concept of Quality the degree to which the software in use will meet the expec-
tations of the user.
Let us first look at the concept of quality before going on We can infer from these statements and other source
to software quality. The need for quality is universal. The materials that software quality metrics (e.g.. defects per !000
: concepts of **zerodefects" and "doing it righ! the first time" lines of code per programmeryear, 70 percent successful test
have changed our perspective on quality management. We cases for the first 4 wealds, and zero major problems at the
• changedfrommeamring defects perunitand acceptablequality preliminary design review) may vary. more than hardware [
_ - levels to monitoring the design and cost reduction processes, quality metrics (e.g.. MTBF or errorsper 1000 transactions).
. _ The present concepts indicate that quality is not free. One In addition, software quality management has gener_tty !
viewpoint is that a major improvement in quality can be focused on the process, and .softwarereliability management _
achieved by ?erfecting the process of developing a product, has focused on theproduct. Since processes differ for different !
Thus, we wattid characterize the process, implement factors software products,few comparativebenchmarksare available, i i
" to achieve customer satisfaction, correct defects as soon as For hardware, in general, benchmarkshave beenavailable for
_ _ possible, and then strive for total quality management. The a long time (i.e., MIL-HDBK-217E series (ref. 8-4) for
i key to achieving quality appears to have a t;tirdmajor factor reliability). Recently, Rome Air Development Center
i in addition to product and process. This third factor is the (RADC), the sponsor of MIL-HDBK-217E. has sponsored
'_ environment. People are important. They make the process a survey of software reliability. It was intended to give
i or the product successful. Figure 8-1 represents the union of software quality the same status as hardware quality.
! these three factors. The next step is to discuss what the process of achieving
The term "software quality" is defined and interpreted quality in software consists of and how quality management
i differently by the many companies involved in producing is involved. The purposeof qualitymanagement for program-
programmin8 products. To place the subject in perspective, ming products is to ensure thata preselected _ftware quality
l we presentprinciplesand definitions for softwarequalityfrom level has been achieved, on schedule, in a cost-effective
several source materials: manner. In developing a quality management system the
! (I) The purpose of software quality asst,ranc_ is to assure programmin$ product's critical life-cycle phase reviews
[ the acquisition of:,igh-quality software productson schedule, provide the reference base for tracking the achievement of
_i within cost, and in compliance with the performance re- quality objectives. The International Electrotechnical
i quirements (ref. 8-1). Commission (IEC) system life-cycle phases presented in their
I (2) The developer of a methodology for assessing the qua- guidelines for reliability and maintainabilitymanagement are
lity ofa soltware productmust respondto variou_._ls. There as follows.
i can be no single quality metric (ref. 8-2). (!) Concept and definition phase, in whichthe qeed for the
(3) The process of assessing the quality of a softwa_ product is decided and its basic requirementsdefined, usually
productbegi s when specific characteristicsandcertainof the in the form of product specification, i is aBreed upon
metrics are selected (ref. 8-3), between manufacturer and user.
(4) Software quality can be defined as (a) the totality of (2) Design and development phase, in which the product
,eatures andcharacteristicsof a software productthat bearon hardware and software are created to perform the functions
i its ability to satisfy needs (e.8., conform to specifications), describedin theproductspecification. ThL_phase w,IInom_;y
._ (b) the dqgree to which software ix)ss_ses a desired include the assembly and testins of a prototype product under
i combination of attributes, (c) thedelffee to which a customer laboratory simulated conditiom or in actual field trialor user perceives that software meets his or her expectations, conditions and the formulation o ¢ detailed manutk'turinlg
i and (d) thectmqx_ite charactedst_ of software thatdetermine specifgations and instructions for operationandmaintenance.
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(3) Man.ufaclxtring,installation,andacceptancephase, in - i !"i__: _
._! - .whichthed_isn is putintoproducti0n_.-Inthecaseof large, Figure8=2.--Progmnuningqualitymeumememap.
_. complex produ_ the ir _tallationof the productOna Particular
_,_ sitemayhe re_udec s an extensionofdg .n_enufacmring- 100 ._--- --
___- _ - _. This phasewillngrmaHy concludewith._
_-_ testingof theproductbeforeit is releas_ to t_ _er." : . e
_:_ (4) Operati6/nandmalntetmce phase, in which,theproduct I
qi_. L_operated,for the peri'od of its useful life. During this phase, 10 •
: essential preventive and corrective maintenance actions are •
!_:_ - taken along-with product enhancements, and produ_:per-_ ••
. •:!.;; formanceis monitors& The tmefuilife of a productends when •
itsoperationhec6ngs unecommic hemuse of increasing repair ,_ 1 •
costs or other factorsor the product becomes technically
' obsolete. - • :
.... • 1
(5) Disposal phase, in which the product reaches the end _"e _. P .r
of its planned useful life or therequirement no longer exists .1
for the product, and it is dispesed of, destroyed, or, if c_mcaPtI_l In_°mu°n! _,_and me }':Ieconomically feasible, modernized, definition inmlmion r
The quality of the programming product can he controlled
in the first three life-cycle phases in order to achieve the Li_ phaum .,
expected level of performanceof the final product. Once the Figure8-3.--Increasingcostsof prolFammingdefects..... .'_.:.
fourthphase hasbeen entered, the operation and maintenance
phase,the qualityof the softwareis generally fixed. With these maintenance phase. This fact produces an incentive for
five life-cycle phaseboundariesin place, we can conceptualize implementing quality metrics in the early design phases. The
what can be implemented as "programming quality programming industry has traditionally required large
_: measurement." If the phases and activities are the X and Y maintenance organizations to correct programming product '
; coordinates, the individual quality metrics can he placed on defects. A typical phase-cos_ curve presentedin figure 8-3 "
_,, ] the Z axis as shown inflgure 8-2. shows the increased costs of correcting programming defectsWithoutstatingthespecific activities for each phase, we can in the later phases of the programming product's life cycle. _ +
discuss the generalities of software quality and its cost. The Note that the vertical axisis nonlinear.
cost of implementingquality increaseswith distance along the , ".:'_
Xaxis. Activities can be arrangedalong the Yaxis so that the *
cost of quality increases with distance along the Y axis. With Software Quality
this arrangementwe can establish rigorous quality standards
for the individualquality metrics as a functionof cost eft•c- The next stepis to look at specific software quality items. {
tiveness (e.g., error seeding--the statistical implanting and Software quality is defined in reference 8-4 as "the achieve-
_..,_ removalof software defects--may be expensive). Otherquality ment of a preselected software qu_alitylevel within the costs,
metrics (e,g,, test case effectiveness) may cost significantly schedule, and productivity boundariesestablished by manage- 1.
less and could be selected, ment." However, agreement on such a definition is often I
• In general, for a programmingproduct the higher the level difficult to achieve. In practice, the quality emphasis can [
:_,_;, of quality, the lower the costs of the product's operation and change withrespect to the specific productapplicationenviron- li
10t _- - 1.
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merit.Different perspectivesof software productquality has a rigorousconstrainton size may sacrifice the main-
have been presentedover the years. However, in todays' ttimutbilitycharacteristicof thesoftwarein orderto meet its
• literaturethere is generalagreementthatthe properquality operationalprogramsize goals. However, this sameproduct . ,,
levelfor a particularsot_wnreproductshouldbe _ my needto be highly portablefor use on severaldifferent ' --:
intheconceptanddefinitionphaseandthatqualitymanagers process . In general,the primarysoftwarequ litychara - _'":;
"_-_ shouldmonitorthe projectduring the remainingfife-cycle teristicsare !,,_:_
c !
_. _ phasesin orderto ensurethe properqualitylevel. (1) Maintainability . _
Thedeveloperofamethodologyforassessingthequality (2)Portability ':_-
;S'! ofasol_wareproductmustrespondtothespecificcharucter- (3)Reliability i_-_
=- _ isticsof theproduct.Therecanbe no single qualitymetric. (4) Testability
-_ The process of assessing the qualityof.a _oftwareproduct (5) Undersmndabilir.
.:"_ll begins withthe selectionof specific characteristics,quality (6) Usability
. metrics,andperformancecriteria. (7) Freedomfromerror
I The specifics of softwarequalitycan now be addressed. Mmagement'sviewof softwarequalityis the qualitychang-
!_ Several areasof interestare teristics. Establishedcriteria fog these char,tcteristicswill
_.- . (1) Softwarequalitycharacteristics providethelevelof qualitydesired.Thequantitativemeasures
_:_i (2) Solb_re quality metrics (metrics)placethequalityattheachievedlevel.Thi_cont_
__i (3) Overallsoftwarequality metrics is shown in figure 8-4.
:_':"_ (4) Sofa, are qualitystandards Sof_war_qualitycrite_ andmetricsaredirectlyrelatndto
_ i Areas(1) md (2) areapplicableduringboththe design_ad tbespucificprodu_Toooften, establishingthedmractedstic
_-,,devetcpmmtphaseandtheopermionandmaintmmn_phase, andthe._ in_ earlyufe-cydephaseswithouttheproper
_i_ 'In general,area(2)isusedaringthedesigna_ldevelopment criterialeadsto defectivesoftware.An exampleof the
[:[_"i_!I plme before the acceptancephase for a given software characteristicsandtheirimportanceforvariousapplications :product.Eachof these fourareas is nowaddressedin detail, is presentedin table 8-1. _ -_
A sot_twarequalitycharacteristictreeis presentedinrefer- The entire areaof softwaremensurmm_tsandmetricshas , :_
i ence8-5. Theauthorsassumethatdifferentsoftwareproducts been widelypublishedand discussed.Two textbooks(refs.requiredifferentsetsofqualitycharucteristics.Aproductthat 8-6 and 8-7) and the establishmentOf the Institutef0t_ '"
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Computer
CU_ ec Society'sworkinggrouponmetrics,which has developeda! guideforsoftwarereliabilitymcasmcna_t,arethreecxt pies
fora given productwithrelationto its productlife cycle.
i i product.It includesthe process indicatorconcept. At the! I I "'" ] C_efia I testingstageof productdevelopmentthe.evolutionof softwarequalitylevels canbe assessedby characteristicsuchas free-
i.! l L i I L i [ domfromerror,success_.t -- compl.'on,,estim.
Me Me . I Meetes I of the softwarebugsremaining.Theseprocessindicatorscanbe usedto predictslippageof theproductdeliverydate, the -. _
Figureg.4.--MtnNlemem'sview of quality. " inabilityto meet originaldesigngoals, etc. ! ,_:'
I? ! Whentheprogrammingprodactententhequalification, 'TABLB8- I.--APPLICATION-DEPBND_qT instltl ltion, _ ilg ep_ phase _ conthttles into file
is importantinthequalitycharacteristicactivity.Thisconcept
Ctmrmerimic Application I_ isshownintable8-3, wherethe$ IF_ systemlifo-cyclephases
_ inability Aircraft High have beenexpandedinto 10 _hwam life-cyclephases:
. MnNpmmtinformationMedium (1) Conc_t_! planningphase, in which the functional,
.ymms operational, and economic context of the proposed
Ten_ Law software is understoodand documented in a product
proposal
LPomblltty (2)" Requirements plume,in which a product
Splcecmft tow definition
'rmtt,_ds t4tgh proposalis.expandedintospecificproductrequirements
105
t,
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TABLE 8-2.--MEASUREMENT OF SOFTWARE ')UALITY CHARACTERISTICS I _ _¢t
: Characteristic Softwarelife-cycle phase
3 I 4 5 7 9 t 3.'_
i t' "_:'_'
Product Top Dexailcd Testing Mairdcnancc _i ,;i."
design integration enhancements
_'i i Maiulaiuability --- (a) (a) ....... (bt
f Portability _ --- -. :
Reliability (a) l I ;b) (b) |
.. Testability: ---
, Test casecompletion "'- l [:_'_:,_,/:-_! Estimateof bugs -- - I
_" remaining I i ' ] - " L ] '__)_:_J
J Understandability (a)
I_ Usability (a) '' ...... ',
Freedomfrom error --- I :-- (a),(c_ I (a).(c)
_w_ _ or _ _y i__i_.
_¢i_ c_ _ _rm of 1_6 irdia_'.
TABLE $-3.--MEASUREMENTS AND PROGRAMMING PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE I °' _
cycle phase life-cycle phase t,• : } Primary Secondary
" definition Requirememsdefinition (21 ..................
i_",_ Productdefini,ion (3)Ouality .tics. ..................
!
_ Designand Top-level design(4) Quality metrics Processindicators I
development Dctailnd design(5) (_ality metrics Processindicators ti Implementation(6) Process indicatorsb Quality metrics -
! Manufacturing and Te_,ling and integration (71 Processindicators Performance nv.-asures
installation Qualification, installation. Performance measures< Quality metrics
and a_.'el_ance(8) - - ,_
Operation and Maintenance and Performancemeasures .................. _ -_""-__i
maintenance enhancements(9)
Dispgsal Disposal(I0) ....................................
UMelri_qulltadi_c z_._fW.'f_t, qu,anlilaliv¢ I_'dP.l_,m, _Wbo4h,
l_ndicaltv_,--;,s_id14¢_.ImXllh lra<_lir_lof k¢) pro_ pai,mKl0_.
i andtherequirements,suchas performanceandfunctional designs for systemarchitecture,software architecture.
I capabilities,amanalyzedandtranslatedintounambiguous components, interfaces,and data are further;created, '. .
developer-orientedterms documented,and verifiedto satisfy requirements i :_.
'J! (3) Productdefinitienphase,in whichsoftwareengineering (6) Implementationphase, in which the software product ,
: principles,technicalinformation,andcreativityareused is createdor implementedfrom the softwaredesignand ! . _
to describethe architecture,interfaces,algorithms,and the faultsare detectedandremoved f :!datathat will satisfythe specified requirements (7) Testing and integration phase, in which software
(4) Top-level design phase, in which the functional, elements,hardwareelements,or botharecombinedinto
operational;andperformancerequirementsareanalyzed
anddesignsforsystemarchitecture,softwarearchitecture, elementsare tested inan orderlyprocess untiltheentire
interfaces,anddataarecreatedanddocumentedto satisfy
requirements
i::, ational, andperformancerequirementsareanalyzedand
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i"_ 1_ meets its specified requirements. This phase includes all of effort with which a given quality characteristic has been _ _]
- _l steps necessary.todeliver, install, andtest a specific release implanted into a product and the degree of effort for quality
[.: i of the system software and itsdeliverable documentation, that has occurred in each life-cycle phase. An example of the! (9) Maintenance and enhancements phase, in which the extent and degree of effon is presented in table 8-4 for any _.:_!
__!I product is ready for or serving its-designated function, given quality characteristic.
is monitoredfor satisfactoryperfonuance, and is modified As table 8-4 shows, i :_"
as necessaryto correctproblemsor to respondto changing (1) Each quality characteristiccan have a matrixs:.milarto ,_
requirements this with a specific quality program tailored to a company's _"_
(10) Disposal phase, in which the pro uct reaches the end products. ,,::
!_l of its planned mteful life or the requirement no longer (2) The quality effort is extended to each of the product's _exists for the product and it is disposed of, destroyed or, life-cycle phases to the degree desired by the company. :_-0,
i: if economically feasible, modernized 13) For each ievei, as the complexity and difficulty of a
characteristic requirement increase, the intensity of the test _
•Overall Software Quality Metrics and verification program effort increases. - ,:,:
Several overallsoftware quality metrics have been put into - (4) This matrix will change for each characteristic in
practiceandhaveeffectivelyindicatedsoftwarequality.Jones accordancewith companyenlplmsis. • _
(tel: 8-8)presents an overall: quality metriccalled defect (5) Traditionally.thequality levelsof aproductcorrespond
removal efficiency. The-data collectedTor the overall quality to degrees of effort. However, this matrix extends the effort ='_
_.,r_ | metric are simplified to the more practicalexpression of to allphases of the product's life cycle. <_
_-_!__ '|i "defects put 1000 lines of source code.'" As an example of using the matrix shown in table 8-4, a
!iii__ A second overall quality metric is based on the concept of cbJu'acteristicsuch as reliability maybe targetedto reach _qualityprisms (refs. 8-9 and 8--!0), which considerstheextent service l vel 2. Then throughout planning, d sign, testing, _ "_;_
•TABLE 8-4.--QUALITY CHARACTERISTIC DF._GREE/EXTENT MATRIX : .,
Product ] - " Service level ":
l
: " phase 0 _ 2 3 4 L: :,
Planning No activity General high level Specific detailed Highly complex required DilT_cult ur complex ;.,.;.__
required requirements definition and support required definition '_ ./,
definition . model and prototype _;'
Design and No activity General architecture Detailed architecture Extensive architecture Separate quality teams __
test consideration; general straclure impa_: __nd structure consider- to verif) design; detaiied
|esl and measurement language impact: test [alien: lailorcd language, testfacility: extensive E
program program extended operating system, man- qualification test plans x
machine interface impact, and procedure t _.'_
etc.;code waikthroughs:, e _.._._.
detailed documentation n
• t '-
Integration No activity _'}eneml quality Extensive qualifica- Quality teams formed; Specialized quality inte- _ .._
-and instal- .. management program; lion test plans and detailed .quality config- gration, mnufacturing, o 1
Intion acceptance test; procedureto verify uration control release and installation.programs f [-/:_
• nominal elmnge con- clmractedsli_: above- program: extensive dam to ensure achievement of [ _
. trol quality program nominal-quality- collection, verification, quality characteristics bY e I":"i]
requirement verifica- and analysis sepmte quality organization f I'_,_]
; ":_,| .. tra_kini and redes,gn andunalyusprogram data nnalysm, and model-- modelmll, vigorous data t I ,::::,_
program to achieve to verify quality ing pe0gnun to verify high- analysis, and specialized . | :
,_ | " " quality objectives objectives: quality . level quality objectives; tests to ensure high-level II _.
_._ ...[ " and requirements redesign effort - extensive redesign achievement of detailed I -'_t
; .. - - - - to obtain quality - quality requirements; . | '_:_
::jj . - extensivechangeprogram l
_:_:::i:i " quality quality ._ quality [ quMity quality : ! :_ :
_.::;'_, " De_re_ of ,frO., " | __
I
• • " _'" ._ : _I_
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integration,and installation,the reliabilityshouldachieveat -:./
least level 2. Theseindicatorsarefled to the propermjor _ _ .-,
.. phase review points of a product's life cycle. For most i.] ""_'_
characteristicstheplanninglevel shouldbe achievedafterthe {_.'"_.
preliminarydesignreview (PDR);the designlevel, alex the
developmentphaseor atthecriticaldesignreview(CDR);the _ "_" _ 'r_'_ _a
integrationlevel, at_r integrationatthequalificationtesting; 1+:-V++_/'
andthe servicelevel, duringtheoperationalservicereviews.
Now qualitymanagementcan .applythis ma...t_.m...eacb
characteristicin a mmmm"depemiingon how eriUc_tu m Io
ensure achievment oftbe changterisfi"c. For example,__.
rdiabilitygonifora keysystemnmYbe I0or fewermishandled
callsper week, _ the reliabilitygoal fora privatebranch
exchmge (PBX)my be only 5 mishandledcalls per .n_nth.
Throeb" mycamq.Utymnemm,tm
_+ " g 2, design 2+,i+!_r_. 2, and servg+ 2+Program
definition, design, test, " •
No_gur m _buloes_ts _ nalm v._ue
objectivesin the serviceplme of a.pmducts life cycle m a
last-minuteattemptto improvequality... . ) :/
• Theprogramfor punulng quality_charactenm.csm.tlst_ I*+
mtablhhedearly. If a particularqualitycharacteristicm not
pursuedto s, reasonableextent in the planningand design
phases,a maximumdesree of effort (4) may notrenii_cnii.y _ __:be achievedin the servicephase.Conversely,the more um-
fonniyandconsisttmtly• qualitye.har_.._i.'¢ is.pursl_, the ,._:
moreachievableandfigurativelystablets the cna!_. nstt¢. _+
i Thisisgraphicallyreflectedfora single.dmmctm'i_m fig."..'_s _'+i.":y:_.(.!_
8-5 to 8-7, wherethequalityitemis suownastamerstatue, _.,m.,,ble.o,",,.'+mely+osOytos ili _/!i
In figure 8-5 an optimumtradeoffof stabilityand pro- mtmre8-6.--immtbilityduetotchedeli_idecisions.
ductivity is portrayed. The base of the prism is secure, -+•
supportingtheplatformby properlybalancingqualityvenus : :+5+
,_ast.In figure 8-6 schedulepressureshave establishedan
t unstableprismtosupportthe platform.In this examplethe
decisionwasnudeto sendtheprodtgtintothefieldatservice /._• :.,._'4
level I even thoushit initiallyhadres_ed a moreextensive ' _+ ._._
degreeofquality(3) in theplanningphase(considerableffort _. _?_
to define qualityobjcgtivmin the planningphase but no i i+_':+_
follow'up),Fisw'c 8-7 preseattsthe mm'mely oomtiyview of
upVadtag,pmgmun_pmduain_m_d to.erviml_v¢_4 +.,/
(afterpmin8 thefirst threephaamoely.to m first degree), l:[:-/++:+
Notethe incruminllamountof tin_ andefforttoachieve _,++,
servicel velsI,2,or3.Servicel vel4 inthisexampleis
: _: usually,extremelydifficultandexpensive,if not impossible,
to achieve.Themea uredproductivit of sucha productwill _J:....
mostlikely be low.
-Anexcellentexampleof the need for this type of quality
managementproc_t occurredmanyyearsago. The lessons PllUm8-7+--BxtremolycoMlypro8rmmln8produm,
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still apply today. An automated program was proposed to the degree of error-free "verified" operation, the quality !_
I' ! generate, from 160 fields of input data per customer, a characteristic objectives for its design architecture ud
[ i centralized database thatwould control a table-driven wired- structure, the language required for changes, etc., a more , _
i, i logic system. It was estimated that 13 weeks of design time realistic projection (and control) of schedule and people could _.::_"_
_" ,, wouldberequiredto constructthistablegeneratorusinga havebeenachieved.Severalreleasestothecustomermayhave _
_ i nominalmountofcomputersupporttime.Arepresentative beenrequiredas theprogramdesigns and operationwere '-;
•. _ of thedesign groupwas assigned to define the inputand output verified to a predeterminedextent within the various life-_cle _>
ii_:_] requirementsfor the supportprogramand verify its operation, plm,_es.Eladthis procedure been followed, boththe customer _::!_i
i_'"::;_I The program was initially written in assembly lafignage. It and the supplierwould have been more satisfied. _,_was later redesigned and split into three separate programs This example offered an excellent opportunity to first !_
_'--i_!_} writtenin a high-level hmgunge. These progranw could then determine the type and degree of quality desired. Thenbeseparatelydesigned,verified, andmaintained.Themain managementcouldhaveconstructedaqualityprocess,interms _:_
consideration became the verification process. An input and of the extent and degree of each desired characteristic, with :_
:;" [ output test was writtento check the extensive programpaths, a elastic compromise between the schedule, resources, and _
;._ The project drasged along for a year as verification testing design activity needed to achieve it. In this case many of the
_:_ _'I attemptedto meet a zero-defect objective (imposed alter the "'ilities," such as changeability, usability, _ity, and
_] initialoesignhadbeeacompleted),costsincrmsedandthe raliabiUty,weresubseque_ymore_itiudlyidamiT_ed.These
_-'-I schedule became critical as the cumomar became impatient considerations could have been translated into the initial(fig. 8-7). As the program began to function more success- requirements for structural d_,sign, program segmentation....
became a serious problem. Confrontationdeveloped between amount of code walk'through, the number of subfunctiou_
: the design and marketing departments over the commercial tests, theamount of erroracceptable at first release, thedepih
_, _ release of the program. The testing continued without of verification reviews, etc. From this form of planning, the
ngremnem on the required degree of effort. Eventually, the "quality prisms" could have been established to define the
customer became disillusioned and turned to another firm to extent and degree (such as service level 2, 3, or 4) to which _
provide the table generator, each of these characteristicsshould have been pursuedin termsHad a clear quality management decision been made in the of projectcost restraints,depending on user willingness to pay !:_
[[ ] pimming phase and tracked throughout tbe development ou and wait for a quality product, i!.__
{:
j.'
Oualilymanmgem_nt
Pllure 8-$.--I)elicate balano_-i_lmmln8 complete, _ _:
109 , ,_
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; Quality managm_nt
i Figure8-10.--Delicatebalance--integrationa dinstallationcomplete,
A figurativelysecureprismaticbase for the programming It maybe desirableto have a productdevelopedthat has I
productis presentedinfigure8=5. This securityis developed reachedservicelevel 4 forall of the forementionedquality
through execution of an extensive quality program, as characteristics,However,realisticschedulesandproductivity
progressivelyshown in figures 8=8 to 8- !0. A product's goalsmustbeconsideredintermsof cost.Theseconsiderations
quality objective is usually composed of more than one establishthe need forvigorousqualitymanagementoverall
characteristic.Previously,thosehave tentativelybeennoted life-cyclephasestoselectivelybalancethevariouspossibilities,
as maintainability,portability,reliability,testability,under- It would be nonsupportive,expensive, andtimeconsuming
standability,u_bility, andfreedomfromerror.Thus,quality if qualitymanagementestablishedthestructuralcombination
i",-' managementcanextendthe supportprismaticstructureto a of individualcharacteristicqualityprismsgraphicallypresented
greaterdepththantojustonequalitycharacteristic.Inpractice, in figure8- ! !, Unfortunately,this is thecase for too many
; severn qualityprismswillbeplacedtogethertoachievea firm products.Qualitymanagementwoulddo betterto establish1
qualitybase. a more consistentsupportstructure,like thatrepresentedin
ilO
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t Integrdonandinstall_ion !
S Service L
/I ___..J i_ I"" etc.
_ _Uty ! I'"
_1 P1 Figureg-13.--Exampleof:,,olidqualitybase.
/ IO2 I 02 I D_ following example point system will serve as an illustration
; ; -- --"-" for discussion purposes.I IHI I_ I
' _ " ] s_ ] If a single characteristic's quality effort has progressed/ I s2 ] S4 through all four levels, as well as through each level's• l , ,|
maximum degree, it has accumulated a maximum of
. 4 + 4 + 4 + 4 = 16 points. If another eharacteristic's effort
Figure 8- I I.--Example of poorquality management, has moved through the levels only at one-half of its maximum
degree, it has accumulated 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 8 points. If it
.. P Planning reached three-quartersof the maximum degree of effort onO O¢_i_nana te_t
I Intewatlonandinttallalion all levels, it has 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 12points. Management can
_, S Service now assign a reference value to the pursuit of quality for a
i_t /__-_ ---L---..-,- programmingproduct. This is shown in the simplifiedexample
' I:lel_a- I Ch__ in table 8-6. For this example the total is 8 + 12 + !3 = 33
bility I a_il y labilN points out of a possible 16 + 16 + 16 : 48 points, or 69
percent. (In more general terms, this can also be referred to
P_ I I p_ I I_ I as an overall level 3 quality effort in the 50 to 75 percent
_ _ _-..- w.--.-.¢ range.) Note thatthe real indication of the quality objectives __
• _ D3 I I D D3 I will be the magnitude of theXIY(33148) values. The greater
13 I I I: _ the X and Y values, the deeper the degree to which the
- _ "" _ characteristics have been pursued. The greater the X value,
S_ I I S, _ the more stable the structurehasbecome and the more quality
objectives the programning product has achieved.
Figure8-12.--Exampleof goodqualitymanagement. If this type of analysis is c.':, led over all eight characteristics
(8 x 16), a maximum of 128 points is possible. Products that
approach this level of effort will have a considerably more
' figure 8-12. The figurative result of this c.msistent effort _s stable structurethan those that are only basedupon a 16-point
shown in the solid cost-effective base of figure 8-13.
_ single-character structure. The X percent quality reference
If quality characteristics are established, monitored, meas- numbershould also be qualified by a factor to note how many
ured, andverified throughout the life cycle, a realistic balance
characteristics were actually used. This could be shown as
can successfully be achieved between qualitycosts, schedule, 69 percent/C3 or 33/48/C3.
and productivity. However, it will require an active quality Finally, some characteristics will be more complex and
management process to establish and track these indicators.
An example of such a quality management process matrix is require greatercosts to achieve thanothers. Thus, a weighting
presented in table 8-5 to quantify the extent and degree of
effort needed to achieve a desired level of quality. This table TABLE8-5.--EXAMPLEOFQUALITYMANAGEMENT
can be used as a programming product quality worksheet, as PROCESSMATRIX
well as both thecharacteristicsurvey damcollection instrument [Numberin circledenotesdegreeof qualityselectedbya
l_'_/I and part of the final quality prisms planning document, qualitymanagementprocess.]As discussed, a quality managementteam must establish the ._ Product Quality characteristic
reachthroughout its life cycle. It may use specialized support _ .... Reliability Changeability Maintainability
tools, measurement systems, and specific product quality planning I 3 4 I 2 3(_ t 2 4
standards in pursuing its quality objectives. A point system Designandtest I 3 4 12 34(_ I 2
can give a quantitative reference for the pursuit of quality. / Integrationand I 3 4 12(,,2,)34 : 2 34(_
The point system can become the basis for tradingtime versus installation
cost to reach specific qualitygoals. Ofcourse. a firm's quality Service 1(_3 4 1{_)34 I 2(_4
management will define their own point system. However, the Degree ofquality
III
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1TABLE 8-6.--EXAMPLE OF PURSUIT OF QUALITY
Reliability Changeability Maintainability
_. Manning 2 4 3
i_i Integrationand 2 4installation m_mor_mrlts
t_:_ Service ,' " 2 3 _
Figure8=14.--Rehtfionship of measurementsand standards, t ; _p
Total points/ 8/16 12/16 131:5
a standard is developed, the quality management team will :.
L Total O3/48)/C3,or (69_)IC3 subjectively assign values and multipliersas noted in table8-5 t !
....... and relate them to their own acceptable degree of documen- "
-_ -tation,codewalkthrough,moduletests, etc. ThesesubJective,."".,
characteristics. Weighting multipliers for the preceding
example are demonstratedin table 8-7. For this example the quality effort goals, _ translatingtheconcept of qualityprisms
total of 10 + 28 + 19--57 points out of a possible to planulnf, design, and test considerations that balance
schedule and cost against quality objectives. However, hum-
20+40+ 24--- 84 points is 57/84/C3, or 68 percent/C3. This agement will now have a more reasonable opportunity to
three-partprogramming qualityratio (e.g., 57/84/C3) can be i
used for reviewing quality across programming products pursue and successfully achieve the extent and degree of I ';__
within a corporation as a more quantitative cross reference desired quality for their products.
of quality costs to quality objectives. The ability to specify an overall software quality metric has
A quality management process matrix (table 8-5) has been been addressed. Overall quality measurements can be nor-
presented for pursuing quality throughout a programming realized, as in the quality prisms concept, for purposes of i'
product's life cycle. It relates the pursuitof quality character- comparison. The quality prisms concept can be used to
• istics to theplanning,design and testing, integrationand install- compare the software of two or more different projects within
ation, and service phases. In practice, actual implementation the same company or between different companies even if the
software productshave unique applications or utilize different
•of this approach will require the selection of languages, code
_ walkthroughs, type of testing, etc., to be specifically defined programming languages. Quality prisms can also be u d to
'i combine hardwarequalityand software quality into an assess- rfor reaching service quality level 2, 3, or 4. From this matrix
the impacton schedule andthe cost of quality can be projected ment of the quality of the whole system.
.and monitored. Software Quality Standards ....
This process will also help management to compare the
extent and degree of quality for productsof competing The relationship of software quality standardsand software
companiesor internalcorporatedivisions. Of course, until such quality measurements is depicted in figure 8-14. Measure-
i ments and standardsmust agree. If a set of quality standards
• ' is established (i.e., zero defects) and quality measurement
i TABLE 8-7.--EXAMPLE OF USE OF WEIGHTING _ prove it (i.e., through exhaustive testing, error seeding,
! MULTIPLIERS(wM) etc.), the software development project must realistically set
j ....Product QualitycMmcteristlc a gnal so that b°th qunlity standards und measurements can i __ ptme be devel ped. The IEEE has published many articles on and *
! Reliability Changeability Maintainability Beliers] guides for formulating goal criteria. Ill addition, malty i /_ii
Levelx WM Levelx WM ' Levelx WM technical papers are available on specific goals beth on a life- f --,:
:_...._ . cycle basis and on a per-delivered software productbasis. 1
Plznnin8 2 x I 4 X 2 3 x 2 tlkdp and test ! x 3 x 1.5
.- : In.mr|on 2xi 2x3 4x t Concluding Remarks !' _ installation
r'i ' This chapter has presented a snapshot of where sof_vare
Service 2 x 2 2 X 3 3 x 1.5
__ ToudpoJm/ 1u20 2s/4o 19/24 quality assurance is today and has indicated future directions.
Toud (_7/_)/C3, or (e8_)/C3 IEEE (ref. 8-11). Resells conttnuin8intothe use of ovendl
_.t ,. software quality metrics and better soft, rare prediction tools
112
"19920232"12-'118
for determining the defect population. In addition, simulators specific task of the software quality assurance function. The i
and code generators are being furtherdeveloped so thathigh- determination of the process indicators and performance . .;
quality software can be produced, measures is a task of the software quality standards function. :_
Several key topics have been discussed:
", (1) Life-cycle phases ,
_ (2) Software quality characteristics " ¢
(3) Software quality metrics References ' "
_._ (4) Overall software quality metrics .....
_ AssuranceforComputerSotqtwane.
McGraw-Hill,1982,p. 265. , i
_ _ (5) Software quality standards 8.1. Dunn,R.;nndUIman,R.:QualityIt=.addition, table 8-3 presente the topics s-2. Bodun,B.W., et Id,:Char cteristicsof SohwareQuality.North-. i
(6) Process indicators Holland,1978,p. 3-1.
i l _ (7) Performance measures 8-3. IBEEStxnda_GlossaryofSotb_u'eEngineeringTerminology.IEEE
Process indicators are closely tied to the software quality ComputerSociety,1982,p. 34.
_. . t 8-4. ReliabilityPredictionofElectronicEquipment,MIL-HDBK-217E,
_ - _ effort andsomepeopleincludethem aspartof the software
:;:_ "_ development effort, In general, there are measures such as Jan.1990. _!_
•.: . 8-5. Boehm,B.W.;Brown,J.R.;andLipuw,M.:QuantitativeEvaluation
_-- (1) test cases completed versus test cases planned,and (2) the of SoftwareQuality,TutorialonModelslindMetricsforSoltware
numberof lines of code developed versus thenumberexpected. ManagementandEngineering,V.R. Besili,ed., IEEEComputer
Such process indicators can also be rolled up (all software SocietyPress,1980.
ili development projectsndded together) to give an indication of 8-6. perils,A.J.;Sayward,F.G.;midShaw,M.,eds.:SoftwareMetrics: _[ _ T _q
overall company or corporate progress toward a quality soft- 8-7. Bmili,V.R.:Tutm_onMedelsm_lMetricsforSoftwareMmmllmnem
ware product. Too often, personnel are moved from one andEngineering.IEEEComputerSocietyPress,1980.
i_ project to another and thus the lagging projects improve but 84. Jones,T.C.:MeasuringProiFmnmingQualityandProductivity,IBM
_" the leading projects decline in their process indicators. The Syst.J., vol. 17,no. I, 1978,pp. 39-63. i
!': life cycle for programming products,as shown in table 8-3, 8-9. Heldnum,R.K.;andMalec,H.A.:QualityManagementProcessfor :_
• should not be disrupted. TelecommunicationsPrognunmingProducts,1984IEEEGlobal ]
TelecommunicationsC ference.GlobeCom1984,IEF-E,1984.pp.
Performance measures, which include such criteria as the 557-_,5. .,
percentage of proper transactions, the number of system 8-10. Malec,H.A.:AnlntroductiontoQtmlityPrismsandTheirApplication
restarts, the numberof system reloads, and the percentage of to Software.Relectronlc'85, SixthSymposiumon Reliabilityin
uptime, should reflect the user's viewpoint. The concept of elmr®ic,,OMIKK-Technoinform,Budepm,Hunlp_,pp. 155-163.
recentlyproposedperformability (ref, 8--12) combines 8-11. IEEEGuideforSoftwareQualityAssurancePlanning.ANSI/IEEE "STD730-1984.
perfornumceandavailability from the customer's perspective. 8-17. Jones,D.R.; andMalec,H.A.:CommunicationsSystemsPerfor-
. In general, thedeterminationof applicablequalitymeasures inability:NewHorizons.1989IEEEInternationalConferenceonfor a given sohware product development is viewed as a Communications,vol. I, IEEE,1989,pp. 1.4.1-1.4.9.
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Reliability Training
: 1. What are the three entities that determine quality software?
, A. Process, material, and vibration
._' _- B. Process, product, and environmentC. Planning, product, and shock
D. All of the above
, 2. What does software quality consist of?
A. Various aspects of producing programming products
• B. Bar charts for process control ,
C. Statistical analysis of software bugs
_ D. All of the above
E-
! 3. How is the term "software quality" defined? i i_ii
A. To assure the acquisition of high.quality software products on schedule, within cost. and in compliance
with the performance requirements !
g. B. To ignore various needs II/i
_ C. To developspecifications,developattributes,perceivecustomerneeds,andmeettheuser'sexpectations
! , D. All of the above
_! 4a. What are the 10 software life-cycle phases.'?
_:_ A. Conceptual;r_uirements; productdefinition; design; implementation; testing; vibration;prototypes;
installation; and disposal
i B. Planning; definition; design; manufacturing; testing; acceptance; debugging; and repair
, C. Conceptual planning; requirements definition; productdefinition; top-level design; detailed design;
implementation; testing and integration; qualification, installation, and acceptance; maintenance
• and enhancements; and disposal
D. All of the above
• t
4b. What are the IEC system life-cycle phases? t
: A. Concept and research: design and plan; manufacture and debug; operation and maintenance;
and wearou)
B. Concept and definition; design and development; manufacturing and installation; operation and
maintenance; and disposal
C. Research and development; design and breadboard: manufacturing and testing; operation and
maintenance; and disposal
D. All of the above
4c. How can the 10 software life-cycle phases be combined to fit in the IEC system life-cycle phases? _l .
" A. Concept and definition: conceptual planning; requirements definition: and product definition I
o, B. Designand development:top-leveldesignand detaileddesign
C. Manufacturing and installation: implementation: testing and integration: qualification: and
installationandacceptance
D. Operationsand maintenance:maintenanceand enhancement
E. Disposal:disposal
_ l_ F. All of the above
i
" " IAnswers are given at the end of this manual.i_ '
I 114
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5. Can there be different degrees of a quality characteristic for different life-cycle phases? El
A. Yes B. No C. Do not know
,q
: 6a. The definition of lack of software quality is
-" A. The lackofproperplanninginearlylife-cyclephases
B. The application of dependent software quality characteristics g
C. Poorly developed software that lacks proper criteria in life-cycle phases
D. All of the above 4.
6b. Three example characteristics of software quality are
A. Testing, ir,'egration, and portability
B. Maintainability, portability, and reliability
C. Design, implementation, and reliability
•, D. All of the above [_ r_= _
., 7. Seven software quality characteristics are li'"
A. Maintainability,portability, reliability,testability, understandability,usability, and freedom from error
B. Planning, definition, reliability, testing, software, hardware, usability
C. Design, implementation, integration, qualification, acceptance, enhancement, maintenance
D. All the above
8. Management has decided that qualityengineering should measure four characteristicsof theXYZ software:
maintainability,portability, reliability, and testability. The desired goals set at the beginning of the program /!
by management for the _,aaracteristiceffort were maintainability, 3.5; portability, 3.0; reliability, 3.9;
' and testability. 3.5. The overall goal was thus 87 percent/C4 for the extent of quality. The 2-year program .
gave the following results:
Planning Design and Integration Service
test
Maintainability 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.4
I Portability 4.0 3.0 3. I 3. I
: Reliability 3.5 3.6 3,9 3.9
f Testability 4.0 3. I 3,5 3.6
Total 15.5 13.2 13.9 14.0
[ a. The actual extent of quality was
k
A. (87.5%)/C4 B. (88.4%)/C4 C. (88.8%)/C4 D. None of the above
b. Have the management objectives been achieved?
A. Yes B. No C. Do not know
l
!
-'_" 1
t
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Chapter 9
Reliability Management +L
: Rootsof ReliabilityManagement Ptanninga ReliabilityManagement
_ Organization
_.+ Overthepastfewyearstheterm"reliabilitymanagement"
has been raisedto a high level of awareness.Previously, In planninga reliability managementorganizationthe
i_£i. i the managementof reliabilitywas concernedwitheliminathtg reliabilityfunctionmust reportto a high enoughlevel to be
_ failure by testing to prove reliability, and it generally effective.If thereportingleveidoesnotinvolvetopmanage-
_- .
complementedthedesign function.Qualitymanagement,on mentin reliabilityissues, the reportinglevel is too low. Forthe other hand, focused on quality control aml generally example,manysuccessf_| programstodayencompass3 to 6
_i: aligneditselfwithmanufacturingandproduction.Thepicture hours per monthat vice-wesidemiaistaff meetings. Each
began to changewith the focuson customerreliabilityand companymustfindthelevelthatmakesreliabilityarealissue
_" qualityconcerns.Specifically,the usageandstandardization to I,e addressed.A guideto reliabilitymmmgementis ref.
by companiesof reliabilitygrowth modelsestablishedthat erence9-2.
the new conceptof reliabilitymanagementis replacingthe A functionalorganizationformsgroupsperformingsimilar
old concept of the managementof reliability.New stress generictaskssuchasplanning,design,testing,andreliability.
is beingplacedon enlawing the areaof reliabilityconcern Oftenthistype of organizationgets muddleddownwithtoo
to all phasesof the life cycle. It is felt thatall aspectsof manylevels of management,andspecific productpr;orities
managementoperationsend functionsmust be integrated areoften differentin the manytaskgroups.However,many
intothe reliabilityconceptandprogram.Thus,reliabilityin benefitsaccruefromthe concentrationof talentandconstant
the manufacturingor productionphase is as importantas technicalpeerreview.Withtoday'stime-to-marketpressures,
. reliabilityinthedesignphase(ref.9--1),asshowninfigure9.-1. b,s_ suchalargecentralizedreliabilityorganizationis often
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not thebestchoice.Theteamapproach,distributedreliability, (I) To endorsethe annualreliabilityplan
is often selectedover functionalorganization. (2) To regularlyreview reliabilitystatus '
A team organization forms teams of people otten with (3) To approvereliabilityimprovementprojects
i _ diversetalentsandbackgrounds.Qualitycirclesandreliability (4) To set prioritieson resources , •
: circlesarebasedon the sameorganizationalapproach.Even (5) To assign tasks
!:, thoughpeer review is not constantly in place, the cross- (6) To regularlyreview tasks
_:r_ _ technologyknowledgeof today'spersonnelappearsto fully (7) To participatein reliabilityimprove'-entawards i +
_!, _ waredevelopmentworld, severaltypes of teamorganization The reliabilitycouncil membershipmayconsistof i
i exist.For instance,the firsttypeof typicalteamorganization (!) Thevice.presidentofthe companyordivisionaschairman
_ is the project team organization. Thi_ is a hierarchical (2) The vice-president'sstaff t, !!_i _ organizationin whichp ogrammerswith le sexperienceare 3 i i t'sbusinesspartners
i:r :, assignedto workforprogrammerswithmoreexperience.The (4) The COrl_Ymteengineeringdirector I _[ projectteam organizationis designed to fit the company (5) The corporatemanufacturingdirector
il i organizationratherthanto fitprojectrequire_ts. Thesecond (6) The corporatecustomerservices director
type is the chief programmerteam. whichemploysa highly
skilledpersonwhoperformsmostof theprogrammingwhile The diagnosticteam'sor person's functionsare
providingtechnicaldirection.A third type is the Weinberg (I) To review the internalreliabilitystatus
p ogrammi gteam, which is c mposedof groupsof l0 or 2 o review reliabilityas p ceive by ustomers
fewer programmerswith complementary skills. Group (3) To recommendtasks to the reliabilitycouncil
' consensusand leadershiproleshiftsare characteristicof this (,;) To diagnose problems
type of teamorganization.Eachof theseteam organizations (5) To designexperiments
has advantagesdependingon the size of the project, the (6) To collect and analyzedata
" ¢t
newnessof the technologybeing implemented,etc.
The fourthtypeof team organization,matrixorganization, The diagnosticteam's or person's concerns include I _ ':
isahybridapproacht atcanbeareliabilitydisasterespecially (I)Reliability,quality,andstatistics
:' iftime-to-marketpr ssuresexist.Oftenthetechnologyis (2)Engineeringa dmanufacturinge iraering
maskedby middlemanagementproceduralmeetings.The (3)Productdevelopmentandprocessoptimization
matrixorganizationcombinesfunctionalt enttoputteams (4)Productassemblyandteststrategies
together. These teams report to one manager.Individual (5) Customerperception
contributt.rsareaddedto workononeor moretasksofa given This is a new dynamicapproachfor establishingreliability
projectorproductdevelopment.Theseprojectsusnallyreport managementat the preper level in a corporationwhile
to middlemanagement, optimizingits effectiveness.
A fifthpossibili*yis basedon the theorystatedinreference
9-3 thatreliabilityis activelypursuedby involvementstarting
on thevice-presidentialevel andis organizationwide. This
new style of reliabilityinvolves establishinga reliability Gelleral Management Considerations '
council,dedicatinga full-timediagnosticpersonor team,and !
generallymakinganupwardchangeinthereliabilityreporting Program lgstabllMmmat r
level. Figure 9-2 pre_nts this concept, The reliability Inorderto designfor successfulreliability:rodcontinueto I
couneil's responsibilitiesare providecustomerswith a reliableproduct,the _ollowingsteps |
are necessary: _t
. l (!) Determine ther. _!abilitygoals to be met.(2) Construct a symbolic representation(e.g.. block
+ diag",,mor Petrinet. ref. 9-4).
(3) Determinethelogisticssupportandrepeirphilosophy.
(4) Selecthereliabilityanalysisprocedure.
($) Select the sourceor sourcesof thedatafor failurerates
and repairrate,.
(6) Determinethe failureratesandtherepairtrees.
(7)Perform the mx'essarycalculations.
(g) Validate and verifythere|iability.
! (9) Measurereliabilityuntilcustomershipment.
' '.: Ftlure9-2.--Reliabilityorpnimaion. This sectionwill addressthefirstthreestepsin detail.
!1g
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g_ * Goals lind ObjecUves TABLE9-1.--RELIABILITY OBIECrivEs FOR
l_ - : TELECOMMUNICATIONSINDUSTRY
: Geelsmm beplacedintoproperpenpective.Theyareoftco
f _ examined by using models that the producerdevelops. Moduleorsystem Objective ,.!:_
I. :, However,one of theweakestlinksin the reliabilityprocess- _ Telephoneinstrument Meantime betwt_nfailures "*:-.isthe modeling.Dr.JohnD. Spragins.aneditorfor heIEEE
• " 4
• ! with ihe followingstatement: Majorloss of service
Some --.de.. of reliability or avallabHity, such Minor loss or service *| _|
as those based on the frobability that all components Of a PABX Completeloss of service 1_Majorloss of service i:
_ii _ l systemareoperationalat a giveo time, can be dismissed as Minor loss of serivce ,•
__-'* i irrelevantwhenstudyinglarge teleconunuuicaC,on networks. Mi_mldledcalls
_/! Many _ networks are so large that the Traffic service Mishandledcalls
.. be very nearly zero; at leut one item of equipment may be
down essentially all of the time. The typical user, however, Class 5 office Systemoutage
does 4plotsee this .nless beor shehappensm be the imitlk:ky Chum4 office Lossof service
,, _y fromthisuser'ipointof view.Amoremeania_d '
_terion isonebasedontbereliabilityseesbytypicalsystem
usm,s.TbereliabilityappmattosystemolmmmrsisenOther Redundancy(simple and compound)is also discussed in
_i_.I _. valid,butdistinct,ct_edon.(SinCes_temopm'amSoma_y .chapter3. Performancestimates,andreliabilitypredictions
considersystemsdownonlyafterfallureslmve_-l_mnreported being pet_formedsimUltaneously-byusingsymbolic,_,_,_ _ - are now
i:_- i teflon, andmaynetbearofshortself-cleafingoutages,their modelingconcepts_suchas Petrinets.
_ ! estimate: of reliability are often higher than the values seen Twenty-five years ago, Carl Adam Petri published a
by users.) mathematical technique for modeling known as a Petri net.
!_* "; Reliability objectives can be defined.differently for various
;i_ i - A Petri net is a tool for analyzing systems and their projected
systems. An example f_om the telecommunications industry
" I behavior. In 1987, Carl Petri delivered the keynote address(ref. 9-5) is presented in table 9-1. We can quantify the at the international workshopon Petri nets and performance
[ objectives, for example, for a- private automatic branch models (ref. 9-7). Many applications were discussed at the
I exchange (PABX) (ref, 9-5) as shown in table 9-2. Table 9-2
workshop including the use of timed models for determining
! presents the reliability specification for a wide Variation of the expected delay in complex sequences of actions, methods
PABX sizes (from fewer than 120 lines to over 5000 lines), used to determine the average data throughput of parallel
i and the failure of fault-tolerantcomputers, dverage rates
Symbolic Representation computerdesigns. Correctnessanalysisand flexible, _nu-
1 Chapter3 presentsreliabilitydiagrams,modelsthatare the facturingtechniqueswere also described.TimedF.,m _ets
_ _ symbolicrepresentationsof the analysis.Therelationshipof showpromiseforanalyzingthroughputperformanceincorn-
operationandfailurescan be representedin these models, puterand communicationssystems.
i TABLE9-2.--RELIABILITYSPECIFICATIONFOR PABX
.-
| Numberof lines
<120 200 400 600 800 1200 3000 5000
i '
" Commonmntrol performance:
Meantimebetweencatastrophic I0 .........................
fzilure_,yr
Systemoutagetimeper20yr, hr ................... I I !
Meantimebetweenoutages,yr .................... >$ >5 >5
Meantimebetweencomplete 5 I0 40 40 40 ..............
Iossmof service,yr
I _ Servl_ level:
Meantime betweennmjorlosses 200 400 300 200 150 365 365 ....
,,_ of mrvlce, days
Metn time betweenminor losses 60 60 50 40 30 30 15 ....
of service,days
": _ DeSrsdationof service,hrlyr .......................... I
_" Mishandledcalls,percent 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 O.I 0.1 0,1 0,02
119 ' ,
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:" "+ "' TABLE9-3.--SPARESPOLICY :__
Subsystem On-she SubdepotTurnaroundDelx_ Turnaround
spares spares time'of spares time,of _i_
? ? subdepm ? depot i[_-_
• . spares, spares, |'p _
Commoncontroland Yes Yes 2 Yes 15
'"" Network No 30
; " Lineandtrunkunits Yes 30 :
: Peripheralequipment No '_ ,, 30 _iS:
+ .o .o __ , I'i
aF_,x.Mac_qmm+'
[[_:-: A Petri net is an abstractand formal graphical model used repair costs, etc. A specific spares policy can be tailornd_to . _:,_
_;:- for systems that exhibit concurrent, asynchronous, or non- .a given geographical area. Note that subsystems have differ-
:_i, :- deterministicbehavior. The Petrinet model provides accurate ent spares policies owing to the criticality of their failures in
_,- system-information when the model is a valid representation contrast to a blanket spares assignmedt without P_ard to
;.::. of the system and the solution of the model is correct.A Petri functionality or survivability.
-_"':; • net is composedof four parts: a set of places, a set Of trans- Even though the spares location and turnaroundtime are:.__-• _:_
_-_;+t itions, an input function, and an output function. Theinput the same fur two different subsystems, the spares adequacy +__
, , functionmidtheoutputfunctionrelateto transitionsand places, can be different. Some spares adequacy levels for a tele- i'.
._:7 i In general, graphics are used-to represent-the Petri net communications systems are presented in table 9-4. t
_ structuresand show the concepts and the problems. A circle Spares provisioning is an important part of a spares plan. [
representsa place, a bar represents a transition, and directed Requirements must be clearly statedor they can lead to over- I_ arcs connect transitionsto places or plac s to transitions. Th or und rsparing For ex mple, a spares adequacy of 99.5 -
state of a Petri net is called the PN marking and is defined pereentcan be interpretedin two ways. First, six spares might
by the number of "tokens" contair,ed in each place. A place be needed to guarantee that spares are available 99.5 percent
is an input to a transition if an arc exists from the place to of the time. Alternatively, if one states that when a failure.
the transitionand an output if an arc exists from the transition occurs a spare must be available .09.5 percent of the time, it
to theplace. Enabled transitions can be "fired" by removing will be necessary to supply 6 + 1 = 7 spares. /
one token from each input place and adding one token to each The establishmentof depot and subdepet sparing, ratherthan :.
outputplace. The firing of a transitioncauses a change of state only individual site sparing, has proven to be cost effective.
and producesa different PN marking. Reference 9-8 contains As an example, table 9-5 presents the depot effectiveness for _-_ r_
additional information. Petri nets are a useful reliability a typicaldigital PABX. This table indicates thata 14.5-percent i-+_'
-r modelingtool. spareslevelwouldbe requiredifonlyper-sitesparingwas , -
used;however,whenonedepotserves100sites,therequired ]
Leglstim Support and Repair Philesophy spares level is less than 1 percent. I+ .+_
A centralizedmaintenancebase(CMB)(ref,9-I0)isessential
- "'.4
The logistics sui_ort plan is normallybased on criteriasuch to a deferred maintenance concept. Deferred maintenance . .+
as (1) failure rates and repair rates of replaceable units, can be available on a real-time basis. When a failure occurs ' ._-_(2) systemmaturity, (3) whetheror not the sites can be served
by depots or subdepots, and (4) the rate at which additional TABLE9-4--SPARESADEQUACY i_ "
_! sites are addedtothe depotresponsibility. Since sparesare ] _::_!
the key to support, this chapter will examine them further. Subsystem On-site Subdepot Depot _. _!
The size of the spares stock depends on (1) the criticality spares? spares spares
of the replaceable unit to the syster ._(2) the necessary spare
adequacy level, (3)the number of systems served, Adequacy"
i _ (4) whether the area served is rural, suburban,or urban, and Commoncontroland Yes 0.9995 0.9995 ....i
_" + (5) whether the repair facility is on site or remote. A typical memory
_.J'_ spares policy for a telecommunications system (ref. 9-9) is Network No .995 .995
+iI i presented in table 9-3. ' Lineandtrunkunits _es ,999 .999Peripheralequspment No 99 99i[i_:'J 'Policies can be formulate_ for families of systems or for _ . ' ' '
i_i.p;. _. multifamily geographical areas. The turnaroundtimedepends rm equspmem No ....... 95
'_.I on the replaceable units failure rate, the repair location, the ._e.b,,._ or_,_*__ ._.i_._.
L,-:. 120k
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TABLE9-$.--DEPOT EFFECTIVENE&5FOR TYPICALDIGITALPABX
r-o_sa control Primedwiriq_ _. ,_ _ _ wiri,sc_ forn_mm ill
4" branchautomatic
_.. part trunk i 2 , 10 .'q) 100 i 2 10 50 19O
l< -'-:
_;• 15003 5 16 32 160 800 I 600 I ! 2 $ 7
! 15004 6 14 28 140 700 I 400 ! I 4 5 8
• .
"" 20703 8 _ 2g 56 280 I 400 2 80V 2 2 4 l0 15
20705 16 153 206 1530 7 650 I$300 7 II 29 106 196
il Total 10_8 2116 10 580 52 9O0 105800 153 173 287 6.58 1001
! Spares.percentof toad 14.5 8.2 . 2.7 1.2 0.95
atan unattendedsite, theCMBwouldreceive informationon coverage,systemmaturity,deferredrepair,and
-i a displayas to thecriticalityof the failureandthe deferred familiarity.A dynamic(continuouslyupdated.)depotstocking
actiontakmif_ andwcuidreceiveuprojec- planwouldbe cost effective. ,_ dynamicdepotmodel using
• lionindicatingimpendingproblems.The_ wouldanalyze Monte Carlo methods (ref. 9- I1) includes unit delivery
.... thesituationfor thespecificsiteconfiguration,the processing schedules,itemusagepermonth,suF_ortpersmmcl_,
level in the system, andthe site's failure-repairhLstory, anddepotand base repaircycle times.
Inputdatacoukl consistof items such as the last similar
occurrence,thenext plannedvisit to the site, the criticality Reliability Management Activities
of theSiteto theoperatingnetwork,thecumulativesitefailures
forthelast3 months,andtheprobabilityof additionalfailures Performance Requirements
occurring.The datawouldbe analyzedwith a maintenance-
predictioncomputerprogramto generatea tablebased on It is often difficult to translatecustomer performance !. _
/Isystem loading, such as table 9-6. Often the suggested requirementsinto designrequirements,nspec_ailyinthe areamaintenancedeferraltime is recommendedto be the next of quality and reliability. Reliability en ompasses bothmaintenancevisit (NMV). The NMV will vary with the quantitativeand qualitative measures. New terms in the l[.amountof equipmenton site and the projected failure computer industry,such as "robustness," are not formally
frequency(ref. 9-10). metricized.However,we canadaptconceptsf0r tbe overail !i_ii
Thecombinndonofdeferredmainteusnceandacantralized performanceprocess (ref. 9-12) to apply to reliabilityas
maintenancebase dictatesthe needs for an efficientspares presentedin figure9-3.
program.Sparesplanningcombinedwithknowledgeof the Ifa business'smatrixof reliabilityrequirementsis reduced
logisticscanoptimizesupportcosts. A depot stockingplan to oneor more models, subjectiveandqualitativecustomer-
canadditionallyvarybecauseof manyfactors,includingerror orientedreliabilitymeasurescanbe translatedintoquantitative
system-orientedreliabilitycriteria.Figure9-3 identifiesboth
the top-down and bottom-up approaches to reliability
TABI._9-6.--MAINTI_NANCEA TION validation, which includes (1) translation,(2) allocation,
RECOMMENDATIONS (3) requirements,and (4) planning.
Before Busy After Off- With the identificationof the agreed-tosystem-oriented
busy hour busy shin reliability criteria, designer-orientedsubsystemor module
_ -7i hour hour time reliabilityparameterscanbe ailocatedas shownin figure9-3,
"_ generallyby a system reliabilityteam. The teamevaluates
•_" Relmir Ym Yes -Ym Yes simple versus redundantconfigurations, levels of faultDeferrepairfor(days)" 0 0 I I
t'/ i[ hmcoMfailureaffecti. No Yes No No detectionandcorrectionimplementations,softwareconsid-
service? erations,etc. System or module reliability modeling may
/ Probabilityofnosimilar 0.95 0.9O 0.S2 O.6O specify reliabilityrequirementsfor specificcomponents.An
secondfailure example of such modeling is a failure modes and effectsSitehilum Im month Low Hilih Nornml.tow analysis (FMAF.A)performedon a productto predicttheSite failureslest year -tow Low Normal Low
Tmesienterrorrote tow High Low Low probabilityof networkfailuresduetoa singlefailureordueto a failureat_eranaccumulationof undetectedfailures.
t2l
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Boa_ up Topdown _."_
rd_b_yCust°mer'_enmdT_rmdm _ ' -.i 2,
t
Fisure9-3.--Overallr_liabilitylm_'_u, i _
- a , .
Forexample,areplacementproductwastou_ averylarge- appliedisthedesignandinq)iementationoffiber-basednet-
scale integration (VLSI) implementation, and the protection works. Reference 9-13 states that "'thestatistical observation
against network f_lures needed to be assessed. An investi- that on the average .56percent of the pairs in a copper cable
gation found no apparentstandard industry FMAEA metitod are cut when the cable is dug up, makes the copper network
for VLSI components. Because future VLSI products may 'structurallysurvivable."""On the otherhand, a fiber network ,
show an increasing need for FMAEA, it is impor.,mt that an can be assumed to be an all or nothing situation with 100
industry standard be generated. In the network examples percent of the circuits being affected by a cable cut, failure,
discussed, a single fault could directly cause a customer- etc. In this c_se study, according to reference 9-13, "cross
oriented problem, connects and allocatablecapacity are utilized by the intelligent ,
The bottom-', approach to reliability validation ensures network operation system to dynamically roconfigure the
customer satisfaction. The appropriate certification, process network in thecase of failures." Figure 9-4 (from ref. 9-14)
metrics,andstatisticalin-processtestsmustbede_siguedfrom presentsa conceptforspecificationtargets
thecustomerviewpoint.A step-by-step u?ward certification
anddesignreviewusingprocessmetricscanbe designedto F',eldStudies
ensurecustomer-orientedreliabilityInaddition,wecansee
theneedforthe independentupwardpathfromreliability Thecustomermayobservespecificresultsofavailability. "
planning and standards to customer-oriented reliability in For instance, figure 9-5 has been the basis for the proposal
of an IEC technology trend document (_,_. 9-15).
figure 9--3. This is the key to success, since reliability control System reliability testing is performed today to benchmarl_
cannotbe bypassedor eliminatedfromdesign- or performance- the reliability,availability,and dependabilitymetricsof complex
related issues. newhardwareandsoftwareprograms.Figure9-6 (takenfrom [
ref. 9=1) presents the traditional viewpoimof th_ design, _ . •
Spedlk#tiou Targets development, and production community on cumulative ]
A system can have a detailed performance or reliability reliability growth. It is possible that the same data generated t
specification that is bared on customer requirements. The both curves in figure 9-6. When we measure the cumulative !survivability of a telecommunications network is defined as reliability growth, the decline of production coupled with a
the ability of the t_etworkto perform under stress caused by decline of reliability is mask_. If we track the product on iI '-i
cable cuts or sudden and lengthy traffic overloads and after a quarterlybasis, often the productshows a relaxationofproc-
failures including equipmentbreakdowns. Thus, performance ess control, incorporation of old, marginal components into
andavailability have beencombined intoa unified metric. One the last year's product manufacture, failure to incorporate the
area of telecommunications where these principles have been latest changes into service manuals, knowledgeable personnel
ii_..__'._,'S_W_.._;_._.._-_. _" _,_o_ ............. _._-"__.'__-_._L'_._(__ _'_'('L _da,. :ev'_'- - _ - - - I
"100:::)0:::)3:::)"1:::)-'1:::)7
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i u,ansferredtootherproducm,etc.Thus,thereisaneedtoUack Oam_ Oom_m
i specific productson a quarterlybasis(ref. 9-1). _ (&8rain) ;
• {ovmtsor l_ymr .,
, mml_m) parmach_ __..
_< Human Reliabllit_ o% _ m_mm
I I
i-:'. .I Tbemajorobjectivesof reliabiiitymanagementare toensure 24% ,,-.._;_==v,_-------_ 2S% E"I_
": i thata selectedreliabilitylevel fora productcanbe achieved
'"_i! onscheduleina cost-eff_verunnerandthathecustomer _ :'_
_..._:',, perceivestheselectedreliabilitylevel.Thecurrentemphasis _-
;: :i in reliabilitymanagementisonmeetingor exceedingcustomer 30%
expectations. We can view this as a challenge,but it should
_I_ beviewedas.thebridgebetweentheuserandtheproducer _ %
_... or provider.Thisbridgecan be tided "'humanreliability."
_:'__ Inthepast,theproducerwasconcernedwith the processand
:-:::.:-: theprod_tandfoundreliabilityngamrmnenmthataddressed
_-- both. Often there was no correlationbetween field data,
the customer's perception of reliability,and the producer's
g__:-_i" reliabilitymetrics.Surveys then began to indicatethatthe
_% 42%
ance, responseto orderplacement,technicalsupport,service
quality,etc.
i Human ErrorsI
t Humanreliabilityis defined(ref.9--16)as "the probability •
_ of accomplishingajobor tasksuccessfullyby humansatany Figure9-7.--Reliabilitycharacteristics, i irequired stage in system operations within a specified _--
minimumtime limit(if the time requirementis specified)." I :.!
Althoughcustomersgenerallyare notyet requiringhuman
reliabilitymodels inadditionto the requestedhardwareand
softwarereliabilitymodels, the scienceof humanreliability PresentatiOll of Reliability
. is well established. Reliability testing usually occurs during product_devel- i_
opmentandends with the _irstproductshipment.However,
•[ Example productreliabilitytestingcanbe cost effectivelyrunthrough _
! Presently,thefocusindesignis shiftingfromhardwareand themanufacturinglifeof theproductoachievebothcontinued
softwarereliabili_ to humanreliability.A recent2½-year customersatisfactionandtheinberentreliabilityof theproduct. :-'-
t!il studyby BellC°mmunicati°nResearch(ref"9-17) indicated A maj°rc°ncerninplanningreliabilitytestin'8is thematurity
that reliability in planning,design, and field maintenance of thespecificmanufacturingfacility.Forinstance,a newplant
proceduresmustbe focusedon proceduralerrors,inadequate may initiallyneed threeto five failuresper week of tested i _-
emergencyactions, recoveryand diagnosticprograms,the productundercontrolledtestenvironmentsin orderto shape _ _:_T_
design of preveetiveme suresto reduce the likelihoodof the anufacturi gprocessa d the productspecifics. The e- I "_
_:_ proceduralerrors,andtheimprovementof thehumanfactors fore,detailedfailureanalysiswillbe conductedon 150to 250
in the design and subsequentdocumentation.The study failed items per year. Once plantpersonnelbegin to feel t
revealedthefollowingresultsforoutagesorcrashesasshown comfortableas a team and severalof the plant'sprocesses, I
_. • in figure9=7. Approximately40 percentof outageeventsand products,or botharecertified,thegoalof one failureperweek
due to proceduralproblems (human error), c_n be institutedin a medium-matureplant. The team in a I-downtimeis
" In fact, if software recovery problemsare includedwith matureplantwithfew failurescanobserveleadingindicators
_:: proceduralproblems,62 percentof theeventsand68 percent thatforewarnof possibleproblemsandcanpreventhemfrom ]
enteringintothe shippedproduct.Thus,ina matureplantthe ]"'_ of the downtimearedue to humanerror.Therefore,human
. goal of one failure per 2 weeks cansuffice as a benchmark J
_: reliabilityplanning,modeling, design, and implementation
:::_-__ mustbe focusedon inorderto achievecustomersatisfaction, for qualityoperationsto achieveproductreliability. [.
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Engineering and Manufnctuving User or Customer
Measuring reliability in a practical way is a challenge. Reliability growth has been studied, modeled, and _,
Reliability grows with product, process, and customer use analyzed--usually from thedesign anddevelopment viewpoint.
: maturity. We could measure, for example, the reliability at Seldom is the process or product studied from the customer's
[_ _ first customer shipment and the reliability during a 5-year or user's perspective. Furthermore,the reliability that the first :
production life. An effective startmay be to establish a three- customer observes with the first customer shipment can be ii_' _
_:. to five-level reliability tier concept (ref. 9- i8). For example, quite different from the reliability thata customer will observe
U table 9-7 presents a five-tier reliability concept. With this with a unit or system produced 5 years later, or last customer .
,_" concept productscan achieve firstcustomershipmentat a mean shipment. Because the customer's experience can vary with
: time between failures (MTBF) of T(min). Manufacturing and the maturityof a system, reliability growth is an important
service will accept risks until T(spec) is reached. Manu- concept to customers and should be considered in the
! i facturinghas a commitment to drive the MTBF of the product customer's purchasing decision.
i up to T(spec), and engineering has a commitment to provide The key to reliability growth is theability to define the goals
:_i:_ ! resources for solving design problenmuntilT(spec) is reached, for the product or service from the customer's perspective: The qualification team working with this process is now while reflecting the actual situation in which *be customer
f_ __-I involved throughout the design qualification process through obtains the product or service. For large telecommunicationsfield feedback. Ide_!ly, the MTBF's of tiers 2 to 5 would be switching systems there has been a rule of thumb for
_ equal; however, the calibration of reliability modeling tools determining reliability growth. Often systems have been 11_ii-i
_ and the accuracy of field MTBF measurementsare challenges allowed to operate at a lower availability than the specified
yet to be met in some corporations and industries. Thus, a availability gopl for the first 6 inonths to 1 year of operation [.)_
_:°_- three- to five-tier approachis a practicaland effective solution (ref. 9-19). Inaddition,component partreplacementrateshave
for developing reliability measurements, often been allowed to be 50 percent higher than specified for '_
Although the MTBF is between T(min) and T(spec), the first 6 months of operation. These allowances accommo-
progr-_s is tracked toward T(spec) as a goal. The point is to dated craftspersons learning patterns,software patches, design ."-_/!
find and fix the problems and thus improve the reliability of errors, etc.
the product. Teamwork and commonality of purpose with The key to reliability growth is to have the growth me,as-
• manufacturingand engineering are necessary in order to deal urement encompass the entire life cycle of :he product. The
with real problems and not symptoms. After T(spec) has been concept is not new, only here the emphasis is placed on the
achieved, an "insurance policy" is necessary to determine if customer's perspective. Reference 9-20 presents the goals of I
anything has gone radically wrong. This can be a gross software reliability growth (table 9-8). I
evaluation based on limited data as the "premiums" for a Table 9-8 covers a large complex system with built-in fault I' •
perfect "iusurance policy" are too high. Once T(spec)hasbeen tolerance. Reference 9-21 regarded this system as not [.i demonstrated, a trigger can be set at the 50-percent lower "'technically or economically feasible to detect and fix all iIMTBF limit for control purposes. Improvement plans at this software problems in a system as large as No. 4 ESS [elec-
I level shouldbe basedon the returnon investment. At matu_ty, tronic switching system]. Consequently, a strong emphasis has
i T(intrinsic), dependence on reliability testing can be reduced, been placedon makingit sufficientlytolerantof software errorsr
._ A few suggestions for reductions are testing fewer samples, to provide successful operation and fault recovery in an envi-
t shortening tests, and skipping testing for I or 2 months when ronment containing software problems."
I the personnel feel comfortable with the product or process. Reliability growth can be specified from "day 1" on a
With a reduced dependence on reliability testing, other product development and can be measured or controlled on
i manufacturing process data can be used for full control, a product with a lO-year life until "day 5000." We can apply
the philosophy of reliability knowledge generation principles, -
_ which is to generate reliability knowledge at the earliest _'
"" _ TABLE 9=7.--FIVE-TIER RELIABILITY CONCEPT _ •"
[:i oo.n.,p--.d,o.doO,.--ITier' Meantime Description for the duration of the product's useful life.- To accuratelybetween measure and control reliability growth, we must examine the
L ! failures entire manufacturinglife cycle. Onemethod is the constructioni _min) MinimumdemonstratedMTBFbeforeshipping of a production life-cycle reliability growth chart.(statisticaltest) Table 9-9 presents a chart for setting goals for small (e.g.,
L I i_i lJ 2 T(spec)Specified MTBFthatmeetamerketneedsand a 60-line PABX or a personal computer), medium, and large
supportservicepricing systems. _mall systems mustachieve manufacturing, shipping,
3 _deslln) Design_ealMTBF(calculation) and installationmaturity in 3 months in order to gain and keep
. 4 _lntrinsic) lr.t nsieMTBF(pl ntm asurement) market share for present and future products.This is I
• . 5 /l{fleld) FieldMTBFmeasurement .... [ .:
__._. j , . an.achievablebut difficult goal to reach.The differencein
i.,:
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TABLE 9-8.--19g0 GENERIC QUALITY METRICS
; {From reference 9-20,1 ,.
_: ,+ j
_._
+' Implementation phase
i"_
_ Require- Design Laboratory FieM test Field ,.
/ merits _ystem test performance
Open questions 0 ..............
IProblema fixed, per --- I/_0 Ill000 III000 i: ,+
words i
Problems open. per --- 115000 1/5000 i/2000 1/2000
_: words
_ + ;'2Interrupts, per day --- <20 <20 <25 ,
i!. , Audits. per day --- 0 < I0 < !0 <25 t '
!_i Service effective - ........ 0 0 1.8 }
incidents, per
: officemonth i ::
i . .. , .
'Reiretiahzations. per ........ I
-°Cutoff calls, per ........ <0.2 _
["_ 10000i :Denied calls; per ....... <0.7 ,
i I0000 + .
+
t
• Trunk out of service, - ....... 20 [ +:+
_i rein/yr ,, t : "
+ L
+ p++". ¢'i
} .,- '
TABLE 9--9.--PRODUCTION LIFE-CYCLE RELIABILITY GROWTH CHART
Year i
Quarter
Qt Q+ 03 Q4 Qi Q2 ... Q3 Q4
Small system:
i Reliability 8mwth, 5 0 0 0 0 0 .... 0 0 +
percent ".
Time to steady 3 0 0 0 0 0 .... 0 0 :_t
rote, months i
Medium system: !00 50 25 i0 I0 I0 ... 10 i0 !
!; Reliability Ilrewth, iI
per_m I
' Time to steady 6 3 2 I I I .., 1 I t
+;.j lllle, 11)o111111;
+ + Larse system:
Reliability jrowth, 200 !00 50 50 33 33 20 20
;:" :i percent
'+...<i Time to steady 12 9 6 3 3 3 . .. 3 3
• i state,months
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interaction,coupled with the humanfactorsof production, 9-8. Petegson, J.L.: Petri Net Themy andthe Mndeling of Systems. Prentk'e- %.
i. Hall. Inc.. 1981.installation, and usage, limits the reliability growth over the 9-9. Mniec. H.A.; and Steinl_rn, D.: A New Technique for Depot and
I_i productionlife cycle for most large, complexsystems. Sub-Depnt S_res, IEEE Trans. Rel.. rot. R-29.no.5. Dec.1980.
ii In certain large telecommunicationssystems the long pp.381-386.I installationtimeallows theelectronicpartreliabilityto grow 9-I0. Maiec,H.A;:MaintenanceTechniquesinDistribntndCommunicntimmso that the customerobserves the design growth and the SwitchiogSystems, IEEETrans. Rel.,vol.R-30,no.3,Aug. 1981.
pp. 253-257.
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"__i on a corporatebasis but mustpresent individualproduct- SurvivableFiberNetwork,IEEEJ. Sel.Topics Commun..vol. j .
-:_ line reliability growth pictures to achieve total customer SAC-4,no. 7, Oct. 1986, pp. !112-1117.
I-: _ satisfaction. 9-14. Jones, D.R.; and Maiue, H.A.: Communications Systems Per-
"_ I formability: New Horizons. 1989 IEEE lntcrnatimwl Conference on
• _ Communicatiom, Vol. 1, IEEE, 1989. pp. 1.4.1-1.4.9.
_: _ i 9-15. Decroix. A.: Analysis and Evaluation of Reliability and Availability
_,:" _ of Software. IEC-TC-56dmft, 56/WGI0 (DECROIZ)02, June 1986.
i i_ I 9-16. Dhillon. B.S.: Huonm Reliability: With Human Factors. pe_nil; References pre.,1.6
_ ; 9-17. All. S.R.: Analysis of Total Outage Data for Stored Program Control
'._ ! 9-1. Melee, H.A.: Reliability Growth From theCustomer lN_mpective,lEEE SwitchingSystems.IEEE J. SOl. Topics Commun., vol. SAC-4. i
; J. Sel. Topics Commun., vol. 6, no. 8, Oct. 1988. pp. 1287-1293. no. 7, Oct !986o pp. 1044-1046. ': _1
'_ 9-2. Dhillon, B.S.; end Reiche, H.: Reliability and Maintainability 9-18. Maiec, H.A.: Produv/qrocnss Reliability Testing. 1987 IEEE
Management. Van NmtreM Reinhold, 1985. International Conference on Communications, IEEE, 1987, : t
i 9-3. Spregim, J.D.,etal.: CurremTelncommonicstion Network Reliability pp. ii98-1202, i
Models: A Critical Assessment, IEEE J. Sel. Topics Common., vol. 9-19. Conroy.. R.A.; Mniec, H.A.; and Van Gonthem, J.: The Desifn, _;_i
I SAC-4, no. 7, OCt. 1986, pp. i 168-1173. Applicatiomt, and Performance of the System-12 Distributed Corn- .
i 9-4. PNPM '87, International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance purer Architecture. First International Conference on Computers • :Models. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1987. and Applications, E.A. perrish and S. Jian8, eds., IEEE, 1984,
9-5. Maiec, H.A.:ReliabilityOptimizationinTeleplmmSwitchingSysttans pp. 186-195. i
I Design, IEEE Trans. Rel., vol. R-26, no. 3. Aug. 1977, 9-20, Giloth, P.K.;andWitsken, J.R.:No. 4_DesignandPerformance
pp. 203-208. of Reliable Switching Software. International Switching Symposium
9-6. petri, C.A.: Communication With Automata. Fi,ai Report, Vol. l, (ISS '81 CIC), IEEE 1981, pp. 33AI/I-9. !J
Supplement 1, RADC TR 65-377-VOL I-SUPPL 1, Applied Data 9-21. Davis, E.A.; and Gilnth, P,K.: Performance Objectives and Service i
_h, Princeton, NL Jan. 1966. Experience,Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 60, no. 6, 1981, pp. 1203-1224. ° i
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Reliability Training '
I.Reliabilitymanagementisconcernedwithwhatphasesofthelifecycle? ""
A. Designanddevelopment B. Manufacturing C. Customer D. Allc."theabove i ""
: , 2. Name a new styleoforganizingreliabilityactivities. _-
i-
, A. Functional B. Team C. Matrix D. Council l',
• i! ,.
',. _ 3. What are the functions of the d;agnostic team or person? ,
A. Review the internal reliability status , /.
B, Review reliability as perceived by the customer
C. Recommend tasks to the reliability council
_: D. Diagnose problems ', .... :.
E. Design experiments ! "::
•_ F. Collect and analyze data II :i iii
i: i ,
: G. All of the above !
i: : 4. Name a goal category for a telephone instrument. ] i
, _ I ?'
i A. Loss of service I :
i*, _ B. Mean time between failures i
[_:"_ C. Mishandledcalls !
_ i D. Alloftheabove _
i 5. A PABX with 800 lines has 8 service level reliability specification for the mean time between major
" losses of ,service (MTBF) of!
A. 150 days B. 1 hour C. 0.1 percent D. All of the above
i-
6. A Petri net is composed of which of the following parts?i
! A. A set of places
B. A set of transitions
C. An input function
.-- D. An outputfunction
E. All of the above
I 7. For a telecommunications system, what is the spares adequacy level for a network subsystem with
, spares depots?
A. 0.999 B. 0.995 C. 0.95
8, Turnaroundtime depends on
'" ;_ A. Replaceable unit failure rate
I B. Repair location
" C. Repair cost
' D. All of the above
•- 9. Spares adequacy is the probability of having spares available.
A. True B. False C. Do not know
]
=.i,i )Answen are given st the end of this manual.
! t
I"
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10. Whatis the normalmaintenanceactionrecommendationfor thesite to defer repairfor (days)during
off-shift time?
A. 0 B. 2 C. 1 "_
I , 11. The bottom-upapproachto reliabilitymakesuseof planning,requirements,allocations,andcustomer
!._ orientation.
_,;, A. True B. False C. Do not know
,_:' 12. Specificationtargets can be used to define whatperformanceand availabilityrequiremena?
_ A. Fully operational
[ B. Subliminalavailability
C. Degradedoperation
! D. Unusable
E. Subliminalperformance
F. All of the above :
13. Trackinga producton a quarterly basisoften shows
A. A relaxationof process control
B. Incorporationof old marginalcomponents
C. Failure:o incorporatethe latest changesinto servicemanuals :ii
D. Knowledgeablepersonneltransferredto other products
E. All of the above
::- 14. If we considerrecoverysoftwareandproceduralproblemsashumanerror,humanerrorcanaccountfor
whatpercentageof outageanddowntimeproblems? :
a. Outage frequency,percentof events/crashes: A. 38 B. 55 C. 62
b. Downtime(3.5 min), percentper year per machine: A. ,,2 B. 51 C. 68
15. Asabenchmarkforqualityoperationstoachieveproductreliability,whatis areasonablegoal(failures
per week) fora matureplant?
A. 3.0 B. 1.0 C. 0.5
16. While the MTBFis between T(min)and T(spec), progressis tracked towardwhatgoal.'?
A. T(design) B. T(spec) C. T(intrinsic)
17. The key to reliabilitygrowth is to have the growth measurementencompass
A. The designphase
B. The manufacturingphase
C. The testingphase
I D. The userphase
E. The entirelife cycle ofthe product
_:-[ 18. For a No. 4 ESSsystemin the field-testphase the numberof interruptsper day can be
i A. <20 e. >20 C, 40
A 19. An electronicsystemmustachievemanufacturing,shipping,and installationmaturityin whatperiod
; of time (months)togain and keep marketshare?
T
i a. Small system: A. 1 B. 2 C, 3
•_ b. Mediumsystem: A. 4 B. 6 C. 12
.
.... _ c. Largesystem: A. 12 B. g C. 16
-i
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Appendix A
- !
Reliabil'ty Information
_ The figures and tables in this appendix provide reference the productof failure rate k (or I/MTBF) and operating time
. i:_, i data to supportchapters 2 to 6. For the most part these data t are substituted for -x. Use of this table is discussed in
:. _ are self-explanatory, chapter 3 and frequently referred m in chapters 4 to 6.
i-i:'_ FigureA-I contains operating failure rates for military Table A-2 contains tolerance factors for calculating the
......i standard parts. They relate to electronic, electromechanicai, results of mean-time-between-failure tests. It provides seven
_' " _ and some mechanical parts and are useful in making approx- confidence levels, from 50 to 99 percent for 0 to 15observed
_ i imate reliability predictions as discussed in Chalxar3. Their failures. The use of this table is explained in the table.
- _ use, limitations, and validity are explained in chapter 4. Examples are discussed in chapter 6.
_'_ li Figure A-2 provides failure rate information for making Tables A-3 to A-5 contain tabulateddata for safety margins,• approximate reliability predictions for systems that use probability, samplesize, and test-demonstratedsafety margins
I I established-reliability parts, such as air- and ground-launched for tests to failure. They provide three confidence levels, from_ ; vehicles, airborne and critical ground support equipment, 90 to 99 percent, and sample sizes fr m 5 to 100. Values
. _ piloted aircraft, and orbiting satellites. The use of this figure similarto these are presented on the safety marginside of the
I is discussed in chapter 4. reliability slide rule; the slide rule provides six confidence
Figure A-3 shows the relationshipof operating application levels and sample sizes from 5 to 80. The use of these tables
factor to noaoperating application factor. These data can be and the slide rule is discussed in chapter 6.
used to adjust failure rates for the mission condition. The use More informationon this subjectcan be found in references
of this figure is also discussed in chapter 4. A-I and A-2.
Figure A-4 contains reliability curves for interpreting the
resultsof attributetests. They provideseven confidence levels,
from 50 percent to 99 percent; and six test failure levels,
from 0 to 5 failures. The use of these figures is discussed in References
chapter 5. A-I. Reliability Modeling and Prediction. MIL-STD-756B (plul change
Table A- _ contains values of the negative exponential _ices), Aug.31. 1982.
function e -x, where -x varies from 0 to -0.1999. The A-2. Reliability for the Enlinecr, BookSeven:Reliebility Tables,Martin
tabulated data make it easy to look up the reliability, where MariettaCorporation.1965.
i
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TABLE A-I.--VALUESOF NEOATIVE EXPONENTIAL FUNCTION ,,=x _
X t -.v X _ -x X _ -X X G-x X C -x X _ -x
0.0000 1.00000 0.0050 0.99501 O.OIQO 0.99005 0.0150 0.98511 0.0200 0.98020 0.0250 0.97531 _t ,,-'
.0001 .99990 .00_1 .99491 .0101 .98995 .0151 .98501 .0201 .98010 .0251 .97521 ]
.0002 .99980 .0052 .99481 .0102 .98985 .0152 .98491 .0202 .98000 .0252 .97511 ! :-
.0003 .99970 .0053 .99471 .0103 .98975 ,0153 .98482 ,0203 ,97990 ._$3 .97502 Ji .:, ' '_
.0004 .99960 .0054 ,99461 .0104. .98965 .0154 .98472 ,0204 .97981 .0254 .97492 _i
0.0005 0.99950 0.0055 0,99452 0.0105 0.98955 0.0155 0.98462 0,0205 0.97971 0.0255 0.97482 ;
.0006 .99940 .0056 .99442 .0106 .98946 .0156 .98452 .0206 .97961 .0256 .97472
.0007 .99930 .0057 .99432 .0107 .98936 .0157 .98442 .0207 .97951 ,0257 .97463 ,,.
,0008 .99920 .0058 .99422 .0108 .98926 .0158 .98432 .0208 .97941 .0258 .97453
•,0009 .99910 .0059 ,99412 ,0109 .98916 .0159 .98423 .0209 •97932 .0259 .97443
00010 0.99900 0.0060 0.99402 0.01 I0 0.98906 0.0160 0.98413 0.0210 0.97922 0.0'260 0.97434
0011 .99800 .0061 .99392 ,011i .98896 .0161 .98403 .0211 .97912 .0261 .97424
0012 .99880 .0062 .99382 .0112 .98886 .0162 .98393 .0212 .97902 .0262 .97414
0013 .99870 .0063 .99372 ,OD3 ,98876 .0163 .98383 .0213 .97893 .0263 .97404 :
0014 .99860 .0064 .99362 .0114 .98866 ,0164 .98373 .0214 .97883 .0264 .97395
0.0015 0.99850 0.0065 0.99352 0.0115 0.98857 0.0165 0.98364 0.0215 0.97873 0.0265 0.97385
,0016 .99840 ,0066 ,99342 ,0116 .98847 .0166 .98354 ,0216 ,97863 .0266 .97375
.0017 .99830 .0067 .99332 .0117 .98837 .0167 ,98344 ,0217 .97853 .0267 .9736_
.0018 .99820 .0068 .99322 .0118 .98827 .0168 .98334 .0218 .97844 .0268 .97356
.0019 .99810 .0069 .99312 ,0119 .98817 .0169 .98324 ,0219 .97834 ,0269 .97346
0.0020 0.99800 0,0070 0.99302 0.0120 0.98807 0.0170 0 98314 0.0220 0.97824 0.0270 0.97330
.0021 ,99790 .0071 .99293 ,0121 ,98797 .0171 .98305 ,0221 .97814 .0271 .97326
.0022 .99780 .0072 .99283 ,0122 ,98787 .0172 .98295 .0222 .97804 .0272 .97317
.0023 .99770 .0073 ,99273 ,0123 .98777 .0173 .98285 .0223 .97795 .0273 .97507 I
.(X)24 .99760 .0074 .99263 ,0124 .98767 .0174 .98275 .0224 .97785 ,0274 .97297
i 0.0025 0.99750 0.0075 0,99253 0.0125 0.9_;757 0.0175 0.98265 0.0225 0.97775 0.0275 0.97287 ,_
.0026 .99740 ,(X_/6 .99243 ,0126 .98747 .0176 .98255 .0226 .97765 .0276 .97278
.0027 .99730 .0077 .99233 ,0127 .98738 ,0177 .98246 .0227 .97756 .0277 .97268
.0028 .99720 .0078 .99223 .0128 .98728 .0178 .98236 ,0228 .97746 ,0278 .97258 "
.0029 .99710 ,0079 .99213 ,0129 .98718 .0179 .98226 ,0229 .97736 ,0279 .97249
0.0030 0.99700 10,0080 0.99203 0,0130 0.98708 0.0180 0.98216 0.0230 0.97726 0,0280 0.97239
,0031 .99690 ,0081 .99193 ,0131 .98699 .0181 .98206 .0231 .97716 .0281 .97229
.0032 ,99681 .0082 .99183 ,0132 ,98689 .0182 .98196 ,0232 .97707 .0282 .97219
.0033 .99671 ,0083 .99173 ,0133 .98679 .0183 ,98187 .0233 .97697 ,0283 .97210
,0034 .99661 .0084 .99164 ,0134 .98669 .0184 .98177 .0234 ,97687 ,0284 ,97200
0.0035 0.99651 _0.0085 0.99154 0,0135 0.98659 0.0185 0.98167 0.0235 0.97677 0,0285 0.97190
.0036 .99641 .0086 ,99144 .0136 .98649 .0186 .98157 ,0236 ,97668 ,0286 .97181
.0037 .99631 ,0087 ,99134 .0137 .98639 ,0187 .98147 .0237 .97658 ,0287 .97171
! .0038 .99621 .0088 ,99124 ,0138 .98629 .0188 .98138 ,0238 .97648 ,0288 .97161t
.0039 .99611 .0089 .99114 ,0139 .9_620 .0189 .98128 .0239 .97638 ,0289 ,97151
[ 0,0040 0,99601 0.0090 0,99104 0,0140 0.98610 0,0190 0,98118 0.0240 0.97629 0,0290 0.97142
.(X)41 .99591 .0091 .99094 .0141 ,98600 .0191 ,98108 ,0241 ,97619 ,0291 .q7132
_- ,0042 .99581 ,0092 ,99084 .0142 ,98590 .0192 ,98098 .0242 .97609 .0292 .97122
.0043 .99571 ,0093 ,99074 .0143 ,98580 ,0193 .98089 .0243 .97599 .0293 .97113 !
I .0044 .99561 .0094 .99064 .0144 .98570 .0194 .98079 .0244 .97590 ,0294 ,97103
v
0,0045 0.99551 0,0095 0.99054 0.0145 0.98560 0,0195 0.98069 0.0245 0.97580 0,0295 0,97093
J .0046 .99541 .0096 ,99045 .0146 ,98551 .0196 .98059 ,0246 ,97570 .0296 .97083
! .0047 .99531 ,0097 .99035 .0147 .98541 ,0197 ,98049 .0247 .97560 .0297 .97074
! ,0048 .99521 .(3098 ,99025 ,0148 .98531 ,0198 .98039 .0248 ,97550 .0298 .97064
•97S41 .0299 .97054
.01,,0149. 8 21,01.900.0249
i.i
i
g,..?i
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JTABLI_A- I.--Continued.
- ! X • -x X e -X x • -x X e-" J_ e -x x • -Jr -,:
i "i 0.0300 0.97045 0,0350 0.%561 0.0400 0.96079 0.0450 0.95600 0.0500 0.95123 0.0550 0.94649 !;".
.0301 .97035 .0351 .%551 .0401 .96069 .'51 .95590 .0501 .95113 .0551 .94639 :_:!"
•_' _ .0302 .97025 .0352 .%541 .0402 .%060 .0452 .95581 .0502 .951" .0552 .94630 __ _:.
... .0303 .97015 .0353 .%531 .0403 .96050 .'53 .95571 .0503 .95094 .0553 .94620 [i._
' .0304 .97006 .0354 .%522 .0404 .96041 .0454 .95562 .0504 .95085 .0554 .9461! i
0.0305 0.96996 0.0355 0.%512 0.0405 0.%031 0.0455 0.95552 0.505 0.95075 0.0555 0.94601 '_'_
.0306 .96986 .0356 .%503 .0406 .96021 .0456 .95542 .0506 .95066 .0556 ..592
i .0307 .%977 .0357 .96493 ..07 .%012 .0457 .95533 .0507 .95056 .0'357 ..582
.0308 .%967 •0358 ,96483 .0408 .96002 .0458 .95523 .0508 .95047 .0558 ..573
.0309 .%957 .0359 .96474 .0409 .95993 .0459 .95514 .0509 .95037 .0559 .94563
' 0.0310 0.96948 0.0360 0.96464 0.0410 0.95983 0.0460 0.95504 0.0510 0.95028 0.0560 0.94554
.0311 .%938 .0361 .%454 .0411 .95973 ..61 .95495 .0511 .95018 .0561 ..544
.0312 .96928 .0562 .96445 .0412 .95964 .0462 .95485 ,0512 .95009 .0562 ..535 _i'
.0313 .96918 .0363 ,96435 _.0413 .95954 .0463 .95476 .0513 ,.999 .0563 ..526 _
.0314 .96909 .0364 .96425 .0414 .95.5 .0464 .95466 .0514 ..990 .0564 ,.516
-~ t
•i 0.0315 0.96899 0.0365 0.96416 0..1_ 0.95935 0.0465 0.95456 0.0515 0.94980 0.0565 0.94507
.0316 .96889 .0366 .%406 .0416 ,95925 .0466 .95447 .0516 ..971 .0566 ..488 "'_
,0317 .%879 .0367 .%397 .0417 .'916 .0467 .95437 .0517 ..%1 .0567 .94488 _:.0318 . 870 .0368 . 387 .0418 .95906 .0468 .95428 ,0518 ..952 .0568 .94478
.0319 .%860 .0569 .%377 .0419 .95897 .0469 .95418 .0519 ..942 .0569 .94469 _:_
i 0.0320 0.%851 0.0370 0.%368 0..20 0.95887 0..70 0,95409 0.0520 0..933 0.0570 0.94450
i .0321 .%841 .0371 .%358 ,.21 .95877 .0471 .95399 .0521 ..923 .0571 .94450 _i/_
; _ .0322 .%831 .0372 .%348 ..22 .95868 ..72 .95390 .0522 ..914 .0572 .94441 I :'i
l .0323 .96822 .0373 .%339 ..23 .95858 ..73 .95380 .0523 ..9. .0573 .94431
.0324 .%812 .0374 .%329 ..24 .95849 .0474 ,95371 .0524 ..895 .0574 .94422 i:&,_
0.0325 0.96802 0.0375 0.%319 0..25 0.95839 0..75 0.95361 0.0525 0..885 0.0575 0.94412
,0326 .%793 .0376 .%310 ..26 .95829 ..76 .95352 .0526 ..876 .0576 .94403. ._27 8 7 0 0427 0 0477 4 • 7 6 7 .393
.0328 .%773 .0378 .%291 .0428 .95810 .0478 .95332 .0528 ..857 .0578 .943_4
[ .0329 .%764 .0379 .%281 .0429 .95801 .C..79 .95323 .0529 ..847 .0579 ..374
!
I 0.0330 0.%754 0.0380 0.%271 0..30 0,95791 0.0480 0.95313 0.0530 0..838 0.0580 0..365
.0331 .%744 .0381 .%262 ..31 ..782 ..81 .95304 .0531 ,.829 .0581 ..356
,0332 ,%735 .0382 .%252 .0432 .95772 ..82 .952. .0532 ..819 .0582 ..346
.0333 .%725 .0383 .%242 .0433 .95762 ..83 .95285 .0533 ..810 .0583 ,.337
.03_ .96715 .0384 .%233 .0434 95753 ..84 .95275 .0534 ..800 ,0584 ..327t
I !0.0335 0.%705 0.0385 0.%223 0..35 0.95743 0.0485 0.95266 0,0535 0.94791 0.0585 0..318
I ,0336 .96696 ,0386 .96214 ..36 ,95734 .0486 ,95256 .0536 ..781 .0586 ..308
,0337 .96686 .0387 .%204 .0437 ,95724 .0487 .95247 .0537 ..772 .0587 ..299
.0338 ,%676 .0388 .%1. .0438 ,95715 .0488 .95237 ,0538 ..762 .0588 ,.289
I .0339 .96667 .0389 .%185 ..39 .95705 .0489 ,95228 .0539 ..753 .0589 ..2800. 40 0. 5 0. 90 0. !75 0..40 0. 69 0. 90 0. 1 0, 40 0.. 4 0, 90 0.. 71 ii
.0341 .96647 .0391 .%165 ..41 .9_686 ,0491 95209 .0541 94734 .0591 ..261
•0342 .96638 .0392 .96156 .0442 .95676 ..92 .95199 .0542 ..724 .0592 ,.252 i !_
.0343 .96628 .0393 .%!46 ,0443 .95667 .0493 .95190 .0543 ..715 ,0593 ..242
.0344 .96618 .03. ,96137 .0444 .95657 ..94 .95180 ,0544 .94705 .05. ..233
0.0345 0,96609 0,0395 0.%127 0.0445 0.95648 0,0495 0.95171 0.0545 0.94696 0.0595 0..224
.0346 ,%599 .0396 .%i17 .0446 .95638 .04% ,95161 .0546 ,94686 .05% ..214
,0347 .%590 ,0397 .96108 .0447 .95628 .0497 .95151 ,0547 .94677 .0597 ..205
.0348 .96580 .0398 .96098 .0448 ,95619 .0498 .95142 ,0548 .94667 .0598 ..195
,0349 .96570 .0399 .96089 .0449 .95609 ..99 ,95132 .0549 ..658 .0599 ..186
143
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_ TABLE A- I.--Continued.
._ e -x x • -_ x • -x X • -Jr x e -_ x • -x _"
_i ).0600 0.94176 k0650 0.93707 1.0700 D.93239 .0750 _.92774 ).0800 D.92312 .0850 0.9185| -_-_-
" .0601 i .94167 .0651 .93697 .0701 .93230 .0751 .92765 .0801 .92302 .0851 .91842 '"'
• t , *_
_; .0602 ! .94158 .0652 .93688 .0702 .93221 .0752 .92756 .0802 .92293 .0852 .91833 _ ,
_ .0603 .94148 .0563 .93679 .0703 .93211 .0753 .92747 .0803 .92284 .0853 .91824
i_ ! .0604 .94139 .0654 .93669 .0704 .93202 .0754 .92737 .0804 .92275 .0854 .91814 !. '_
.! D.0605 0.94129 ).0655 0.93660 ).0705 0.93193 _.0755 &92728 D.0805 0.92265 b.O_$ 0.9180_ i
.0606 .94120 .0656 .93651 .0706 .93183 .0756 .92719 .0806 .92256 .0_6 .91796
.0607 .941 i! .0657 .93641 .0707 .93174 .0757 .92709 .0807 .92247 .0857 .91787 ,i i
.0608 .941Ci .0658 .93632 .0708 .93165 .0758 .92700 0808 .92238 .0_8 .91775 _ '?_;
.0609 .94092 .0659 .93622 .0709 .93156 .0759 .92691 .0809 .92229 .0859 .91769
, 0.0610 0.94082 ).0660 0.93613 }.0710 0.93146 k0760 0.92682 0.0810 0.92219 P.0860 0.91759 '. ,
.0611 .94073 .0861 .93604 .0711 .93137 .0761 .92672 .0811 .922 I0 .0861 .91750 i' ii
• .0812 ,94064 .0662 .93594 .0712 .93128 .0762 .92663 .0812 .92201 .0_, .91741 _
.0613 .94054 .0663 .93_85 .0713 .93118 .0763 .92654 .0813 .92191 .0863 .91732 ,i_|
.0614 .94045 .0664 .93576 .9714 .93109 .0764 .92645 .0814 .92182 .0_4 .91723 ,_
_i 0.0615 0.94035 D.0665 0.93566 ).0715 0.93100 ).0765 0.92635 0.0815 0.92173 ).0865 0.91714 _ i
[, .0618 .94007 .0668 .93538 .0718 .93072 .0768 .92608 .0818 .92146 .0808 .91686 !i .0819 .93998 .0669 .93529 .0719 .93062 .0769 .92998 .0819 .92136 ,0869 .91677 I
0.0620i 0.93988 0.0670 0.93520 D.0720 0.93053 ).0770 0.92589 0.0820 0.92127 ).0870 0.91668 _
.0821 .93979 .0671 .93510 .0721 .93044 .07"/1 .92580 .0821 .92118 .0871
.0622 .93969 .0672 .93501 .0722 .93034 .0772 .92570 .0822 .92109 .0872 .91649 _ _iI
i .0623 .93960 .0673 .93491 .0723 .9302_ .0T73 .92561 .0823 .92100 .0f73 .91640
• i .0624 .9393! .0674 .93482 .0724 .93016 .0774 .92552 .0824 .92090 .0874 .91631 _ .
i 0.0825 0.93941 0.0675 0.93473 D0725 0.93007 D.0775 0.92543 0.0825 0.92081 I}.0875 0.91622 i
! .0626 .93932 .0676 .93463 .0726 .92997 .0776 .92533 .0826 .92072 .0876 .91613
" .0627 .93923 .0677 .93454 .0727 .92988 .0777 .92524 .0827 .92063 .0877 .91604 _ _
.0628 .93913 .0678 .93445 .0728 .92979 .0778 .92515 .0828 .92054 .0878 .91594
.0629 .93904 .0679 .93435 .0729 .92969 .0779 .92506 .0829 .92044 .0879 .91585
0.0650 0.93894 0.0080 0.93425 0.0730 0.92960 0.0780 0,92496 0.0830 0.92035 0.0880 0.91576
.0651 .93885 .0081 .93417 .0731 .92951 .0781 .92487 .0831 .92026 .0881 .91567
.0632 .93876 .0682 .93407 .0732 .92941 .0782 .92478 .0832 .92019 .0882 .91558 i
.0633 .93866 .0683 .93398 .0733 .92932 .0783 .92469 .0833 .92008 .0883 .91549
.0834 .93857 .0684 .93389 .0734 .92923 .0784 .92459 .0834 .91998 .0884 .91539 _r
0.0635 0.93847 0.0685 0.93379 0.0735 0.92914 0.078,q 0.92450 0.0835 0.91989 0.088_ 0.91530
, .0656 .93838 .0686 .9337_ .0736 .92904 .078_ .92441 .0836 .91980 .08M .91521
.0637 .93829 .0887 .93361 .0737 .92893 .078_ .92432 .0837 .91971 .088./ .91512 i
, .0638 .93819 .0688 .93351 .0738 .92886 .078_ .92422 .0838 .91962 .0888 .91503 _,
.0639 .93810 .06S9 .93342 .0739 .92876 .078_ .92413 .0839 .91932 .088_ .91494
I
i 0.0640 0.93800 0.069_ 0.9333_ 0.0740 0.9286"/ 0.079¢ 0.92404 0.0840 0.91943 0.089¢ 0.91485 ,
_, I ,0641 .93791 .0691 .93322 .0741 .92858 .0791 .9239-_ .0841 .91934 .0891 .91475
_ .0642 .93782 .0692 .9331_ .0742 .9284_ .079_ .9238_ .0842 .9192_ .089_ .91465 _ _
.0643 .93772 .0693 .9330! .0743 .9283g .0792 .9237_ ,0843 .9191_ .089._ .91457 "
.0644 .93763 .0694 .9379._ .0744 .9283C .079_ .9236"J .0844 .9190e .089_ .9144_
0.0645 0.93754 0.069J 0.932_ 0.07_ 0.92921 0.079._ 0.9235! 0.08_$ 0.9189"] 0.089! 0.91439 i
.0640 .9374_ .069¢ .932T, .07_ .92811 .079_ .9234_ .08_ .91881 ,089_ J .9143_
.06_7 .9373_ .069"_ .9326_ .074./ .9280_ .079_ .9233_ .084./ ,9187_ ,089_ I .91421 :
.(}648 .9372_ .069| .93251 .074_ .9279_ .0791 .9233( .01148 .9187( .0891 '. .91411 !
:,/ .0649 I ,9371e .Of_ .9324_ .074_ .927&1 ,079_ [ .92321, .084_ .9186_ .OIEEi, .9140_
1992023212-148
TABLE A-l.--Continued.
X t -x X e-x !I x G -x X G -x X G -x 0_ G -x
0.09G0 0.91393 0.0950 0.90937 O.l_O 0.90484 0.1050 0.90032 0.II00 0.89583 0.1150 0.89137
.0901 .913M .0951 .90928 .1O01 .90475 .1051 .90023 .1101 .89574 .I151 .89128
.0902 .91375 ,0952 .90919! ,1002 .90466 ,1052 .90014 .1102 .89_5 .1152 ,89119
.0903 .91366 .0953 .909101 .1003 .90457 .1053 .gO005 .1103 .89557 .1153 .89110
.0904 .91357 .0954 .90901 .1004 .90448 .1054 .89996 .1004 .89548 .1154 .89101 i "
0.0905 0.91347 0.0955 0.90892 0.1005 0.90439 0.1055 0.89987 0.1105 0.89539 0,1155 0.89092 t
.0906 .91338 .0956 .90883 .1006 .90429 .1056 .89978 . 1106 .89530 .1156 .89083
.0907 .91329 .0957 .90874 1 .1007 .90420 .1057 .89969 .i107 ,89521 .1157 .89074
.0908 .91320 .0958 .90865 1 .1008 .90411 .1058 .89960 .1108 .89512 .1158 .89065
.0909 .91311 ,0959 .90855 _ .1009 .90402 .1059 .89951 .!109 .89503 .!159 .89056
0.0910 0.91302 0.0960 0.90846 _ 0.1010 0.90393 0.1060 0.89942 0.1110 0.89494 0.1160 0.89048
.0911 .91293 .0961 .90837 .1011 .90384 .1061 .89933 .!111 .89485 .1161 .89039
.0912 .91284 .0962 .908281 . 1012 .90375 . 1062 .89924 . i 112 .89476 . 1162 .89030
.. .0913 .91274 .0963 .90819 ..1013 .90366 .1063 .89915 .1113 .89467 .il63 .89021
.0914 .91265 .0964 .90810 .1014 .90357 .1064 .89906 .!114 .89458 .!i64 .89012
0.0915 0.912.56 0.0965 0.90801 0.1015 0.90348 0.1065 0.89898 0.1115 0.89449 0.1165 0.89003
,0916 .91247 .0966 .90792 ! .!016 .90339 .1066 .89889 .!116 ,89440 .1166 .88994
.0917 .91238 .0967 .90783 .1017 .90330 .1067 ._9880 . i 117 ,89431 .1167 .88985
.0918 .91229 .0968 .90774 .!018 .90321 .i068 .89871 .1118 .b'9422 ,1168 .88976
- .0919 .9122C .0969 .90765 .1019 .90312 .1069 .89862 .1119 .89413 ,1169 .88967
0.0920 0.92111 0.0970 0.90756 0.1020 0.90303 0.1070 0.89853 0.1120 0.89404 0.1170 0.88959
.0921 .91201 .0971 .90747 .1021 .90294 ,1071 .89844 .1121 .89395 .1171 .88950
_ .0922 .91192 .0972 .90737 .1022 .90285 .1072 .89835 .1122 .89387 .1172 ,88941
.0923 .91183 .0973 .90728 .1023 .90276 .1073 .89826 . !123 .89378 •1173 .88932
.0924 .91174 .0974 .90719 .1024 .90267 .1074 .89817 .!124 .89369 .1174 .88923
0.0925 0.91165 0.0975 0.90710 0.1025 0.90258 0.1075 0.89808 0.1125 0.89360 0.1175 0.88914
.0926 .91156 .0976 .90701 .1026 .90249 .1076 .89799 . i 126 .89351 .1 i 76 ,88905
.0927 .91147 .0977 .90692 .1027 .90240 .1077 .89790 .1127 .89342 . i 177 .88896
.0928 .91138 .0978 .90683 .1028 .90231 .1078 .89781 .1128 .89333 ,1178 .88887
.0929 .91128 .0979 .90674 . 1029 .90222 . 1079 .89772 . 1129 .89324 •1179 .88878
0.0930 0.91119 0.0980 0.90665 0.1030 0.90213 0.1080 0.89763 0.1130 0.89315 0.1180 0.88870
,0931 .91110 .0981 .90656 .1031 .90204 .1081 .89754 .1131 .89306 .!181 .88861
•0932 .91 I01 .0982 .90647 •1032 .90195 . 1082 .89745 . 1132 .89297 •1182 .88852
.0933 .9109. ,0983 .90638 •1033 .90186 •1083 .89736 •1133 .89288 •1183 .88843
.0934 .91083 .0984 .90629 •1034 .90177 .1084 ,89727 •! 134 .89279 •1184 .88834
0.0935 0.91074 0.0985 0.90620 0.1035 0.90168 0.1085 0.89718 0.1135 0.89270 0,1185 0.88825
•0936 .91065 .0986 .90611 .1036 .90159 .1086 .89709 .1136 .89251 ,ii86 .88816
.0937 .91056 .0987 ,90601 •1037 .90150 . 1087 .89700 . i 137 .89253 •! 187 .88807
•0938 .91046 .0988 .90592 •1038 .90141 •1088 .89691 . ! 138 .89244 •i 188 .88799
.0939 .91037 .0q89 .90583 .1039 .90132 •1089 .89682 . ! 139 .89235 •! 189 .88790
0.0940 0.91028 0,0990 0.90574 0.1040 0.90123 0.1090 0.89673 0.1140 0.8_26 0.1190 0.98781
, .0941 .91019 .0991 .90565 .1041 ,90114 .!091 ,89664 .1141 .89217 ,1191 .88772
.0942 .91010 .0992 .90556 •1042 .90105 .1092 .89655 •! 142 .89208 . ! 192 .88763
l i .0943 .91001 .0993 ,90547 .1043 .90095 /.1093 ,896445 .1143 .89199 .1193 .88754
i i .0944 ,90992 .0994 .90538 •1044 ,90086 [ .1094 .896._7 •I Z44 .89190 •i 194 .88745
P"-":T 0.094.5 0.90983 0.0995 0.90529 0.104,5 0.90077 _3.1095 0.8q628 0.1145 0.89181 0.1195 0.88736
.0946 .90974 .0996 .90,520 .1046 .90068 .1096 ,89619 •1146 .89172 .1196 .88728
.0947 .90965 .0997 ,90501 ,1047 .9(X)59 .1097 .89610 ,1147 .89163 ,1197 .88719
_" .0948 .90955 .0998 ,90502 .1048 .90050 .1098 ,89(501 .1148 .89154 .1198 .887 I0
,0949 .90946 .0999 .90493 1049 .90041 1099 .8959"_ i 149 .89146 1199 .88701
I e I R
145
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TABLE A- l.--Contk)ued.
l
X e'-x x r- x X _,-x .¥ e -x X ,F-x x e- %'111B
0•1200 0.88692 0.1250 0.88250 0.1300 0.87810 0.1350 0,87372 0.1400 0.86936 0•1450 0.85502
.1201 .88683 .1251 ,88241 •1"_:1 •87801 .1351 •87363 .1401 ,86927 •1451 ,86494
.1202 .88674 •1252 .88232 .1302 .87792 ,1352 ,87354 .1402 ,86918 .1452 .86485
.1203 .88665 .1253 .88223 .1303 .87783 1353 .87345 ,1403 .86910 .1453 .86476
;, .1204 ,88657 .1254 .88214 .1304 .87774 .1354 ,87337 .1404 .86901 .1454 •86468
!' 0.1205 0.88648 0.1255 0.88206 0•1305 0.87766 0.1355 0 87128 0.1405 0.85892 0.1455 0.86459 I
i_ , 1206 .88639 . 1256 .88197 . 1306 .87757 . 1356 .87319 .1405 .86884 . 1456 .86450 t
! ,1207 .88630 .1257 •88188 .1307 .87748 .1357 .87310 .1407 .86875 .1457 .86442 !
. . 1208 .88621 . 125S •88179 . 1308 .87739 . 1358 •87302 .1408 •86866 . 1458 .86433 :
. 1209 .88612 . 1259 .88170 .1309 .87731 . 1359 .87283 .1409 .86858 . 1459 .86424 _
0.1210 0.88603 ).1260 0.88161 0.1310 0.87722 0.1360 0.87284 0.1,410 0.86849 0.1460 0.86416
_ .1211 .88595 .1261 •88153 .1311 .87713 .1361 .87276 .1411 .86840 .1461 •86407
: •1212 ,88586 .1262 ,88144 .1312 .87704 .1362 .87267 .1412 .86832 .1462 •86398
.1213 .88577 .1263 .88135 ,1313 •87695 ,1363 .87258 •1413 .86823 .1463 .86390
.1214 .88568 .L264 .88126 .1314 •87687 ,1364 .87249 ,1414 ,85814 .1464 •86381
r 0,1215 0.88559 0.1265 0.88117 i0.1315 0.87678 0.I365 0.87241 0.1415 0.86806 0.1455 0.86373
•1216 .88550 .1266 ,88109 .1316 87669 ,1356 •87232 •1416 .86797 .1466 .86364
.1217 .88541 .1267 ,88100 .1317 ,87660 .1367 .87223 .1417 .85788 .1457 •85355
k .1218 .88533 .1268 .88091 .1318 .87652 .1368 .87214 .1418 •85779 .1468 • 86347
.1219 .88*]24 .1269 .88082 .1319 .87643 .1369 .87206 .1419 .85771 .1469 .86338
0.1220 0.88515 0.1270 0.88(]65 0.1320 0.87634 0.1370 0.871971 0.1420 0.86762 0.1470 0.86329
.1221 •88506 .1271 ,1321 .87625 .1371 •87188 .1421 ,86753 .1471 ._,6321 _
.1222 .88497 .1272 .88056 .1322 ,87617 .1372 .87180 .1422 .86745 .1472 .86312
.1223 .88488 .1273 .88047 .1323 .8760_' ,1373 ,87171 ,1423 .86736 .1473 .86304
•1224 .88479 •1274 .88038 .1324 .87599 .1374 ,87162 .1424 .86727 .1474 .86295
0.1225 0,88471 0.1275 0.88029 0.1325 0.875_0 0,1375 0.87153 0•1425 0.86719 0.1475 0.86286
_. .1226 .88462 •!276 .88021 .1326 .87582 •1376 ,87145 .1426 •86710 .1476 .86278
,1227 .88453 •1277 •88012 .1327 .87573 .1377 ,87136 .1427 •86701 .1477 .86269
•1228 .88444 .1728 ,88003 .1328 .8'7564 .1378 .87127 .1428 .85693 ,1478 .8_260 ,
.1229 .88435 .1279 .879'_,;4 .1329 ,87555 ,1379 .87119 .1429 .85684 .1479 .86252
0.1230 0.88426 0.1280 0.87985 0.1330 0.87547 0.1380 0.87110 0.1430 0.85675 O.1480 0.85243
.1231 .88418 .1281 .87977 •1331 .87538 1381 .87101 .1431 ,85667 ,1481 .86234
.1232 .88409 .1282 .87968 ,1332 .87529 •1382 ,87092 .1432 ,85658 .1482 .86226
,1233 .88400 .1283 •87959 .1333 .87520 .1383 .87084 .1433 .85649 .1483 ,86217
•1234 •88391 .1284 ,87950 .1334 .87511 ,1384 •87075 .1434 .85641 .1484 .86209
0•i235 0.88382 0.1285 0.87941 0.1335 0.87503 0.1385 0.87056 0•i435 0.86532 0.1485 0.86200
.1236 ,88373 ,1286 ,87933 .1336 .87494 •1386 •87058 .1436 ,8_23 .1486 .85191
•1237 .88364 .1287 .8"/q24 ,1337 ,87485 .1387 ,87049 .1437 •b6615 .1487 .85183
,1238 ,88356 .1288 .87915 .1338 .87477 ,1388 .87040 .1438 ,86606 ,1488 .86174
,1339 •1389 •87031 .1439 .85597 ,1489 .85156•1239 ,88347 .1289 87906 .87468
0.1240 0.88338 0.1290 0.87897 0.1340 0.87459 0,1._90 0.87023 0.1440 0.86589 0.1490 0.86157
,1241 ,88329 .1291 .87889 .1341 .87450 .1391 .87014 ,1441 .86530 .1491 .85_48
,1242 .88320 .1292 ,87880 .1342 ,87442 .1392 .87005 .1442 .86571 ,1492 ,86140
,1243 .88311 .1293 .87871 ,1343 .87433 .1393 ,86997 .1443 ,86563 .1493 ,86131 _
ql, .1244 ,88303 .1294 ,878_2 .1344 .87424 ,13._4 .85988 .1444 .8_54 .1494 .86122 _
'4
."_:': 0.1245 0,88294 0.1295 0.87853 0 1345 0•87415 0.1395 0.85979 0.1445 0,85545 0•1495 0.85114
.1246 ,88285 .1296 .87845 .1346 ,87407 .1396 ,86971 .1446 ,86537 .1496 .8610A
.1247 .88275 i ,1297 .8"/836 ,1347 ,87398 ,1397 ,85962 .1447 .86528 .149"/ .8f_97
,.., .1248 ,88257 .1298 .87827 ,1348 .87389 .1398 .85953 .1448 •85520 ,1498 .85088 _'i
.1249 .88255 .1299 .8"7818 .1t49 ,87380 .1399 ,85945 .1449 .85511 .1499 .8e079
|
.... ........ ...... .............................................
iP" IP"
TABLE A-I .-Comir_led.
X tt-J X t_--_ .If C -_ X ', t '-J X e
0.1500 0.86071 0.1550 0.85642 0.1600 0.85214 0.1650 [ 0.g4789 0, 0.175( 0.83946 : "_i
.1501 .860'J2 .1551 •85633 .1601 .85206 .1651 .84781 .1701 I .84358 .1751 .83937 ]
.1502 86054 .1552 .85624 .1602 •85197 .1652 •84772 .1702 I •84350 .175_ .83929
.1503 .86045 .1553 .85616 .1603 .85189 .165_ •_,$764 .1703 J .84341 .175_ .83921
.1504 •86036 .1554 •85607 .1604 .85180 .1654 .84755 .1704 .84333 .1754 .83912
0.1505 0•86028 0.1555 0.85599 0•1('05 0.85172 0.1655 0.84747 01705 0•8432_ 0.175_ 0.83904
.1506 86019 .1556 .85590 .1606 •85163 •i656 .84739 .1706 .84316 .17_ ,838q'5 ,
:_ .1507 .86010 •1557 •85582 .160'7 .85155 .1657 .84730 .1707 .84307 .175'7 _83887 - i
.1508 .86002 .1558 •85573 •1608 •85146 .1658 .84722 .1708 •842_,'9 .175J .83879
•1509 .85993 .1559 •85564 .1609 .85138 .1659 .84713 .1709 .84296 .1758 .83870
0.1510 0.85985 0.1560 0.85556 0.1610 0.85129 0.1_0 0.84705 0.1710 0•84282 0.176(3 0.83862
•1511 •85976 .1561 .85347 •|611 •85121 .1661 .84696 .1711 .84274 .1761 .83853
•1512 .85968 .1562 •85539 •1612 .85112 .1662 •84688 .1712 .&4265 .1762 •8384'_
.1513 •85959 .1563 .85530 •!613 .85104 •1663 84679 .1713 8425! .1763 .838'_,? i
.1514 .85950 .1564 •85522 .1614 .85095 .1664 .84671 .1714 .84248 .1764 .83828 iI
i- 0.1515 0.85942 0.1565 0.85513 0.1615 0.85087 0.1665 0.84662 0.1715 0.84240 0.1765 0.83820
.1516 .8593., .1566 .85505 .1616 .85078 .1666 .84654 .1716 ,84231 .1766 .8381 !
•1517 .85925 .1567 .85496 .1617 .85070 .1667 .84645 .1717 ,84223 .1767 .83803
.1518 •85916 •1568 .85488 .1618 .85061 .1668 .84637 .1718 •84.215 .1768 .83795 i
.1519 .85907 .156_ .85479 .1619 .85053 .1669 .84628 .171o .84706 .1769 •83786
0.1520 0.85899 0.1570 0.85470 0•1620 0.85044 0.1670 0.84620 0.1720 0•84198 0.1770 0.83778
,1521 .85890 .1571 .85462 .1621 .85036 •1671 .84611 .172| .84189 •1771 •83770
: •1522 .85882 . 1572 •854.53 . 1622 .85027 . 1672 •84603 •1722 .84181 •1772 .83761
•1523 .85873 . 1573 .85445 •1623 .85019 . 1673 .84595 . 1723 •84173 . 1773 •83753
. 1524 •85864 . 1574 .85436 . 1624 .85010 •1674 .84586 •1724 .84164 . 1774 •83744
0.1525 0.85856 0.1575 0.85428 0•1625 0.85002 0.1675 0.84578 I).1725 0.84156 0.1775 0.83736
• 1_26 .85847 •1576 .85412 .1626 .84993 .1676 .845qJ9 .1726 .84147 •1776 .83728
.1527 •85839 .1577 .85411 •1627 •84985 .1677 .84561 .1727 .84139 •1777 .83719
,1528 .85830 .1578 .85402 .1628 .84976 .1678 84552 .1728 •8413 ! .1778 .8371 !
.1529 .85822 .1579 .85394 .1629 .84968 .1679 .84544 .1729 .84122 .1779 •83703
L).1530 0._5813 0.1580 0.85385 0.1630 0.84959 D.1680 0.84535 C).1730 0.84114 0.177. 0.83694
•1531 .85804 .1581 .85376 .1631 .84951 •i681 .84527 .1731 ,84105 .1781 .83686
.1532 .85796 •1582 .85368 .1632 .84942 ,1682 .84518 •1732 •84097 .1782 .83678 i
.1533 .85787 .1583 .85359 .1633 .849M .1683 .84510 .1733 .84089 .1783 .83669!
.1534 .85779 .1584 .85351 .1634 .84925 .1684 .84502 .1734 •84080. .1784 .83661 I
). 1535 0.85770 O.1585 &85342 i O.1635 0.84917 _).1685 0.84493 ). 1735 0.84072 0.1785 0•8,';652 I
.1536 .85761 .1586 .85334 I .1636 .84908 .1686 .84485 .1736 .84063 •i786 .83644 I
.1537 •85753 .1587 .85325 I .1637 .84900 .1687 .84476 .1737 .84055 .1787 .83636 I
• 1538 .85744 .1588 .85317 I •1638 .84891 .1688 .84468 .1738 .84046 i .1788 .83627 I
,1539 .85736 .1589 .85308 ] .1639 .84883 .1689 .84459 .1739 .84038 .1789 .836191
).1540 0.85727 0.1590 3.85300 I 0.1640 0.84874 ).1690 0,84451 ).1740 0.84030 E).1790 0.83611 I
.1541 ,85719 ,1591 .85291 I .1641 .84866 ,1691 .84442 .1741 .84021 .1791 .83602 I
•1542 .83710 .1592 .8.5283 I . t642 .84857 .1692 .84434 .1742 .84013 .1792 .83594 I
i _ .1543 .85701 .1593 .85274 I .1643 .84849 .1693 ] .84426 .1743 .84004 .1793 .83586 I
. 4 . 693 . 4 . 66 ] .IMA . 0 . 4 . 17 . 4 . 3996 . 4 . 77 I
! ).1545 0.85684 D.1595 1.85257 [ 0.1645 I 0.84832 1.1695 0.84409 1,1745 0,q3988 1.1795 &835691
, _, .1546 .85676 .1596 ._248 I ._,_"6 ] .84823 .1696 .86400 [ .1746 .83979 .1796 .835601
._ .1547 .85667 . I_Y/ .85240 I .1647 84815 .1697 .84392 .1747 .83971 .1797
_2 I
.IJ48 .8S659 .1598 ,8523t I .1648 .84806 .1698 .84383 ,1748 .83962 .1798 .83_44_
! .I.549 .IL56_ .1599 i .1649 .84798 .1699 ._._'75 .1749 .83954 .1799 .83535 I
t,
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_- TABLE A- ! •--Concl_led.
X t-" X C -x ,g £-x X f"_
? 0.1800 0.83527 0•!850 0.83110 0.1900 0.82696 0.1950 0.82283 ."
.1801 .83519 .18_! .83102 .1901 .82688 .1951 .82275
_" " •1802 .83510 .1852 .83094 .1902 .82679 .1952 .82267 _
. r .803 .83502 •1853 •83085 .1903 .82671 .1953 .82259 .•1804 .83494 .1854 .85077 .1904 .82f63 .1954 .82251
_' 0.1"50•8"50•18550.8--0.19050.826550•19550.82242 Ii i
il: .1806 .85477 .1856 .83061 .1906 .82646 .1956 .82234.1807 .85469 .1857 .83052 .1907 .82638 .1957 .82226
_ - .1808 .83460 .1858 .83f_ .1968 •82630 .1958 .82218 !_
I .1809 .83452 .1859 .83036 .1909 .82622 .1959 .822090.1810 0.83444 0.1860 0.83027 0.1910 0.82613 0.1960 0.82201
.1811 .834.35 .1861 .83019 .1911 •82605 .1961 .82193 L
.1812 .83427 .1862 .83017 .1912 .82597 .1962 .82185
_ .1813 .83419 .1863 .83002 .1913 .82588 .1963 .82177
I
x
.1814 .85410 .1864 .82994 '_914 .82.q80 .1964 .82168 i
_ - 0.181.5 0.83402 0.1865 0.82986 (}.i915 0.82572 0.1965 0.82160
.1816 .83393 .1866 .87.978 .1916 .82564 .1966 .82152
.... 1817 .83385 .1867 .82969 .1917 .87.555 _1967 .82144
.1818 .833T7 .1868 .82961 .1918 .82547 .1968 .82135
.1819 .83368 .1869 .8'2953 .1919 •82539 .1969 .82127
0.1820 0.83360 0.1870 0.82944 0_!920 0.82531 0.1970 0.82119 i
.1821 .83352 .1871 .82936 .1921 .82522 .1971 .82111
.1822 .8354_ .1872 .82928 .1922 .82514 .1972 .82103
:. .1823 .83335 .1873 .82919 .1923 .82506 .1973 .82094
.1824 .83327 .1874 .82911 .1924 .82498 .1974 .82086
0.1825 0.83318 0.i875 0.82903 0.1925 0.82489 0.1975 0.82078
.1826 .83310 .1876 .82895 .1926 .82481 •i976 .82070
•1827 .83302 .1877 : .82886 .1927 .82473 .1977 .82062
•1828 .83293 .1878 I .82878 .1928 .82465 .1978 .82C53
.1829 .83285 .1879 .82870 .1929 .82456 .1979 .82045
0.1830 0.83277 0.1880 0.82861 0.1930 0.82448 0.1980 0.82037
.1831 .83268 .1881 .82853 .1931 .82440 .1981 .82029
•1832 .83260 .1882 .82845 .1932 •82432 .1982 .8202 I
.1833 .83252 .1883 .82837 .1933 ._2423 .1983 .82012
.1834 .83244 .1884 .82828 .1934 .82,; 15 .1984 .82004
0.1835 0.83235 0.1885 0._,2820 0.1935 0.82407 0.1985 0.$1996 , •
.1836 .83227 .188_ . 82812 .1936 .823_ .1986 .81988
.1837 .83219 .1887 .82803 .1937 .83391 .1987 .81980
.1838 •83210 .1888 .82795 .1938 .82382 .1988 .81971
.1839 .83202 .1889 .82787 .!939 .82374 .1989 .81963
0.1840 0.83194 0.1890 0.82779 0.1940 0.82366 0.1990 0.81955
.1841 .83185 .1891 .82770 .1941 .82358 .1991 .81947
.1842 .83177 .1892 .82762 .!942 .82349 .1992 .81939
.1843 .83169 .1893 .82754 .1943 .82541 .1993 .81930 i
.1844 .83160 .1894 .82746 .1944 .82333 .1994 .81922
t 0.1845 0.83152 0.1895 0.82737 0.1945 0.82325 0.1993 0.81914 _'
.1846 .83144 .1896 .82729 .1946 .82316 .1996 .81906
_ .;847 .83135 .1897 .82721 .1947 .82308 .1997 .81898 i
.1848 .83127 .1898 .82712 .1948 .82300 .1998 .81889
.1849 .83119 .1899 .82704 .1949 .82392 ,i999 .81881 i
t
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4i • "_ TABLE A-3.--Cominued. i: "(b) Sample sizes13 to 20 t
i Safe_/ Probability, Sample size, N _ :._
margin. Px ._.....
SH 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2O _ !
-$.0 0 -3.3027 -3.3485 -3.3903 -3.4297 -3.4642 -3.4972 -3.5280 -3.5567-4. -2.6 69 -2.6 47 -2.6792 -2.7109 -2.740! -2.76 3 -2.7927 -2.81 3
-3.0 .0013 - 1.8997 - ! .9299 - 1.9573 - 1.9826 -2.003, -2.0275 -2.0477 -2.0666 _
-2.0 .0227 -I.1628 -I.1866 -I.2083 -I.2281 -1.24_t -i.2633 -i.2791 -I.2937 *
_, " - 1.0 .1586 - .341 i - .5628 -.3823 - .40(X) - .4162 - .4309 - .4445 -.4b'7 i I -
0 .5000 .7424 .7074 .6770 .6503 .6265 .6049 .5854 .5677 f i
•1 .$398 .9733 .8357 .8031 7745 .7491 .7260 .7052 .6863 -z
•2 .5792 1.0(_ .9679 .9328 .9022 .8751 .8503 .8281 .8079 , i:!_
': _- .3 .6179 1.1477 1.1039 !.0662 1.0332 i.0042 ,gTT7 .9540 .9325
.4 .6554 1.2905 1,2433 1.2_8 1.1675 i.1364 1.1081 1.0827 I.OY_
.S .6914 1.4369 1.3862 1.3428 i.3049 1.2717 1.2414 1.2143 1.1898
.6 .7257 I .$867 I .$324 1.4859 1.4434 ! .4099 1.3775 ! .348,q 1.3224 ._-_
_* .7 .7580 1.7393 !.6810 1.6312 1.5880 1.5500 1.$155 !.4846 1.4569 !_-_r._; .8 . 0 1 .8947 !.8324 i.7792 .7331 !.6926. .65 8 1.6230-- .5935
_ .9 .8159 2.0227 !.9862 1.9294 1.8803 1.8372 1.7981 1.7632 !.7319 ,_ ;i
1.0 .8413 2.2130 2.1422 2.0818 2.0295 1.9838 1.9423 !.9053 1,8721
I. I .8643 2.3752 2.3000 2.2359 2.1803 2.1320 2.0880 2.0489 2.0138
1.2 .8849 2.5393 2.4596 2.3917 2.3330 2.2817 2.2352 2.1939 2.1568
1.3 .9031 2.7050 2.67,08 2.5491 2.4871 2.4329 2.3839 2.3403 2.3012
1.4 .9192 2.8722 2.7833 2.7077 2.6424 2.5853 2.$337 2.4877 2.4466 ! "i
1.5 .9331 3.0408 2.9472 2.8675 2.7988 2.7388 2.6845 2.6362 2.5930
1.6 .9452 3.2106 3.1122 3.0285 2.9563 2.8932 2.8363 2.7856 2.7403 [
1.7 .9554 3.3815 3.2782 3.1905 3.1147 3.0486 2.9890 2.9360 2.8885
1,8 .9640 3.5534 3.4452 3.3533 3.2740 3.2049 3.1425 3.0870 3.03"/'4
1.9 .9712 3.7259 3.6129 3.$168 3.4340 3.3617 3.2966 3.2387 3.1870
2.0 .9772 3.8992 3.7812 3.6810 3.5946 3.5193 3.4513 3.3910 3.3370
2. I .9821 4.0732 3.9503 3.8459 3.7559 3.6774 3.6066 3.5438 3.4876
2.2 ,:,,oo_, 4.2479 4.1200 4.0113 3.9177 3.8360 3.7625 3.6972 3.6388 ]
2.3 .9892 4.4232 4.2902 4.1773 4.0800 3.9952 3.9188 3.8:510 3.7904
2.4 .9918 4.$990 4.4610 4.3438 4,2429 4.1548 4.0756 4.0052 3.9424
2.$ .9937 4.7753 4.6322 4.$107 4.4061 4.3149 4.2327 4. I $99 4.0947 '
2.6 .9953 4.9520 4.8038 4.6781 4.5697 4.4'753 4.3963 4.3149 4,2474 -.
2.7 .996,5 $. 1291 4.9759 4.8458 4.7337 4.6561 4.5482 4.4702 4.4005 i
2.8 .9974 $,3066 5.1482 $.0138 _4.8980 4.7971 4.7063 4.6258 4.5538
2.9 .9981 5.4843 5.3208 S. 1820 $.0635 4.9584 4.8647 4.7816 4.7073
3.0 .9986 5.6624 5.4937 5.3505 $.2273 5.1198 5.0232 4.9376 4.8610 _
3.1 .9990 5.8407 5.6668 $.5193 $.3922 5,2816 &!820 5.0938 5.0149 -'_i
3.2 .9993 6.0192 5.8402 5.6882 5.5575 5.4435 S.3411 5.2502 5 1690 ,.._
3.3 .9995 6.1981 6.0138 5.8575 5.7229 5.6056 5.5003 5.4069 5.3234
:4 .9996 6.3771 6.1876 6.0269 5.8885 5.7680 $.6597 5.5637 5.4779 [ *. ,_
,d, _.' .9997 6.5564 6.3617 6.1965 6.0544 5.9.t05 5.8193 5.7207 5.6325 _ :
3.6 .9998 6.7358 6.$3_9 6.3663 6.2204 6.0932 5.9790 5.8778 5.7873 _
3.7 .9998 6.9154 6.7103 6.5363 6.3865 6.2560 6.1389 6.0351 5.9423
I
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• . TABLE A-3.--Continued.
: (b) Concluded.
• i
:_ i Safely Probability, Samplesize, N
_- margin, p_
_ $t¢ 13 14 !.5 16 17 18 19 20
t
_ 3.8 0.9999 7.0952 6.8849 6.7064 6.5528 6.4190 6.2990 6.1925 6,0974
i 3.9 7.2752 7.0596 6.8767 6.7193 6.5822 6.4591 6.3501 6.2526
4.0 7.4553 7.2344 7.0471 6,8859 6.74.54 6.6194 6.5077 6.4079
Ii_:. _ 4.1 7.6356 7.4094 7,2176 7.0526 6.9088 6.7798 6.6655 6.5633
4.2 7.8159 7.5845 7,3883 7.2194 7.0723 6.9403 6.8234 6.7189
4.3 7.9964 7.7597 7.5590 7.3863 7.2359 7.1010 6.9814 6.8745
_--- _ 4.4 8.1771 7.9351 7.7299 7.5533 7.3995 7.2617 7.1394 7.0302
_ 4.5 8.3578 8.1105 7.9009 7.7204 7.5633 7.4225 7.2976 7.1860
' " i 4.6 8.5386 8.2861 8.0719 7.8877 7.72"2 7.5833 7.4558 7.3419
ix 47 8.71958.46178 31 8.05507.89117.74437.61417.,,78 II:......... 4.8 b, 8.9005 8.6374 8.4143 8.2223 8.0551 7.9053 7.7725 7.6538 "*
__ I 4.9 1.0000 9.0816 8.8132 8.5856 8.3898 8.2192 8.0664 7.9310 7.8099
'- _ 5.0 9.2628 8.9890 8.7570 8.5573 8.3834 8.2276 8,0895 7.9660 i, :---._
, 5.1 9.4440 9.1650 8.9284 8.7249 8.5476 8.3888 8.2480 8.1222 "' _il
_" _' 5.2 9.6253 9.3410 9.0999 8.8925 8.7119 8.5501 .8.4067 8.2785 :
• 5.3 9.8067 9.5170 9.2715 9.0602 8.8763 8.7114 8,5654 8.4348
: 5.4 9.9881 9.6932 9.4431 9.2280 9.0406 8.8728 8.7241 8.5912 __
t"i 10.1696 9.8694 9.6148 9.3958 9.2051 9.0843 8.8829 8.7476 "-
5.5
5.6 I 3512 10.0456 7865 5637 3696 1958 9 0417 9040
*' 5.7 10.5328 10.2219 9.9583 9.7316 9.5341 9.3573 9.2006 9.0605 ._
i 5.8 10.7145 10.3983 10.1302 9.8996 9.6987 9.5189 9.3595 9.2171
i 5.9 10.8962 10.5746 10.3020 10.0676 9.8634 9.6805 9.5184 9.3736
6.0 I1.0779 10,751! 10.4740 w.2356 10.0280 9.8422 9.6774 9.5302 "*
_ 6. I I!.2598 10.9276 10.6459 10.4037 i0.1928 10.0039 9,8365 9,6869
! 6.2 11,4416 11.1041 10.8179 10.5718 10.3575 10.1656 9.9955 9,8435
' 6.3 I1,6235 ! !.2806 10.9900 10,7400 10.5223 10,3274 !0.1546 10.0003
6.4 11.8054 11.4572 11.1621 10.9082 10.6871 10.4892 10.3138 10.1_70
6.5 11.9874 1!.6339 !!.3342 I1.0764 10.8520 10.6.5I0 10.4729 10.3138
6.6 12.1694 I1.8105 I i.5063 I i .2447 I1.0168 10,8129 10.6321 10.4706
6,7 12,3514 I1.9873 I1.6785 11,4130 ! I,1817 10.9748 10.7913 10.6274
6.8 12,5335 12.1640 I1.8507 ! 1.5813 ! i .3467 i I. 1367 10.9505 10.7842
6,9 12.7156 12.3407 12,0230 il.7496 11.$116 11.2986 11.1098 10.9411
7.0 12.8978 12,5175 12.1952 11,9180 I!.6766 i !,4606 I1,2691 I1.0980
7, I 12,0799 12,6944 12.3675 12.0864 I1.8416 ! 1,6226 !1.4284 I!.2549
7,2 13,2621 12.8712 12,5398 12.2548 12.0067 i 1.7846 ! !._877 I1,4119 _-
7.3 13.4443 13.0481 12.7122 12.4233 12.1717 11.9466 11,7471 11.5688 I ._
7.4 13.6266 13.2250 12,8846 12.5918 12.3368 12.1087 11,9065 I1,7253 _
7,$ 13,8088 13.4019 13,0569 12,7603 12.5019 12.2708 12.0859 I1.8823 ..
7,6 13.9911 13,5788 13,2294 12.9288 12,6671 12.4329 12.2253 12,0398
7.7 14,1734 13.7558 13,4018 13.0973 12,8322 12,5950 12.3847 12,1969
7,8 14.3558 13.9328 13.5742 13,2659 12.9974 12.7871 12.$442 12,3539 .
7.9 14,5381 14.1098 13,7467 13.4344 13,1626 12,9193 12,7036 12,SILO *i
i 8,0 14.7205 14,2868 13,9192 13.6030 13,3278 13.0814 12.8631 I 12,6681
J
i
1992023212-157
" •.............i ................................................V
,,if,
i
! : ' TABLE A-3.--Continued.
(c) Sample sizes 21 to 28
I
'2 Safety Probability. Sample size. N I : ,i._--
_" margin. P,
_ SM 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
-5.0 0 -3.5836 -3.6090 -3.6328 -3.6554 -3.6767 -3.6970 -3.7162 -3.7346 i
-4.0 0 "2.8385 -2.8594 -2.8790 -2.8976 -2.9152 -2.9318 -2.9477 -2.9628
-3.0 .0013 -2.0842 -2.1008 -2.1164 -2.1312 -2.1451 -2.1584 -2.1710 -2.1830
-2.0 .0227 - 1.3075 - 1.3204 - 1.3325 - 1.3439 - t .3548 - i.3650 - 1.3748 - 1.3840
-I.0 .1586 -.4688 -.4797 -.4900 -.4996 -.5087 -.5173 -.5254 -.5331
0 .5000 .5514 .5366 .5228 .5101 .4982 .4872 .4769 .4671
•I .5398 .6691 .6533 .6387 .6253 .6128 .6011 .5902 5800
•2 .5792 .7896 .7728 .7574 .7432 .7299 .7176 .7061 .6953
•3 .6179 .9130 .8952 .8788 .8637 .8496 .8366 .8244 .8130
_. .4 .6554 1.0390 1.0201 1.0026 .9866 .9717 .9579 .9450 .9330
.5 .6914 I. 1677 1.1475 I. 1289 I. I 119 1.0961 i.0814 1.0678 1.0550
L .6 .7257 i.2988 1.2773 1.2576 !.2395 1.2227 1.2071 I. 1926 I. 1791
•7 .7580 1.4318 1.4089 1.3880 1.3687 1.3510 1.3345 i.3191 !.3048
• - .8 .7881 !.5669 1.5426 1.5204 1.5000 1.4811 1.4637 1.447_ 1,4323
.9 .8159 1.7036 1.6779 i.6544 1.6327 1.6128 1.5943 1.5771 1.5611
1.0 .8413 1.8421 !.8149 i.7900 1.7671 1.7460 1.7265 1.7084 !.6914
I. I .8643 1.982 ! 1.9533 1.9270 1.9028 1.8806 1.8600 1.8408 !.8230
1.2 .8849 2.1234 2.0930 2.0652 2.0397 2.0163 1.9945 1.9744 1.9556
! 1.3 .9031 2.2659 2.2339 2.2046 2.1778 2.1531 2.1302 2.1090 2.0892 "
1.4 .9192 2.4095 2.3758 2.3451 2.3169 2.2909 2.2669 2.2446 2.2238
1.5 .9331 2.5540 2.5187 2.4864 2.4568 2.4296 2.4044 2.3810 2.3592
1.6 .9452 2.6995 2.6624 2.6286 2.5976 2.5690 2.5426 2.5182 2.4954 •
1.7 .9554 2.8457 2.8069 2.7716 2.7391 2.7093 2.6817 2.6561 2.6322
1.8 .9640 2.9927 2.9522 2.9152 2.8813 2.8501 2.8213 2.7946 2.7697
1.9 .9712 3.1403 3.0980 3.0594 3.0241 2.9915 2.9615 2.9336 2.9077
2.0 .9772 3.2884 3.2443 3.204 1 3.1673 3.1334 3.1021 3.0731 3.0461
2.1 .9821 3.4370 3.3912 3.3493 3.3110 3.2758 3.2432 3.2130 3.1849
2.2 .9860 3.5862 3.5385 3.4950 3.4552 3.4186 3.3847 3.3534 3.3242
2.3 .9892 3.7357 3.6862 3.6411 3.5998 3.5618 3.5267 3.4941 3.4638
2.4 .9918 3.8857 3.8344 3.7876 3.7448 3.7053 3,6689 3.6352 3.6038
2.5 ,9937 4.0360 3,9829 3.9344 3.8901 3.8492 3.8115 3,7766 3.7441
2.6 .9953 4.1867 4 1317 4.0816 4,0357 3.9934 3,9544 3.0183 3.8847
2.7 .9965 4.3377 4.2808 4.2290 4.1816 4.1379 4.0976 4.0603 4,0255
; 2.8 ,9974 4.4890 4.4302 4,3767 4.3277 4.2826 4.2410 4.2025 4.1666
i 2,9 ,9981 4.6404 4.5798 4.5246 4,4741 4.4276 4,3847 4,3449 4.3079
3.0 .9986 4.7920 4.7296 4.6727 4.6206 4.5727 4.5284 4.4874 4.4493
i 3.1 .9990 4.9439 4.8796 4.8210 4.7673 4.7180 4.6724 4.6302 4.5909
! 3,2 .9993 5,0959 5.0297 4,9694 4.9142 4.8634 4,8166 4.7731 4,7327
_. _ 3.3 .9995 5.2482 5.1801 5.1181 5.0613 5.0091 4.9609 4.9162 4.8747
3.4 .9996 5.4006 5.3306 5.2669 5.2085 5.1549 5.1053 5.0594 5.0168
Ii 3.5 .9997 5.5532 5.4813 5.4158 5.3559 5.3008 5.2500 5.2028 5.1590
3.6 .9991; 5.7059 5.6321 5.5649 5.5034 5.4469 5.3947 5.3463 5.3014
3.7 .9998 5.8587 5.7831 5.7142 5.651 ! 5.5931 5.5396 5.4899 5.4438
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i _ TABLE A-3.--Continued. " '
_ (c) Concluded.
_ Safety Probability Sample size. N
margin. P, ......
_-. SM 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
3.8 0.9999 6.0117 5.9342 5.8635 5.7989 5.7394 5.6845 5.6337 5.5864
3.9 ! 6.1648 6.0854 6.0130 5.9467 5.8858 5.8296 5.7775 5.7291
_, 4.0 I 6.3180 6.2367 6.1626 6.0947 6.0324 5.9748 5.9215 5.8719
,i 4.1 6.4714 6.3881 6.3122 6.2428 6.1790 6.1201 6.0655 6.0147
_ ! 4.2 6.6248 6.5396 6.4620 6.3910 6,3257 6.2654 6.2096 6.15774.3 I 6.7788 6.6912 6.6118 6.5392 6.4725 6,4109 6.3538 6.3007
_: 4.4 6.9319 6.8428 6.7618 6.6876 6.6193 6.5564 6.4980 6.4438
_ 4.5 7.0856 6.9946 6.9118 6.8360 6.7663 6.7020 6.6424 6.5870
i 6 7 2 93 7 1 64 7 0 9 9 44 _ 9 3 8476 7868 7302
i 4,7 7.3931 7.2983 7.2120 7.1330 7.0604 6.9933 6.9312 6.8735
! 4.8 7.5470 7.4503 7.3622 7.2816 7.2075 7.1391 7.0757 7.0168
=I 4.9 1.0800 7.7010 7.6023 7.5125 7.4303 7.3547 7.2849 7.2203 7.16025,0 .855 .7544 .66 8 .5790 .5019 .a308 .3649 .3037 ,._
{__ 5.1 8.0090 7.9065 7.8132 7.7278 7.6492 7.5768 7.5096 7.4472
,0 3
5.3 8.3173 8.2110 8.1141 8.0255 7.9440 7.8688 7.7991 7.7343
_-"'; 5.4 8.4716 8.3633 8.2646 8.1744 8.0914 8.0148 7.9439 7.8780 .
'_ 5.7 8,9345 8.8204 8.7165 8.6214 8.5340 8.4533 8.3785 8.3091
f
5.8 9,0889 8.9728 8,8671 8.7704 8.6815 8,5995 8.5235 8.4529
f 5.9 9.2433 9,1253 9.0179 8.9195 8.8292 8.7458 8.6685 8.5967 •
,_ 6.0 9.3978 9.2778 9.1686 9.0687 8.9768 8.8920 8.8135 8.7405
6. I 9.5523 9.4304 9.3194 8,2179 9.1245 8.0384 8.9585 8.8844
! 6.2 9.7068 9.5830 9.4702 9.3671 9.2722 9. i 847 9.1036 9.0283t
6.3 9.8614 9.7356 9.6211 9.5163 9.4200 9.3311 9.2487 9.1722
i 6.4 10,0160 9.8882 9.7720 9.6655 9.5677 9.4775 9.3938 9,3161
.-_' 6.5 10.1706 10.0409 9.9229 9.8148 9.7155 9.6239 9.5390 9.4601
! 6.6 10.3252 10.1936 10.0738 9.9641 8.8634 9.7703 9.6842 9.6041
6.7 10.4799 10,3463 10.2247 10.1135 10.C112 9.9168 9.8294 9.7481
6.8 10.6346 10,4991 10,3757 10.2628 10.1591 10,0633 9.9746 9,8921
i 6.9 10,7893 10.6519 10.5267 10.4122 10.3070 10.2098 10.1198 10.0362
7.0 10.9441 10.8047 10,6777 10.5616 10.4549 10.3563 10.2651 10.1803
7. I 11.0988 10.9575 10.8288 10.7110 10.6028 10.5029 10.4104 10.32447.2 11.2536 I I, 1103 10,9798 10.8605 10.7507 10.6495 10.5557 10,4685
7,3 ! 1,4084 11,2632 I I. 1309 i 1.0099 10.8987 10.7961 10.7010 10.6126
7,4 11.5632 11,4160 ! 1,2820 ! I, 1594 1i.0467 10,9427 10.8463 10.7567
7.5 I 11.7181 11.5689 1i,4331 11.3089 I I. 1947 ! 1.0893 10.9916 10.9009
7,6 I 11.8729 i 1,7218 11.5843 i 1.4584 11,3427 11,2359 I I, 1370 11.0451
7.7 12,0278 11.8748 11,7354 I 1.6079 11.4907 11.3826 I 1.2824 1i, 1893
i 7,8 12.1827 12,0277 11,8866 11,7575 11.6388 11,5292 1i.4278 11.3335
7.9 12,3376 12.1807 12,0378 11.9070 I i.7868 11.6759 11.5732 I !.4777
8.0 12,4926 12.3337 12.1890 12,0566 11.9349 11.8226 11.7186 11,6219
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. I TABLE A-3.--Continued.
(d) Sample sizes 30 to 100
'_ Safety Probability. Sample size. N !t.
margin. P. -' ic
" Su 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 I00 :
: -5.0 0 -3.7688 -3.9040 -4.0005 -4.0741 -4.1328 -4.1810 -4.2216 -4.2565
-4.0 0 -2.9910 -3.1021 -3.1815 -3.2420 -3.2901 - 3.3297 -3.3630 -3.3916
-3.0 .0013 -2.2053 -2.2935 -2.2564 -2.4042 -2.4422 - 2.4735 -2.4998 -2.5224
_; . -2.0 .0227 - 1.4013 - 1.4691 - 1.5172 - !.5536 - !,5825 - 1.6063 - 1.6262 - 1.6432
. . -I.0 .1586 -.5473 -.6024 -.6406 -.f_92 -.6918 - .710! -.7254 -.7385
ii" : 0 .5000 .4494 .3835 .3401 .3087 .2846 .2655 .2497 .2364 i
•! .5398 .5613 .4924 .4472 .4146 .3897 .3700 .3537 .3401
• .2 .5792 .6756 .6033 .5560 .5221 .4963 .4758 .4590 .4449
_'__ .3 .6179 .7923 .7162 .6665 .6311 .6042 .5828 .5654 .5508 a
•4 .6554 .9110 .8308 .7786 .7415 .7134 .6912 .6730 .6579
i i .5 .6914 1.0318 .9471 .8922 .3533 .8239 .8007 .7818 .7659
. . .6 .7257 1.1545 1.0650 I.Q073 .9664 .9356 .9113 .8915 .8750 .
!_ .7 .7580 !.2788 1.1844 1.1236 1.0806 1.0483 1.022_ 1.0022 .9850
_i .8 .7881 ! .4048 1.3051 1.2411 !. 1960 1.1621 I. 1355 1.1138 1.0958 +
.9 .8159 1.5321 1.4270 1.3596 1.3122 1.2767 1.2488 i.2261 1.2073
"'_ 1.0 .8413 1.6608 1.5500 !.4792 1.4294 1.3922 1.3629 i.3392 1.3195
_. i I. I .8643 1.7906 i .6740 1.5996 1.5474 ! .5084 1.4778 1.4530 1.4324
1.2 .8849 1.9215 ! .7989 1.7208 ! .6662 1.6253 1.5933 i .5673 1..$458 i
_ 1.3 .9031 2.0535 !.9247 1.8429 !.7856 i.7429 1.7094 1.6823 !.6598 i
i 1.4 .9192 2.1863 2.0513 i.96:_6 1.9057 1.8610 1.8260 !.7977 1.77421.5 .9331 2.3198 2.1784 2.0888 2.0262 1.9795 1.9430 1.9135 1.8890 i
_" 1.6 .9452 2.4542 2.3062 2.2126 2.1473 2.0986 2.0605 2.0297 _.0042 '*"
!" 1.7 .9554 2.5891 2.4346 2.3369 2.2688 2.2180 2.1784 2.1463 2.1198 I
! 1.8 .9640 2.7247 2.5635 2.4617 2.3908 2.3379 2.2966 2.2632 2.2356
:_. 1.9 .9712 2.8608 2.6928 2.5868 2.5130 2.4580 2.4151 2.3804 2.3517
' 2.0 .977? 2.9972 2.8225 2.7123 2.6356 2.5784 2.5339 2.4979 2.4681
2.! .98_ 3.1341 2.9525 2.8380 2.7584 2.6991 2.6529 2.6155 2.5846
2.2 .o_.._ 3.2715 3.0829 2.9641 2.8815 2.8201 2.7721 2.7334 2.7014
_.'_ 2.3 .9892 3.4091 3.2136 3.0905 3.0049 2.9412 2.8916 2.8515 2.8184
2.4 .9918 3.5471 3.3445 3.2171 3.1285 3.0626 3.0112 2.9698 2.9355
I. 2.5 .9937 3.6854 3.4757 3.3439 3.2523 3.1842 3.131 i 3.0882 3.0528
2.6 .9953 3.8240 3.6072 3.4709 3.3763 3.3059 3.2511 3.2068 3.1702 !
i 2.7 .9965 3.9628 3.7389 3.5982 3.5005 3.4278 3.3712 3.3256 3.2878.8 . 74 4.1019 .8707 .7256 .6248 .5499 .49 5 .4444 .4055
i 2.9 .9981 4.2411 4.0028 3.8531 3.7493 3.6720 3.6119 3.5634 3.5233
'_ 3.0 .9986 4.3805 4.1349 3.9808 3.8738 3.7943 3.7324 3.6825 3.6412
i 3.1 .9990 4.520i 4.2673 4.1086 3.9985 3.9167 3.8530 3.8017 3.7592
i 3.2 .9993 4.6598 4.3997 4.2366 4.1234 4.0393 3.9737 3.9209 3.8773
i 3.3 ] .9995 4.7997 4.5323 4.3646 4.2483 4.1619 4.0945 4.0403 3.9954
3.4 _. .999_ 4.9397 4.6650 4.4928 4.3733 4.2845 4.2154 4.1597 4.1137
3.5 .9997 4.0799 4.7979 4.6211 4.4984 4.4073 4.3364 4.2792 4.2320
3.6 .9998 5.2202 4.9308 4.7494 4.6236 4.5302 4.4574 4.3988 4.3503
_'_---:" 3.7 .9998 3.3606 5.0638 4.8778 4.7489 4.6531 4.5785 4.5184 4.4688
i
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TABLE A-3,--Concluded.
i- (d) Concluded. •
,. Safer Probability Sample size, H
,L .. • t.
i margin, p_Su 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3.8 0.9999 5.5011 5.1969 5.0064 4.8742 4,7761 4.6997 4.6381 4.5872
3.9 5.6417 5.3301 5.1350 4.9996 4.8991 4.8209 4.7579 4.7058
4.0 i 5.7824 5,4634 5.2636 5.1251 5.0223 4,9422 4.8777 4.8243
4. i j 5,9232 5,5968 5.3923 5.2506 5.1454 5.0635 4,9975 4,9430
4.2 6.t_O 5.7302 5.5211 5,3762 5.2686 5.1849 5.1174 5.0615
_ ' 4.3 I 6.2049 5.8637 5.6500 5.5019 5.3919 5.3063 5.2373 5.1803
; 4.4 i 6.3459 5.9972 5.7789 5.6275 5.5152 5.4_77 5.3573 5.2991
i i 4.5 6.4870 6.1308 5.9078 5.7533 5.6385 5._492 5.4773 5.4178
; 4.6 6.6281 6.2645 6.0368 5.$791 5,7619 5.6708 5.5974 5.5367
4.7 6.7693 6.3982 6.1659 6,0049 5,8853 5.792.3 5.7174 3.6555
• i 4.8 P 6.9106 6.5319 6.2949 6,1307 6.0088 5.9139 5.8375 5.7744
4.9 !.00(30 7.0518 6.6657 6.4241 6.2566 6.1323 6.0356 5.957"_ 5.8933
5.0 7.1932 6.7996 6._532 6.3825 6.2558 6.1572 6.0778 6,0122 _1
5.1 7.3346 6.9334 6.6824 6.5085 6.3794 6.2789 6.1980 6,1311 t
5,2 7.4760 7,0673 6.8116 6.6345 6.5029 6.4006 .6.3182 6.2501 i
5.3 7.6175 7.2013 6.9409 6.7605 6.6266 6.5224 6.4384 6.369! 1
_. ,, 5.4 7.7590 7.3353 7.0702 6.8865 6.7502 6.6441 6,5587 6.4881 _I
5.5 7.9005 7.4693 7.1995 7.0126 6.8738 6.7659 6,6790 6.6071
6 8 0421 ,603 3288 7 1386 9975 8877 .7993 7262
5.7 8.1837 7.7374 7.4582 7.2648 7.1212 7.0095 6.9196 6.8452 ' ;i
5.8 8.3254 7.8715 7.5876 7.3909 7.2449 7.1314 7.0399 6.9643
5.9 8.4671 8.0036 7.7170 7.5170 7.3687 7.2532 7.1603 7.0834
6.0 8.6088 8.1398 7,84,_ 7.6432 7.4924 7.3751 7.2806 7.2025 •
6.1 8.7505 8.2740 7,9759 7.7694 7.6162 7.4970 7.4010 7.3217
6,2 8.8923 8.4082 8,1054 7.8956 7.7400 7.6189 7.5214 7.4408
6.3 9.0341 8.5424 8.2348 8.0218 7.8638 7.7409 7.6418 7.5600
6,4 9,1759 8.6766 8,3644 8.1481 7.9876 7.8627 7.7622 7.6791
i 6.5 9.3177 8.8109 8.4939 8.2744 8.1114 7.9847 7.8827 7.7983
i" 6.6 9.4596 8.9452 8.6234 8.4006 8,2353 &1067 8,0631 7,9175
I 6.7 9.6015 9.0794 8,7530 8.5269 8.3592 8.2286 8,1236 8.0367 ]
6.8 9.7434 9.2138 8.8826 8.6532 8.4830 8,3506 8.2440 8.1559i
[ I 6.9 9.8853 9,3481 9.0122 8.7795 8..f_9 8.4726 8.3645 8,2751
10,0272 9.4824 9,1418 8.9059 8.7308 8.5946 8.4850 8.39447,0
7.! 10.1692 9,6168 9,2714 9.0322 8.8547 8.7167 8.6055 8.5136
7.2 10,3112 9.7512 9.4010 9.1586 8,9786 8.8387 8.7260 8,6329
i 7..3 10.4532 9,8856 9,5307 9,2849 9.1026 8.9607 8.8465 8.752 I
• i
7.4 10,5952 10,0200 9.6603 9.4113 9,2265 8.0828 8,9670 8,8714t
t _ 7,5 10.7372 10.1544 9.7900 9,5377 9.3505 9.2048 9,0876 8.9907 _ _
_i" _ 7.6 10,8792 10,2888 9,9197 9.6641 9.4744 9.3269 9,2081 9, 1100
. 7.7 I 1.0213 10,4233 10,0494 9.7905 9.5984 9.4490 9.3287 9.2293
_ 7,8 I I, 1633 10,5577 10,1791 9.9169 9.7224 9.5711 9,4492 9,3486
"_ 7.9 11.3054 10.6922 10,3088 10,0433 9.8464 9.6932 9,5698 9.4679
_'! 8.0 ' 11.4475 10,8266 10.4385 10.1698 9,9704 9.8153 9,6904 9,5872
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, TABLEA-A.--SAFETY MARGINSAT 95-PERCENTCONFIDENCELEVEL ' 4
(a) Samplesizes 5 ',o 12
Safety Probability, Sample size. N i_
r
q
margin, Pr '"
SM 5 6 7 8 9 10 !1 12 I
,-- i
-5,0 0 -3.1600 -3,2797 -3.3759 -3.4551 -3.5230 -3.5814 -3.6328 -3.6783 I
-,+,0 0 -2,4898 -2.5882 -2.6674 -2,7326 -2.7884 -2.8364 -2.8787 -2.9161
-3.0 .0013 -I.8066 .I.8847 -I.9477 -I.9995 -2.0438 -2.0819 -2.1155 -2.1453 _
-2.0 .0227 - 1,0897 - I.1507 - I.1999 - 1.2402 - 1.2748 - i .3064 - 1.3304 - 1.3535 i
-i.O .1586 -.2651 -.324I -.3691 -.4062 -,4363 -.4625 -.4847 -.5043
0 .5000 .9538 .8223 .7340 .6697 .6197 .5796 .5464 .5184
[ , I .5398 !, 1123 .9664 .8692 .7989 .7449 .7017 .6661 .6361
"_ .2 ,5792 1,2779 1.1159 1.0094 .9328 .8741 ,8273 .7889 .7567
.3 .6179 1.45_ 1.2710 1.1543 1.0708 1.0071 .9562 .9148 .8803
.4 ,6554 1,6309 i .4315 1.3035 1,2118 1.1428 1.0882 1.0436 i .0065
.5 .6914 1,8155 1.5966 !.4564 1,3565 i.2822 1,2231 1.1751 1.1353 I !
.6 ,7257 2,0061 1,7662 !.6130 1,5047 1.4247 1.3609 1.3093 1.2666
_. .7 .7580 2.2023 1.9395 i.7729 !.6562 1.5691 1.5010 !.4456 !.3999 1
.8 .7881 2.40"22 2.1163 1.9362 1.8104 1.7162 1.6434 1.5841 1.5353
.9 .8159 2,6057 2.2960 2.1023 i,9666 1.8658 !,7878 i.7245 1,6724
1,0 .8413 2.8129 2.4788 2,2709 2.1252 2,0174 1.9343 1,8667 1.8112
_ I.! .8643 3,0237 2.6647 2.4415 2,2858 2.1710 2.0822 2.q!03 !.9514
1.2 .8849 3.2370 2.8528 2,6140 2,4483 2.3263 2.2317 2.1554 2.0930 ,
1.3 .9031 3,4526 3.0427 2.7883 2,6123 2.4830 2,3826 2.3018 2.2358
1.4 .9192 3.6702 3.2340 2.9642 2.7779 2.6408 2.5345 2.4493 2.3796 I
1.5 .9331 3.8896 3,4268 3.1415 2.9447 2,7998 2.6876 2.5977 2.5243
1.6 .9452 4.1105 3.62 i I 3.3200 3.1126 2.9598 2.8416 2.7471 2.6699
1.7 .9554 4.3329 3.8165 3.4997 3,2815 3.1208 2.9965 2.8972 2,8163
1.8 .9640 4,5564 4.0134 3.6803 3.4513 3,2826 3,1522 3.0482 2.9633
' i,g .9712 4,7811 4,2113 3.8618 3,6216 3.4451 3.3085 3.1997 3.1110
2.0 .9772 5.0067 4.4101 4.0440 3.7927 3.6083 3.4654 3.3518 3.2592
2. I 821 5 2332 .6097 4 2270 .9645 772 6229 ,5044 4079 ',
• 2.2 ,9860 5,4605 4,8099 4.4106 4.1368 3.9364 3.7810 3,6575 3.5570 _!
2.3 ,9892 5.6885 5.0108 4.5947 4.3096 4. i013 3.9394 3.81 ! I 3.7066 i!
2,4 ,9918 5,9171 5.2122 4.7794 4.4829 4,2665 4.0983 3.9650 3,8565
2.5 .9937 6.1463 5.4142 4.9646 4.6567 4.4322 4.2576 4.1193 4,0068
2,6 .9953 6.3761 5,6166 5.1501 4.8308 4.5982 4.4172 4.2739 4.1574
2.7 ,9965 6,6063 5.8193 5.3361 5,0053 4.7646 4.577t 4.4289 4,3083
2.8 .9974 6,8369 6.0223 5,5222 5.1801 4,9311 4,7?73 4,5840 4.4594
2,9 ,9981 7,0679 6.2256 5.7086 5,3552 5.0978 48977 4.7394 4.6107
3.0 .9986 7,2993 6,4292 5,8953 5.5306 5.2647 ._.0584 4.8950 4,7622 i:
._. , 3,1 .9990 7,5311 6.6332 6,0823 5.7062 5.4319 5,2193 5.0508 4.9139 4.2 3 763 8 74 2696 ,8821 5993 380 ,206 5 0658 " ":i
3,3 .9995 7,9954 7,0418 6.4570 6,0582 5,7668 5.5416 5.3630 5.2179 ,!_
¢ 3,4 ,9996 8,2280 7.2465 6.64,*7 62344 5,9346 5.7030 5,5194 5,3701 "
i 3.5 ,9997 8,4698 7,4514 6,8326 6.4109 6,1026 5,8646 5,6759 5.5225 i
'-":_'_ 3,6 .9998 8,6939 7.6565 7,0207 6.5875 6.2707 6.0264 5.8325 L6750
3,7 ,9998 8,9271 7,8618 7,2089 6,7643 6.4389 6,1882 5,9893 5,8277
!
1992023212-162
=_ TABLE A-4.--Continued.
'i (a) Concluded. ,
_ i Safety Probability Sample size, N
; ', margin, Px ..... :
:_ " ': SM 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12
; ::I 3.8 0.9999 9.1606 8.0673 7.3973 6.9412 6.6073 6.3502 6.1462 5.9804
3.9 9.3942 8.2729 7.5858 7.1182 6.7758 6.5124 6.3032 6,1333
4.0 9.6280 8.4787 7.7745 7.2954 6.9444 6.6746 6.4603 6.2852
_. 4.1 9.8619 8.6846 7.%33 7.4727 7.1132 6.8369 6.6175 6,4393
_ 4.2 10.0960 8.8906 8.1522 7.6501 7.2820 6.9994 6.7748 6.5924t..
_. 4.3 10.3302 9.0968 8.3413 7,8276 7.4510 7.1619 6.9322 6.7456
[:- 4.4 10,5645 9.3031 8.5304 8.0052 7.6200 7.3245 7.0896 6.8989
4.5 10,7990 9.5095 8.71% 8.1829 7.7891 7.4872 7.2472 7.0523
_." 4.6 11.0336 9.7160 8,9090 8.3606 7.9583 7.6499 7.4048 7.2057
. 4.7 I1,2683 9.9225 9.0984 8.5385 8.1276 7,8128 7.5625 7.35924.8 il.5031 10.1292 8.2879 8.7164 8.2969 7.9757 7.7202 7.5128
_': 4.9 1.0000 I1.7379 10,3359 9.4775 8.8944 8,4664 8.1386 7.8780 7.6664 :5.0 1 .972 .5428 ,66 1 9.0725 .6358 .3017 8.0358 .8200
_ 5.1 12,2080 10,7497 9.8568 9.2506 8.8054 8.4647 8,1938 7.9738
5.2 12.4431 10.9567 10.0466 9,4288 8.9750 8.6279 8.3517 8.1275
"" 5.3 12.6783 i1.1637 10.2364 9.6070 9.1446 8,7910 8.5097 8.2813 J
5.4 12.9136 11.3708 10.4263 9.7853 9.3143 8.9543 8.6678 8.4352 !
" 5.5 13.1489 il.5780 10.6163 9.9636 9.4841 9.1176 8.8259 8.5891 t
5.6 13.3843 11,7852 10.8063 10,1420 9.6539 9.2809 8.9840 8.7430 ,
5.7 13.6198 i 1.9925 10.9963 10.3205 9.8237 9.4442 9.1422 8,8970
5.8 13.8553 12.1998 I I. 1865 10.4989 9.9936 9.6076 9,3004 9.0510
! 5.9 14.0909 12.4072 11.3766 10.6775 !0,1635 9.77 I0 9.4586 9.2050 ,
_' 6.0 14.3265 12.6146 I 1.566g 10.8560 10.3335 9.9345 9.6169 9.3:.91 " J
i 6. I 14,5622 12.8221 i ! .7570 11.0346 10,5034 10.0980 9.7752 9.5132 i
i_ 6.2 14.7979 13.0296 !1.9473 I! .2133 10.6735 10,2615 9.9336 9.6673
6.3 15.0337 13.2372 12.1376 il.3919 10.8435 10.4251 10.09!9 9.8215
, 6.4 15.2695 13.4447 12,3279 I 1.5706 11.0136 10,5887 10.2503 9.9757
.i_ 6.5 15,5054 13.6524 12,5183 11.7494 11.1837 10,7523 10.4087 10.12996.6 15.7413 13.8600 12.7087 11.9281 il.3_39 10.9160 10,5672 10.2841
6.7 15.9777 14.0677 12.8992 12.1069 11,5241 il.07% 10.7257 10,4384
6,8 16.21_2 14.2755 13,0897 12,2857 11,6943 11.2433 10.8842 10.5927
! 6.9 16,4492 14.4832 13,2802 12.4646 !1.gfH,5 11,4070 11.0427 10.7470
'_ 7.0 16.6852 14.6910 13.4707 12,6434 12.0347 11.5708 11.2012 10.9013
7.1 16.9213 14.8988 13,6612 12.8223 12.2050 11.7345 11,3598 11,0556
i 7,2 1"1.1574 15,1067 13.8518 13.0013 12.3753 11.8983 11.5183 il,2100
i _ 7.3 17.3935 15.3146 14.0424 13.1802 12.5456 12.0621 11.6769 11,3644
7.4 17,6297 15,5225 14.2330 13.3592 12.7160 !2.22.,'9 il,8356 11,5187
7.5 17.8659 15.7304 14,4237 13.5381 12.8863 12.3898 11,9942 11,6732 ,, .=:l,
"_ 7.6 18.1021 15,9383 14.6144 13.7171 13,0567 12,5536 12,1528 il,8276
!.__ 7.7 18.3383 16.1463 14.8050 13.8%2 13.2271 12.7175 12,3115 11,9820
7.8 18.5746 16,3543 14.9958 14.0752 13,3975 12,8814 12.4702 12.1365
7.9 18,8109 16,5623 15,1865 14,2542 13.5679 13.0453 12,6289 12.2909
l 8.0 19.0472 16,7703 15.3772 14.4333 13.738,4 13,2092 12.7876 12.4454
f I
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tTABLE A-4.--Continued. _ '
(b) Samplesizes13 to 20
_ Safety Probability, Samplesize, N
margin, Px "'
Su 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-5.0 0 -3,7191 -3.7560 -3.7895 -3.8202 -3.8485 -3.8747 -3.8990 -3.9217
-4.0 0 -2.9497 -2.9800 -3.0076 -3.0329 -3.0561 -3.0777 -3.0977 -3.1164
-3.0 .0013 -2.1719 -2.1960 -2.2179 -2.2380 -2.2564 -2.2735 -2.2894 -2.3042
_ -2.0 .0227 - 1.3741 - 1.3927 - 1.4097 - 1.4251 - 1.4394 - 1.4525 - 1.4647 - 1.4761
:-: -1.0 .1586 -.5217 -,5373 -,5514 -.5642 -.5759 -.5866 -.5965 -.6057
-0 .5000 .4943 .4733 .4347 .4382 .4234 .4100 .3978 .3867
_-. .1 .5398 .6104 .5881 .5684 .5510 .5353 .5212 .5084 .4967
" .2 .5792 .7293 .7055 .6846 .6661 .6496 ,6347 .621! .6087
.3 .6179 .8509 .8256 .8033 .7837 .7661 .7503 .7359 .7228
i_ .4 .6554 .9751 .9480 .9243 .9034 .8848 .8679 .8527 .8388
.5 .6914 1.1017 1.0727 1.0475 i.02.52 1.0034 .9875 .9713 .9566
.6 .7257 ! .2506 I.1996 !. 1727 !. 1490 1.1279 I. 1(}69 J.0918 ! .0762
_ .7 .7580 1.3614 1.3284 !.2997 !.2745 !.2521 1.2319 !.2137 1.1972 _!ii
" .8 .7881 ! .4942 1.4591 1.4286 1.4018 1.3780 i .3506 ! .3373 1.3197
_ .9 .8159 !.6286 1.$912 I.$$88 I.$304 1.5052 1.4825 I 4620 1.4435!.0 .8413 1.7647 1.7250 !.6906 _.6603 1.6338 !.6097 !.5880 1.3684
_, I.I .8643 1.9021 i.8600 i.8236 !.7917 1.7635 1.7380 1.7151 1.6945
1.2 .8849 2.0407 1.9962 i.9577 1.9240 1.8942 1.8674 !.8432 1.8214
1.3 .9031 2.1806 2.1335 2.0929 2.0574 2.0260 I._.-W77 !.9723 1.9493
!.4 .9192 2.3213 2.2718 2.2290 2.1916 2.1583 2.128_ 2.1020 2.0779
1.5 .9331 2.4630 2.41C9 2.3659 2.3265 2.2918 2.2606 2.2325 2.2072
!.6 .9452 2.6055 2.5507 2.5035 2.4622 2.4258 2.3930 2.3636 2.3371 .
_" 1.7 .9534 2.7487 2.6913 2.6418 2.5986 2.5605 2.5261 2.4954 2.4676
1,8 .9640 2.8926 2.8325 2.7807 2.7355 2.6957 ' 2.6598 2.6277 2.5.986
• 1.9 .9712 3.0370 2.9743 2.9202 2.8730 2.8313 2.793rJ 2.7604 2.7301
2.0 .9772 3.1820 3.1165 3.0601 3.0108 2.9674 29284 2.8935 2,8619
2. I .9821 3.3274 3.2592 3.2004 3.1491 3.1040 3.0633 3.0270 2.9941
i 2.2 .9860 3.4733 3.4023 3.3411 3.2878 3.2409 3.1986 3.1608 3.1267
:_ 2,3 .9892 3.6196 3,3458 3,4823 3.4269 3.3781 3.3343 3.2950 3.2596
2.4 .9918 3.7662 3.6896 3.6237 3.$662 3.$156 3.4702. 3.4295 3.3927
_ 2,5 .9937 3.9131 3.8338 3.76.54 3.7059 3.6525 3.6064 3.3642 3.5262
i 2,6 .9953 4.0604 3.9782 3.9075 3.8458 3.7915 3.7428 3.6991 3.6.598
[ 2.7 .9965 4.2079 4.1229 4.0497 3.9860 3.9298 3.8?94 3.8343 3.7987
; 2.8 .9974 4.3557 4.2678 4.1922 4.1263 4.0684 4.0163 3.9697 3.92.77.
2.9 .9981 4.5036 4.4i29 4.3349 4.2669 4,2071 4.1533 4.1053 4.0619
3.0 .9986 4.6518 4.5582 4.4777 4.4076 4.3459 4.2905 4,2409 4.1963
3. ! .9990 4.8001 4.7036 4.6207 4.3485 4.4849 4.4279 4.3768 4.3308
3.2 .9993 4.9486 4,8493 4.7639 4.6895 4.6241 4.5653 4.5128 4.46.54 " "_
". 3,3 .9995 5.0973 4.9951 4.9072 4.8307 4.7634 4.7050 4,6489 .t.6(X)2
3.4 .9996 5.2461 5.1410 5.0507 4.9?20 4.9028 4.8407 4.78.51 4,7351
qJ 3.5 .9997 $.3050 $.2871 5.1943 $.1135 $.4024 4.9786 4.9215 4,8701 :
3.6 .9998 5.3441 5.4333 5.3380 $.2550 5.1820 3.1165 5.0580 $.0052
_'_-' 3.7 .9998 5.6933 S,5796 5.4818 5,3967 5.3218 $.2_46 5,1945 5.1404 i
i
,r!
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: TABLE A-4.--Cominued.
(b) Concluded.
, Safety Probability San:ple size. N I
margin, Px
SM 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
3.8 0.9999 5.8426 5.7260 5.6257 5.5385 5.4617 5.3928 5.3312 5.2757
3.9 ' 5.9920 5.8725 5.7697 5.6803 5.6016 5.5310 5.4679 5.41 I0
4.0 6.1416 6.0191 5.9139 5.8223 5.7417 5.6694 5.6047 5.5465
4.1 6.2912 6.1658 6.0580 5.9643 5.8818 5.8078 5.7416 5.6820
,.£ 6.4408 6.3126 6.2023 6.1064 6.0220 5.9463 5.8785 5.8176
4.3 6.5906 6.4594 6.3467 6.2485 6.1622 6.0848 6.0156 5.9532 j
4.4 6.7404 6.6063 6.491 ! 6.3908 6.3025 6.2234 6.1526 6.0889
4.5 6.8903 6.7533 6.6355 6.5331 6.4429 6.3621 6.2989 6.2247
4.6 7.0403 6.9003 6.7801 6.6754 6.5834 6.5008 6.4270 6.3605
4.7 7.1903 7.0474 6.9247 6.8178 0.7239 6.6396 6.5642 6.4963
4.8 7.3404 7.1946 7.0693 6.9603 6.8644 6.7784 6.7015 6.6322
4.9 1.0000 7.4906 7.3418 7.2140 7.1028 7.0050 6.9173 6.8388 6.7682
5.0 i 7.6408 7.4891 7.3588 7.2454 7.1456 7.0562 6.9762 6.9042
5. I i 7.7910 7.6364 7.5035 7.3879 7.2863 7.1951 7.1136 7.0402
5.2 7.9413 7.7837 7.6484 7.5306 7.4270 7.3341 7.2510 7.1763
5.3 8.0916 7.9311 7.7932 7.6733 7.5677 7.4731 7.3885 7.3124
5.4 8.2420 8.07S6 7.9381 7.8160 7.7085 7.6,22 7.5260 7.4485
5.5 8.3924 8.2260 8.0831 7.9587 7.8494 7.7513 7.6636 7.5846
5.6 8.5429 8.3735 8.2281 8.1015 7.9902 7.8904 7.8012 7.7208
5.7 8.6934 8.5211 8.3731 8.2443 8.1311 8.0296 7.9388 7.8571
5.8 8.8439 8.6687 8.5181 8.3872 8.2720 8.1687 8.0764 7.9933
5.9 8.9944 8.8163 8.6632 8.5300 8.4129 • 8.3080 8.2141 8.1296
• .0 9.1450 8.9639 8.8083 8.6729 8.5539 8.4472 8.3518 8.2659
6. I 9.2956 9. I i 15 8.9534 8.8159 8.6949 8.5864 8.4895 8.4022
• 6.2 9.4463 9.2592 9.0986 8.9588 8.8359 8.7257 8.6272 8.5385
6.3 9.5969 9.4069 9.2438 9.1018 8.9770 8.8650 8.7650 8.6749
6.4 9.7476 9.5547 9.3890 9.2448 9.1180 9.0044 8.9028 8.8113
I _ 6.5 9.8983 9.7024 9.5342 9.3878 9.2591 9.1437 9.0406 8.9477
" 6.6 !0.0491 9.8502 9.6794 9.5309 9._v_._ 9.2831 9.1784 9.08416.7 10.1998 9.9980 9.8247 9.6739 9.5413 94225 9.3162 9.2205
6.8 10.3506 10.1458 9.9700 9.8170 9.6825 9.5619 9.4540 9.3570
6.9 10.5014 10.2937 10. i 153 9.9601 9.8236 9.7013 9.5919 9.4935
7.0 10.6522 10.4416 10.2606 I0.1032 9.9648 9.8407 9.7298 9.6?.99
7. i 10.803 ! 10.5894 10.4059 10.2463 O.1060 9.9802 9.8677 9.7664
7.2 10.9539 10.7373 10.5513 10.3895 0.2472 10.1196 10.0056 9.9030
7.3 I 1.10411 10.8852 10.6967 10.5326 0.3884 10.2591 10.1435 i0.0395
7.4 I ! .2557 I 1.0332 10.8421 10.67!', 10.5296 10.3986 10.2815 !0.1760
7.5 11.4066 11.1811 10.9875 10.81'_ 10.6709 10.5381 10.4194 10.3126
7.6 11.5575 11,3291 11.1329 10.9622 10.8122 10.6776 10.5574 10.4491
¢1, 7.7 I 1.7084 I 1.4770 I 1,2783 1I. 1054 10.9534 10.8172 10.6954 10.5857
7.8 i i.8.._, a I 1.62,q) I 1.4237 I 1.248'7 I 1.0947 10.9567 10.8334 10.7223
_-. " 7.9 12.0_,..'_ I I.T'/30 I 1.5692 11.3919 I 1.2360 I 1.0963 10.9714 10.8589
8.0 i 12.1613 11.9210 I 1.7147 I !.5352 i 1.3773 I 1.2358 I I. 1094 10.9955
i i/i ¸ i ..... ......................................
i
' TABLE A--4.--Continued.
i'i (c) Sample sizes 21 to28 _';_
i_ Safely Probability, Sample size. N ! ,- •
_, '_ SM 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 '
_! -5.0 0 -3.9429 -3.9629 -3,9816 -3.9993 -4.0160 --4.0318 -4.0468 -4.0612
_, -4.0 0 -3.1338 -3.1502 -3.1656 -3.1801 -3.1938 -3.2068 -3.2192 -3.2310 ' :
-3.0 .0013 -2.3180 -2.3310 "2.3432 -2.3547 -2.3655 -2.3759 -2.3856 -2.3949 "
-2.0 .0227 - 1.4867 - i .4966 - ! .5060 - i .5148 - 1.5231 - ! .53 I0 - 1.5385 - 1.5456 i' ._
- i .0 .1586 -.61-42 - .6222 -.6297 - .6568 - .6434 -.6497 -.6556 - .6613 _
-0 .5000 .3764 .3669 .3581 .3499 .3422 .3350 .3283 .3219 i
. I .5398 .4859 .4759 .4667 .4581 .4501 .4426 .4356 .4289
i .2 .5792 .5974 .5869 .5772 .5682 .5598 .5519 .5446 .5376 :
iili .3 .6179 .710_ .6998 ,6896 .6801 .6713 .6630 .6553 .6480.4 .6354 .8261 : .8145 .8037 .7937 .7844 -_7757 .7676 .7599
[_i'j_'i .5 .6914 .9432 .9308 .9194 .9089 .8991 .8899 .8813 .8733 " i.6 .7257 i.0619 1.0489 1,0368 1.0256 1.0153 .I.0056 .9966 .9881 ;.
.7 .7580 1.1821i.16831,15551.14371.13281.12261.113 1.1041
_i! .8 .7881 !.3038 !.2891 1.2756 1_2632 1.2516 1.2408 1.2307 1.2213.9 .8159 1.4266 1.4111 .3968 .3837 .37 5 .36 1 .3495 .3396 [
,0 ,5 .3 ,5192 ,5053 ,4925 ,4805 1.4588
,1 ,6?56 ,65 , 25 ,6279 ,6,44 157
i._ 1.2 .8849 1.8016 1.7834 1.7667 1.7513 i.7371 1.7238 1.7114 1.6999 !
1.3 .9031 1.9284 ! 1.9093 1.8918 1.8756 1.8606 1.8466 1.8337 1.8215 :.
._ 1.4 .9192 2.0560 2.0359 2.0175 2.0005 1.9848 !.9701 1.9565 1.9438
1.5 .9331 2.1842 2.1631 2.1438 2, i;.bO 2.1095 2.0942 2.0799 2.0666 i
1.6 .9452 2.3130 2.2910 2.2707 2.2521 2.2349 2.2188 2.2039 2.1899 i. "
1.7 .9554 2.4424 2.4194 2,3982 2.3787 2.3607 2.3439 2.3283 2.3, q
i.8 .9640 _ .".723 2.5482 2.5262 2.5058 2.4870 2.4695 2.4532 2.43_J
1.9 .9712 2.7026 2.6775 2,6545 2.6333 2,6137 2.5955 2.5785 2.5626
2.0 .9772 2.8333 2.8072 2.7832 2.7611 2.7407 2.72[7 2.7041 2.6876
2.1 .9821 2.9644 2.9372 2.9123 2.8893 2.8681 2.8483 2.8300 2.8128
2.2 ,9860 3,09_58 3.0675 3.041_ 3.0178 2.9957 2.9753 2.9562 2.9384
2.3 .9892 3.2275 3.1982 3.1713 3.1465 3.1237 3.1024 3.0827 3.0642
2.4 .9918 3.3594 3.3291 3.3012 3.2756 3.2519 3.2298. 3.2094 3,1902
2.5 .9937 3.4917 3.4602 3,4314 3.4048 3.3803 3.3575 3.3363 3.3165
: 2.6 .9953 3.6241 3.5916 3.5617 3.5343 "L5089 3.4853 3.4634 3.4429
_ 2.7 .9965 3.7568 3.7231 3,6923 3.6639 3.6377 3,6134 3.5907 3.5695
i 2.8 .9974 3.8896 3.8549 3,8231 3.7938 3.7667 3.7416 3.7182 3.6963
i 2.9 .9981 4.0226 3.9868 3,9540 3.9237 3,8958 3.8699 3.8458 3.8233
, 3.0 ,9986 4.1558 4,1188 4.0850 4.0538 4,0251 3.9984 3.9735 3.950_
i_Ji 3.1 ,9990 4.2891 4.2510 4,2162 4.1841 4.1544 4.1269 4.1013 4.0775 1 _._
3.2 .9993 4.4225 4.3833 4,3475 4.3145 4.2839 4.2557 4.2293 4.2047
3.3 .9995 4,5560 4.5158 4,4789 4.4449 4.4136 4.3845 4.3574 4,3321
3,4 .9996 4.6897 4.6483 4,6104 4,5755 4,5433 4.5134 4.4856 4,4596
:i__..[ 3,5 ,9997 4.8235 4,7810 4,7420 4,7062 4.6731 4,6424 4.6138 4.58723.6 .9998 4.9573 4.9137 4.8738 4.8370 4.8030 4.7715 4.?422 4.7148
i 3.7 .9998 5.0913 5,0466 I 5,0056 4.9679 4,9330 4,9007 4.8707 4,8426i I
i
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: TABLE A-4.--Continued. _•
i ,
(c) Concluded. _,.. ,
;: Safety Probability Sample size. N
_- margin, /_
:' S,u 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 287 ;
;. 3.8 0.9999 5.2254 5.1'795 5.1375 5.0988 5.8631 5.0300 4.9992 4.9704
! . : 3.9 5.3595 5.3125 5.2695 5.2298 5.1933 5.1593 5.1278 5.0983
i _ 4.0 5.4937 5.4456 5.4015 5.3609 5.3235 5.2887 5.2564 5.2262
_' 4.1 5.6280 5.5787 5.5336 5.4921 5.4538 5.4182 5.3851 5.3542
_- 4.2 5.7623 5.7119 5.6658 5.6233 5.5841 5.5477 5.5139 5.4823
!: 4.3 5.8967 5.E._.52 5.7980 5.7546 5.7145 5.6773 5.6427 5.6104
• '. 4.4 6.0311 5.9785 5.9303 5.8859 5.8449 5.8069 5.7716 5.7386
4.5 6.1657 6. I 119 6.0626 6.0173 5.9754 5.9366 5.9005 5.8668j
E 4.6 6.3002 6.2453 6.19',_ I 6.1487 6.1060 6.0663 6.0295 5.9951
4,7 6.4348 6.3788 6.3./74 J 6.2802 6.2366 6.1961 6.1585 6.1234
4.8 , 6.5695 6.5123 6.4599 6.4117 6.3672 6.3259 6.2875 6.2517 .:.i
4.9 1.0000 6.7042 6.6458 6.5924 6.5433 6.4979 6.4558 6.4166 6.3801 ".!
5.0 6.8389 6.7794 6.7250 6.6748 6.6286 6.5856 6.5457 6.5085 : :
i ._.1 6.9737 6.9131 6.8575 6.8065 6.7593 6.7156 6.6749 6.6369 " _.
i/ 5.2 7.1085 7.0467 6.9902 6.9381 6.8901 6,8455 6.8041 6.7654
5.3 7.2433 7.1804 7.1228 7.0698 7.0209 6.9755 6.9333 6.8939
4 .3782 .31,1 7.25557.20157.15177.10557.o0257.o224
_• 5.5 7.5131 7.4479 7.3882 i 7.3333 7.2826 7.2355 7.1918 7.1510
l!"_• 5.6 7.6480 7.5817 7.5209 I 7.4651 7.4134 7.3656 7.3211 7.2795
5.7 7.7830 7.7155 7.6537 7.5969 7.5443 7.4957 7.4504 7.4081
._ 5.8 7.9180 7.8493 7.7865 7.7287 7.6753 7.6258 7.5797 7.5368
_' 5.9 8.0530 7.9832 7.9193 7.8605 7.8062 7.7559 "/.7091 7.6654
I 6.0 i 8.1880 8.1171 8.0521 7.9924 7.9372 7.8861 7,8385 7.7941
6.1 i 8.3231 8.2510 8.1850 8.1243 8.0682 8.0162 7.9679 7.9228
6.2 I 8.4582 8.3849 8.3179 8.2562 8.1992 8.1464 8.0973 8.0515
_. 6.3 8.5933 8.5189 8.4508 8.3881 8.3303 8.2766 8.2267 8.18o2
6.4 8.7284 8.6529 8.5837 8.5201 8.4613 8.4O09 8.3562 8.3089
8.8635 8.7868 8.7166 8.6520 8.5924 8.5371 8.4857 8.4377
6.5
i 6.6 8.9987 8.9208 8.8496 8.7840 8.7235 8.6674 8.6152 8.5664
i 6.7 9.1338 9.0549 8.9825 8.9160 8.8546 8.7976 8.7447 8.6952
6.8 9.2690 9.1889 9.1155 9.0480 8.9857 8.9279 8.8742 8.8240
6.9 9.4042 9.3230 9.2485 9.1801 q. 1168 9.0582 9.0037 8.9528
i 7.0 9.5395 9.4570 9.3815 9.3121 9.2480 9.188J 9.1333 9.0817
7.1 [ 9.6747 9.5911 9.5146 9.4442 0.3791 9.3189 9.2628 9.2105I
7.2 ! 9.8099 9.7252 9.6476 9.5762 9.5103 9.4492 9.3924 9.3394
i 7.3 9.9452 9.8593 9.7807 9.7083 9.6415 9.5796 9.5220 9.4682
7.4 10,0805 9.9934 9.9137 9.8404 9.7727 9.7099 9.6516 9.5971
i 7.5 10.2158 10.1276 10.0468 I 9.9725 9.9039 9.8403 9.7812 9.7260
, 7.6 10.3511 10.2617 10.1799 [ 10.1046 10.0351 9.9707 9.9108 9.8549'. .7 .4864 .3959 .3130 .2368 i0.1664 I0. !011 10.0404 .9838
7.8 10.6217 10.5300 10.4461 ] 10.3689 10.2976 10,2315 10.1700 10,1127
7.9 10.7570 10.6642 10.5792 10,5010 10.4288 10.3619 10.2997 10.2416I( 8.0 " 10.8924 10.7984 10.7123 10.6332 10.5601 10.4923 10.4293 10,3705
....I 163
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%• TABLE A-4.--Continued.
(d) Samplesizes30 to I00 !...
:. Safely Probability, SmnlPlesize, N _" ._ ,
" " SM 30 40 50 60 70 80 go !00
-5.0 0 -,'.0878 -4.1922 -4.2661 -4.3220 -4.3664 -4.4028 -4.4333 -4.4594
: -4.0 0 -3.2528 -3.3386 -3.3992 -3.4452 -3.4815 -3.5113 -3.5364 -3.5578
-3.0 .0013 -2.4123 -2.4801 -2.5280 -2.5642 -2.5929 -2.6164 -2.6361 -2.6530
-2.0 .0227 - 1.5589 - 1.6105 - 1.6469 - 1.6743 - 1.6960 - 1.7138 - !.7286 - 1.7413
-!.0 .1586 -.6717 -.7122 -.7402 -.7612 -.7777 -.7911 -.8023 -.8118
-0 .5000 .3102 .2664 .2371 .2158 .1993 .1861 .1752 .1660 ::
.1 .5398 .4168 .3713 .3411 .3191 .3022 .2886 .2775 .2681 i
.2 .5792 .5249 .4776 .4462 .4235 .4060 .3921 .3806 .3710
.3 .6179 .6347 .5852 .$526 .5290 .5109 .4965 .4846 .4747
.4 .6554 .7459 .6941 .6600 .6354 .6166 .6017 .$894 .5791
i: -! .5 .6914 .8586 .8042 .7685 .7429 .?233 .?078 .6950 .6843
" _ .6 .7257 .9726 .9154 .8781 .8512 ,8308 .8146 .8014 .7905 _
Ii i .7 .7580 1.0877 1.0277 .9885 .9604 .9391 .9222 .9084 .8968 ; ::
.8 .7881 1.2041 1.1409 1.0998 i.0704 1.0481 1.0304 1.0460 1.0039
.9 .8159 1.3214 !.2550 1.2118 1.1811 1.1577 1.1393 1.1242 I.I!i61
1.0 .8413 ! .4398 ! .5699 !.3246 1.2924 1.2680 1.2487 1.2329 1.2198 _ -
!. i .8643 1.5589 ! .4855 1.4381 ! .4043 1.3787 1.3586 1.3421 1.3284 :
1.2 ,8849 1.6788 1.6018 !.5520 1.5167 1.4900 1.4689 1.4518 1.4374
1.3 .9031 1.7994 1.7187 1.6666 1.6296 i.6017 i.5797 1.5618 !.5468 _" : -
1.4 .9192 1.9206 1.8361 !.7816 i.7429 1.7138 !.6908 1.6721 i.6566
!.5 .9331 2.0423 1.9539 1.8970 i.8566 1.8262 1.8023 !.7828 !.7666
1.6 .9452 2.1645 2.0722 2.0127 1.9707 1.9390 i .9140 1.8938 1.8769 •
1.7 .9354 2.2873 2.1908 2.1289 2.0851 2.0521 2.0261 2.0050 i.9874
1.8 .9640 2.4104 2.3099 2.2453 2.1997 2.1654 2.1384 2.1164 2.0981
1.9 .9712 2.5338 2.4292 2.3620 2.3146 2.27b'9 2.2509 2.2281 2.2091
2.0 .97"12 2.6576 2.5488 2.4790 2.4297 2.3927 2.3635 2.3399 2.3202
2.1 .9821 2.7817 2.6686 2.5962 2.5451 2.5066 2.4764 2.4519 2,4314
2.2 .9860 2.9061 2.7887 2.7136 2.6606 2.6207 2.3894 2.5640 2.3428
2.3 .9892 3.0307 2.9090 2.8312 2.7763 2.7350 2.7026 2.6763 2.6544
2.4 .9918 3.15-55 3.0295 2.9489 2.8921 2,8494 2.8159 2.7887 2.7661
2.5 .9937 3.2905 3.1502 3.0669 3.0081 2.9640 2.9293 2.9012 2.8778
2.6 .9953 3.4058 3.2710 3.1849 3.1243 3.0787 3.0429 3.0139 2.9897
2.7 .9965 3.5311 3.3920 3.3031 3,2405 3.1935 3.1565 3,1266 3.1017
2.8 .9974 3.6567 3.$131 3.4214 3.3568 3.3083 3.2703 3.2394 3.2137
2.9 .9981 3.7824 3.6344 3,5398 3,4733 3.4233 3.3841 3.3523 3.3258
3.0 .9986 3.9082 3:7557 3.6583 3.$898 3.5384 3.4980 3.4653 3.4380
; 3, I .9990 4.0341 3.8771 3.7769 3.7064 3.6535 3.6120 3,$783 3.5503
: 3.2 .9993 4.1601 3.9987 3.8956 3,8231 3,7687 3.7260 3 6914 3.6626
_ i 3.3 .9995 4.2863 4.1203 4.0144 3.9399 3,8840 3.8401 3.8045 3.7750 ,
l 3.4 .9996 4.4125 4,2420 4.1332 4.0567 3.9993 3.9542 3.9177 3.8874
3,5 ,9997 4.5388 4.3638 4,2521 4.1736 4. ! 147 4.0684 4.0310 3,9998 J
3.6 ,9998 4,6652 4.4856 4.3711 4.2905 4.2301 4.1827 4.1443 4.1123
3.7 .9998 4.7917 4,6075 4.4901 4.4075 4,3456 4.2970 4.2576 4.2249
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:, I TABLEA-4..-Concluded.
__ Snf_ p.t_ s_pJe_, N
_ margin. P, I
sH 3o I 4o 5o 6o 7o so 9o 100
I
_" 3.8 0.9999 4.9182 4.7295 .4.6092 4.5246 4.461! 4.4114 4.3710 4.3375
•: 3.9 $.0448 4.8515 4.7283 4.6417 4.5767 4.5257 4.4844 4.43Ol
-_ 4.0 5.1715 4.9736 4.8475 4.7588 4.6923 4.6402 4.5979 4.5628
• 4. ! 5.2982 $.0938 4 9667 4,8760 4.8080 4.7546 4.7114 4.6755
4.2 5.4250 $.2179 5.0860 4.9932 4.9237 4.8691 4.8249 4.7882
4.3 $.$$19 5.3402 5.2053 5.1105 5.0394 4.9836 4.9385 4.9009
• " 4.4 $.6788 $.4624 5.3246 5.2278 5,1551 $.0082 5.0520 5.0137
_':'' 4.5 5.8057 5.5847 5.4440 5.3431 5.2?09 3.2128 3.1656 5.1265
_- - 4.6 .5.9327 $.7071 5.5634 5.4624 3.386? 3.32?4 5.2?93 5.2393
r-: 4.7 _ 6.059"/ $.8294 5.0828 $.5798 $.50_ 5.4420 5.3929 $.3521
• i 4.8 _ 6.1867 5.9519 5.8023 5.6972 5.6184 5.5566 5.5066 5,46.50
t 4.9 !.0030 6.3138 6.0743 5.9218 5.8146 5.7343 5.6713 $.rQ03 5.57?9
5.0 6.4409 6.1968 6.0413 $.9321 $.8502 $.7860 $.734O $.6OM r:_":_:_ _ s.! ._1 .31. .1_ 6.0405 _._! 5.9307 5u77 5._7 _
5.2 6.6952 6.4418 6.2804 6.1670 6.0820 6.0154 5.9614 5.9166 : i/
5.3 6.8224 6.5643 6.4000 6.2845 6.1980 6.1302 6.0752 6.029_ _ I
5.4 6.9497 6.6869 6.5196 6.4021 6.3140 6.2449 6.1890 - 6.1425 •
S.S I 7.0769 6.809.5 6.6392 6.5196 6.4300 6.3597 6.3O_8 6,2555
i 7.2042 6.9321 6.7588 6.6372 6.5460 6.4745 6.4166 6.36,q5$.6
i 5.7 _ 7.3315 7.0547 6.8785 6.7548 6,6620 6.5893 6.5304 6.4815
5.8 ,i 7.4588 7.1774 6.9982 6.8723 6.7780 6.7041 6.6442 6.5945 :"_i
" 5.9 ,i 7.5862 7.3000 7.1179 6.9900 6.8941 6.8189 6.7581 6.7075 [/i
6.0 7.7136 7.4227 7.2376 7.1076 7.0101 6.9338 6.8719 6.8205
6.1 7.8409 7.._54 7.3573 7.2252 7.1262 7.0486 6.9858 6.9336
__ 6.2 : 7.9683 7.6o81 7.4770 7.3429 7.2423 7.1635 7.0996 7.0466 _"
6.3 8.0958 7.7908 7.5968 7.4605 7.3584 7.2784 7.2135 7.1597
i ' I 6.4 8.2232 7.913_ 7.716_ 7.5782 7.4745 7.3932 7.3274 7.2727 "
6.5 8.35_ 8.0363 7.'3 7.0959 7.5906 7.5081 7.4413 7.3858 .;
. 6.6 8e4781 8.1591 7.956, 7.8|36 7.70_8 7.6230 7.5552 7.49_9
•, ,= ,4o. ..,..o..o =..
!7.0 8,9_1 8.6,503 8.4354 8.2844 8.1714 8.0827 8.0109 7.95137. i 9. ! 157 8.7731 8.5552 8.4022 8.2875 8.1977 8.1249 8.0644
7,2 9.2432 8.8960 8.6750 8.5199 8.4037 8.3126 8,2388 8.1776 [
7.3 9.3708 9.0188 8.7949 8.6377 8.5199 8.4276 8.3528 8.2907 I
7.4 9.4983 9.1417 8.9147 8.7554 8,636! 8.5425 _8.4608 8.4038 I '_
7.5 9.6259 9.2645 9.0346 8.8732 8.7523 8.6575 8.5807 8.5170
7.6 9.7535 9.3874 9.1545 8.9910 8.8685 8.7725 8.6947 8.63O;
._.- 7.7 9.8811 9.5103 9.2744 9.1088 8.9847 8.8874 8.8087 8.7433
7.8 10.0087 9.6332 9.3943 9.2266 9.1009 9.0024 8.9227 8.8564
7.9 10.1363 9.7361 9.5142 9.3444 9.2171 9.1174 9.0367 8.9696
_-__,-_ t 8.0 ', 10,2639 9.8790 9.6341 9A622 9.3334 9.2324 9,ffd)7 9.0828
!i,. i
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i"_ TABLE A-5.'SAFETY MARGINS AT 90-PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL I_ "__I':_:__"
Safely Probabilily. Samplesize. N
margin, Px
r $, 5 6 7 8 9 I0 i I 12
i I i -5.0 0 -3.5162 -3.6140 -3.6932 -3.7586 -3.8146 -3.8623 -3.9045 -3.9418
-4.0 0 -2.7824 -2.8627 -2.9278 -2.9816 -3.0276 -3.0669 -3.1016 -3,1323
• ! -3.0 .0013 -2.0381 -2.1018 -2,1535 -2.1962 -2.2327 -2.2640 -2.2915 -2.3159
-2.g .0227 - 1:,2682 - 1.3178 - 1,3578 - i .3910 - i .4192 - i .4435 - 1.4647 - 1.4835
:, - 1.0 .1586 i ".4225 --.4673 - ,5023 -.5312 -.5548 -.5752 - .5927 -.6082
_i' -0 .5000 = .6857 .6023 ,5439 .5000 .4657 .4373 .4137 .3936
I
.I . 398 .8218 .730 ,6665 .619 .5822 .5518 .526 .505.'*
:j_ .2 ,5792 .9632 .8623 ,7930 .7412 .7014 I .6689 .6420 .6193
_:":i .3 .6179 1.1098 .9984 ,9229 .8664. .8234 .7885 .7598 .7"J55 "
_'i_ .4 .6554 1.2615 I,.1385 I.I)557 .9946 ,9481 .9105 .8797 .8537
": |_ .5 .6914 1,41" |.2817 i.|912 1.12.e_ 1.0750 i.0347 1.0016 ,9739
_"_: I .6 .72_7 1.5762 1.42_2 1.3296 |.2591 !.2"3 i.1610 1.12._ 1.0960
•8 .7881 i.9057 i .7301 ! ,6147 1.5321 1.4693 1.4196 1.3789 1.3451 y,:
___ _7 ii'.• ! 1.0 ._13 2.2475 2.o422 I._7 1.8127 |:7412 i._3 i.6381 1.5997! I.I ,8643 2.4221 2.2010 2,0578 1.9558 1.8792 !.8186 1.7695 1.7288 ....., 1.2 .8849 2.5988 2.3615 2.2085 2.1003 2.0184 1.9542 1.9021 1.85901.3 .9031 2.7769 2.5237 2.3605 2.2460 2,1589 2.0908 2,0357 1.9901
_ i 1.4 .9192 2.9_4 2.6871 2,5138 2.3923 2.3003 2.2283 2.1701 2.1220 _;i:5 , 33! 3 1372 8518 .6681 5396 4426 3666 3052 2.2546 t
! _ 1.6 .9452 313192 3.0175 2,8234 2.6878 2.5857 2.5057 2.4411 2.3879 !|
i 1.7 .9554 3.5024 3.1841 2,97_5 2.8367 2.7296 2.6454 2.5776 2.5217 [
1.8 .9640 3.6868 3.3516 3,1Y_'_ 2.9863 2.8740 2.7857 2.7147 2.6562
1.9 .9712 3.8720 3.5198 3,2938 3.1366 3.0189 2.9265 2.8522 2.7910 ! iI I
2.0 .9772 4.0580 3.6886 3.4519 3.2873 3.1643 3.0678 2.9902 2.9262 , <
2.1 .9821 4.2446 3.8580 3,6105 3.4386 3,310J 3.2095 3.1285 3.0619 i -_',
2.2 .9860 4.4318 4.02.79 3.7696 3.5903 3.4503 3.3515 3.2672 3.1979
2,3 .9892 4.6195 4,1983 3,9292 3,7424 3,6029 3,4940 3,4063 3,3.341 _ i_
2,4 ,9918 4.80764.36914,08913.89483,74993.63673.54563.4707 [_,
t
; 2.$ ._37 4._2 4._3 4.2493 4._76"' 3,_71 3,7797" 3.6_2 3._6 _
i 2.6 .9953 5.1851 4.7118 4,4099 4.2006 o,..0446 3.9230 3.8251 3.7446 ]
2.7 ,9965 5.3742 4.8836 4.5707 4.3539 4.1924 4.0665 3.9652 3.8819
! ]2.8 ,9974 5.5636 5.0557 4,7318 4.5075 4.3404 4.2102 4.1054 4.01942.9 ,9981 5.7532 5.2281 4,8931 4,6613 4.4886 4.3541 4.2459 4.1570 _ :'
! 3.0 ,9986 5.9431 $,4007 5,0547 4.8152 4.6870 4.4982 4,3865 4.2948 I3.1 ,999_, 6.1332 $.5735 5,2164 4.9694 4,7855 4.6425 4.5273 4.4328
3,2 ,9993 6.3236 5.7465 5.3784 5,1237 4.9342 4,7869 4,6683 4.5709 iI'_I''
3.4 ,9996 6.7049 6.0931 5.7027 5,4328 5,2321 5.0761 4.9505 4.8475
I_ 3.5 ,9997 6,8958 6.2666 5.8651 5.5876 5.3812 5.2209 5.0918 4.9859
3.6 ,9_'_8 7.0869 6.4402 6.0276 5,7.425 5.5305 $.3658 5.2332 5.1245 i3.7 ,9998 7.2781 6.6140 6.1903 5.8975 5.6798 5.5108 5.3747 5,2631
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TABLE A-5.--Continued. i
_;. t (a) Concluded. t.
!.._ Safety Probability, Sample size, N
sj, 5 6 7 8 9 !0 II 12
_ 3.8 0.9999 7.4694 6.7879 6.3531 6.0526 5.8293 5.6559 5.5163 5.4018
• 3.9 7.6609 6.9619 6.5159 6.2078 5.9"/88 5.8011 5.6580 5.5406
4.0 7.8525 7.1360 6.6789 6.3631 6.1284 5.9464 5.7998 5.6795
_ 4.1 8.0442 7.3102 6.8419 6.51&q 6.2751 6.0917 5.9416 5.8185
i,
_: 4.2 8.2360 7.4845 7,00_1 6.6740 6.4279 6.2371 6.0835 5.9575
_- 4.3 8.4279 7.6589 7.1683 6.8295 6.5778 6.3826 6.2254 6.0965
.. z 4.4 18.6199 7.8334 7.3316 6.9851 6.7277 6.5282 6.3675 6.235745 8810 7.4949 6.6738 6.3749i46 ,o0,1 8.18267.65, 7.02776.8194,65176.5141
: _ 4.7 9.1963 8.3572 7.8219 7.4523 7.1778 6.9651 6.7938 6.6534 t"
"-' I 4.8 ,, 9.3886 8.5320 7.9854 7.6082 7.3280 7. !109 6.9361 6.792.7
" _ 4.9 1.0000 9.5809 8.7068 8.1490 7.7641 7.4782 7.2.567 7.0783 6.9321 I
:_• 5.0 9.7734 8.8816 8.3127 7.9200 7.6284 7.4025 7.2206 7.0715 i.
il i 5. I 9.9658 9.0566 8.4764 8.0760 7.7787 7.5484 7.3630 7.2109: _ 5.2 10.1584 9.2315 8.6401 8.2320 7.9290 7.6944 7.5054 7.35045.3 10.3509 9/_]65 8.8039 8.3881 8.0794 7.8403 7.6478 7.4900
_. 5.4 10.5436 9.5816 8.9677 8.5442 8.2298 7.9863 ?.7902 7.6295
_i 5.5 10.7362 9.7567 9.1316 8.7004 8.3802 8.1324 7.9327 7.7691, " 6 9289 9318 2955 8566 53 7 .278 8 0752 .9087
,_ 5.7 11.1217 10,!070 9.4595 9.0128 8.6812 8.4245 8.2178 8.0483
| 5.8 I! .3145 10.2822 9;6235 9.1691 8.8318 8.5706 8.3603 8.1880
| _.9 11._3 10.4574 9.7875 9.3253 8.9823 8.7168 8.50_9 8.3277
I 6.0 11.7002 10.6327 9.9515 9.4817 9.1329 8.8630 8.6456 8.46741 ii.8931 8080 10 1156 6380 2835 9.0092 7882 60 1
6.2 12.0860 10.9833 10.2797 9.7944 9.4342 9.15.54 8.9309 8.7469
6.3 12.2'790 I i. 1587 10.4438 9.9508 9.5848 9.3016 9.0736 8.88666.4 12.4720 I 1.3341 !0 6079 10.1072 9.7355 9.4479 9.2163 9.02646.5 12.6650 I1.5095 10.772 1 10.2636 9 8862 9.5942 9.3590 9.1662
6.6 12.8581 11.6849 10.9363 10.4201 10.0869 9.7405 9.5017 9.3061
| 6.7 13.05 12 1i.8604 I I. 1005 10.5765 10.1877 9.8868 9.6445 9.4459
6.8 13.2443 12.0359 I 1.2648 10.7330 10.3385 10.0332 9.7873 9.5858
6.9 13.4374 12.2114 11.4290 10.8896 10.4892 10.1795 _ 9.9301 9.7257
7.0 13.6305 12.3869 11.5933 11.0461 10.6400 10.3259 10.0729 9.8656
7. I 13.8237 12,5625 I 1.7576 I1,2026 10.7909 10.4723 10.2157 10.0055
7.2 14.0169 12.7380 [ 1.9219 i 1.3592 10.9417 10.6187 10.3585 10.1454
7.3 14.2101 12.9136 12.0863 1!.5158 I1.0925 10.7651 10.5014 10,2853
I 7.4 14.4033 13.0892 12.2506 I 1.6724 I1.2434 10.9116 10.6443 10.42537.5 14.$966 13.2648 12.4150 11.8290 I1.394_ 1!.0580 10.7_72 10.5652
7.6 14.7899 13.4405 12.5794 I1,9857 i 1.5,_52 I 1.2045 10.9300 10.7052
7.7 |4.9831 13.6161 12.7437 12.1423 I1.6961 ! 1,3509 ! 1.0729 10,8452
7,8 15.1764 13.7918 12.9082 12,2990 11,8470 11.4974 11.2159 10.9852
7.9 15,3698 13.9675 13.0726 12.4556 11.9979 I i,6439 11.3588 11.1252
8.0 ', 15.5631 14.1432 13.2370 12.6123 12.1488 i ! .7904 I 1.5017 11.2652
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"I_,-I TABLEA-5.--Conttnued.
: (b) Samplesizes 13 to 20 I _- 1
: Safety Probabilip], Samplesize, A'
margin, Px " ' _
$_ 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-5.0 0 -3.9752 -4.00,54 -4.0328 -4.6579 -4,0809 -4.1023 -4.1221 -4.1406 :_"
-4.0 0 -3.1598 -3,1846 -3,2072 -3,2278 -3.2468 -3.2643 -3,2806 -3.2958 i *__,
-3.0 .0013 -2.3377 -2.3574 -2.3753 -2.3916 -2.4067 -2.4206 -2,4335 -2.445_1 d
-2.0 .0227 - 1.5003 - 1.5155 - !.$293 - 1.3419 - 1.5534 - !.5641 - !.5739 - 1.5831 '
• -1.0 .1586 -.6220 -.6343 -.6455 -.6556 -.6649 -.6734 -.6813 -.6886
"0 .5000 .3762 .3609 .3473 .3351 .3242 .3143 .3052 .2969
.1 .5398 .4869 .4707 .4564 .4436 .4321 .4217 .4123 .4036 T. _:,
.2 ,5792 ,5997 .5826 .5675 .5540 .54.19 .5310 .5210 .5119
.3 .6179 ,7146 .6964 .6804 .6662 .6534 .6419 .6314 .6218 :
.4 .6554 .8315 .8122 .7952 .7801 3666 ,7544 .7433 .7332
•,_ .5 .6914 .9502 .9296 .9116 ..56 .8813 .8684 .8566 .8460 ! _
" i .6 .72_t7 1.0707 1.0488 !.0296 1.0126 .9975 .9838 .9714 .9601 [
.7 .7580 i,1927 !.1694 1.1490 1.1310 I.ii49 1,1004 I.OID3 1.0753 ' r d_
-.... .8 .7881 1.3163 i.29!5 1.2698 i.2507 i.2336 !.2182 i.2044 1.1917 _i_
.9 .8159 1,441i 1.4148 1.3918 1.3715 1.3534 1.3372 1.3225 !.3091 _ ._
i.0 .8413 1,5673 1.5393 1.5149 1.4935 1.4744 1.4572 !.4416 1.4275 _ i_
I.I .8643 1.6944 1.6648 !.6390 1.6163 1.5962 1.5780 !.5616 i.5467 _ "_
1.2 .8849 1,8225 i.7913 1.7640 1.7401 1.7188 1.6996 1.6824 !.6667
i
I 1.3 .9031 1,9516 1.9186 1.8899 !.8646 !.8422 1.8220 !.8038 1.7873i.4 .9192 2,0814 2.0466 2.0164 1.9,8 i .9662 1.9450 1.9259 1.9086 i "_
1.5 .9331 2.2119 2.1753 2.1435 2.1156 2.0908 2.0686 2.0485 2.0303 ! ,
1.6 .9452 2,3430 2.3046 2.2712 2.2420 2.2160 2.1927 2.1716 2.1526 ,t
1.7 .9554 2,4747 2.4344 2.3995 2.3688 2.3416 2.3172 2.2952 2.2753 _,, '
1.8 .9640 2,6069 2.5648 2.5282 2.4962 2.4677 2.4422 2.4192 2.3984 !I
!.9 .9712 2.7395 2.6955 2.6573 2.6238 2.5942 2.,5675 2.5435 2.5218 _
2.0 .9772 2,8725 2.8266 2.7868 2.7519 2.7210 2.6932 2.6682 2.6456
2.1 .982! 3.0059 2.9580 2.9166 2.88_ 2.8480 2.8191 2.7931 2.7696
2.2 .9860 3.1396 3.0898 3.0467 3.0089 2.9754 2.9454. 2.9183 2.8939
2.3 ,9892 3,2736 3.2219 3.1771 3,1378 3.1031 3.0719 3.0438 3.0184
2.4 .9918 3,4079 3.3542 3.3077 3.2670 3.2309 3.1986 3.1695 3.1432 ..
2.5 .9937 3,5424 3.4867 3.4385 3.3963 3.3590 3.3255 3.2954 3.2681
2.6 .9953 3,6771 3.6195 3.5696 3.5259 3.48?3 3.4526 3.4214 3.3932
2.7 .9965 3,8121 3.7525 3.7009 3.6557 3.6157 3.5799 3.5476 3.5185
2.8 .9974 3,9472 3.88,56 3.8323 3.7856 3.7444 3.7073 3.6740 3.6439
2.9 .9981 4,0825 4.0189 3.9639 3.9157 3.8731 3.8349 3.8005 3.7695
3.0 .9986 4,2179 4.1523 4.0986 4.0459 4.0020 3.9626 3.9272 3.,52
3.1 .9090 4.3535 4.2859 4.2275 4.1763 4.1310 4.0904 4.0539 4.0209
3.2 .9993 4.4"3 4.4197 4.3594 4.3067 4.2602 4.2183 4.1808 4.1468 t _
"" 3.3 .9995 4,6251 4.5535 4.4915 4.4373 4.3894 4.3464 4.3078 4.2728 (|_ *"_'_.4 . _ .761 .6874 .6237 .5680 .5187 .4745 .434 .39"
'm35 4.1 4821, 4.69884.64,1 4.56194.5251
._._._. 3.6 .9998 5.0333 4.9556 4.8884 4.8296 4.7777 4.7310 4.6892 4.6513: _,,.7 ._8 .1695 5.0898 5.0209 .9605 ,9072 .8594 .816' .7775 i - "
1.cl.q2r}' R919_179
,[Y iii :ii!i....... iiiii":i __±_±___......
_ _ TABLEA-5.--Continued.
" (b) Concluded.
Safety Probability Samplesize, R" ,_ .s-
i) . margin, Px$.V 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -
3.8 0.9999 5.3059 5.2241 5.1534 5.0916 5.0369 4.9879 4.9438 4.9040
! 3.9 5.4423 5.3585 5.2860 5.2226 5.1666 5. ! 164 5.0712 5.0305 '
4.0 5.5798 5.4929 5.4187 5.3538 5.2964 5.2449 5.1987 5.1570
4. 4.1 5.7153 5.6274 5.5514 5.4850 5.4263 5.3736 5.3263 5.2835
_ 4.2 5.8519 5.7620 5.6842 5.6162 5,5362 5.5022 5.4539 5.4101
_!_ i 4.3 5.9886 5.8966 5.8171 5.7475 5.6861 5.6310 5.5815 5.5368 r
- 'i 4.4 6.1253 6.0313 5.9500 5.8789 5.8161 5.7598 5.7092 5.6635
4.5 _ 6.2621 6.1660 6.0829 6.0103 5.9461 5.8886 5.8369 5.7902 ]
" 4.6 6.3989 6.3008 6.2159 6.1418 6.0762 6.0174 5.9647 5.9170 f4.7 6.5358 6.4356 6.3490 6.2733 6.2064 6.1463 6.t)925 6.0438 ._
4.8 6.6727 6.5704 6.459! 6.4048 6.3365 6.2743 6.2203 6.1707
:_" -, 4.9 1.0000 6.8096 6.7053 6.6152 6.5364 6.4667 6.4043 6.3482 6.2975
5.0 6.9466 6.8402 6,7483 6.6680 6.5970 6.5333 6.4761 6.4245
: 5.1 7.0836 6.9752 6.8815 6.7996 6.7272 6.6623 6.6040 6.5514 ::
5.2 7.2207 7.1102 7.0147 6.9313 6.8575 6.7914 6.7320 6.6784 I
5.3 7.3578 7.2452 7,1480 7.0630 6.9878 6.9205 6.8600 6.8054
5.4 7.4949 7.3803 7.2813 7.1947 7.1182 7.0496 6.9880 6.9324 I
5.5 7.6321 7.5154 7.4146 7.3264 7.2486 7.1787 7.1160 7.0594
5.6 7.7693 7.6505 7.5479 7.4582 7.3790 7.3079 7.2441 7.1865
5.7 7.9065 7.7836 7.6813 7.5900 7.5094 7.4371 7.3722 7,3136
5.8 8.0437 7.9208 7.8146 7.7218 7.63 8 7.5663 7.5003 7.4407I
5.9 i 8.1809 8.0560 7.9480 7.8537 7.7703 7.6955 7.6284 7.5678
6.0 8.3182 8.1912 8.0815 7.9855 7.9008 7.8248 7.7566 7.6960
6.1 8.4555 8.3264 8.2149 8.1174 8.0313 7.9540 7.8847 7.8221
6." 8.5928 8.4617 8.3484 8.2493 8.1618 8.0833 8.0129 7.9493
6.3 8.7302 8.59_9 8.4818 8.3812 8.2924 8.2126 8,1411 8.0765
6.4 8.8675 8.7322 8.6153 8.5131 8.4229 8.3420 8.2693 8.2037
6.5 9.0049 8.8675 8.7488 8.6451 8.5535 8.4713 8.3975 8.3309
6.6 9.1423 9.0028 8.8824 8.7771 8.6841 8.6006 8.5258 8.4582
; 6.7 9.2797 9.1382 9.0159 8.9090 8.8147 8.7300 8.6540 8.5854
'7 6.8 9,4171 9:2735 9,1495 9.0410 8.9453 8.8594 8.7823 8.7127l
6.9 9,$546 9.4089 9.2830 9.1730 9.0759 8.9888 8.9106 8.8400
( 7.0 9.6920 9.5443 9.4166 9.3051 9.2065 9,1182 9.0389 8.9672
: 7.1 9.8295 9.6797 9.5502 9.4371 9.3372 9,2476 9.1672 9.0045
7.2 9.9670 9.8151 9.6838 9.5691 9.4679 9.3770 9.2955 9.2219
'_ 7.3 10.1045 9.9505 9.8175 9.7012 9.5985 9.5064 9.4238 9.3492
7.4 10.2a20 10.0859 9.9511 9.8333 9.7292 9,6359 9.5521 9.4765
7.5 10.3795 10.2213 10.0847 9.9653 9.8599 9.7653 9.6805 9.6038 "
... 7.6 10.5170 10.3568 10.2184 10.0974 9.9906 9.8948 9.8088 9.7312
7.7 10.6546 10.4923 10.3521 10.2295 10.1213 10.0243 8.8372 9.8585
7.8 i 10.7921 10.6277 10.4857 10.3616 10.2521 10.1538 10.0656 9,9859
7.9 [ 10.9297 10.7632 10.6194 10.4938 10.3828 10.2833 10.1940 10.1133
---_-, 8.0 _ ! 1.0872 10.8987 10.7531 10.6259 10.5135 10.4128 10.3223 10.2407
t
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: TABLE A-5.--Continued.
;- (c) Samplesizes 21 to 28 1
_ .
' ISafety Probability. Sample size. N ,
i m,gi. -
SM 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
L -5.0 0 -4.1579 -4.1740 -4.1893 -4.2036 -4.2172 -4.2300 -4.2422 -4.2538
-4.0 0 -3.3100 -3.3233 -3.3358 -3.34"_ -3.3587 -3.3693 -3.3793 -3.3888
_ -3.0 .0013 -2.4568 -2.4673 -2.4772 -2.4865 -2.4954 -2.5037 -2.5116 -2.5192
-2.0 .0227 - 1.5917 - 1.5998 - I. (_T/3 - i .6145 - 1.6212 - ! .6276 - 1.6336 - 1.6393
_ - !.0 .1586 -.6954 -.7017 -.7077 -.7133 -.7186 -.7235 -.7283 -.7327
. " 0 .5000 .2893 .2821 .2755 .2694 .2636 .2582 .2531 .2483
•i .5398 .3956 .3882 .3813 .3749 .3689 .3633 .3580 .3530
.2 .5792 .5035 .4958 .4886 .4819 .4757 .4698 .4643 .4591
- .3 .6i79 .6130 .6049 .5973 .5903 .5837 .5776 .5719 .5664
_ _ .4 .6554 .7239 .7153 .7074 .7000 .6931 .6867 .6807 .6750 I
.5 .69t4 .8362 .8271 .8188 .8110 .8037 .7970 .7906 .7847 J
": .6 .7257 .9497 .9402 .9314 .9232 .9155 .9084 .9017 .8955 !ii
_" .7 .7580 1,0644 1.0543 1.0450 1.0364 1.0283 1.0208 1.0138 1.0072
•8 .7881 1.1802 1,1695 !.1597 1.1506 1.1421 1.1342 1.1269 1.1199
: 9 8159 .2969 2857 27 4 2658 2568 2485 2407 i.2334
i_ 1.0 .8413 1.4146 1.4028 1.3919 1.3818 1.3724 1.3636 1.3554 1.3477 "
1.1 .8643 1.5331 1.5207 i.5092 1.4985 1.4886 1.4794 1.4708 1.4627
f;: 1.2 .8849 1.6524 1.6392 1.6271 1.6159 1.6055 1.5959 1.5868 i.5783
t i.3 .9031 1.7723 1.7585 1.7457 1.7340 1.7231 !.7129 1.7034 1.6945 I
1.4 .9192 1.8927 1.8783 1.8649 1.8526 i.8411 1.8305 !.8205 i.8112 !
!.5 .9331 2.0137 i.9985 1.9846 1.9716 1.9596 1.9485 1.9380 !.9283
1.6 .9452 2.1352 2. 1193 2.1047 2.0911 2.0786 2°0669 2.0560 2.0458
1.7 .9554 2.2571 2.2405 2.2252 2.2111 2.1979 2.1857 2.1743 2.1637
I. 1.8 .9640 2.3794 2.3621 2.3461 2.3313 2.3176 2.3049 2.2930 2.2819
1.9 .9712 2.5021 2.4839 2.4673 2.4519 2.4376 2.4244 2.4120 2.4004
2.0 .9772 2.6250 2.6061 2.5888 2.5728 2.5579 2.5441 2.5312 2.5192
2.1 .9821 2.7482 2.7286 2.7105 2._939 2.6784 2.6641 2.6507 2.6382
2.2 .9860 2.8716 2.8513 2.8325 2.8152 2.7992 2.7843 2.7704 2.7574
2.3 .9892 2.9953 2.9742 2.9547 2.9368 2.9202 2.9047 2.8903 2.8768
2.4 .9918 3. 1192 3.0973 3.0772 3.0586 3.0413 3.0253 3.0104 2.9964
2.5 .9937 3.2433 3.2206 3.1998 3.1805 3.1627 3.1461 3.1306 3.1162
2.6 .9953 3.3676 3.3441 3.3225 3.3026 3.2842 3.2670 3.2510 3.2361
2.7 .9965 3.4920 3.4677 3.4454 3.4249 3.4058 3.3881 3.3716 3.3561
2.8 .9974 3.6165 3.5915 3.5685 3.5472 3.5276 3.5093 3.4922 3.4763
2.9 .9981 3.7412 3.7154 3.6916 3.6697 3.6495 3.6306 3.6130 3.5966
3.0 .9986 3.8660 3.8394 3.8149 3.7924 3.7714 3.7520 3.7339 3.7170
3.1 .9990 3.9909 3.9635 3.9383 3.9151 3.8935 3.8735 3.8549 3.8374
3.2 .9993 4.1160 4.0877 4.0618 4.0379 4.0157 3.9951 3.9759 3.9580
3.3 .9995 4.2411 4.2120 4.1854 4.1608 4.1380 4.1168 4.0971 4.0786
e 3.4 .9996 4.3663 4.3364 4.3090 4.2838 4.2603 4.2386 4.2183 4.1994
'_ 3.5 .9997 4.4916 4.4609 4.4328 4.4068 4.3828 4.3604 4.3396 4.3201
_"_- :-i 3.6 .9998 4.6169 4.5855 4.5566 4.5299 4.5053 4.4823 4.4610 4.4410
3.7 .9998 4.7423 4.7101 4.6805 4.6531 4.6278 5.6043 4.5824 4.5619
it¸ . i
!, _. FABLE A-5.--Continued. i _
i _ i (c) Concluded. ;
i 2/1
_: . Safety Probability. Sample size. N
.--* _ margin, P, .'
3.8 0.9999 4.8678 4.8348 4.8044 4.7764 4.7504 4.7263 4.7039 4.6829
" 3.9 4.9934 4.9595 4.9284 4.8997 4.8731 4.3484 4.8254 4.8039
4.0 5.1190 5.0843 5.0524 5.0231 4.9958 4.9706 4.9470 4.9250
4. i 5.2447 5.2091 5.1765 5.1465 5.1186 5.0927 5.0686 5.0461
-- 4.2 5.3704 5.3340 5.3007 5.2699 5.2414 5.2150 5.1903 5.1673 !
• . 4.3 5.4961 5.4596 5.4259 5.3934 5.3643 5.3372 5.3120 5.2885
:. ' 4.4 5.6219 5.5840 5.5491 5.5170 5.4872 5.4595 5.4338 5.4097 ":!J
,_.:.'" 4.5 5.7478 5.7090 5.6734 5.6405 5.6101 5.5819 5.5556 5.5310
. 4.6 5.8737 5.8340 5.7977 5.7641 5.7331 5.7043 5.6774 5.6523
4.7 5.-¢996 5.9591 5.9220 5.8878 5.8561 5.8267 5.7992 5.7736
4.8 6.1255 6.0843 6.0464 6.0115 5.9791 5.9491 5.9211 5.8950
4.9 1.0000 6.2515 '6.2094 6.1708 6.1352 6.1022 6.0716 6.0430 6.0164
.:. : 5.0 6.3775 6.3346 6.2952 6.2589 i 6.2253 6.1941 6.1650 6.1378 _
5. I 6.5035 6.4598 6.4197 6.3827 I 6.3484 6.3166 6.2869 6.2592 '_
:" - 5.2 &6296 6.5851 6.5442 6.5065 6.4716 6.4391 6.4089 6.3807
.. 5.3 6.7557 6.7103 6.6687 : 6.6303 6.5947 6.5617 6.5309 6.5022
5.4 6.8818 6.8356 6.7932 I 6.7541 I 6.7179 6.6843 6.6530 6.6237 :i
__. 5.5 7.0080 6.9609 6.9178 6.8780 6.8411 6.8069 6.7750 6.7452 i
5.6 7 1341 7.0863 7.0423 7.0019 6.9644 6.9295 6.8971 6.8668
5.7 7.2603 7.2116 7.1669 7. i 257 7.0876 7.0522 7.0192 6.9883 "
5.8 I 7.3865 7.3370 7.2916 7.2497 7.2109 7.1749 7.1413 7.1099
5.9 7.5127 7.4624 7.4162 7.3736 7.3342 7.2975 7.2634 7.2315
6.0 7.6390 7.5878 7.5408 7.4975 7.4575 7.4202 7.3856 7.3531
_ 6.1 7.7652 7.7132 7.6655 I 7.6215 7.5808 7.5430 7.5077 7.4748
i 6.2 7.8915 7.8387 7.7902 7.7455 7.7041 7,6657 7.6299 7.5964
_. 6.3 8.0178 7.9641 7.9149 7.8695 7.8275 7.7884 7.7521 7.7181
6.4 8.1441 8.0896 8.0396 7.9935 7.9508 7.9112 7.8743 7.8398
6.5 8.2704 8.2151 8.1643 8.1175 8.0742 8.0340 7.9965 7.9614
i 6.6 8.3967 8.3406 8.2891 8.2415 8.1976 8.1567 8.1187 8.0831 [
6.7 8.5231 8.4661 8.4138 8.3656 8.3210 8.2795 8.2409 8.20481
! 6.8 8.6494 I 8.5916 8.5386 8.4897 8.4444 8.4023 8.3632 8.32661
i 6/, 8.7758 8.7172 8.6633 8.6137 8.5678 8.5252 8.4854 8.44831
7.0 8.9022 8.8427 8.7881 8.7378 8.6912 8.6480 8 6077 8.5700 I
i 7.1 9.0285 8.9683 8.9129 8.8619 8.1847 8.7708 I 8.7300 8.69181
7.2 9.1549 9.0938 9.0377 8.9860 8.9381 8.8937 ! 8.8522 8.8135 ]
i 7.3 9.2814 9.2194 8.1625 8.1101 9.0616 9.0165 I 8.9745 8.9353 I7.4 9.4078 9.3450 9.2873 9.2342 9.1850 9.i394 9.0968 I 9.05711
i' l 7.5 9"5342 9'4706 9"4122 9"3583 i 0'3_e;5 8'2622 9'2'191 I 9'1788 I
.- _ 7.6 9.6606 9.5962 9.5370 9.._7.3 9.4320 9.3851 9.34_4 ] 9.3006 I
• 7.7 9.7871 9.7218 9.6610 [ 9.6066 9.5555 9.5080 9.4638 ] 9.42241
+_ 7.8 9.9135 9.8474 _.7867 I 9.7308 9.6790 9.6309 9.5861 I 9.5442 I
*i. 7.9 10.0400 O._30 9.9116 I 9.8549 9.8025 9.7538 9.7084 ] 9.66601
8.0 10.1_5 I 10.0987 10.0365[ .9791 9.9260 9.8767 .83(q].... .78."91
'Y" !
t
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i_ TABLE A-5.--Continued.
(d) Sample sizes 30 to 100 _ .-
: Safety Probability, Sample size, N ! "
margin, Pz _,
, S,u 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 !00
i
-5.0 0 -4.2753 -4.3596 -4.4191 -4,4640 -4.4996 -4.5286 -4.5530 -4,5738 _ : r
-4.0 0 -3,4065 -3.4757 -3.5245 -3.5613 -3.5905 -3.614_ -.;._343 -3.6514
-3,0 .0013 -2,5332 -2.5879 -2.6264 -2.6555 -2.6785 -2.6973 -2.7130 -2.7265 i! i.
-2.0 .0227 -1.6500 -1,6916 -i.7208 -1.7427 -1.7601 -1.7742 -I.7861 -1.7962 "_
-1,0 .1586 -.7411 -.77_2 -.7954 -.8121 -,8251 -.8358 -•8446 -.8522
-0 .5000 .2394 .2061 .1837 .1673 .1547 •1445 .1361 .1290
•I .5398 .3439 .3094 .2864 .2696 .2566 .2462 .2376 .2304
.2 .5792 .4496 .4138 .3901 .3727 .3594 .3487 ,3399 .3325
,3 .6179 .5565 .5193 .4946 .4767 .4629 .4519 .4428 .4352
.4 .6554 .6646 .6257 .60(O .5814 .5671 .5557 ,5464 .5385
.5 .6914 .7737 .7331 .7063 .6869 .6721 .6602 ,6505 .6424
_ .6 ,7257 .8840 .8414 .8134 .7931 .7777 .7654 ,7553 .7468
.7 ,7580 .9951 .9505 .9211 .9000 .8839 .8710 ,8605 ,8517 "!
.8 .7881 1.1072 1.0603 1.0296 1.0075 .9906 .9773 .9663 .9571
.9 .8159 1.2201 1,1708 1.1386 1.1155 1.0979 1,0839 !,0725 i,0630
1.0 .8413 1.3337 !.2820 1,2482 1.2240 1.2056 I. 191! !. 1791 I, 1692
i. 1.1 .8643 1.4480 1.3937 1,3583 1.3330 !.3138 1.2986 !.2861 1.2757
1.2 ,8849 1.5628 !.5059 !.4689 !.4424 1.4223 1.4064 !.3935 1.3826
1.3 ,9031 i,6782 i.6186 1.5799 1,5522 !,5312 1.5146 1.5011 1.4898 _ '_
1,4 .9192 1.7941 1,7317 1.6912 1.6623 i.6404 1.6231 1.6090 1.5972
1.5 .9331 !.9105 1.8452 i.8029 1•7727 !,7499 i.7319 1.7171 1.7049
1.6 .9452 2.0272 1.9590 1.9149 1.8834 1.8596 1.8408 1.8255 1.8127
i ,7 .9534 2.1442 2.073 ! 2.0271 i.q944 1.9696 !,9500 1.934 ! 1.9208
!.8 ,9640 2,2616 2.1875 2.1396 2. IU55 2.0797 2.0594 2.0428 I 2,0290
1.9 .9712 2.3793 2.3021 2,2523 2.2169 2.1901 2.1689 2.1517 I 2,13742.0 . 7 .4972 •4170 ,3652 .3284 ,30 6 .27 6 .2608 .2459
2.1 .9821 2.6154 2•5320 2,4782 2.4401 2,4112 2•3885 2.3700 2,3545
2,2 .9860 2,7337 2.6472 2.5915 2.5519 2.5220 2,4984 2,4792 2,4633
2,3 ,9892 2.8523 2,7626 2.7049 2.6639 2,6329 2.6085 2.5887 2.5721
2.4 ,9918 2.9710 2•8782 2,8184 2,7759 2,7439 2.7187 2,6982 2,6810
2.5 .9937 3.0899 2.9938 2.9320 2.8881 2.8550 2.8290 2.8078 2,7901
2.6 .9953 3.2089 3,1096 3,0457 3.0004 2.9663 2.9393 2.9174 2,8992
2,7 ,9965 3.3280 3.2255 3,1596 3. I !28 3,0776 3,0498 3,0272 3.0084
2.8 .9974 3.4473 3.3416 3,2735 3.2253 3.1889 3.1603 3,1370 3.1176
2.9 .9981 3.5667 3,4577 3,3875 3.3378 3,3004 3.2709 3.2469 3,2269
3.0 ,9986 3.6861 3.5738 3,5016 3.4505 3.4119 3,3815 3,3568 3,3362
3,1 ,9990 3.8057 3.6901 3.6158 3•5631 3,5234 3,4922 3.4668 3.4456
3,2 ,9993 3.9253 3,8064 3,7300 3.6?59 3.6351 3,6030 3.5768 3.5551
'_ 3,3 ,9995 4.0451 3,9228 3,8443 3,7887 3,7467 3,7137 3,6869 3.6646
3.4 ,9996 4.1649 4.0393 3,9586 3.9015 3.8585 3,8246 3,7970 • 3.7741
3.5 ,9997 4,2847 4.1558 4,0730 4,0144 3.9702 3,9355 3.9072 3,8837
_._ 3,6 ,9998 4.4047 4.2724 4.1874 4.1273 4.0820 4.0464 4,0174 3.9933
3,7 .9998 4,5247 4.3891 4.3019 4,2403 4,1939 4.1573 4,1276 4,1029
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TABLEA-5.--Concluded. L
(d) Concluded.
Safety Probability. Sample size,N
_; margin, P.,
;. t SAc 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 I00
3.8 0.9999 4.6447 4.5057 4.4165 4.3433 4.3057 4.2682, 4.2379 4.2126
_'_ 3.9 4.764A 4.6224 4.5310 4.4664 4.4177 4.3793 4.3482 4.3223
! 4.0 4.8849 4.7392 4.6456 4.5795 ,t.5296 4.4904 4.4585 4.4320[
*_ i 4.1 5.0051 4.8560 4.7603 4.6926 4.6416 4.6014 4.5688 4.5417
i 4.2 5.1253 4.9728 4.8749 4.8057 4.7536 4.7125 4.6792 4.6516• : .3 .24 6 5.0897 .9896 .9189 .865 .8237 .78 6 .76 2
4.4 5.3659 5.2066 5.1044 5.0321 4.9776 4.9348 4.9000 4.8710
4.5 5.4862 5.323._ 5.2191 5.1453 5.0897 5.0460 5.0104 4.9809
• 4.6 5.6066 5.4405 5.3339 5.2585 :).2018 5.b72 5.1209 5.0907
I',7 5.7270 5.5575 5.4487 5.3718 5.3139 5.2684 5.2314 5.2006
-,.8 _ 5.8474 5.6745 5.5635 5.4851 5.4260 5.3796 5.3418 5.3104
i: 4.9 1.0000 5.9679 5.7915 5.6784 5.5984 5.5882 5.4908 5.4523 5.4203 :_'
5.0 6.0883 5.9086 5.7932 5.7117 5.6503 .5.6021 5.5628 5.5.'_)2
'\.
_: 5.1 6.2088 6.0256 5.9081 5.9250 5.7625 5.7133 5.6734 5.6401
5.2 6.3294 6.1427 6.0230 5.9384 5.8747 5.8246 5.7839 5.7500
5.3 6.6499 6.2598 6.1379 6.0518 5.9869 5.9359 5.8945 5.8(_
L, 5.4 6.5705 6.3770 6.2528 6.1651 6.0991 6.0472 6.0050 5.9_9
5.5 6.6911 6.4941 6.3678 6.2785 6.2113 6.1585 6.1156 6.ff799
5.6 6.8117 6.6113 6.4828 6.3919 6.3236 6.2698 6.2262 6.1898
5.7 6.9323 6.7285 6.5977 6.5054 6.4358 6.3812 6.3368 6.2998
5.8 7.0529 6.8456 6.7127 6.6188 6.5481 6.4925 b.4474 6.4098
5.9 7.1735 6.9628 6.8277 6.7322 6.6694 6.6039 6.5580 6.5198 •
6.0 7.2942 7.0801 6.9427 6.8457 6.7727 6.7152 6.6686 6.6298
6. I 7.4149 7.1973 7.0577 6.9592 6.8850 6.8266 6.7792 6.7398
6.2 7.5356 7.3145 7.1728 7.0726 6.9973 6.9380 6.8899 6.8498
6.3 7.6563 7.4318 7.2878 7.1861 7.1096 7.0494 7.0005 6.9598 I
6.4 7.7770 7.3490 7.4029 7.2996 7.2219 7.1608 7. I ' 12 7.0699
6.5 7.8978 7.6663 7.5179 7.4131 7.3342 7.2722 7.2218 7.1799 ]
6.6 8.0185 7.7836 7.6330 7.5266 7.4466 7.3836 7.3325 7.2899 !
/
6.7 8.1393 7.9009 7.7481 7.6401 7.5589 7.4950 7.4432 7.4000
6.8 i 8.2600 8.0182 7.8632 7.7537 7.6712 7.6064 7.5538 7.5100
6.9 I 8.3808 8.1355 7.9783 7.8672 7.7836 7.7179 7.6645 7.6201
7.0 I 8.5016 8.2528 8.0934 7.9807 7.8960 7.8283 7.7752 7.7302
7. I 8.6224 8.3701 8.2085 8.0943 &0083 7.9408 7.88.59 7.8402
7.2 8.7432 8.4875 8.3236 8.2078 8.1207 8.0522 7.9966 7.9.503
7.3 8.8640 8.6048 8.4387 8.3214 8.2331 8,1637 8.1073 8.0(i04
7.4 8.9848 8.7222 8.5538 8.4349 8.3455 8.2751 8.2180 8.1705
7.5 9.1056 8.8395 8.6690 8.548,5 8.4579 8.3866 8.3287 8.2806
7.6 9.2264 8.9569 8,7841 8.6621 8.5102 8.4981 8.4394 8.3906
7.7 9.3473 9.0743 8.8992 8,7756 8.6826 8.6095 8.5502 8.5007
7.8 9.4681 9.1916 9.0144 8.8892 8.7950 8.7210 8.6609 8.6108
_[ 7.9 9.5890 9.3090 9.1296 9.0028 8.9075 8.8325 8.7716 8.7209
t 8.0 ' 9.7098 9.4264 9.2447 9.1164 9.0199 8.9440 8.8823 8.8310
1
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'i AppendixBProject Managers Guide on Product Assurance
i: ; This concise, practical appendix on product assurance (5) Prepares letters of delegation for P.,&QAfunctions andmanagementaims to convince you that reliability and quality mandatory inspectionpoints to cognizant Government inspec-t: assurance are major components of project Success. It is tion agencies._i especially useful to newly appointed project managers and (6) Review: ",devaluates R&QAplans, fabricationand testothersconcernedwith specifyingproductassuranceprovisions, inspectionprocedures, process specifications, failure reports,
It begins with a general discussion of the product assurance corrective actions, equipmenthisto_ records, andother docu-
manager and his or her roles, duties, and functions and ments relating to R&QA.
then provideq condensed descriptions, with illustrations, of (7) Monitors activities of contractor and Government
! frequently applied reliability and quality assurance re- inspection agencies to assure compliance with R&QA
quirements. NASA NHB 5300.4 and Department of Defense requirements.
;_/_ MIL-STD-785 series documents (refs. B-1 to B-I 1) cover (8) Arranges and coordinates problem investigations and
. i the same subjects, analyses with interdirectorate reliability and quality engi-
neering support groups.
(9) A_t_.ndsdirectorate and project management meetings.
Product Assurance Manager 10) Supports project design reviews and program status
meetings. '
Ro/t.--Product essurance managersin NASA Lewis' Office (1 I) Supports the project in the final acceptance of equip-
of Reliabilityand Quality Assuranceadvise thevarious project ment, when planned.
offices on R&QA matters. Their leadership is extremely
_ important during the preparation of a project plan, the
t generation of a statement of work, the review of a bidder's Economics of R&QAproposals, and the final contract negotiations. The assigned
produc:,assurancemanager is normally includedon the project Classical curves (fiR. B-1) show the relationshipof product
organization chart in a staff reporting position. A product qualitycost to operationalcost. Whenthe percentageof defects
assurance manager works closely with the project office that is low, the productqualitycost is extremelyhigh. Conversely,
he or she is supporting to develop R&QA requirements that when the percentage of defects is high, the operational cost
! are in consonance with the uniqueness of the project and that
are significantly cost effective.
! _ Rapom/bt//_s.--The productassmancc managersuppom High
* ! projects by providing technical management leadership in It Product Opem_nal /
! _ applying R&QA principles to the design, manufacture, test, I _ quaUty cost /
" _ handling, installation, andoperationofaeronautics, space,andsTD.7_$series B-I into !_____
__ ener_ projects. To accomplish this duty, he or she performs• the following functions:
(1) Formulates R&QA requirementsfor assigned projects.(2) IncorporatesappropriateNASA NHB 53004 or MIL-
i (refs. to B-II) requirements
i st tements of work. H_
i (3) Hvaluates proposals and then participates in contract 0 Qus_,_emtm_
negotiations.
(4) Serves on source evaluation boards when assigned. FigureB-I.-Relsttonthip of product quality costto operational cot.,.
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TABLE B-i.--RELIABILrrY AND QUALITYASSURANCEREQUIREMENTSIMPOSED
ON VARIOUSPROGRAMTYPES
[Compositewl,d _.t,rbineblades,C;globalairsamplingprogram,G; lii_/cruisefan,L; nmterMsforadvancedturbiJeengines, _
::. M;electricalpowe,'processor,P;quiet,clean,short-haulexperimentalengine,Q; JTgDrefanengines,R;spaceexperiments, .,.
: S; variable-cycleengine. V; 200-kWwind turbinegenerators,W.]
Requiremen, Aeronautics Space Energy
;o i
_ Study Advanced Develop- Flight Develop- Flight Develop- Opera- ,
_._ technology ment ment merit t;onal
Reliabilityprogramplan P j
Reliabilityprogramcontrol S r
i Reliabilityprogram S
i reporting
Reliabilitytraining S
_.. Suppliercontrol S i
• t
_. Reliabilityof Government- Sfurnishedpro_rty
Design_pecifications S i
Reliabilityprediction P
Pailuremodeand effects G
- analysis I _ ,
. Maintainabilityandhuman- L Sinducedfailures
:, Des:, n reviews G
Failurereportingandcor- Q R,G S
rectiveaction
Standardizationof design S
:I_Ii. practices
Partsprogram p W
Reliabilityevaluationplan S
Testing P
_" Reliabilityassessment S
_- Reliabilityinputsto S
I readinessreview
Reliabilityevaluation S
• programreviews
i Qualitystatusreporting S
Governmentaudits;quality Q R S W
:_ programaudits
Qualityprogramplan Q R W
TechnkMdocuments;quality
supporlldesignreviews M C
Changecontrol Q R,G
Identificationcontrol Q R.G S
Dam retrieval S
SourceselectLqn M Q R.G C W
Pmcurememdocuments Q R.G C
Quality assurance at source Q k W
. Receivinginspection M Q R,G S
Receivinginspectionrecords M Q R,G S
@ Supplierratingsyste,n S
Posmwardsurveys S
.-'_: Coordinatesul_plierinspec- S
lion and tests
Nonconformanceinfomm- S
lion fmdback
F_icmlonoperations Q R,G
Article andmaterialcontrol M Q R S C W
Cleanlinesscontrol C ,V
Proemscontrol Q R.( C W
i. • Worlummship,landard, M C .. I
i
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TABLE B-I .---Concluded.
Requirement Aeroneutics Space Energy . "_
Study Advanced Develop. Right Develo,,- I Right Develop- [ Opera.
technology ment ment ment ] tional
Inspection and test planning Q R "
:. h,spaction records; inspac- M Q R,G S C W
_: tion and test performance
_; Contractor quality control S
actions
Nonconformance control M Q R,G S C
Nonconformance docomen- M Q R S C
ration
Failur,: analysis and correc- M Q R,G S
live action
.. Matedal review Q R G C W
Material ,eview board Q R S
Contract as o_cer approval S _
-" Suppli,, material review S '
_ boar,* -
Inspocr on of test equipment _1
and tandards
Evale_:ion of standards and 1,._ S
[.__ test equipment
• Measurement accur=,.-y S
Calibration accuracy M S
Calibrafi-, comrol V . M Q R,G S C W
Envi onmental requireq_-ms
Remedial and preventive R S
action (calibration)
Stamp o.mtrol system Q R W :
_ Stamp restriction S
Handling and storage Q R,G S W
Preserving, marking, pack- Q R S W,C
aging, and packing
'_hipping S
,_urnpling plans R
• Statistical planning and G S
i_ ; analysis
Contractor's responsibility Q R W
for Government propeny
i UnsuitableGovernment Q R,G W
property
is extremelyhigh.The intersectionof thesecurvesgives the assurancemanageratthe beginningof eachprojectphasewhen
i _;ptimuh}goal froma cost viewpoint. R&QArequirementsmustbe formulated.
i The productassurancemanagerhas theoptimumcost goal Theproduct_ssurancemanageris qualifiedtosell the need
" j in mind when selectingthe R&QAprogramrequirements, forR&QAcontrols.Heorshehasthe properskills,training,
4 However,dteremaybe some-.dticalitems,h"roman engineer- andproject,experience_oworkoutthe variousorganizational
_i ingviewpoint,whereadditionalsafeguardsm,,stbe established, relationshipsandcantailorthe manyR&QAtasksin the NHB
' and the needforclose R&QAcontrolis mandatory.Under 5300.4 or ;vIIL-STD-785series documents(refs. B-I to
sucha conditioneconomicsisstilla majorconsideration. B-I 1)intosomethi_realistic,reasonableinscope,andeasily
.- i understood.In addition, the productassurancemanager
-"! Developmentof R&QA Requirements ultimatelyhasthe responsibilityforassuringthat the:R&QAprogramis consistentwith the projectobjectivesandthat the
i discip!incsthat havesome overlappingauthoritywith pro- example,tableB-I lists the actualrequirementsimposedon
curement,engineering, manufacturing,and te.*ting.This 10 Lewiscontracts.The particularproject phaseassociated
.i ov,-rlapproblemis lessenedatLewisby assigninga product with each contractis also identified.
177
1992023212-180
_ Parts Selection and Screening Other. factors influence parts selection and screening, such
" as the criticality of the hardware application, unusual envi-F'
_ The costs incurred during subsystem and system testing ate romnents, _r experience, and in-house resources (R&QA
: inversely proportional to the money that is spent for examining parts screening laboratory, etc.). The selection can range from
i;_" and testing the parts. Success is directly related to the part a high-reliability part (identified in a Government- or industry-
" screening costs. For example, the exceptional operational life preferred parts handbook) to an off-the-shelf commercial part
!" : of the Space Electric Rocket Test (SERT) iI satellite is no doubt (fig. B-2). Likewise, screening is a selective process as called
attributable to the extensive parts selection and screening out in the source control document. Reference B-6, paragraph
program. IF302, explains in detail how screening can be done.
I. PARTUSEDIN (ASSEMBLY,COMPONENT,ANDSYSTEM)
TP_SHITTEREQUIPHENTPACKAGE(TEP) /
i
2. LcRC REQUESTER,CONTRACTOR,ANDPROJECT 3. CONTRACTNO. (IF APPLICABLE)
TRYSystems N_S3-15839
4. DESCRIPTIONOF PART
Hybrid Driver, High Voltage, Nigh Current
!,
5- DRAWINGSPECNO. 6. ._ARTNO. 7. MFR. ANDMFR'S EQUIVALENT
COMHERCIALPARTSTYLE t i/DESIGNATION
eTJl-4145 PTk-kl kS-O II Nat iona I
DHOOOBH _.
8. PREVIOUSAPPROVAL(AGENCY) FORUSE IN ON CONTRACT
NASA Pioneer TRW
SAHSO/USAF FLTSATCOM TRW ,
9. COMPARISONBETWEENON-STANDARDPARTANDSTANDARDPART:
Standard part not available. This part selected based on previous sucGessfu"
use at TRW In similar applications.
I0. TEST DATAANDAPPLICATIONINFORMATION
Part qualified by Group B t C testing on production lot.
II. ._,!IS PARTSHOULDBE CONSIDEREDFORINCLUSIONINTO THENSPL(NlL-STD-975)
STATEREASONSFORRECOMMENDATIONREVERSLSIDE
t
12. CONTRACTORCER" FICATION
i
i I CERTIFYTHAT, TO THEBESTOF NY KNO_.EDGE,THEABOVEINFORMATIONANDDATA "'ARECORRECT.
@_ PARTSORRELIABILITY ENGINEER(SIGNATURE) DATE
PROJECTMANAGEROR CESI_,NATEDREPRESENTATIVE DATE
"-_"_--_ I_. FORLeRCUS,EONLY APPROVALS
THEPARTSBRANCH(DOES,.DOESNOT) coNcuR SIGNATURE DATE
I WITH THE USECF THIS PART
_i THIS REQUEST(IS, IS NOT) APPROVEDBY THE
. PROJECTMAI_GERORDESIGNATEDREPRESENTATIVE
PROJECTDIRECTOR(IF REQUIRED)
DIRECTOROF SYSTEMSRELIABILITY (It REQUIRED)
i FigureB-2.--Typical nonstandardpe'ls approvtl r_uu.,,I
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Identificationof Parts end Materials MaterialCertification
i
It is good _,,gineering practice to identify parts, components, There are applications in which the certification of metallic
and materialswitha partnumber,aserial number,anda date and nonmetallicmaterials is essential to assure that the i - '
i i code, as applicable.Furthermore,the markingon partsand chemicalandphysicalpropertiesof the materialsarecompat-
componentshouldbe affixedin a locationthatis easilyseen iblewiththe designrequirements.Oncea materialis selected
whenthe itemis installedon anassembly.The identification by the engineer and precisely defined by a specification
method(paint,electrochemical,etc.) andlocationon the item (Federal,Societyof AutomotiveEngineers,AmericanSociety
are includedon drawing,a specification,orotherassoci te for Testing and M te ials.etc.), the purch e order for
1 _ engineeringdocument(fig. B-3, note6). Duringthe period materialssuchas steels,aluminumalloys,brass,weldingrods,
_ of fabrication,assembly,andtestingthe systemof marking solder,metalcoatings,gases, andpottingcompoundsshould
_ and recordkeepingwill providea way of tracingbackward requirethata test report,a certificateof conformance(fig.
froman end itemto the partor material level. !]-4), or both accompanythe vendor'_shipment.In addition
m_
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specificationcalloutsin thenotesectionof thedrawings(fig. Changes in Engineering Documents
B--3). Precise informationon materials, surface finish,
processing,nondeslructivetesting,cleanliness,identification, Startingearly in thedesign phasea systemis established
packaging,specialinstructions,etc., is importantinobtaining to control changes (fig. B--5) in engineeringdocuments.
a quality )roduct. Changesin releaseddrawings,specifications,testprocedures, '
SolarArmyFailureModeand Effete Analysisof Mountingand MechanicalDeldoymentAssembly .,,
for SpaceElectricRocketTest!I
,., -. .
Component Failure Cause Effect Criticality Action Status
"" rood6
Ac_mLtor Binding Needlevalveplugged I Degradeddeployment Minor SIxingstiffnessadequacy Completed
_sannb_ andtt:4enmcesreviewed;
testscarefullyevaluated
_. Operalion Tolerancebuildup; Parlialdeployment Major WorkmanshipInspected Specified
_; isemttic O-ringdamage;
workmanship
Aotudon Slxingfailure No ck_loyment Cdtical Datai_okageswillbe Planned
stops prepared
Linkage _4olion Bindingandlookup Partialdeployment Major I_nemslicsstudydisclosed COmlde_l
:.. : (mechanismslops sourceof binding;redesigned
_- . , assembly) xemstumly Designweakness; Slowdeployment Minol Confidencetestswillverify Planned
poorworkmanship; eliminationoffailuremode
_+.. + dam.age
Pin-i_ller _Tie-rod Excessiveload; Solararraydoes Cr_ic,aJ Need studyto develop Open
is not squibfailure; notdep/oy alternativedesignwiUl
assembly released oorrosionof I_npuller; adequateredundancy
. _ jammingofcatch
_-. i
i Mechanical ABachment ExmssiveIoa3s Partialdeployment Major Coldgas etitude control Planned
_-_:' i assembly pointof solar systemto be programmed;arraysto lowmodetoavoidexcessive
orbreak.s
_:_." Hinges Workmanship Slowdeployment Minor Confidencetests Planned
Und
r: spdng Tolerancestsckup Tolerancesreviewed Completed
F
FigureB-6.--Typical failuremode and effects analysis_ I
!'
r
i: and related documents can be critical, particularly during the Use of a Process Plan
i"_ building and testing phases. For this reason the latest
i engineering data are processed early, and their distribution It is good quality assurance practice to identify in a plan
_. (fig. B-7) those manufacturing operations that must be
i i is expedited to the participating line organizations. In addition, performed in a particular sequence. The most commonly used
i i the system must provide for removing obsolete documents, processes are machining, mechanical fastening, grinding, I
ii ++++" +++++++ _ Failure Mode, Effects, and CriticalityAnalysis radiography,ultrasonics,fluorescentpenetrantinspection,The fundamentalobjectiveof a failuremode, effects, and magneticparticleinspection,painting,bonding,heattreating,criticalityanalysists to identifythe criticalfailureareas in a identificationmarking,and safetywiring.design,Inordertoaccomplishthis, eachfunctionalcomponent(or higherlevel, if adequateto attainthe intendedpurpose) Calibrationof MeasuringDevices
:_ is sequentially assumed to fail, and the broad effects of each
such failure on the operationof the system (fig. B-6) are Thecalibrationof instrumentsis necessarywherephysical
traced. More detailson this subjectare availablein MIL- quantitiesareto be measuredwithany degreeof accuracy.
STD-1629 (ref. B-12). t The instrumentsconsidered, which use standardunits ofmeasure, includetest and measuringinstruments,various
repairing,periodic(recall)maintenance,anddeterminingthe
rUse the latestdocumentthathas been issued, accuracy(adjustmentsmadeas required)of the measuring
' 182
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I devices when comparedwith known standardsfrom the NonconformingHardware
NationalInstituteof StandardsandTechnology.Figure13-8
Whenhardwareis to bebuilt,someprovisionmustbe made
shows a ,ypical certificateof calibration, for the orderly review anddispositionof all items that are
determinedby inspectionortestnotto conformtothe drawing,
specification,or workmanshir,equirements.Thesystemmost
Inspectionof HardwareItem frequentlyused comprisestwo basic methods: "
Qualitycontrol inspectorscheck in-processitemsa_inst (1) It providesforreviewanddispositionof hardwarethat
acceptablequalitystandardsand_ngineeringdocuments(fig. can be reworked into a conforming condition without an
d-9). Minor deviations _'romgood quality practices are engineeringchange,an instruction,or beth.Trad!tionally,an
normallyresolvedattheworksite;otherwisetheyarebrought engineercra productassurancemanageris authorizedtomake
to the attentionof the inspectionsupervisor.If the quality this decision.
I standardbeing violated is not containedin an ex_gineering (2) If theitemcannotbereworkedto meet the engineeringdocument,thesupervisormay reviewtheinspector'sdecision specifications,the materialreviewboardreviewstheproblem.
if therisk_areinvolved.If thediscrepancyis acharacteristic This board consists of engineering, product assurance,
definedbyan engineeringdocument,the finaldecisionis made and,whenrequired,Governmentrepresentatives.Indifficult
by materialreviewengineeringandproductassurancerepre- situationsthe board membersare not reluctant to consult
sentativesorthe materialreviewboard(engineering,p_'oduct with other organizationsand persons to arriveat the best
assurance,andGowrnment representatives), deCision.
183
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DocumentingEquipmentDiscrepancies out to assurethattheproblemdoesnotrecur.The corrective _'
action is verifiedby testing.The problemis closed by ERB
Certaincharacteristicsin adesignaredistinct,describable, review.Sometimescorrectiveactionmaychangeacomponent
andmeasurablein engineeringunits. The criticalcharacter- applicationcriterion,improveapackagingtechnique,or revise "_
istics aregenerallyidentifiedby engineeringdocumentsand a test procedure.Often the detailedphysicalandchemical
are closely controlledby qualityassurancepersonnel, examinationrevealsthatarefinementis neededinthe materials
Wheneverany characteristicis determinednotto conform usedduringthemanufacturingof apartor thatanimprovement
toreleasedengineeringrequirements,oneof the followingtwo in the pans screeningprocess is necessary. I.
reportingmethods applies:
/
(1) A minordiscrepancyis recordedin a discrepancylog Quality Assurance Recordingof Production, Inspection,
" (fig. B-10). A dispositionmustbe madeby an engineer,an and Test Operations
inspector,or bothif the conditionis a minordiscrepancy(e.g., Manufacturing,inspecting,testing,andrelatedoperations
a scratchon a metalsurfaceor excess material)thatdoesnot
on majorassembliesandsubassemblieshouldbe documented i
adverselyaffect form, fit, or functionand can be used "as forseveralreasons. Such4ocumentationcanprovidea status
is" or reworkedto engineeringrequirements, recordof the workinprogressas well as theworkcompleted.
(2) A failurediscrepancyreportis written. A disposition Also, it can become a part of the permanent record of
is obtainedthroughthe engineeringreviewboard(ERB)if a production,inspection,andtestoperations.The sophistication
mechanical,electrical,or electronicsystemor subsystemhas of the formatand the entriesin the logcan be adjustedtosuit
_ failedto performwithin the limitsof a criticalcharacteristic the type of contract--research,development,or production.identifiedby an engineering drawing, specification, ,_st Thesechronologicalentries in the logcanbe summarizedand
procedure,or relatedengineeringdocument. included in an acceptance data package, which contains
informationthat is helpful to review during a contractor's
Failure Analysis of Parts acceptanceof a supplier'sequipmentorduringfinalGovern-
Some failedpartsare analyzedandinvestigatedtodetermine ment acceptanceof a contractend item. FigureB-12 shows
thecauseof die failure(fig.B-11). Correctiveactionis worked a list used to checkan item's conformanceto specifications.
VEHICLE DISCREPANCY t.OG
v_cuE_R,_._.__._P- suos,rrcM_ =a¢cv--L-.. or-./-_
• _sr,u ,a,pog.I oucalpvaosoF=ue.a¢_ac, . uevxooor_aa[croeo, pare 1_ ]=v_p
_..._, " ....
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t
I _,,u._ I
I Initla_ reportwithin24hr !
, , "!_
I Distribution: II Assignnumberend opan file I - Projectmanager
(control) - Officeof Mildon SafetyandAssurance
.... Designengine
. Cognizantengineerfor
[ _ "" i - Safety orma.risl, end processes(cognizantengineer) - Softwareorelectricalelectronicandelectromechenicalparts
- Reliabilityend qualityconlrolWorkinggroup;Designengineer
I Take correczlve"°ti°n I - Safetyor electricaleleclronioend(designengineerorworkinggroup) eloctromechanicalparts;m_ter_alsend processes;
qualityinspectorengineer
.. Implementcorrectiveaction - Design,material,orprocesschanges
(projectmare) - Reworking,repair,or replacement
I Testorvedfycorre_ve aCion I
(testengineerortochnidansnd i
qualityinspector)
Concur I Oistribu_n:
(projectmanagerand - Projectmanager
Officeof MissionSafetyandAuumnce - Officeof MissionSafety and Anumrce
productauurlnce manager) , - Designengineer i
I °°"" 1o _ (_trol)
FigureB-! I,--Faiiure r¢port,analysis,andcorrectiveactiontlowchart.
ql
2.0 Qualityassurancechecklistforconformancetospecificationsof
CommunicationsTechnologySatellite(OT$)outputstagetube(OST) ._.
OSTS/N: 2021 Classification:....QTM-2(OF-2)
2.1 Overallefficiency _:
i ._fi_t_on: 50I_n_nt Actual:40.7percent
IminimumoverCT$bandof minimumat1_.O40GHz._' 12.038GHzto12.123GHz, QutofspectficaUon.atsaturation (Waiverequired.)
2.2 Centerfrequency
, , z_
I Specification:12.0805GHz I Actual:12.0805GH
i.
_- 2.3 RFpoweroutput
.... Specificalfon:200W Actual:170Wminimumminimumstsaturation st12.040GHz.
overG'FSbandof12.038to Outofspecification.
t_ 12.123GHz (Waiverequired)
L-- -
2.4 Smallsignalbandwidth
CTSband,12.038to 12.123GHz
[
_r
i Figure B-12.--Checklist for item conformance to specifications.
" Quality Assurance for Suppliers of Materials and Services B-3. QualityProgramprovisionsfor AeronauticalandSpaceSystem
Contractors.NHB5300.4(In), NASA,Apr.I, 1%9.
I Materials and services acquired by the user from outside B-4. Inspection System Provisionsfor AeronauticalndSpace System
_, sources must satisfy, as applicable, either contract, Govern- Materials,Parts,Components and Services.NHB5300.4(IC),
ment, or company reliability and quality assurance require- NASA, July I. 1971.
ments. The user needs a system of control that involves F,-5.Quality AssuranceProvisionsforDelegated Government Agencies.NHB 5300.4 (2B-i), NASA. June I, 1985.
(1) Selecting acceptable or qualified sources n-6. Requirementsfor SolderedElectricalConnections.NHB5300.4(3A-I), NASA.Dec. I. 1976.
(2) Performing surveys and auditsof the supplier's facilities B-7. QualifiedProductsListsRequirementsforMicrocircuits.NHB5300.4
(3) Inspecting supplier's products received (3F). NASA.June!. 1972.
(4) Taking corrective action on problems that occur B-8. Requirements forPrintedWiring Boards.NHB53(X).4(31).NASA,
May I, 1984.
B-9. Requirements for Conformal Coating and Stacking of Printed Wiring
Boards and Electronic Assemblies. NHB 5300.4 (3J). NASA.
Apr. I, 1985.
References B-10 Design Requirchzentsfor Rigid PrintedWiring Boards andAssemblies.
NHB 5300.4 (3K), NASA. Jan. 7, 1986.
B-I. ReliabilityProgramRequirementsforAeronauticalandSpaceSystent B-II. ReliabilityProgramforSystemsand EquipmentDe_'elopmentand
Contractors.NHB5300.4(IA-I), NASA,Jan.21. 1987. Production.MIL-STD-785B(pluschangenotices).Sepl.15.1980.
_ B-2. MaintainabilityProgram Requirementsfor Space Systems. NHB 5300.4 B-12. Procedures for Performing a Failure Mnde, Effects and Criticality(IE), NASA. Ma . 10, 1987. Analysis. MIL-STD-1629. Nov. 1984.
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" Appendix C
Reliability Testing Examples
A great dealof workhas beendone by variousresearchers The reliabilityfunctionR(t) is given by
todevelopprobabilisticmethodssuitableforreliabilityprob-
, lems(ref.C-l). Probabilisticmethodsthatapplydiscreteand R(t) = 1 - Q(t)
continuousrandomvariablesto userproblemsarenotas well
covered in the literature. In i_egral formR(t) is given by
This appendix concentlates on four useful functions:
(I)failuref(t),2 reliabilityR(t),(3)failurerateX,and i'" ,
(4)hazardrateX'.Becausewe usuallyneedtoknowhow R(t)= 3_p(t)dt -I
wella pointestimatehasbeendefined,someconsideration
isgiventoconfidenceintervalsforthesefunctions.The Diff_rentiatioa/_:i,ls
appendixalsoexplainsmethodsforplanningeventsatthe
criticaldeliverymilestoneandcloseswitha briefexplanation dR(t) dQ(t) -p(t)
of two reliabilitycase histories, dt = --'_ =
Useful DistributionFunctions The a posterioriprobabilityof failurep/in a given time
Thefailurefunctionf(t), whichdefinesfailuresasa function interval,tl to t2, canbe calculatedby usingtheseequations
and is given by
of timeor numberuf cycles, is importantknowledgeobtained
fromreliabilitytesting.Failurerecordsarekepton aparticular
' Is' ]piece of hardwareto obtaina histogramof failuresagainst p/= p(t) dttime. This histogramis studiedto determinewhich failure _ t
distributionfits theexistingdatabest. Oncea functionf(t)
is obtained,reliabilityanalysiscan proceed.In manycases 1 [I_ I_ ]sufficienttime is notavailableto obtain largequantitiesof = R(tt--") p(t) dt - . p(t) dt
failuredensityfunctiondata. In these cases experiencecan
be used to determinewhich failure frequencyfunctionbest Substitutingandsimplifyinggives
fitsa givenset of data.TableC-I lists seven distributions--
r: five continuousandtwo discrete.Thesedistributionscan be R(t2)
used to describe the time-to-failurefunctionsfor various pf- 1 R(tl)
:omponents.The derivationof the fourreliabilityfunctions
lot-theseven listeddistributionsi explainedin thenextsection The rateatwhichfailuresoccurinatime intervalis defined "
. (ref. C-2). as the ratioof the probabilityof failurein theintervalto the
Deflation of _t), Rft), _, and _' functions.-- The intervallength.Thus,theequationforfailurerateXis givenby _
,t unreliabdityfunctionQ(t) is theprobabilitythatin arandom i
_ trial the randomvariableis notgreaterthan t; hence, F "1
7, R{q)-R{t2)= I___[1 R(t2)l' ffi (t2 - tl)R(tt) t2 - t| - _ )J _!I :Qlt)ffi oP(t) dt *
• Su_stitutingtl ffit and t2 = t + h into this equationgives
Whentimeis thevariable,theusualrangeis 0 to t. implying
i thatthe processoperatesfor some finitetime interval.This ......
integralis usedtodefinetheunreliabilityfunctionwhenfailures _, ffiR(t) -- IcU + h) ffiR(t) -- I¢(t + t_)
•" arebeingconsidered. (t+ h - OR(t) hR(t) :.
'. 189
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i _ TABLEC-I.--FITDATA FOR FAILUREFUNCTIONS FigureC-I (pp.192and193)showsasummarycftheuseful
frequency functions for the failure distributions given in
t. Distribution Failurefit tableC-1. These functions were deriv_ by using thedefining
i _ Choose failure function and "*i Continuousdistribution equatiOnSverifythatgivenR(t),previ°usly'k,and _,' are properlyanydefined by going
! :' " Exponential Complex electrical systems through the derivationyourself. Five reliabilityproblemsusing
Normal Mechanicalsystemsubjecto wear the continuous distributio1,s given in figure C-1 are solved
WeeVil Mechanical, electromechanical, or electrical in the next section.
parts: bearings, linkages with fatigue loads,
relays, capacitors, and semiconductors. J_tl//.¢_,g the exponetlt/_ notz_ W_g_ _ .
Reducesto exponential distributionif a ,= t, and/of norms/d/..C6bu//ons.--As an illust,-aEonof how to use :
0" I. and 'v= 0 these equations for an electrical pert that experience indicates
IGamnm Combinedmechanicalndelectricalsystems will follow the exponential distribution, consider example 1:
Log normal Mechanical parts under stress future loading F_.xa_le 1: Testing of a particulartantalumcapacitorshowed
Discretedistribution that the failure density function was exponentially distributed.
For the 100 specimens tested, it was found that the mean time
poisson One.shotparts between failures t was 1000 hours.
Binomial Complex electrical systems for probability (l) What is the hazard rate?
of N!defects (2) What is the failure rate at 100 hours andduring thenext
10-hour interval?
_.-, (3) What are the failure and reliability time functions?The instanteous failur_ rate in reliability literature is o_..._:.
called the hazardrate. The hazart_rate X' is by definition the Solution l:
limit of the failure rate as h- 0. Using a pre_ious _uation
and taking the limit of the failure rate as h- 0 gives (1) Using the equations given in figure C-I for exponential
i distribution, the hazard rate is given by
lim R(t) - R(t + h) 1 1
_" = h -- 0 hR(t) _' = "- =t 1000 hours/failure
Letting h = At in this equation gives
i or
, lim I Rlt+ _t) - R(t) X' = Ix 10-3failurelhot,r
=At-O-R- _
i (2) The failure rate is given by
The term in brackets is recognized from the calculus to be / ,_
the derivation of R(t) with respect to time, and the negative ), = 1 _! e-t:nof this derivation is equal to p (t). Substituti g se v lues h _ |/ 1
gives
For this cas_ the time interval is given by
' [-("i ,(') ]j= = t2- =11o- leo- 1oho,rs
, : T',. necessary reliabil!_y functions a_ g_ve_ by I
¢_ As an example consider a jet airplane traveling _rom
Cleveland to Miami. This distance is about 1500 miles and • =_/_ = e -tt°_t°°° = e -°''t = 0.896 ,
could be covered in about2.5 hours. The average rateof speed 1
: would be 1500 miles divided by 2,5 hours, or 600 miles per and i
hour. The inst_,Jmeous speed amy have variedanywhere from
"i 0 to 700 ,r..i_esper hour. Theairspeed at any given instantcould e -_,# = e - too/10oo= e-°' l_ 0.905 ]
bc determined by reading the speed indicator in the cockpit.
! Replacing the distance continuum by failures, failure rate is Substituting these values gives
, analogous to average speed,600milesperhour in this eumpl¢,
0.896
:_i""-t andindicatorhaZardreadingrateis analogoUSinthis example.t°instantaneous speed, the spe_gl _ - _-_ 1 - -i × I0-' fa',iure_hour
t
1.q.q209.0,'219_1aq
]Thisis tobe expectedfortheexlxmentialcasebecausethe Therefore,usingthedatafromtableC-2, I
failure rate is constant with time and always equal to the !
hazard rate. _-: 750 000 : 75 000 hours I
(3) The failure and reliability time functions are given by 10 i'.I|
. I e-"'m° The unbiased standarddeviation • is given by
C-I formedumicalpartssubjecto wearusingthenormal a =
dimibtaioa, consider example 2: n - I "
F.xampb 2: A gimbel actuatoris being used where friction,
• mwJmkalIoedins,sad_ aretheprind_ failure-
;. i causingsumses.Assumethattests to failurehave been Thesumtermsrequiredforthiscalculationaregi-,enby
; coadmedunthemechanicalperu,resultingine_edatashown
!_-_ intableC-2. n
_" _ t_ = 57 213 (lOs hours)2 (column 3, table C-2)
(1) Wire is tbe mum time be/ween failuns end the stasxlard l
! deviati_? /=i
, (2) hatsm the hazard rateat 85 300 hours ml the failure and
' (57 213 ;._ 250),a (__),a
, o= = " 10300houri .
"_=l_'/f. I.
n (2) The hazard rate _' is given by
where Scaled ordinate at 85 300 hours
t" meantime bemoen falI.res, hours X' = Normal area from 85 300hours to m
t/ timeto failure,hours
n numberofobserva_ons Let Y_bethenormal ordinate m 85 300 hours and Z_bethe
standardized normal variable, which is given by
TABLE C-2.--TBST DATA FOR
omnAu.AcruAcoJu r - _- (85300- 75 000)hours
Z! s_--
' Onk_ Timeto Timeto o 10 300 hours
i
uunl_ failure. _luret_,._,_. Existing tables for the normal ordinatevalues for Z = 1.0 •.
num_ t_ (10_hr)2 fpves" Y; = 0.242. The scale constant K. to modify thishr
• ordinatevalueforthisproblemis givenby (ref. C-3)
"" i 60x103 _
2 _ 427J
3 6S 4624 f,=--
,_ _. 4 "tO 4900 o
s vs s6_s
6 75 _S whore# is the classinterval. Substitutingvaluesandmlvinll
7 m ¢,,0o forY,_vm
8 IB 6089 10 x 1 failure,s
9 SS 7225 ¥, =l(tl) = X,Y; = x 0.242
tO 90 St00 10 300 hours
II
Total ?_OxlOs 57213
•- = 2.35 × 10-4 rxiluro/hour
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_; Notethatthedenommatorequiredto calculateX mR(tn) , (3) Theconstantsrecmredtownte expressionsforp(t) and !: _
! whichis the normalareafrom85 300 hoursto oo. Existing R(t) arecalculatedas follows: _ , ]
: tablesforthenormalareaforZn= 1.0 (ref.C-3) givethearea , "_,
:- i. from -oo to Zi, so thatthe unreliabilityQ(to) is given by 1 = 3.87×10_ s :
_" _ Q(t n) =0.841 x (Area from -_o toZn) 0(2_ ,nr'2 (1.03×104)x2.52
] BecauseQ(tl) + R(tl) -- 1.000, 202= 2 x (1.03)<1Ot'2 = 2.12x 10s ;t
_ R(tt) = 1.000--0,841 = 0.159 Usingthe constantsandsubstitutingvalues gives
p_
the hazardrateis givenby p(t) = 3.87 x 10-5. •- o-7.sx to,)2rz.t2xto, _, _/_and
'; 2.35 X10-4 failure/hour
_ , X = = 1.47× lO-S failure/hour
_ _ 1.59x 10-n As an illustrationfor the Weibulldistribution,consider
_.. example3:
_; : The failurerate is given by E.ran_le3: A lotof I00 steppingmotorswas testedto see
_ " i what_eir reliabilityfunctionswere.Apowersupplyfurnished
if: I k = _ I - R--_t)J numberof continuous tepsa motor madebefore it failed to ,:::
i= stepeventhoughn pulsewasprovided.All testingwasstupped '!i_!_
at 1x 10_steps. The stepfailuredataaregivenin tableC-3.
: _ ln thiscaseh is givenas I0 300hours.Thereliabilityat95 600 (1) Calculatethe frequencyfunctions.
I__ I hoursis given by (2) Plot the hazardrate functionon log,log paper, tR(h) = Normalarea from95 600 hoursto oo 3 Whatconclusionscan be drawnfrom this graph? t
i Solution3: Becausethere are 100motorsinthis lot, the data
- Using the precedingprocedureresultsin give orderedplottingpositionssuitableforplottingon Weibull
probabilitypaper.FigureC-2 showsa plotof thesedata. From
i R(t2) = 0.023 the shapeof the data in figureC-2 it appearsas thoughtwo
straightlinesarenecessaryto fitthis failuredensityfunction.
! Substitutingvalues gives Thismeansthatdifferentfrequencyfunctionsexistatdifferent
times.These frequencyfunctionsare saidto be separatedby ,
i_ a partitionparameter_.1 (1 0.023_ 8.56 x 10-t From figure C-2 the Weibull scale, shape, and location i
!, X= 10300hours \ -_"9) = 1.03X I0' Panuneterscanbeestimatedbyf°ll°wingthestel_slistedhere:[ _..
i (1) Estimatethe partitionmrameter_. This estimatecan I
I = 8.31 x 10-s failure/hour beobtaineddirectlyfromfigureC-2. The two straightlines '
I _ TABLEC-3.--WEDULLDATAFORSTEPPINGMOTORS
Numberof Cumulativenumber Median[ S-Percent[ 9$.Pereen,
' ntepto of failures nmk l rank [ ran'.
_ failure Problem3 Problem9 SctI_ametofailure,_ F
0,2X103 2 I 6.10 0,51 25.89 i
:", : .4 4 2 16,23 3.68 39.42
:.-- .9 _ 3 25.86 S.73 50,69
4.0 16 4 35.$1 I$.00 60,66
i- 10,0 20 $ 45.17 22.24 69,6518,0 50 6 .54,83 30.35 77,76
30.9 90 7 64.49 39,34 85,00 [50,0 97 8 74.14 49.30 91.27 t
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Figure C-2.--Weibull plot forsteppingmotors.
that best fit the givendata intersectat point f. Projectingthis Byusingthe parametersjust estimatedandthe equationsgiven
pointdownto theabscissagivesa failureageof 10 000cycles in figureC-I fortheWeibulldistribution,the followingfailure
for the partitionparameter& frequencyfunctionscanbe expressed:Thepartitionlimitson
(2) Estimatethe locationparameter7. This parameteris the number of steps c are 0 < c < 10 and c > 10. The
usedas a straightenerforp (t). Becausep (t - 0) is already frequencyfunctionsaregiven by
a straightline for both regions,it is clear that 3'1= 3'2= 0.
Ingeneral,severaltriesat straighteningmay be requiredbefore f( c) = _-(c - 3')B- Ie - (c- _)n,_
the one yieldinga straightline forp(t - 3")is found. ¢x
(3) Estimatethe shapingparameter/_.The interceptpoint
a forlineb, drawnparallelto linec andpassingthroughpoint Substitutingvalues resultsin
d, where ln(t - 3') = I is equalto/_. Thus, _l = 0.75 and
02 = 1.50. 0.75 cO.TS_le_(_/is.7)o.,,(4) Estimatethe scale parameter¢x.At pointe for line c, J_(c) =
1
In¢ = -In In or
:- ' ]- {2(t)
eI sothat
' [ ___1 ] _(c)=O'047c-°'2Se-c°"'s"f°rOsc<lO
""'---"il ot= exp -In In ! - Q(t) Similarly,t
t
•" i Therefore, _(c) ,, 0.015c°'Se-c'"_*® for c > 10
t
i at - e2'7s= 15.7 The reliabilityfunctionsare given by
e4"e 100 R(c) = e -(c-_'°
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Therefore, substituting values gives Useful corollary equations are :
R, (t) = e-¢_"" for 0 < c _ 10 10_ = y ' •.,
- " and x=logY i ""
100 = 1 : ""
R2(t)= e-c's''m forc > I0 i '
(: : and !"i:
The failureatefunctionsaregivenby log0.047= log4.7xi0-2= log4.7+ (-2)logI0 ;
= [.672,or 8.672- IO
1[ 1 ee-(C_-"'"°'].j >"":': 7,= _ - _(¢,_._,_,,o,| Forc = I
- _ log _{ =log 0.047 + (-0.25) log 1 :J-.
Therefore, substituting values gives ),[ = 0.047
i: For t=10 I _i!il •- (c21°'7_'
j forO<c<lo logX/=logO.047+fO.2S)logm=[.672-0.25=.422!:"
X{ = 0.0264 /
1 [1 e-(c,),.**®] In a similar manner solving for _,_ gives the data points [
_2 -- h L - _j for c > 10 shown in table C--4. These data are plotted in figure C-3. _
$
The hazard rate functions are given by TABLEC-4.--HAZARDRATEDATA FOR
STEPPINGMOTORS
X' _ -t)B-_: - (c - Numberof; Failures "
c_ steps, percycle,
c k'
Therefore, substitutingvaluesgives I xto3 0.04"/
10 .026
k{ = 0.047 c -°,25 for 0 _ ¢ < 10 I0 .01510o .150
and
M = 0.015 c°'s for c > 10 (3) Figure C-3 indicates that the hazardrate is decreasing
by 0.25 daring the first interval an0 increasing by 0.50 during
e the second interval for eachlogarithmicunit changeof c. It
(2) By using two-cycle log-log paper and the following appears that stepmotors, for first misses, jump from the
calculation method, a graphof k' against c can be obtained: "infant mortality" stage into the wearout stage without any
transitionperiod of randomfailures with a constant failure rate
X{ - 0.047 c -°'is (ref. C-4).
/, As an illustration of combined mechanical and electrical
Taking logarithms to the base 10 gives systemsthatfollow thegammadistribution,mmider example4:
i Examp/¢ 4: Envirotmamtldtesting of 10 electric rocketswith
associatedpowerconditioninghasresulted in the ordered
.:'i log X_- log 0.047 + (-0.25) log c to-failure dam given in table C-5.
196
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.2 where
.1 _ ithscaled time to failure
.oil
.oeq tso rough estimate of 80-percent failure time
i _ .04 ti ithtime to failure, hours
__ _]! Table C-5 gives _ for each ordered sample.
,t .0a (5) Plot on lineargraph paper(10 x 10 to the inch) median
_-r, rank against scaled time to failure ti. Figure C-5 shows the[+.
_; .ol I , I ,,,,Jl t , ! f,,,,I plotted data points for this problem.
a 4 s s 10 _o 4o eo 10ox103 (6) These dat_ poims fit the gamma curve well with a
Numberofsteps_ cyrus es:imate of 2.0; hence, it appears as though a two-parameter
Figure C-3.--Hazardrateplot for steppingmotors, garlma distribution is required with the location parameter3'
equal to zero. The nonzero location parametercase is covered
_i in _e literature (ref. C-5).
_:i (7) Overlay the linear axis (10 spaces to the inch) of a sheet
TABLEC-5.--ELECTRICROCKET ' offive-cyclesemilogpapercorrespondingtoa_ of2.0.Plot
- ; RELIABILITYDATA on this special graph paper the linear scale rankagainst time-t
:: , to-failure data given in table C-5.0 _lered Timeto Median Scaled Linear
_ _i s tmple failure, rank timeto scale (8) Fit a straight line through the plottedpoints. Figure C-6
, n_Imber tp failure rank shows the plot for these data. Two additional straight lines :
: hr _ are shown in this figure. Line 1 was obtained by plotting two
_..! Scaled time to failure, t:i known points (0.5,1) and (20,8) (ref. C-5). Line 2 has one
_ , I 1037.8 6.70 7.2 5.0 point at (0.5,1) with a slope m. If line 1 were coincident with
_-i 2 1814.4 16.23 12.6 15.0 line 2, the/_ estimate would be sufficiently accurate.
_c. 3 2332.8 25.86 16.3 25.0 (9) Because the two lines are not coincident, a closer
4 3124.8 35.51 21.7 35.o approximation for/_ is obtained by taking a new midpoint
! 5 3614.4 45.71 25.1 45.o coordinate estimate of 6.8 from figure C-6. Using existing
i 67 45579.2342.464.4954'837.31"8165.055"° charts gives _8= 2.25, which satisfies the slope criteria "_
i 8 6292.8 74.14 43.7 75.0 (ref. C-5).
i 9 7920.0 83.77 55.0 85.0 (10) For a shape parameter _ of 2.25 a linear scale rank
!_. j IO I1404.8 93.30 79.2 95.0 of 20 percent applies. Entering figure C-6 at this point on the, ordinate gives a scale parameter _ of 2400 hours.
(!) What is the mean time between failures?
(2) Write the gamma failure and the reliability functions.
(3) What is the hazard rate at 5000 hours?
(4) What is the failure rate at 5000 hours during the next 90_
lO00-hour interval?
Solution 4: The essential steps for the graphical solution of
this problem are as follows (ref. C-5):
(1) Obtain the median ranksfor each ordered position; see e0
- taule C-5. J_
(2) Plot on linear graphpaper(10 x 10 to the inch) median Jrank against time to failure for the range around 80-percent
median rank. _J l tee _'
i _ (3) Fit a straight line to the plotted points. For a median 7o
i_- I rank of 80 read the corresponding time to failure tm in hours.
' _! Figure C-4 gives a t_o of 7200 hours,(4) The time-to-failuredata are scaled by using the equation /_
e0 .... I I I
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'_ Withthese graphicalconstructionaids the solutionto the Here _'Ii
problemis readilyachieved:
(I) The meantime betweenfailuresis given by I
p4tl) -- 45 X 103) 1.25 e-SxllP/2.4xlOs l
!_ 4.5 x 107
, t'= a_ = 2.4X103 hoursx 2.25 = 5.4x 103hours _
_ Performingthe indicatedoperationsgives ! _
'! i ' (2) The gammafailureandreliabilityfunctionsaregivenby
1 _,y)#_le_(t_.y)/a p(tl) = (4"21xl04)X (1"25×10-]) = 1.17×10 -4 i_
• p4t)= 4t 4.5×107 i?
t We can0brainR(fl) eitheranalyticallyby usingthis integral
Ithasbeenshownthat"y= 0; theotherconstantsarecalculated equationor graphicallyfromfigureC-6. EnterfigureC-6 at
_-i as follows: a failureage of 5000 hours.Drawa verticalline to line 3.
Projectthe intersectionoff(t) and 5000 hoursover to the
i_ otB--'--42.4× 10312.25 linear scale rank(0.605). Using a previous identity._iii
_-: Using logarithms, log an = 2.25(!o8 2.4 + log lOS); R(tl) = I - 0.605 = 0.395
I_ii I hence,perf°rmingthe indicated°Perati°m gives log a_ -7"6l;a# = 4.25 × 10v.Th secondrequiredconstantis F(0) = I'(2.25). Using the Substitutingvalues gives
Ii i identityr(x+ 11= x!,then1"42.251= "41.25+ 11= 1.25!.
Using Sterling's formula, x! =x'e-_(2a'x) *rz. Taking
logarithmsgives k' 1"17×10-4 = 2.71×10 -4 failure/hour
= 3.95x 10-I !
!
log x! = x 1o8x + (-x) log, + (2) [log 2w+ log x] (4) Th_failurerate functionat 50O0hoursduringthe next
1000--hourintervalis given by
= (x + _/log x - 0.434x + 0.399
Io841.25_)" 1.75 log 1.25 - 0.434 × 1.25 + 0.399 - 0.026
Following the proceduregiven previouslyand substituting
Substitutingandformingthe productgives o_l'_) = (4.24 values gives
x 10_) x 1.06 = 4.5x 10v. Usingthese constantsandsubsti-
tutingvalues gives R(t_) = 1 - 0.710 = 0.290
• 1 11,2_e-_12,4 x tO_pit) =
k = ]'_1 -(1 - 0.395j0"290'_= 2.65 x 10"4 failure/hourand
I"Rltl = 4.5 _(107 _ ASan illustrationof mechanicalparts,considerexample5:
Ezamp/_5: Acableusedasguysupportsforsailexperiments
inwindtunneltestingexhibitedthe time-to-failureperfo_
(3) The hazardratefunctionat 5000 hours is given by datagiven in tableC-6.
X' .. p(fl-_) (2). Whatis the hazardrateat 5715 hours?
R(fl) (3) What is the failurerate duringthe next 3000 hours7
199
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TABLEC-6.--TESTDATAFORGUYSUPPORTS _10 a _I
Ordered Timeto Median 5-Percent 95-Percent
sample failure, rank rank rank 40 %1
. number tf. _i.
hr I _ .
, 1IOO 6.7 o.s 25.9 2o i
2 l 8_0 1612 3.7 39.4 _ _ r'
3 2 920 25.9 8.7 50.7 _ :4 4 100 35.5 15.0 60.7 _ 5 % Confidence r_ /.
5 5 715 45.2 22.2 69.7 _ 10 line"-x i __
6 8 720 54.8 30.3 77.8 .9 8 . \\ i_, ' t'
7 12000 64.5 39.3 85.08 17500 74.1 49.3 91.3 E 6 i_
9 23 900 83.3 60.6 96.3 i=
.... 10 46 020 93.3 74.I 99.5 4
_> _95 % Gonldenmline
Solution 5: 2 Point4-_
• (1) The essential steps for solving this problem are given
here: _- Point2
m=..... (a) Obtainthe median rankfor each ordered position, see
(b) Plot median rankagainsttime to failure on log-normal 2 10 SO SO 70 90 98
probability graph paper (probability times two log cycles), as Flank,;_m_ent
shown in figure C-7. RCtl) R{t2) i
(c) If a straight line can be fitted to the_ plotted points. , , ,',', , , !ii.i
the time-to-failure function is log normal. .9e .90 .70 .SO .30 .10 .02
(d) The mean time between failures is calculated by 1- Flank
t' = ln(t'), where t'-- 6970 hours as shown in figure C-7 for
a median rank of 50 percent; hence t-' = 8.84. Figure C-7.--Guy supportlife.
(e) The standard deviation is given by !"
II t/.] =t'-_-'=8"66-8"84 -0.143
n tb - in Z2 ov 1.28 =
or= 3
From the normal-curve ordinate tables
where t_ = 49 500 hoursand t' =L 1020 hours as shown in
figure C-7 for a median rank and a 1 - rank of 93.3 percent; Y_ = 0.395
hence, at, = (10.81 - 6,93)/3 = 1.28.
With these constants the expressions forp(t) and R(t) are and
written its m, :_}'2 NY_ = 10 × 0.395 = 3.09 failures
1.28
p(t) - 3.21 × 10-_ e_o. s.84):/3.2sxlo ii_
p(t') " }'2= 3.09 = 5.40X 10-4 failurelh_ur
t 5.715 × 10_
I_ e-("-"u""sXt°dt
R(t) - 3.21X 10-I _) The log-normal area from t' to infinity can be obtained
directly from figure C-7 by using the i - rank scale. Enter
(2) The log-normal ordinate required for k' c_ be calcu, the time-to-failure ordinate at 5715 hours; project over to the
_:. lated by using the standardized normal variable table as in Iog.nomud file functionf(t) and down to the I - rankabscissa
example 2. The log.normal standardized variable is given by value of 0.638. Therefore, the hazardrote k' at $7 I$hours
2oo
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is givenby T totalobservedoperatingtime, hours
X2 percentagepointsof chi-squareddistribution
5.,t0× 10-4 r numberof failures ",
_' = = 8.46× 10-4 failure/hour
6.38)<10-' I -a/2, probabilitiesthatt'will be in calculated
cd2 interval
(3) Thefailurerateduringthenext3000hoursis calculated For the 98-percentconfidencelevel requiredby this problem
by kJiowingthatR(tl) = -0.638 at a timeto failureof 5715
: hoursandobtainingR(t2) -- 0.437 fromfigareC-7 at 8715
_ hours.Therefore,the failurerate is given by a_.=0.01
_-_ 2
: _ : 1 - --- -- 1.05x 10-4 failure/hour 1 a : 0.992
and
_.• Damnlnationof confidencellmits.--Inthepreceding
sectionsstatisticalestimatesof variousparametershavebeen 2r = 30
i made.Herewe determinethemethodsfordefiningthe con-
' f-Klenceto be placedn someof theseestimates.In example1 Therefore,the chi-squareddistributionvalues are givenby
_ tantalumcapacitorswith a one-parameterexponentialdis- (a':allablefrom manyexisting tables)
_ tributionwere studied. For an exponentially distributed 2
population,additionalestimatesfollow the chi-squaredistri- Xo.m;3o 50.9
i bution.As anillustrationof how todetermineconfidencelimits 2i foran exponentiallydistributedestimate,considerexample6. Xo._;3e: 14.9
i Egample6: Onehundredtantalumcapacitorswere tested
i= for 15000 hours, duringwhich time 15 partsfailed. Substitutingvalues gives
i (1) Whatis the meantimebetween failures?
(2) Whatare the upper and lower confidence limits at U: 30 x 1000 = 2013 hours
98-percentconfidencelevel? 14.9
Solution 6: and
(1) The meantime between failuresis givenby
_ x I000
L = : 589 hoursT 15000 hours 50.9
t: - : : 1000 hours/failure i
r 15 failures
Thus, it is knownwith 98-percentconfidencethatthe limits
(2) The upper and lower confidence limits at some of the tiwe t'lie betweenapproximately590 and2010 hours. I
confidencelevel aregiven by Determiningthe ._rcentage values for the chi-squared
distributionforvaluesof • greaterthan30mayalsobe useful.
It has been shown thatwhen r _ 30,
Xp|-tan)i; (2X2)I/2= [2(2r) 1]tr_4. Z
" i
e_ and whereg is the areaunderthe normalcurve at the specified '
confidencelevel. Example7 illustrateshowthis equationis
.-"=" F "l used forconfidenceintervalcalculations.
L2r:J/, = ..-y--- _" _ 7:Thetantalumcapacitonof example6 havebeenX(_._); opmmd for5000morehours;fiveadditionalunitshavefailed.
i+:''7 _ Whatm thecon_kncelinlim ont'mthe98-pementconfidence/ p
+ where level for this additionaltesting?
i _ ,9_r/m 7.'Fortheareasunderthenormalcurvefrom- oo
U upperconfidencelimit, hours to Z equal to 0.98 and 0.02, existing area tables give
L lowerconfidencelimit, hours Z = :1:2.06tad r - 15+ $ = 20totalfailures,with2r = 40.
!
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Substituting values gives 1.64 x 10 300 _lU -- 75 000 + = 78 400 hours
25 ,r_
(0x2)Ira-- (2 x 40 - 1) I/24- 2.06
"%
and
2 2
Xo.0t:4o: 59.7, Xo.99;40: 23.4
J
Hence, L = 75 000 1.64 x 10 300 _.-71 600 hours _ :J
25 jn
40x 103 "t
U-- 23.--'-_= 1709 hours This means that90_percentof the time the mean-time-between- i
failures estimate t for 25 gimbai actuators, rather than the
40× 103 original 10, will be between 71 600 and 78 400 hours. Note
L = -- - 670 hours thatthe samplesize n has been increased to use this technique.
59.7 This reflects the usual user pressure to learn as much as
possible with the least amount of testing. Try to keep n > 25
Thus, it can be said, with 98-percent confidence that t-lies in estimatingnormalparameterswith this technique. Ifn < 25,
between appmxima:ely 670 and 1710 hours; as the test time use Student's t distribution(ref. C-6). To determine theeffects
- increases,the_ confidenceintervaldecreases, of reducing sample size on confidence intervals, rework '
In example 2 gimbai actuators that exhibited normally example 2 for the smaller sample size of 10, using Student's
distributedtime-to-failure datawere analyzed. For a normally t distribution. The upper and lower confidence limits are I
distributedpopulation,additionalmean estimates will also be given by
normal. As an illustration of how to determine confidence
• intervals for normal estimates, consider example 8.
Example 8: Twenty-five gimbal actuators have been teste4.. U -- t-+ tara ___s
T_,e mean time between failures has been calculated to be nil2
75 000 hours with a standarddeviation of 10 300 hours (see
example 2). What are the upperand lower confidence limits aad !
at a 90-percent confidence level? _"
So/udon8: The upperandlowermnfidence limitsaregiven by
L_= i-_taraS..__ :"
0 n 112g..ra,.-
where i
O
L : _- K, r2_'_ tara Student's t variable
s standard deviation
where For this problem, r : n -- 1 ---9, a :: 0.10, and tara from
t" mean time between failures, hours existing tables is 1.83. The standard deviation is given by
Eora standardized normal variable
• unl,iased standard deviation /'57 213 - 56 250'_ '/2
n number of samples s : t" _ --) -: 98201 - a probability that t will he in calculated interval
For this problem Substitutingvaluesgiveso
1 - a =0.90
_._"_ _
1.83 x 9820
a = O.I0 U = 75 000 + = 80 700 hours
10Ira
Q
m_
2 0.05 and
1.83 x 9820 +
and from existing tables for the area underthe normal curve L = 75 000 + = 69 300 hours
g_ - 1.64. _ab6titut_ values gives lOir_ ._
I 2m
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Comparingthistimeintervalwith thatcalculatedforItsample (1) Enterthe rankaxis with the first5-percentrankvalue _1
size of 25 showsthatthesmallersamplegivesItlargerinterval hittingf(t), thelog-normalife function_own in figureC-7;
of uncertainty, for orderedsample3 the 5-percentrank is 8.7. i "_
• In example 3 steppingmotors that exhibited Weibull- (2) DrawItverticalline tointerseotf(t) IttpointI asshown '
distributedtime-to-failuredatawere studied.As a graphical in figureC-7.
i' illustrationof how to determineconfidenceintervals for a (3) Draw a horizontalline to cross the corresponding
Weibull-distributedestimate, considerexample9. medianrank;fororderedsample3 the medianrankis 25.9. _ ." _
_" i F.xamp/e9: Anothergroupof steppingmotorshasbeenstep (4) The intersectionpoint(point2 in fig. C-7) of step (3) i " •
_ testedas previously_xplainedinexample3. TheWeibuHplot and the median-rankline is one point on the 95-per_,ot I _ '
_ of percentfailuresfora givenfailureage is the sameas that confidenceline. 1
givenin figureC-2. Duringthistesting,however,onlyeight (5) Repeatsteps (1) to (4) until thedesiredtime to failure [
failureshaveoccurred.Whatis tbe90-percentconfidencebend is covered;5715 hours in this case. I._ on the reliabilityestimateat 4000 cycles7 (6) The 5-percentconfidenceline is obtainedin ItsimilarSol, on 9: The data neededfor graphicalconstruotioaof manner.Enterthe rankaxis withthe95-percent-failurerank,
i the conf,,tencelineson theWeibnllplotaregivenintableC-3. 25.9, for orderedsample 1.
The stepsmcessarytocoustmottheconfidencelinesin figure (7) Drawa verticalline intersectingf(t) at point 3.C-2 areas follows: (8) Draw It horizontal line to cross the corresixmdin8
(1) Eaterthe percentfailureaxis with the first5-percent medianrank;for orde'-4 sample1 themediannmk is 6.7.
"_ rankvalue hittinllf(t); for failore2 the5-percentrankis 3.68. (9) Tbe interseotionpoint(point4 infla. C-7) of thesetwo
i (2) DrawIthorizontalline thatinterae_f(t) at point 1. lh_'s is one poJoton the 5-percentconfidenceline.• (3) ra Itverticalline to crossthecorrespondingmedian (10) Repeatsteps(6) to (9) untilthedesiredtimeto failure
rank;for failure2 the medianrankis 16.23. is covered.
(4) DrawIthorizontallineat the medianrank,16.23, for At 5715 hoursthe90-percentconfidenceintervalforf(t) is,
failure2. The intersectionpointof the line for step(3) with fromfigureC-7, 19.7 to 69.4 percent.Hence, It90-pereent
this line is one point on the 9S-percentconfidenceline. confidenceintervalforR (t) at 5715hoursis 0.803 to 0.306.
(5) Repeatsteps (1) to (4) until the desiredcycle life is Incidentally,this graphicalprocedurefor findingconfidence
I covered,4000 cycles in this case. intervalsis completelygeneralandcanbe usedon othertypes
(6) _'he5-percentconfidenceline is obtainedin It similar of life test diagrams.
mar,net. Enterthe percentfailure axis with the 95-percent F,sa_sa_n m_g tke Potnon and _ emm.--Tbe
i failurerank;25.89 for failure 1. binomialandPoisson distributionsare discretefunctionsof "
(7) Draw Ithorizontalline thatintersectsf(t) at point 3. the numberof failuresNlthatooJurratherthanofthe timet.
i (8) DrawItverticalline to crossthecorrespondingmedien The Poissondistribution(fig. C-I) is atdiscretefunction
_ rank;6.70 for failure 1. of the numberof failures.Whenthis distributionapplies, it
i (9) Draw It horizontaline at the medianrank,6.70, for is of interestto determinethe probabilitiesassociatedwitha
. _ failure1.Tbe intersectionpointof thnsetwo linesis oue point specified numberof failura in the time continuum.As tn
on the S-percentconfidenceline. illustrationfora complexelectricalcomponentthatfoUo_
(10) Repeatsteps (6) to (9) until the desiredcycle life is the Poinon distribution,considerexample !1.
covered. Example11: Teaspsce-powerspeedcontrollmwereteaed
A 90.percentconfidenceintervalforf(t ) at 4000 cycles is, duringtherotatingmlardynamicdevelopmentProaram.The
from figure C-2, 1.2 percentto 37.5 percent. Hence, a time-to-failuretest dataare given in tableC-7.90.pereeatcoaftda_intervalfofR(t) m4000cyeissis0.99S
to0.62& (1) Write the Poi_ton faiim demity and reliability
In example $ guy supportsthtt exhibitedlos-nofmally, functions.
distdbetM time-to-failuredatawere Imlyald. As It final (2) Whatis thepmbebilityof fivefailuresin 10000 h,wlt?
_d _ iihatrtlimof howto de_miue t.ea_ienceinwrvais (3) Whatis the wobability that6, 7, 8, 9, of 10 faUmm
forItloa-rornlslly-distributedesthaitte,_ exampleI0. will occur?What is the reliabilityItftorthe fifth failure?
F,mw,,/a 10:.It Im bNa dtowathat the _ mplxms of &_/_m I1:
extmlde$ exhibiteds reliabilityof 0.638st Ittimeto fnlim (I) it_ladal Ihedatasiren in tableC-7 givnsdteB¢.m
of Y/I$ hours. Comidaraow I_ pmeedmefof determinl_ time bmweenfaUurnsns
the _fideEe bendan this los-reread menme. The data
aeeded fof the _ _ of tbe 90-per_
ceafid,_ linesm the lel-mnml 8nkehof _ C-7 m to
aiso C.6. E t,
,_m lO:.The st_ aecnssm'yto _y comm_ ._= i=1 m8.59XiO4ms._gXlO) hOUlll/fl_Ute
the_ lira t_ film C-7 m t_ foUo_: N! 10
,,to3
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TABLE C-7.--_ DATA I0 "_
FOaSP_D CONTROLI_ R(N/) = _ 0"314(1'16)/
_ _ 1 j=6 j!
_.. mmpl¢ failure.
t 3 szo.o R(6) = O.K t3 J
J2 4 6/I.2
i 3 I 6T_.3 The. binomial distribution is given in figure C-I as
4 I 7010.0 dJsU'Jt_ll_ino7. Considerable work has _ dometo develop5 s 51o.2 tbe tedmiquesmilable forusingthispowerfultool(refs. C- I: 6 92._.1
7 Ioolo.o and C-3). As an iHusUation comider a _ Imrt ,,
$ it 220.5 descrH3edih example 12. _
,:, 9 tl sts.6 Eaamp/e 12: A _tot of expiodve boila is estinmmd i
to i2 :n_.4 m be 15pccm defective.duem improper Iomdiugdemity as i :
ol_=.v_byaem_radio_y.Tmal I_ 1_.3
(!) Cakulatethepmbebilityof onedefectiveunitappeming i
inaai_ qum_offour. 1
l'leece, tbePoimeefidlureden, _'fmgtioak._veaby ('2) Pl°llhemsuitingkismgram. " i -_.O) Whatis thereliabilityafterthefirst_fecO
\s._lOV with_ _ h_ _w_ _ _ b_
p(N/) '= e-#t_x Io_ distri'bedouapplies.From the given datathe per-unitnumber
N_ of effectivmq is 0.85, the per-unit numberof defectivesF :
is 0.15. the samplesizen is 4, andthe possiblenumberof {
re_ility functionis _veg.by _lurcs N/is 0, I, 2, 3, or 4. The frequencyfumqions "_
conespondingtotheseconstantsaregivenby
Io 39x 10 4!
R(N/)= E " e-,_L_vxto_ p(N/) = pN,q,-N_
j=l j! (4 - N/)!N/.
and(2) To caladate the prob_iity of five failuresin 10000
kours,treethe ratio 4
X(SI) =E 4: #q,-s
t 1.0x 104 j=Nj" (4--j)U!
---= - !.16
t 8.59x 103
One simple method for obtaining the binomial expansion
coefficients is to make use of Pascal's triangle. Pascal found
The pndatbility of five _ iu I0 000 hours is siren by that them was symmetry to the coefficient development and
explainedit as shown in lame C-8. Pascal's triangle (dashed ;
p($) = (l.16)Se -''t6 =, 2.09 x 0.314 = $.47X 10-s lines)is shown in the last column. The lower number in the f
$! 1.2x 10a !
-- "i,._l £ (;.-,_.. -BINOMIAL
Ommsy mMhodof cakubl_ lira Imm(I.16)sisas P,._vs: EXPANSIONCOBIF_CIBNTS ,
loldl.16)s=$ Io8 1.16=$(0.148)=0.740 _ Poaible RinomiM 1
nmnlm'of Ctlamim_
(i.16) s = 2.09 f_k_m meakiem
2 i t
O) TlmndimbUityfmmdm_hmCm10_hf._ilumistlmsum _ i 2 i 1
of IhemmMainl tram in thePoimm expmmion.The Poitmn 4 1',_:_'3_
:_ expuu_ in sum furm is lliv_ by S i 4_6/4 t
• q%.
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dashed triangle is obtainedby adding the two uppernumbers 0.0013 in apreviousproblem.Whatare theupperand lower
(i.e., 3 + 3 = 6). confidencelimit_on thiseslhnateat a 95-pereentconfideace
Using_-'_aeconstantsandexpandinggivesP(Nl)as level? ,.
The variation in t'canbe foundby usingfigureC-9. Enter .,
p(Nl)= q4+ 4q3p+ 6q2p2+ 4_3 +p, figureC-9on theS-_per_=ta lineatthelen-lmndendof ,:: /
the 5 interval.HereTlq = 10.5; then _ = lOt/(T!_) = "
The probabilityof one defective unit appearing in a flight 8.57× 10¢110.5: 8160 hours.Usingtheleft-landendoftbe "_m . .'
:- qtmntityof four is givenbythesecondtermin theexpansion; 4 interval gives TI_ =9.25; then h : 8.57×104/9.25 = ,'_,hence, 9530bonn.Onesimple_ma findf(S) istomefit
-_ _ C-10 (ref.C-$). TheUtratio4tofinterestare1.22,1.16,and i
4q3p = 4 {0.85 )3{0. l$) = 0.37 1.05, respective&.FortheseratioswithN! = 5 thevaluesof I. ,_
=" f(5)fromfigureC-10are0.99"7,0.._987,and0.99992, [;
Tberesultinghistogramforthisdism'butionis shownin ,_,que respectively.Becausethestar,of thelastfivetenm is desired, ]
i C-8. The probabilitythat2, 3, or 4 defectswilloccur, a_the R($) is 0.003, 0.0013 and0.0008, respectively.This means _reliabilityafterthefirstdefect,isthesumoftherenmi_ thatheprobabilityofthe5thtothe101hfailureofaspeed ....
_::= 'i terms in the binomialexpansion. This probabilitycan be controloccurringis in the interval0.0008 to 0.003 at a [___!_i
.... . : cakalated by using theequation forR(Nj_. However, it is confulem_ level of 95 percent. ii
: simplerto usethe histogramgrapkandsumthe ptr_tbilities As an illum_tion of how confidence intervalscan be
":._7- _ over Nf from2 to 4; hence, " obtainedfor a _ial distribution,cousidm"example 14.
" : _14:Tbe_ofonedefecfn_unit_
R(2) = 0.096 + 0.011 + 0.0011 = 0.108 ina flightquanftyof fourexplosiveboltshasbeencalculated
_ tobe0.37.Whataretheupperandlowerconfidencelimits __--
r'_-- _ _ explosivebolts in theirpresentformare not .,mitable on this estimateat a 90-purcentconfidencelevel? : --.
:= _ for _ _r any spacecraftbecausethe probabilityof zero If the samplesize is n, the numberof defe,.'tivesis r, and
- ' defectsis only 0.522, muchbelow the usuallydesired0.999 the confidencelevel is .y, this examplehas the following _ r_
for pyre/ethnicspacecraftdevices, constraints:n =4, r = 1, and_. = 90 perceat. Using these _
__ of__/im/a.--when anestimateis constraints,the upper U and lowerL mn_ limitscan _-
madehem discretedistributions,it is expectedthatadditional be obtaineddirectlyfrom existing tablesas U = 0.680and
; e_imatesof the same._ vail be close to the original L = 0.026. Thismeansthatwitha90-porcemconfidencelevel t-
estimate.It isdesirableto be abletodetermineupperandlower the probabilityof one defective holt appearingin a flight 1confidencelimitsat someslatedconfidencelevel fordiscrete quantityof four is in the intervalfrom 0.026 to 0.680.
! distributionestimatesjustas is done forcontinuousfunctions
' of time. The analyticalprocedurefordeterminingtheseinter- SmnpUng
i vats is simp'_l byusingspeciallypreparedtablesandgraphs.
: ! Useful tables for the binomialdistributionare given in the Pu_peseofmmpl_&,--Samplingis astatisticalmethodused
! literature(ref. C-3). whenit is notpracticaltostudythewholepopulation.There
Asan exampleof howconfidanceintervalscanbeobtained are usuallyfive basic m whysamplingis necessary:
" i forPoisson esdmates,comiderproblem 13. (1) Economy--Itusury costslessmoneytostudyasample
Problem13: The Poisson estimateof reliabilityfromthe of an itemthanthewhole population.
5th to the 10thfailure for speedcontrollerswas foundto be (2) Timeliness--Asamplec_ be studiedin less timethani
i the whole population,giving pron;ptresults.
i ,, .?5 (3) Destructivenatureof a test--Sometestsrequirethatthe
- I a_ enditemmustbeuseduptodemonslrateperformance,leaving
"" i ; nothing to use.
i ,_ _ ._o (4) Accuracy--A munplesurvey accomplisbedby well-
_. trainedrasem_ben usuallywill result in _umte andvalid
;'_I decisions.(5) Infinite population--In many analytical studies an
i _ _ "_ infinitepopulationis available.If any informationis to beusedj fordecision makinil, it must be based on a sample.
Omo:/mg • M_eb.--.Goad judgmen* must be used in
i _, * _' * 4 dmosing a sample.Subjectivemethodsof choo_injsamples[ V " . ". . " frequentiyrmultinbias,e_isanexprmsion,eitl_-comcimm
[ mumowm re.m, s, or sebconscious,f the se,luctor'spreferen_. Biase.anbe bakl
!*'_-_i__] eqp_mC-8.-_do,iv_ boltsIdmmsmm. toa'minimumby usinga nonsubje_vemethoddev_q_edjust20s
"""_ ""_'""'_"_ "__<" _" *:" " "___'_/* 1992023212-208

iNmnUerof i[ W_n,.,
!
_ _ ,99999 _ 5 6 7 8 9 10 i_
-!1
1
f
f, .° o
2
)_¢, .1.01
i" _t .11111
'_ ._t
.ooool I I 1 _ I , I,I
i .1 .2 .4 .6 I 2 4 6 8 10 20 30
"[_n8 m_o. t lF
Figure C-lO.--Poisson unw.liabili_ sum,
forthislmrpoN.Severalnonsubjectivesamplingprocedures sampleisdrawn.Afar thesecondrandomsampleis drawn,
aredescri_l here: actionis takenonthebasisof dataobtainedfromthecombi-
(1) Random npling--F,achiteminthepopulationhasan nationof bothsamples, i- -__equalandindependentchanceof beingselectedasa sample. (_ Sequmlialsampling--Randomsamplesareselec_l and
studio!oneata time.A dadsionon whetherto mkoaction l__-_.A random-digitstable, figureC--I1, hasbeendevelopedNe
to facmtauDdrawingrandommunplm.Thistablehasbeen ortocontinuesamplingis madeaftereachobservationonthe [ :_
constnte,_ tomakethe10digitsfrom0too equallylikely basisof all dataavailableat dmtselection.
toappearat anylocationin thetable.Adjaceatcolumnsof Asanillustrationof whentousevariousamplingmethods
numberscan be combinedto get various.sizedrandom considerexample15.
1.5:Describehowasampleshouldbesei_'o_dfor.umpn_.ber8.
(2) Stratifi_isampling--Similarltmmina populationm thr_ _ums:
groupedorstratified,and• nmdomsamplei8 _lemedfrom (1) lnvoice.snumberedfrom(5721to8966consecutively.
eachgroup. Arandomsamplingproca/urecouldbeusedinthiscasebwed
O) Cius_ sampling--ll_msinapopulationmpm_tfloned onthefour.-disittablegiveninfigureC-II. Usingthegiven
into¢lustm's;anda nmdomsampleIs selectedfromeach invok_numbm,martst_ _ ottheleftoolumnandproceed
clunor. " downeachcolumnselectingrandomdigitsuntilthedesired
(4) Doubleumpling-A rmtdom unpleisselected;then, samplesizeis obtained.Disreprdnumbersoutsidetheranse
depmMln8 onwhatIslearned,someactionis takenor • second of intorest. --
202
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•6433 2582 0820 1450 6606 7143 9158 5114 9491 8063
3465 7348 5774 3821 6216 2148 1221 5896 7942 9971
9601 9189 0141 1377 3467 7971 0811 830@ 0504 4606
2364 3260 1430 9505 3146 4315 9772 3447 7705 4532 j _
7304 9292 4580 8160 7144 8073 8476 1898 6661 1285 I:-/
$764 5460 6385 9045 7170 5831 4668 5333 3079 1116 f
0251 3139 4201 0878 2172 6876 4347 4288 1514 9985 J ,."2031 0819 7613 1535 1610 7491 3255 4014 3614 S599 '_.
6398 1374 1904 7490 3941 0284 5817 1630 4029 6773
0811 3930 0824 8151 3365 6685 0566 5047 8471 6166 _ *;_
5062 5023 3045 3433 6365 7310 5077 5416 _ 0822 : _]9225 3984 4659 4642 7260 1383 7625 7512 8547 7343 ,'
3100 7916 9757 0838 5307 2081 0786 2701 0102 5748 _
4508 0065 4257 6557 4638 8418 7398 9790 5074 5018 _ i
5356 7285 _ 1411 7766 3377 5023 0227 8047 1887 i _,,_
9380 1041 2094 4212 2623 2384 6422 6374 0651 8677 _: i _"
8796 9074 1913 8309 4943 9423 9143 4683 4436 8413
5000 8237 6208 6829 5325 5784 8720 5053 6347 1112 ! ""i
4255 6894 80_ 9191 5011 0452 6199 0009 8086 5170 _ . "ii
1308 9129 7113 3089 1887 0544 6415 9148 4381
7218 5939 49.'>2 5465 6648 6365 4179 9266 9600 5572 )
6854 5911 14_J5 4940 4630 4514 0942 7218 7382 2145 _. I]
4403 4263 4755 5451 8251 2652 6207 4841 3528 7665
2978 438 2206 9638 6946 7126 9039 9194 6676 4396
1072 2292 4428 4934 8183 7385 3236 7748 4488 1351 )." _
6488 6568 9530 8316 7709 9022 8041 5564 6567 5329
9263 7"/56 6300 6793 7769 3099 3606 2468 2574 5230
0357 3493 088S 4451 4313 3024 8243 4920 3523 9644 _
5372 9051 5353 6023 2811 1744 2306 7U83 4330 7277 -_ ;]6570 2866 7565 7871 9490 9050 4454 3475 5319 29728506 8251 0336 8119 1966 9115 4202 7785 5269 5941 i •4177 0092 4207 7386 9891 1149 3429 7062 4622 8415 _
8438 4892 2089 5509 2054 9024 1213 5791 2543 7863 , 1
5820 6287 7484 0339 8585 0968 3675 2440 4000 5148 !
7721 3804 9620 6184 9152 1853 8640 3601 8506 7218
_ z 4
FigureC-! I.--Randomdigitstable, i-
• i
1
" I
i (2) Printed circuit assemblies to compare the effectiveness
i ofdifferentsolderingmethods.Ifboardsareallofthesame Q(t) : l - R(tt): -_ {
! type, n cluster sampling procedure could be used here. Group I ;
i the boards by soldering methods; select x joints from each I " _
! cluster to compare the effectiveness of different soldering where ]_/i
methods. N/ desired number of time-to-failure points v L
o. (3) Residual gases in a vacuum vessel to determine the n sample sizepartial pressure of gases at vario s tank locati ns. A stratified
t, test truncation time
sampling procedure could be used in this cs__. Strati_ the I
tank near existing feedthroughs into x sections; an appropriate This equation can be used with any of the reliability functions |
• mass run could be taken from each section at various ionizer given in figure C-l. |
.-" dtsumces from the tank walls. Analysis would tell how the As an illustration of how these equations can be applied tO |
!" partial pressures varied with ionizer depth at the feedthmugh electrical pare, consider example 16, which is derived from |
locations, example 1. |
&W_k _t.--A omnpletely genend equation for _ E.gample 16: Tantalum capacitors with a failure rate of |
sample size n is given by I x l0 "_ failure/hour are to be tested to failure. In a )
208 ,
i ,
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lO00-hourtestwhatsamplesizeshouldbe usedtoget25 time- wouldyieldbiasedinformation.As anillnstradenofcompressed &'l
to-failuredatapoints? timetesting,considerexample 17.
Solution16: The tnmcatedexponentialreliabilityfunction Example17: The steppingmotorin example3 was being • ,.
_ is given by pulsedforlife testing.Howcouldthislife testbe accelerated?
The powersupplyprovidingthesteppingpulsesmayhave
i. R(tt) = e-"/toe° = 0.37 beensteppingattherateofone pulseper 10seconds,resulting
ina testtimeof 10vseconds.These motorshada frequency ' 4
Solvingthegeneralsamplesize equationforn andsubstituting responseallowingfor 10 pulsesper second. Increasingthe
values gives pulsesteppingrateupto the frequencyresponselimityields
comparabletime-to-failuredata in l0s seconds,a savingsin
time of two orders of magnitude.
n = N/ _-_25 _-39.6 (2) Advanced-stresstesting--If a device is expectedto 1
1 - R (zt) 0.63 operatein adefinedmultidimensionalstressregion,lifetesting
of this device may be acceleratedby changingthe multi-
_ " Roundingoff to the nearestwholeunit gives n = 40 pieces, dimensionalstress boundary.Usuallythechanges will be
• towardincreasedstressesbecausethis tends to reducetime il' Thismeansthat40 capacitorstestedfor lO00bours should
_- give 24 time-to-failuredata points, to failure.There are two basic reasonswhyadvancedstress
-. i, i(a) To save time _:
_ AcceleratedLife Testing (b) To see how a device performs u.der these stress
- Lifetestingtodefinethetimedurationduringwhichadevice conditions
performssatisfactorilyis an importantmeasurementinrelia- i
_. Care_Jtouldbe exercisedin changingstressboundariesto be
bility testingbecauseit is a measureof the reliabilityof a
r sure thatunrealistic onditionsleadingto wrongconclusions
_. device. The life that a device will exhibit is very much arenotimposedon thedevice. Athoroughstudyof thefailure i :J
;_. dependenton thestressesitis subjectedto. Thesamedevices mechanismshouldbe madeto ensurethatproposedchanges i 1infieldapplicationare frequentlysubjectedtodifferentstresses will not introducenew mechanismsthatare not normally .
atvaryingtimes.Itshouldbe recognizedthenthatlifetesting encountered.Ifan itemhasa certainfailuredensitydistribution
! involvesthe followingenvironmentalfactors: in theratedmultidimensionalstressregion,changingthestress !
: (1) The use stressesmay influence the device's life and boundarieshouldnotchangethefailuredensitydistribution. J
failurerate functions. Some guidelines for planningadvanced-stresstests are as
'- (2) The field stressescould be multidimensional, follows: i!
(3) In the multidimensionalstressspacethere is an inter- (a) Defme the multidimensionalstressregion foran i_em; '
_, _ dependenceamongthe stresseffects, nominalvalues shouldbe centrallylocated.
(4) Becausemostdevices oper,tte overa rangein a multi- (b) Study the failure mechanismsapplicableto this item.
: " dimensionalstressspace, life performancemay vary. (c) On the basis of guidelines (a) and (b) decide which
Testingobjects to failurem,der multidimensionalstress stresses can be advanced without changing the failure
conditionsis usuallynotpractical.Evenif itwere, if thesystem mechanisms.
wereproperlydesigned,thewaitingtime to failurewouldbe (d) Specifymultiplestressteststoestablishtrends;one point
quitelong and therefore unrealistic.It has been shownthat shouldbeon the outersurfaceofthe multidimensionalregion. !
time-to-failuredataareimportantto reliabilitytesting,andnow (e) Be sure that the specimensize at each stress level is
theyappeardifficultto obtain.Thesearesomeof the reasons adequateto identifythe failuredensityfunctionandthatithas
why manyare turningto acceleratedlife testing, such as not changedfrom level to level. ' .::
I. _ compressed-timetesting,advenced-stresstesting,oroptimum (f) Payattentionto thetypesof failuresthatoccuratvarious
i e, stress levels to be sure that new failuremechanismsarenot
life estimete_:
i (1) Compressed-timetesting--If a device is expected to being introduced.
.... _ operateonce in a giventimeperiodon a repeatedcycle, life (g) Decide whethernew techniquesbeing developedfor
I testingof this device may be acceleratedby reducingthe advanced-stresstestingapplyto this item. Severalpopular
! + operatingtimecycle. The multidimensionalstresscondition techniquesare describedhere:
:' _ i neednotbe changed.Thestressesarebeingappliedata faster (i) Sensitivity testing--Test an item at the boundary
,. rateto acceleratedevice deterioration.Careshouldbe taken stress fora giventime. If failureoccurs, reducestressby a
i not to acceleratethe repetitionrate beyond conditions that flxedamountandretestforthe sametime.lfnofallureoccurs,
l allowthedeviceto operate inaccordancewith specifications, increasestressbya fixedamountandretestforthe sametime.
f Suchaccelerationwouldmove thedevice intoa muitidimen- Repeatthisprocessuntil25 failuresoccur.This techniqu,,is_-:-i."• sionalstressregionthatdcos not existin fieldconditionsand used to defineendurencelimits for items.
_ 200 _ ,
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l_r _ (ii) l..e_t-of-N testing--Clusteritemsin groups,subject This is an optimisticestimate for the mean time between
!_ _ eachclusterto a specifiedstressfora giventime. Stopat the failures,butit certainlyis fairandreasonableto make these, firstfailurea e chstresslevel.Examinefailedit mst ensure typesof corre tions. _",,
_ _ conformanceto expected failuremechanisms.
_._i_i (iii) Progressive-stresstesting--Testan itemby starting Aeeept/Rejeet Decisions With SequentialTesting :_
_' _ at the centralregion instressspaceandlinearlyaccelerating A criticalmilestoneoccurs in productmanufacturingat [
i stresswith timeuntilfailureoccurs.Observeboththe failure deliverytime.Anethicalprodm_ris concernedaboutshipping _."
increasingstressandobserve its effect on the failurestress is concernedaboutspendingmoneyto purchaseaproductthat
magnitude.Examinefaileditems to ensure conformanceto doesnotmeetspecifications.A testmethodthatpermitseach
expectedfailure mechanics, to havean opportunityto obtaindatafordecisionmakingisAs an illustrationof advanced-stresstesting, consider required.i example18. Sequent/a/test/rag¢omtm/m_.--lf a is theproducer'srisk
i} Egample 18: A power-conditioningsupplywas beinglife andOis theconsumer'srisk,twodeliverytin_ constantsvalid I _i,_/
testedatnominalconditionswithan associatedelectricrocket, for small risks have beendefined andare givenas
r_ stresses resultedin fairly long waiting periodsto failure.
Changingthemultidimensionalstressconditionsby a factor 1 -/_
i/ of 1.25to2, whichis usuallydoneduringdevelopmenttesting, A -- _c_tended identifydesign defici ncieswith shorterwaiti g
_- periodswithoutaffectingthe failure mechanism.
(3) Optimumlife estimate--Oneremainingcalculationfor B =
1 nonreplacementfailure or time-tnmcatedlife test is the 1- ¢x { _
optimumestimateof _t_antimebetweenfailurest. Ithasbeen I { _i
shown(ref. C-I) thatt givenby the timesumdividedby the Let Pt be theprobabilitythat N! failures_will occur in time
i numberof failuresshouldbe modifiedby a censorshipfactor t for a specified minimumacceptableit, alKIlet P0 be the
anda tnmcationtimefactor.ThecensorshipfactorK is caused probability that Nf failures will occur in time t for an
i bywearuutfailures,operatorerror,manufacturingerrors,etc. arbitrarilychosenuppervalueto. Test rulesusing these four
The correctionequationfor t is given by (ref. C-I) constantshave been defined for each condition(refs. C-I
!- andC-S):
! (1) Acceptif Pt/Po _ B.
!. N! (2) Rejectif P,IPo > A.
_* tl + (n - Nf)t t (3) Continue testing if B < PIIPo < A.
I i _-ffii=l :'
i_ _ Nf - g F.z_ma_/pammaer dec/s/onma/_g.--As anillustration iof how these testingconstraintscan be implementedfor the _
exponentialdistribution,considerexample20.
I where Example 20: A purchasedquantityof I00 000 tantalum
N/ numberof failures capacitorshasbeenreceived.Negotiationspriorto placement
' of the order had establishedthat c_= _ = 0. I, t_ : I000
K censorshipfactor hours,and_0= 2000 hours andthatthe sequentialreliabilityi
As an illustrationconsiderexample 19. test shouldbe truncatedin 48 hours.
F..vample19: The tantalumcapacitortested in example I (I) Calculate,4 andB.
couldhavebeenstoppedwhenI0 capacitors(580 part-hours) (2) Writethe expressionsfor Po andPt.
¢_ outof 100hadfailedat _atestingtimeof 100hours. Whatis (3) How manyunitsshouldbe placedon test?
___ an optimisticvalue for t? (4) Plot a sequentialreliabilitycontrolgraphto facilitate
Solution19: Inspectionof the 10 failedcapacitorsshowed decision makingat each failuretime.
i thattwounitsfailedowingtomanufacturingerrors.Therofor_,
i N! = 10, g = 2, n = 100capacitors,t, = 100hours,andthe Solution 20:
sum of t_= $80 hours. Substitutingthese values into the t (1) Thedeliverytimeconsumtsareobtainedbysubstituting
-J correctionequationgives values into the definingequations.
_-=$80 + (100 - 10)100 1 - 0.1= 1197hours A = -- = 9
,i_,i 10-2 0.1
t 210 o
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[_p__ _-_,_i_ _,-_,_--_: ,
F
i B---0"--I =0.Ill t(0)m_n= 4400, NI-- 0 [_¢1
! 1 -0.1 f
tt--9.6Xl03, N/--0 I -_t
_. (2) Using binomialdistributionfrom figure C-I and t= O, NI--O
" ! substitutingvalues gives Po(Nf) andP, (Nil as , _,.
_I The remainingtwo pointsare calculatedby using the test i" '_
: t _N/e-,/20eo inequalitygivenby _ i
i! B<vWf)< A
{'t_N/e-mOOO In generaltermsthe ratiop(Sf) is given by
;',, P,(Nf) _.\1000/
4 ,,,.,,,,,
.>,(...,.,,.n-,.d.mo,.op.o...ri.,or""
Pl/Po.Usingthisconstrainta dsubstitutingforPlandPo
_.. gives Takingnaturallogarithmsoftheinequalityandsubstituting
!::-.i giv.
"o(N/) ,nB<N/ln(_) (_ _o)
- - t<lnA
I
':.! The minimumtestingtimewithoutfailuret (O)m|nis given by
Adding(l/tt - lffo)t to each te..qr.,gives
i: I 0.111 = (2)0 • -,(o)._oo
' Solving for t(0)mingives lnB+(_-l--_t<Nfln(_)<lnA+(_ 1) tto/ - _
t(0)mi n 2.20 × 2000 = 4400 unit-hours
Dividingall terms by ln(to/ti) gives
The minimumnumberof capacitorsto be life tested for 48
hours is givenby
1_1
• 4400unit-hours= 91.7 lnB + . t< N/
nmin= 48 h°urs In(_1°) L (_10)In
To ensuregood results,choosea samplesize n thatis more
than twice nmln,for this problemuse n = 200 units. The
requiredminimumtestingtime for200 unitsis given by F 1 _ _1 q
L /< InA + _ tt(O)m'n4400unit'h°vrs=22"Oh°urs"200 units In(_I In(_/J|
The testcan be stoppedand anaccept/rejectdecisionmade
at t. where tt is givenby --:
The inequalityis now in th,: formgiven by
.--J tt = 48 hours× 20 units= 9,6× l0 s unit-hours
a + bt < Nf < c + bt
(4) The tantalumcapacitorreliabilitychartis constructed
ii:': by usingfive pointsin the(Nh t) plane;threeof these points The constantsa andc for this problemforzero failuresare
havealreadybeencalculatedand aregiven by given by
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WInB -2.2 theslopeb isgivenby
a= .... 3.15,ICf=O . __I
\td - "_
b ..... -- 5×10"4 = 7.22X10-4 "'i
____o_ 0.69InA 2.2 3.18, Nf=O In "
In{_} . .
\td
Figure C. 12 shows the resulting tantalum capacitor : _
reliability chart. The tantalum capacitor acceptance reliability "
test results in an "accept," "continue to teat," or "reject" i
Because these boundary consh-aints are straight lines in the decision depending on the failure performan_, of thecapacitors I
form as a function of operating time in unit-hours as zoned in l
N/-- bt + (a or c) figure C-12.
1
t _., .+4
::i
10 I _ t
I
l
+ bt IftruncaWd )
G
6 /"" [ alonglhese
///." / lines/
4 //
totest / / Continue
(3.18,O) // tolist/
J 2 ..// J/
I //./ a + bt Aoo_t
(o.o,/" ._- _(O)mln10,4,401 _- t t 10,9.6xl0S) :}_
if- 1_.I '!
-4 I. I I I I I .... 1
0 2 4 6 8 10x10$ _+
Opera_nOtime,f,unit-hr
,i
Figure C-12.--T_ltalum capacitor reliability chirr, _;
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Bimomtalparameters decision mak_g.--For the binomial /'Rn'_
frequencyfunctionthe procedureto _¢ up a sequential In
reliabilitytestis similartothe Poissonmethodology.Because b .--- _"_
the unreliability,or numberof defectives,is givenby 1 - R InRo( 1 - R_)
foran effectivenessof R, then P,(N/) is given in binomial Rn( 1 - Ro) _"
formby ' _'_
Pn(N_= (1 -RI)IVI(R, )"-sl The inequalityequationfor these conditionsis givenby : i:_
where a + bn < Nf < c + bn
i n Ns + N! Accept/rejectchartsat deliverymilestoneswhen basedon
, Ns numberof successfultrials reliabiYitysequentialtestingmethodsprovidea rigorousmathe-
: i N! numberof failedtrials maticalmethodfordecidingwhetheror notto acceptor reject
-- _ R0, Rn chosenreliabilityvalues at some time t, R0 > Rt an orderof components.Theactualreliabilityvalueforthese
componentsis notknown,noris it wiseto considerreliability
TheratioP|(Nf)lPo(Nf) is givenby assessmentat this criticalmilestone. !.il i
Subsamp/ef dmrt.--The chief advantagesof a subsample
fchart are (1) it reducesreliabilityacceptancetestingcosts,
Pl(_) = (1 - Rt)Nf(RI )n-ICy (2) it providesfor productimprovements,(3) it determines i
Po(Nf) (1-Ro)Nf(Ro) n-sf if statisticalcontrolexists,and(4) itdeterminesthemeantime ....
to repair.
! Followingthe steps givenin example20, give fourof the Example21: A power supplyhas the following data: _i:
points in the (Nf, t) plane. (1) Acceptable reliability level, rI, 0.01 failure/hour; :
producer'sreliabilityrisk, Ra, 10 percent;specified mean
time to repair,3.0 hours
N(O)min-- ln/.\B , N/= 0 (2) Lot tolerance fractionalreliabilitydeviation,r2, 0.005
In(_) failure/hour;consumer'sreliabilityrisk, RB, 10 percentVno/
The producttestdataaregivenin tableC-9. Use figureC-13
The testcan be stoppedandan accept/rejectdecisionmade to analyzethese data; thenanswer the followingquestions:
i at the numberof test truncationtrialsNr;Nr is given by (1) What is a suitabletimesampleand rejectionnumber
i for meeting the 80-percent confidence level selected by
Nr - ttNc, Nf -- 0 management?
! (2) Whatare the subsamplesizes and rejectionnumbers?
i whereNc is the numberof unitschosenfor testing. (3) Whatare theconfidencelevels forthe variousrejection
numbers?
(4) Whatarethecontrollimitson the meantimeto repair?
n = 0, N$= 0 (5) Plot these data on a subsamplef chart.(6) What shouldbe done with the manufacturedunits?
Solution 21: Given the productdata, follow these steps:
in B
a = , N!= 0 (1) Calculatetheconfidencelevel7, the ratioof acceptable
In R0(l - Rt) reliabilitylevel to lottolerancefractiotmlreliabilitydeviation
Rl(l - R0) k, and the meantime betweenfailuresm:
t 7 = 1 - (R_ + RB)= 1 - (0.1 + 0.1) = 0.80, or 80 percent
I
./I ¢= InX , N/L. O
in -&) k= =o.oo_...ss=s
R|(l- Ro) rt 0.001
I I
m _- = -- - 1000 hours
The slope b is givenby rl 1× 10-3 .:
213 i
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TABLE C-9,--POWER SUPPLY PROBLEM DATA TABLE C-10,--SUBSAMPLE DATA
Sample Number' Reason for failure Repair t Kz ' ?i' R= Z_ &(?) ]/ '( :.
serial of time, percent ]., :
number failures hr I '':!". _ 250 0.25 0.46 0,27 0.61 I
:. "__' I I AIA-2VR3 zener shorted 1.2 500 ,SO ,63 ,185 ,89 2 | _
:ix _ I Ground wire broke 1.4 750 .75 .73 .133 1.11 2 ::
1000 i.0 38 .11 1.22 3 [" ,
_. A IA2-Q2 trapaistor shorted :'
_' . : 0 In a 250-hr test no failure occurred
, 2 0 In a 250-hr test no failur: occurred (3) Calculate g2 for each value of t _ ill tsbk.' C-10 u 'r_" _: :
:- _ 1 A3A]-C3 capacitor leaked 9.5 :
( _ 3 I A3AI-C3capacitorleaked 9.0 K 2---=--t250 = 0.25 fork = 5;m --I000hours
0 In a 250-hr test no failme occurred m 1000 :':
_--_/ 4 1 A7AI-VRI unsoldered joint .5
A3AI-C3capacitorleaked 9.$ Lookupinfigure11-1in t_erence C-3 theconfidenceleveli_i ? values shown in table C-10. Calculate Ru for each
_:._l $ 0 In a 250-hr test no failure occurred ..... confidence level. (The calculated values are shown in
_,i ...... tableC-10.)
Lookingup Z_ in a normalcurve areatable (table3 in ref, R, = 1 -....._= _1- 0.46 = 0.27
! C-3) for_, : 0.1 showsthatZa --:- 1.28. The valueof K2 2 2
whenk :, 5 and 3'= 0.80 is obtainedfrom figure 11-1 in
referenceC-3, whereK2 -- 1.05. The equationfor t is thus LookupZa foreachconfidencelevel in table3 inreference
t = m/t"2= (1000)(1.05) -- 1050hoursJ, 1000 hours. The C-3 (the valuesaretabulatedin tableC-10). Recalculatethe
rejectionnumberR for a timesampleof 1000 hoursanda rejectionnumbers& (_/) foreachsubsample(the valuesare
confidencelevel ? :: 0.80 is given by listedin tableC-10).
J
' i
&(.y)-:K2+ Z_K + 0.5
:,! &oo_o,,o>= K_+ ZOf+ 0.5
= 1.05 + (1.28) 1.025 + 0.5 = 2.86 ,w3 R2._o.4e)= 0.25 + (0.61) 0.5 + 0.5 = 1.05 - 1 '
" R_o,_)= 0.50 + (0.89) 0.71 + 0.5 = 1.63 ,m2
(2) Recalculatethesubsmnplefor3' ,=0.50 andk = 5: From
figure 11-1 in referenceC-3, K2= 0.29. Therefore, R7_o.73)= 0,75 + (1.11) 0.87 + 0.5 :*2.21 ,, 2
, t =mK 2 = (1000)(0.29) - 290 .hours- 250 hours R,ooo(o._)- 1.00 + (1.22) 1 + 0.5 = 2.72 ,, 3
' Lookingup 7-,,in table3 in referenceC-3 for (4) Find the controllimitson the meantime to repairfor
!:._ the damgiven in tableC-9.
_= I -3' =0.5 =0.2 5
i i 2 2 UCL, = _m.m = 2 x 4 × 3 = 6'88h°urs .49
i ! showsthatZ_ " -0.6_. Recalculatethe rejectionnumberas
2f_ 2x4x3
=s:'+z: +0.5  -CL,= 13.,,"1,7
! t
: - 0.29 + (0.68) 0.54 + 0.5 where/is theaveragenumberof failuresandqbdenotesmean
I,_i timeto repair.Thesecontrollimlmere shownin figureC-13
_ -1.16m I failure fortherq_proc_m.Thelowerm_ollim_tndd,_
t
214 .... .,,J(
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TABLE C-II.--POWER SUPPLYANALYZEDDATA _ _i
[San_si_. _ _.l
' Time Sample Sublmmple I_ for failure Nun_er of ] Rqmir Meantime %'
;" sample serial number fililur_ time. tor_r,
number hr hr •
L, I I I AIA2-VI_ zmmrshorted ! 1.2 --- " 4/
2 OrolmdwSr_broke I 1.4 ---
p, t-,
_ 3 AIA2-VR3 zenm'ghorted; 2 5.5, 7.3 5.1 _ •
_" AHV2-Q2 lramislor_mrled _
_ - 4 No failura ¢_curred 0 ---
! ii; 2 2 $ No failuresoccurred 0 .......
_' 6 A3AI-C3 ¢aplcilorleaked ! 9.5 ---
3 7 A3AI-C3 cafmcilorleaked I 9.0 4.6
_ " $ No failuresoccurmi 0 .....
[ 3 4 9 ATA:-Vmu_ joim t 0.5 _ ! i
!.. 10 A3AI-C3 Calmcilorleaked 1 9.5 ---
J
- - $ II No failuresoccurred 0 ...........
12 No failuresoccurred 0 ---
Tolals 8 48.9 --- )
_"" hasnoimportanceotherthanstatisticalcompletenessbecause actionworkedoutandapprovedby sinmlginecringreview
L anyvalueless than 1.79 hoursis anindicationof a better board. _! ,
)_ condition.maintenanceactivitydmnwhathasbeenspecified--ad,'.iirable (3) Duringsubsampleinterval9 to 12failures i
i_ Thecomplmedsubsamplefchartis showninfigureC-13. 12 i_
' TableC-I1 showsthetabulatedatacalcuhtedtosolvethis _ ];< R !
; problem.Duringthevariousmbsempleintervalssomeuseful i=9 ,
; conclusionscanbedrawn. /"
(1) During subsampleinterval ! to 4 failures ship serial numbers 4 and 5 after all failures have been
,. reviewed, properly closed out, and approved by the
4 engineeringreviewboard.
. Y:j_=-R t"
i,,I t
rejectserialnumber!, requestan engineeringinvestigation, References 1
andrepairandretestserialnumber1 later.
(2) Duringsubsempleinterval5 to 8 failures c-L Smmv_.t.:b,a_,_ "r_mry,n_emerita,emmice-H_J,t_J.
C-2. Barles, D.R."and F,ddim. M.F.: ReliabilityPh_ks. AVCOCorp.,
8 C-3.Cddlo, ,.R.: Raial_ty Prin_plmmidPm:ti_. M_nm-HUl, 106,1.
_. _ ,_<:R C--4. Bcrreetoni,J.N.: IPrmmtealAiP_kafiomof_heWdmlt _. ,
t-.$ Am_m Soclet_r Qudl_ Coital, Anu_ TedmimlCo_mm_ i_,
• ship mriai numbers2 and3 afterall failureshavebeen c-s. _,,_,,,c*,mUma,^,,a_msu,_y,v_,. j. u..-, m.Applimtimmhg., NY, Aul. 196,1.
__-_-.:-_ reviewed, the cause idmflfied, and appropmte corrective c_. Howl,P. O,: mmm_ Slimles. 3olin w,e_qm, t_o.
4
_ 4
_.. .
?
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Devine, J.: Ulmumnic Batm Lmcl Bondin8 Bquiprnent. RelP_ RADC- AIAA/SAE. 1969, pp, 503-521. _TR-73-27. Feb. 19"/3. (Avail. NTIS, AD--757_61.) IAm_. F.C., _ d.: Pm_mltk= of llte Binomial[_1_. Cme Imlim_
Dominllm, H.: Bk_llumul _ Fdlunein Mkmdem'oaVcs.ltepm of Teclmoio_. 1_7.
RADC*TR-73-_, AW. 19"/3.(Avail. NTIS, AD-'MI792.) I._. M.: _)_lmmSollb_m,kmqltde.Mml_ Qiddd_m_ for
_ CoWol 1_ f_r NASA SINe Fllahl hqpam. NHB _00.4 (I1=). Lodm_, R.H.: BitimMioa aml Pmdk.lm Usiql the_ bisuib_lwt.
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,":,Reliability Training Answers
i _ Chapter I Answers
_ ._ I (el, 2 (B). 3 (el, 4 (C)
" _- 2 I la (C), lb (B). 2a (C), 2b (B), 3a (C). 3b (A), 4a (13),4b (C), 5ai (B), 5aii (C),
_-" _,_ 5aiii (B), 5b (C), 6a (C), 6b (B), 7a (B), To (C), 8a (C), 8b (C), 9 (D), 10 (A),
I._. ',_ ii (B), 12 rE). 13 (C), 14 (C), 15 (D), 16 (E). 17 (D), 18 (F)
• 3 I ia (B), lb (B), Ic (C), 2a (A), 2b (C), 2c (A), 3a (B), 3b (A), 3c (B), 4 (C). 5a (B),
_. 5b (B), 6 (C), 7a (A), 7b (B), 7c (13), 7d (C), 7e (A). 8 (B), 9a (B), 9b (C), 10a (C),
10b (C), 10c (A)
'- "_ - I
_:. " 4 I la (B). Ib (B). 2a (A), 2b (A), 3 (C), 4a (B), 4b (B)
i 5 I ! (C), 2 (B), 3a (C), 3b (A), 3c (C), 4a (C), 4b (B), 4.c (A), 5a (C). 5b (A), 6a (C),
'_ 6b (C), 6c (A), 7a (B), 7b (C), 7c (C), 7d (C), 8a (A), 8b (C). 8c (B), 8d (C),
Sc (B), 8f (B)
6 I la (B). Ib (C). ic (A), 2a (C). 2b (B), 2c (A), 2d (C), 3a (B), 3b (C), 3ci (B), 3cii (A)
I
7 I I(C),2 (B),3 (D),4 (A),5 (B),6 (C),7 (B),8 (C)
i
-- _: 8 II(B),2 (A),3 (C),4a (C).4b (B),4c (F),5 (A),6a (C).6b (B),7 (A),8a{B).8b (A)
' I
i 9 I I (D), 2 (D), 3 (G), 4 (B), 5 (A), 6 (E), 7 (B), 8 (D), 9 (A), 10 (C), I1 (B), 12 (F),
., :-_ 13 (E), 14a (C), 14b (C), 15 (C), 16 (B), 17 (E), 18 (A), 19a (C), 19b (B), 19c (A)
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Thethemeof thismanualis failurephysics- thestudyof howI_Oducts,herdware,softwaure,lindsystemsfail andwhat
canbedoneaboutit.The intent is toimpartusefulinformation,to extendthe limitsof productioncapability,andtomist
inachievin_low-costreliablepx_lucts.Ina Im_a0ersensethemanualshoulddo more.It shouldunderscoretheurgent
needfor matureattitudestowardreliability.Fiveof thechapterswereorisJnallypresentedasaclassroomcourseto over
1000MartinMariettaengineersandtechnicians.Anotherfourchapter,and threeappendixeshavebe_nadded.Webesin
witha viewof reliabilityfrom theycan 1940to 2000. Chapter2 stem _ trainingmaterialwith a reviewof mathematics
: i a descriptionof what elementscontributetoproductfailures.The rdmsinin8Chalets elucidatebasicreliabilitytheory
and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate hdlures.
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